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Preface
The creation of a coherent system to ensure the cybersecurity of the Republic of
Poland was the purpose of the Act of the National Cyber Security System adopted by
the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on the 5th of July 2018. It was the first attempt to
create a comprehensive legal regulation, which assigned specific tasks and compe-
tences to its constituent entities and defined their responsibilities in order to enable
effective operation in order to detect, prevent and minimise the effects of network
incidents (such as, e.g. network attacks or failures) violating cybersecurity of the
state and its citizens.
In addition, the Act on the national cybersecurity system and the implementing
regulations accompanying it have implemented the provisions of the Directive
(EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council of the 6th July 2016
on measures for a high common level of security of network and information
systems within the Union (the NIS Directive).
The first part of the book is an introduction to cybersecurity issues.
In the main part of the publication, the authors, guided by the systematics of the
Act, discuss the role of individual entities included in the cybersecurity system, Part
II presents tasks and competences of entities responsible for ensuring cybersecurity
under the national cybersecurity system (“imperious entities”, e.g. competent author-
ities, CSIRTS), Part III describes the obligations of other entities included in the
national cybersecurity system (“participants” of the national cybersecurity system,
especially operators of essential services and digital service providers).
The last part is dedicated to cybercrime and combating this phenomenon.
In addition, the problem of collision of state actions ensuring cybersecurity,
which is often associated with the possibility of state interference in the rights of
individuals, and the right to privacy and the protection of personal data were raised.
The monograph is an attempt to comprehensively discuss the issue of ensuring
cybersecurity. Therefore, the authors are not limited to the framework created by the
Act on the national cybersecurity system, but may discuss a number of other issues.
First of all, it presents international and EU regulations in the field of cybersecurity,
issues of combating cybercrime and cyberterrorism, which are the greatest threat to
v
cybersecurity. Moreover, regulations concerning cybercrime in a few selected
European countries are presented.
The monograph is an attempt to comprehensively discuss the issue of ensuring
cybersecurity.
The authors are researchers at the War Studies University in Warsaw. A part of
them also works at the Academic Centre for Cybersecurity Policy (the think-tank
created by Ministry of National Defense).
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Historically, humans have been, and continue to be, active in environments that have
accompanied our species since its beginnings. We needed some time to discover
these environments and learn how to manage them effectively. Initially, our primary
natural environments were land and sea, but over time we also learned to fly, and
eventually started to explore the outer space. For decades no one would expect that
in addition to these three, and then four, domains, which are currently considered
traditional, there is also a fifth—cyberspace, which permeates all the other. The
discoverers of the electromagnetic field may have had an inkling that the waves they
explored could form part of a new environment. But at that time no one used the term
cyberspace, let alone being able to define it. Leaving aside the term itself, which
emerged only in the second half of the twentieth century, cyberspace has become
another area of exploration that is commonly considered to be interdisciplinary, and
which at the same time is generating many new challenges, including especially
those related to broadly defined security.
The significance of this new domain in the context of the security of both
individuals and nations has become evident as technology continued to advance,
ushering in computerisation in all its forms, and widespread access to the Internet.
This direct access to information, available thanks to the rapid development of
computer systems, is now one of the primary determinants of social and economic
growth, and often determines the success or failure of an undertaking. Access to
network services has influenced social relations and can be a tool for encouraging or
controlling specific behavioural patterns, such as political decisions. Actions taken
by various actors in cyberspace can directly produce specific economic, social, or
political outcomes. This makes cyberspace an area that affects the security of the
public and private sectors, and also that of citizens, and, by extension, of nations as a
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whole. Poland is no exception here, and it constantly articulates the importance of
cyberspace for its national security in its National Security Strategy publications.
The latest (2020) publication is no different, as its authors emphasise the role of
cyberspace and information space in the social, economic, and military aspects. In
this context, key postulates are to increase resilience to cyber risks and provide a
better protection of public, military, and private information. Other worthwhile goals
are to raise awareness and promote good practices so that citizens can protect their
information better, and to create a safe information space for the state and society to
function in. These objectives clearly show that cyberspace needs to be considered in
terms of challenges and hazards, because these are what will constitute the blueprint
for actions to ensure national security. This is also true for Poland, and it seems
useful to see how the Polish national cybersecurity policy has developed in relation
to these goals.
It is important to note that efforts to develop a comprehensive national strategy for
counteracting security risks in cyberspace have been undertaken since 2008. By
2011, seven draft documents had been developed, but those were not adopted by the
government, mainly because of poor content quality. The first strategic document on
Poland’s cybersecurity was Policy on Protecting the Cyberspace of the Republic of
Poland (2013), as adopted by resolution of the Council of Ministers. While the
document was designed to help achieve the appropriate level of security in cyber-
space, it failed to identify any risks and only described them in general terms. As a
result, the first systemic actions of government administration to identify the risks
and challenges in cyberspace are those identified in The Cybersecurity Doctrine of
the Republic of Poland (2015). That was the first document to describe the strategic
directions and a shared vision for cybersecurity in relation to public administration
units, security services, public order, and armed forces, but also the private sector
and citizens. Of course, the question remains whether it was not too late for the state
to address cyberspace security issues at the systemic level. Attacks in cyberspace,
whether aimed at the public or private sectors, have happened virtually from the start
of the computer revolution. But it was not until the cybernetic attack in 2007 on
Estonia’s critical infrastructure that many decision-makers realised that national
security could be at risk and the components that are vital for state functioning
could be paralysed. Therefore, the decision to adopt a systemic approach to cyber-
security by developing a consistent strategy, as found in The Cybersecurity Doctrine
of the Republic of Poland, was certainly sensible but belated. Its authors divided
challenges and risks into internal and external. When it comes to the former, these
are considered similar to traditional risks and challenges, and differ only in terms of
their environment and the tools that are used. This creates such categories as
cybercrime, cyber violence, cyber protests, and destructive cyber demonstrations,
which can disrupt some crucial functions within public administration and the
private sector. The cyber risks that were considered particularly important were
those related to state’s critical infrastructure relying on computer systems. As regards
internal challenges in cyberspace, special attention is given to legal loopholes and
unregulated or poorly regulated relations between the individual members of the
cybersecurity system. The authors of the Doctrine were right to note that this
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problem might be exacerbated as individual elements of national, public, or private
infrastructure become more dependent on computer systems. What seems interesting
are conclusions drawn from the analysis of external risks and challenges. It was
clearly shown that cyber conflicts and cyber crises involving national and
non-national parties, including cyberwars, are likely to happen. In other words,
cyberspace was considered among the domains which can serve as yet another
battlefield for military operations. National security can also be compromised by
cyber espionage involving foreign services and non-state parties, including terrorist
organisations. As regards to challenges, there was apparently no shared terminology
and definitions for allied cyberspace operations, which seems natural but needed
addressing, as the allied cybersecurity system was only developing.
The next step in developing our national cybersecurity policy were efforts by the
government administration to work out a cybersecurity strategy. Its first draft was
completed in 2016, and a year later we adopted The Cybersecurity Strategy of the
Republic of Poland for 2017–2022, also referred to as The National Framework of
Cybersecurity Policy. That document did not identify any specific risks or challenges
for Poland’s cyberspace security, but this was not the objective behind the Strategy.
In the context of risks, those are collectively referred to as cyber risks. The chal-
lenges that were considered crucial were
to ensure information safety across all members of the national cybersecurity system,
i.e. businesses that provide their services using communication and information systems,
as well as cyberspace users, public government authorities, and professional organisations
dealing with ICT security in the operational domain.
The Cybersecurity Strategy identifies the primary goal, “to ensure a high level of
security for the public and private sectors and for citizens in relation to providing or
using essential services and digital services”, and four sub-goals,
(a) to achieve capability for nationally coordinated action to prevent, detect, fight, and
mitigate the consequences of incidents that compromise the security of state’s critical
communication and information systems; (b) to enhance the capacity to prevent cyber
risks; (c) to develop the national cyberspace security potential and expertise; (d) to position
the Republic of Poland as a strong international player in cybersecurity.
Without going into details, it can be claimed that the Cybersecurity Strategy
addresses some major issues, as found in similar documents prepared by other
countries. Is it a complete document? Probably not, but at the time it was adopted
(2017), it served as the basis for some more advanced work, including at the legal
level, to make it a complete strategy in the future. Importantly, as the document was
approved, experts argued that it needed to be quickly implemented, which was
ultimately to translate into the development of the Act on Cybersecurity. Conse-
quently, it was only natural that in 2018 the Minister of Digital Affairs presented an
action plan referring to the National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy, a planning
document to describe in detail how to achieve the sub-goals identified in the
Cybersecurity Strategy. An important element of that document was also the divi-
sion of responsibilities between the relevant government administration authorities.
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Cybersecurity actions taken by government administration authorities ultimately
made it possible for the Sejm, the Lower House of the Polish Parliament, to adopt in
2018 the Act on the National Cybersecurity System. This was the first legal Act in
Poland to regulate this field. The goal of that regulation was to ensure cybersecurity
in relation to the provision of essential services and digital services, and to define the
rules for selecting the operators of essential services and defining their responsibil-
ities in cybersecurity matters. The Act also defined the bodies in charge of cyberse-
curity, which are responsible for supervising the operators of essential services. In
addition, the regulation describes the scope of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the
Republic of Poland. Following the above, in 2019, Poland adopted The Cybersecu-
rity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2019–2024.
The current Cybersecurity Strategy is similar to that adopted in 2017. What
makes it different from its antecedent is the new vision which is to “continuously
strengthen and develop the national cybersecurity system.” The new strategy seems
to be more mature and more specific, also in relation to its goal and implementation
details, which are “to increase resilience to cyber risks and improve the level of
information protection in the public, military, and private sectors, as well as to
promote good practices to help citizens better protect their information.” There is
also a new, important sub-goal, namely to raise awareness and social expertise
related to cybersecurity. Unfortunately, the government did not secure the funds to
implement the tasks defined in the Cybersecurity Strategy. Its provisions are to be
implemented from the budgets of individual units, and from the funds of the National
Centre for Research and Development, and EU funds.
The presented overview of how Poland’s national cybersecurity policy has
developed, and lessons learned from this demonstrate that the issues related to
cybersecurity in its broad sense can be reduced to three key areas—technology,
law and organisation, and society. These are complementary to one another and
equally important.
There is no doubt that technology is an important area in preventing cyber risks.
This is clearly articulated in the current Cybersecurity Strategy. Access to new
technologies is accelerating globalisation, which in turn is generating further tech-
nological advancements. Cyberspace is an environment in which new technologies
are crucial and determine the success of any endeavour. The transformation of
society, through the development of computer technologies, into information society
with access to cyberspace resources has produced more risks for nations and citizens.
On the one hand, modern technology has contributed to improved cybersecurity, but
on the other hand it can compromise the security of citizens and nations. Research
and development, and technological advancements in cybersecurity, should defi-
nitely be aimed at enhancing Poland’s cyberspace security. These technologies
should make it possible to detect, notify and protect us against the existing and
future risks in cyberspace, and their consequences.
The second area, law and organisation, is directly associated with legal regula-
tions on cybersecurity and with systemic solutions adopted in Poland. The national
cybersecurity system has been functioning on the basis of the Act on the National
Cybersecurity System, which also aligns Polish law with Directive 2016/1148 of the
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European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures for a high common
level of security of network and information systems across the Union, known as the
NIS Directive. The main goal of this legislation is to ensure cybersecurity at the
national level. The system relies on the operators of essential services, including
from the energy, transport, health, and banking sectors, digital service providers,
Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) at the national level, sectoral
cybersecurity teams, cybersecurity service providers, responsible cybersecurity
authorities, and single points of contact as part of the European Union cooperation
on cybersecurity. Cybersecurity, understood as the resilience of computer systems to
any action that compromises the confidentiality, integrity, availability or authenticity
of processed data, or the related services offered by those systems, requires the
appropriate organisation of the entities referred to in the Act. After the 2 years that
the national cybersecurity system has been in operation (since 2018), it is possible to
state that the undertaken actions have proven successful, and the development of a
resilient system is a continuous process. Despite many difficulties and challenges
along the way, the system has slowly become more and more methodical and
informed, even though it still requires legislation adjustments to standardise the
solutions used across the various sectors involved in its development. At the same
time, an insufficient pool of well-qualified personnel and experts on cybersecurity
requires further systemic solutions related to education and scientific research.
The social area of cybersecurity in Poland is directly associated with information
society, often referred to as cybersociety. Similarly to other countries, in Poland
society, meaning citizens, but also public organisations, is more and more dependent
on technology and network services. By using the available network solutions,
people, either consciously or unconsciously, share data about their lives, behaviour,
and interests. As a result, they are increasingly vulnerable to risks which require
“cyber awareness”. This, in turn, generates educational needs in this area related to
the fundamentals of personal safety online, safe shopping and payments, safety of
parents and children online, safe use of social media, and many more issues on which
various social groups need to be educated. This generates demand for various types
of educational services, which are expected to contribute to raising knowledge and
social awareness, and, by extension, to improving state security. Cyberspace is also
an environment where educational services can, and are, provided. This also applies
to the public sphere, which should foster appropriate values and behaviour in
cyberspace through educational activities. In the future, knowledge of technologies
that protect our life in cyberspace should be common, especially given that we are
heading towards becoming a cybersociety.
To sum up, the national cybersecurity system built in Poland plays an important
part in improving national security in general. In addition to the other four domains,
cyberspace is starting to serve a crucial role in security, which is only natural as our
society is becoming a cybersociety. Of course, many questions remain unanswered,
and not all of the challenges and risks in the area of cybersecurity can be anticipated.
Nevertheless, the actions taken by the government administration in Poland to
improve its cybersecurity system can be assessed positively.
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Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to discuss two basic concepts—cyberspace
and cybersecurity. The author describes the genesis of both and attempts to define
them. In the introduction, the author briefly addresses the issue of the progress of
information technology in recent decades and the impact of this factor on security.
Then, he indicates the source of the term “cyberspace” and presents the definitions in
American documents, doctrine and Polish law. Defining the concept of “cybersecu-
rity”, the author starts from the definition of the term “security”. Then he presents
selected definitions of this term. He also emphasizes that cybersecurity should be
viewed broadly and that a definition should be made taking into account both the
attacks by hackers or foreign forces and the “plain” failures.
1 Introduction
In April 1998, during a widely commented lecture on information security in an
increasingly digital world delivered at the Georgia Institute of Technology in
Atlanta, CIA Director George J. Tenet warned: “We are staking our future on a
resource that we have not yet learned to protect”.1 As the reality changed, the people
responsible for the security of states and citizens accurately anticipated the threats
they would soon face on an unprecedented scale. The increasing digitization and
automation of every area of life would make more and more processes without
digital support impossible with each day. An increasing part of human activity is also
moving to the web, and access to information and keeping constantly “in touch”
have become, in many spheres, the basic determinants of individual and organiza-
tional success. At the same time, the ease of access to information, as well as to the
T. Zdzikot (*)
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technologies enabling its generation and dissemination, contributes to a constant
increase in data supply.
In the past, a few centuries ago, the best university libraries had hundreds of
volumes in their book collections. Thus, reading them all did not exceed the
capabilities of a single reader. Today, hundreds of thousands of new books are
published every year. In Poland alone, more than 36 thousand titles2 were published
in 2017, while the number of books published annually in other countries often
exceeds 100 thousand. The global network aggregating knowledge, information and
access to entertainment and communication platforms is also growing rapidly. It is
estimated that every second the network grows by 30 GB of data, that is, as much as
the entire Internet3 covered 25 years ago, while the number of websites increased
from just over 17 million to one billion from 2002 to 2014.4 Every second, Internet
users carry out hundreds of thousands of operations on various social networking,
entertainment and transactional sites. According to data quoted by Edward Lucas,
the number of Internet users has exceeded 3 billion, and in “richer countries almost
all are Internet users – in the USA, 88% of Americans are online (. . .) In 2015, the
number of e-mails sent exceeded 200 billion per day. This means that more e-mails
are sent in two days than traditional letters for a year.” According to J. Surma: “The
daily average number of searches using the Google browser is around 3.5 billion.
Assuming that each search is made by a different person, almost every second person
on the planet makes one search a day! The number of Facebook users is 25% of the
world’s population. In the case of Poland, almost 70% of the population use Google
and almost 60% are Facebook users”.5 Therefore, today we receive as much
information every day as our grandparents did throughout their lives. At the same
time, the concept of the Internet of Things (IoT), in which the devices of everyday
use around us become part of a trans-boundary information exchange system, is
developing extremely intensively. It is assumed that within a few years there will
already be more than 50 billion devices permanently connected to the Internet in the
world.
At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the digital world today cannot be
regarded as an anchor of stability and security. It is also a space where organized
crime groups actively and creatively use new tools, improving new methods of
committing known crimes and creating completely new categories of crimes. At the
same time, in geopolitical and institutional terms, it is an attractive place for many
2BN: in 2017, the number of books published in Poland increased by 6%, http://www.pap.pl/
aktualnosci/news,1436634,bn-w-2017-roku-liczba-wydanych-w-polsce-ksiazek-wzrosla-o-6-proc.
html Accessed on 7 July 2020.
3Co może zdarzyć się w sekundę w Internecie? (2015). https://www.focus.pl/artykul/co-moze-
zdarzyc-sie-w-sekunde-w-internecie Accessed on 7 July 2020.
4Ile waży praca? (2017) https://www.forbes.pl/technologie/jak-wiele-danych-produkujemy-
kazdego-dnia/4mn4w69 Accessed on 7 July 2020.
5Surma (2017), p. 74; the author also states that: “Such a widespread use of Google, Facebook and
other similar companies in the global economy is of great importance for the security of individual
states and the whole world”.
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countries to pursue their political objectives, intelligence tasks or a manifestation of
power. Actions in cyberspace can also be a preparation for military operations or an
element of those already under way.
In view of the outlined changes in civilization and new challenges, the perfor-
mance of the basic tasks of a state, which include ensuring internal and external
security, requires an adequate response from the state administration today. It is
necessary to adapt to a situation in which a new field of action is cyberspace, and the
ability to ensure the digital security of citizens and to secure one’s own networks and
systems represent the fundamental elements of national security.
In the face of globalization, security in cyberspace has become one of the priority
tasks in the internal affairs of each country, while at the same time affecting
international security. Any serious disruption to the operation of cyberspace will
affect citizens’ sense of security, the security of business trading, the efficiency of
public sector institutions and, consequently, security in general. Therefore, it has
become necessary to implement legal solutions which will make it possible to
organize an effective and efficient system for protecting the information resources
of public entities, entrepreneurs and also citizens.
2 Definitions of Cyberspace
One of the areas which has been partially governed by law, and which can be
distinguished in the legal system and in the duties of public administration, is
cybersecurity, which is the subject of this monograph. Any consideration of this
subject must be preceded by defining the meaning of the terms cyberspace and
cybersecurity, taking into account the typology of possible threats.
Cyberspace is one of the many concepts discussed in this monograph, which must
be considered to be highly underdefined, eluding a uniform approach. No uniform
definition has yet been established at the national or international level that could be
considered universally accepted, although numerous attempts have been made and
are being made on the basis of legislation, programming, legal commentary and
strategic and political documents, as well as in legal commentaries and literature
(including popular literature). Even the etymology of the word cyberspace is ambig-
uous. According to the literature “it can only be said in general terms that it is a blend
(hybrid) of two words – kubernḗtēs, which in Greek means a helmsman, a governor,
to control, and the English word space”.6
The term cyberspace was first used by the American science-fiction author
William Gibson in his short story “Burning Chrome” published in the “Omni”
magazine in July 1982. Cyberspace was also mentioned in his novel
“Neuromancer”, published 2 years later, as
6Banasiński (2018), p. 23.
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a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every
nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts (. . .). A graphic representation of
data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable
complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations
of data.7
It is noteworthy that 37 years ago, several characteristic features of the digital
reality that surrounds us today were captured in this way—its global nature, the
aggregation of data from a huge number of sources, dispersed network architecture,
graphical visualization of complex source codes, light as an information carrier.
According to the Dictionary of the Polish Language, “cybeprzestrzeń” (cyber-
space) is “a virtual space in which communication between computers connected to
the Internet takes place”.8 However, this approach focuses only on one of the
dimensions of cyberspace. Many experts divide cyberspace into layers,
distinguishing between the physical network (hardware—connections and com-
puters), the logical network (software – network and service software, such as
websites), and a kind of human network (people functioning in cyberspace).9 Such
a comprehensive approach may also serve to create a definition, such as that of
Z. Trejnis and P. Trejnis, according to which “Cyberspace encompasses all infor-
mation and communication means in a collection of networks, techniques, users and
digital space, which in turn is assigned three layers: material, logical and
informational”.10
The US Department of Defense, while unifying military terminology, has also
introduced a definition of cyberspace as
a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers.11
Compared with the aforementioned division of cyberspace into three layers, it can
be noted that this US military definition seems to ignore the human aspect—
participants and users of cyberspace—and to focus solely on the infrastructural
and logical aspects.
Interestingly, a uniform definition of cyberspace was not adopted by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization until 2019. According to the NATO Glossary of Terms
and Definitions, cyberspace is “The global domain consisting of all interconnected
communication, information technology and other electronic systems, networks and
7Gibson (2009), p. 59; New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1989; after: https://techterms.com/
definition/cyberspace, accessed on 3.10.2020.
8https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/cyberprzestrze%C5%84.html Accessed on 3.10.2020.
9For example, Crowther Alexander (2018), pp. 83–84 https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/
2017-09/2018_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_CROWTHER.pdf Accessed on 3.10.2020.
10Trejnis and Trejnis (2017), p. 27 http://bobolanum.pl/images/studia-bobolanum/2017/03/StBob_
2017_3_Trejnis.pdf Accessed on 3.10.2020.
11Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2010) (Joint Publication
1-02), p. 58 https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf Accessed on 10.10.2020.
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their data, including those which are separated or independent, which process, store
or transmit data.”12
In Poland, threats associated with cyberspace have already been mentioned in the
“National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland” of 2007, but without precise
terminological specification.13
The first official definition of cyberspace was contained in the assumptions for the
“Government Cyberspace Protection Programme of the Republic of Poland for the
years 2009-2011”, for the purpose of which it is understood as “a communication
space created by a system of Internet connections”.14 An attempt was also made to
distinguish the category of state and, specifically, Polish cyberspace by stating that
State cyberspace is understood to be the communication space created by the system of all
Internet connections within the state. In the case of Poland, state cyberspace is also referred
to as the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland. The cyberspace of the Republic of Poland
comprises, among others, information and communication systems, networks and services
of particular importance to the internal security of the state, the banking system, as well as
systems ensuring the functioning in the country of transport, communications, energy, water
and gas infrastructure and healthcare information systems, the destruction or damage of
which may pose a threat to human life or health, the national heritage and the environment
on a significant scale or cause serious material losses.15
In the “Government Cyberspace Protection Programme of the Republic of Poland
for the years 2011-2016” prepared by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration
in June 2010, the definition of cyberspace was developed. The document states that it
is “digital space for the processing and exchange of information created by infor-
mation and communication systems and networks, including the links between them
and relations with the users”.16 The cyberspace of the Republic of Poland, on the
other hand, was closely linked to the territory by indicating that it is “cyberspace
within the territory of the Republic of Poland and in locations outside the territory
12NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-06 Edition 2018 https://nso.nato.int/nso/
ZPUBLIC/_BRANCHINFO/TERMINOLOGY_PUBLIC/NON-CLASSIFIED%20NATO%
20GLOSSARIES/AAP-6.PDF Accessed on 3.10.2020.
13As part of the outlined challenges and threats to security, it was pointed out that one of them “may
be the impact in cyberspace, directed at the information and communication systems and networks
of critical infrastructure. Such actions may result in both material losses and the paralysis of
important spheres of public life.” National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland p. 10.
However, one of the objectives of economic security was to continue the development of “a
modern, integrated electronic communication structure that would be resistant to failures and
potential cybercrime attacks. This will require proper interaction between relevant ministries and
agencies as well as private actors”, p. 19, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/dokumenty/SBN_RP.pdf,
Accessed on 3.10.2020.
14https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/93e1e4c7-e129-41c7-8365-39dbad8b1c54:JCR, p. 4, accessed
on 3.10.2020.
15Ibidem.
16Government Cyberspace Protection Programme of the Republic of Poland for the years
2011–2016.
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where representatives of the Republic of Poland operate (diplomatic posts, military
contingents)”.17
The Act of 30 August 2011 amending the Act on Martial Law and the Powers of
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Rules for Their Subordination
to the Constitutional Authorities of the Republic of Poland and certain other Acts18
had a significant impact on the establishment of the concept of cyberspace in the
Polish legal system. As stated in the justification of the Presidential bill, the basic aim
of the regulation was
to take into account threats resulting from activities and events in cyberspace as a circum-
stance complying with the normative content of the reasons for the introduction of one of the
states of emergency referred to in Articles 229, 230 and 232 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland.19
The legal definition established for the purposes of the amendment, setting out
cyberspace as
space for the processing and exchange of information created by information and commu-
nication systems, as defined in Article 3(3) of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the
Computerization of the Operations of Entities Performing Public Tasks including the links
between them and relations with the users,
by virtue of the amending act in question, was added to the provisions of:
1. the Act of 29 August 2002 on Martial Law and the Powers of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces and the Rules for Their Subordination to the Consti-
tutional Authorities of the Republic of Poland—where actions in cyberspace were
also included as one of the reasons for the introduction of martial law by the
President of the Republic of Poland, at the request of the Council of Ministers, on
part or all of the territory of the country;
2. the Act of 21 June 2002 on the State of Emergency—actions in cyberspace that
pose a threat to the constitutional system of the state, security of citizens or public
order may constitute a basis for the Council of Ministers to adopt a resolution to
submit a request to the President of the Republic of Poland to introduce a state of
emergency;
3. the Act of 18 April 2002 on Natural Disasters—indicating at the same time that a
natural disaster or technical failure may also be caused by events in cyberspace.
17Government Cyberspace Protection Programme . . . ., p. 6
18Act of 30 August 2011 amending the Act on Martial Law and the Competences of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Rules for Their Subordination to the Constitu-
tional Authorities of the Republic of Poland and certain other Acts, Polish Journal of Laws of 2011,
No. 222, item 1323.
1 9 Pa r l i amen t a ry pape r No . 4355 . h t t p : / / o rka . s e jm .gov .p l /Druk i6ka .n s f / 0 /
0C7D2B7644A7B3C5C12578BD00339405/$file/4355.pdf, accessed on 3.10.2020.
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The definition developed for the purpose of introducing to the aforementioned
acts on emergency states, referring directly to their content,20 was transferred to the
“Government Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland”, prepared in
June 2013 by the Ministry of Administration and Digitization and the Internal
Security Agency. The definition of the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland is
basically a repetition of the one established on the basis of the discussed “Govern-
ment Cyberspace Protection Programme of the Republic of Poland for the years
2011-2016.”
An extensive definition of cyberspace is included in the “Cybersecurity Doctrine
of the Republic of Poland” of 2015, according to which it is
a space for the processing and exchange of information created by information and com-
munication systems (groups of cooperating IT equipment and software that ensure the
processing, storage, as well as sending and receiving of data through telecommunications
networks by means of telecommunications terminal equipment appropriate for a given type
of network and intended to be connected directly or indirectly to network terminations),
including the links between them and relations with the users.21
Despite the lack of a single common definition of cyberspace, a number of
common features have been identified:
1. a seamless, flexible and non-material nature;
2. lack of clearly and unambiguously identifiable boundaries;
3. decentralization;
4. lack of a centre of control and supervision over it as a whole;
5. universal accessibility;
6. digital information processing and calculations in real time with high accuracy;
7. numerical, hypertext, interactive and virtual nature.22
A number of common features of cyberspace are also noticed by the Supreme
Audit Office, which, in its information on the results of the audit on the “Implemen-
tation of tasks in the field of protection of the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland
20The full definition is as follows:
space for the processing and exchange of information created by information and commu-
nication systems, as defined in Article 3(3) of the Act of 17th February 2005 on
computerisation of the activities of entities performing public tasks (consolidated text Polish
Journal of Laws of 2020, item 346, as amended), including the links between them and
relations with the users; pursuant to Article 2(1b) of the Act of 29th of August 2002 on
Martial Law and the Competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the
rules for their subordination to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Poland
(consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1932, as amended), Article 2
(1a) of the Act of 21st of June 2002 on the state of emergency (consolidated text Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1928, as amended) and Article 3(1)(4) of the Act of 18th April
2002 on the state of natural disaster (consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item
1897, as amended).
21Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland (2015) https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/
DCB.pdf, accessed on 3.10.2020.
22Kasprzyk et al. (2015), p. 529.
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by state entities”, also attempted to formulate a specific definition, perceiving
cyberspace as “a virtual area created inside and within the range of influence of IT
and telecommunications equipment”,23 whose common features include global
reach, easy access, efficiency, universality and relative “cheapness”.
In its electronic glossary related to information society, the European Commis-
sion has proposed a definition of cyberspace that emphasizes the hardware and
software layers, but excludes the user sphere. In this sense, cyberspace is the “virtual
space in which the electronic data of worldwide PCs circulate”.24
On the basis of legal commentaries and literature, an interesting definition of
cyberspace has been provided by M. Lakomy, who, summing up his multi-faceted
considerations on the understanding of the concept, finally concludes that, in
practice, cyberspace is
a domain for the processing, storage and transmission of information in digital form, based
on the transmission of digital signals and electromagnetic radiation. It is an immaterial space
in its essence, but one that functions through the ICT infrastructure that produces and
transmits these signals.25
The author stresses that this domain is created by “every bit of data stored,
processed and transmitted in computers and computer networks, and all other
elements that make up the ICT infrastructure in the broad sense”.26 Importantly,
M. Lakomy also emphasizes that computers and other devices that are not currently
connected to the global network should not be overlooked in this context, because
even though they are not connected, these devices
can perform important functions from the perspective of the interests of individuals, busi-
nesses or entire societies and countries: they control machines, help with calculations,
support education and development, and therefore have a significant impact on the func-
tioning of various areas of human life.27
In addition, isolation from cyberspace can be temporary, impermanent and
illusory, and computers can communicate with other devices even when they remain
offline, for example using various types of physical data carriers.
C. Banasiński very rightly connects the individual layers (spheres) of cyberspace,
noting that it consists of both tooling and the social component. Of course, this
author also states that “The basic factor that makes up cyberspace is the material
information and communication system, which is a set of cooperating ICT equip-
ment and software ensuring the processing, storage, as well as sending and receiving
of data by telecommunications networks by means of telecommunications terminal
equipment appropriate for a given type of network.28 C. Banasiński notes, however,
23https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/P/14/043/, accessed on 3.10.2020.
24After Wasilewski (2013), p. 229.
25Lakomy (2015), p. 83.
26Lakomy (2015), p. 83.
27Lakomy (2015), p. 83.
28Banasiński (2018), p. 25.
16 T. Zdzikot
that the focus on the infrastructural and logical sphere (which he collectively calls the
instrumental sphere) leads to the omission or marginalization of the
social component of cyberspace, which refers to cyber users, and which treats cyberspace as
a complex environment resulting from the immaterial interaction between people, software
and services on the Internet provided through technical devices and networks connected to it;
an equally important, integral and interconnected element with the technical infrastructure is
its relationship with people and the interaction between people related to its use.29
Other authors also draw attention to the need for a comprehensive approach to
cyberspace, not only as an infrastructure domain. According to R. Tadeusiewicz,
cyberspace is
a set of hardware and software tools related to the techniques of collecting, processing,
transmitting and sharing information, used by people to acquire knowledge and to commu-
nicate with other people. The most important, but not the only, component of cyberspace
today is the Internet.30
Similar conclusions are also drawn by J. Rzucidło and J. Węgrzyn, who stated
that the notion of cyberspace “certainly includes at least a specific type of infra-
structure and processes that take place in it, or includes people and the relationships
that exist between them through this infrastructure, as well as between them and this
infrastructure”.31
Legal commentators also draw attention to the legal difficulties, both international
and national, associated with the nature and essence of cyberspace as a cross-border,
immaterial creation, with an unlimited number of users.32
3 Definitions of Cybersecurity
In the theory of security studies, it is assumed that the concept of security (from the
Latin sine cura—“without concern”) is interpreted primarily as a state of peace,
safety and no threat.33 At the same time, however, “security” should also be
understood as a process, thus emphasizing that security and its organization are
constantly changing, and therefore cannot be considered to be permanently
established and organized.34 In this sense, security means “the continuous activity
of individuals, local communities, states or international organizations in creating
29Banasiński (2018), p. 26.
30Tadeusiewicz (2010), p. 32.
31Rzucidło and Węgrzyn (2015), p. 144.
32Wrona (2015), p. 872.
33Ściborek et al. (2015), p. 26.
34Marczak (2011), p. 15.
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the desired state of security”.35 Cybersecurity can also be defined both by reference
to the desired state and as a continuous process leading to it.
Closer to the first interpretation is the legal definition introduced by the Act of
5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System,36 which gives priority to the term
“resilience”. According to Article 2(4) of this Act, cybersecurity is therefore “the
ability of information systems to resist any action that compromises the confidenti-
ality, integrity, availability and authenticity of processed data or the related services
offered by those systems”. This term is based on the definition of “security of
network and information systems” in Directive 2016/1148,37 taking into account
the evolution of certain concepts (e.g. information system).
The strategic document adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2017, entitled the
National Cybersecurity Policy Framework of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022,
associates cybersecurity with the security of network and information systems and
ICT security, using them interchangeably and treating them as synonyms. However,
the interpretation set out in the document is consistent with the definition mentioned
above, introduced into the legal framework by the provisions of the Act on the
National Cybersecurity System, and focusses on the ability of
information and communication systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action
that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or
transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by, or accessible via, those
network and information systems.
The definition established at the Community level in the Digital Single Market
Glossary leads to an emphasis on action and processes aimed at ensuring cyberse-
curity. According to it, cybersecurity
commonly refers to the safeguards and actions available to protect the cyber domain, both in
the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm
its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cybersecurity strives to preserve
the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the
information contained therein. The term cybersecurity also covers prevention and law
enforcement measures to fight cybercrime.38
35Marczak (2011), p. 15.
36Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System (Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item
1369, as amended, hereinafter “NCSA”).
37Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems
across the Union (OJ EU 2016 L 194/1) For the purposes of the provisions of the Directive,
“security of network and information systems” means the ability of network and information
systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability,
authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related
services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems.
38Digital Single market Glossary, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/glossary, accessed on
3.10.2020;
18 T. Zdzikot
According to C. Banasiński, cybersecurity can be reduced to “an undisturbed way
of collecting, processing and exchanging information recorded and processed
digitally”.39
The explicit process-oriented understanding of cybersecurity indicates that it is
not about an existing or desired state, but “a process which consists of actions taken
by technical and non-technical means to protect cyberspace, including hardware,
software and information or data”.40 This dynamic approach to cybersecurity (spe-
cifically the cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland) was also adopted in the already
mentioned Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland, stating that it is
a process of ensuring the safe functioning in cyberspace of the state as a whole, its structures,
natural persons and legal entities, including entrepreneurs and other entities without a legal
personality, as well as the information and communication systems and information
resources at their disposal in global cyberspace.41
The community-created definition in the Cybrary glossary is also process-
oriented, according to which cybersecurity are “the processes employed to safeguard
and secure assets used to carry information of an organization from being stolen or
attacked”.42 At the same time, the definition also stresses that cybersecurity requires
broad knowledge of the possible threats, such as viruses or other malicious objects,
and that identity management, risk management and incident management are the
crux of cybersecurity strategies of an organization.
A comprehensive understanding of the term cybersecurity is proposed in the
dictionary of the US Department of Homeland Security, according to which it should
be defined strictly as the activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby
information and communications systems and the information contained therein are
protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification,
or exploitation. An extended definition is also available, referring to strategy, policy,
and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encom-
passes the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence,
39Banasiński (2018), p. 33.
40Wasiuta et al. (2018), p. 223.
41https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/DCB.pdf Interestingly, the document distinguishes between
the cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland and the security of the cyberspace of the Republic of
Poland as “a part of state cybersecurity comprising a set of organisational and legal, technical,
physical and educational projects aimed at ensuring the undisturbed functioning of the cyberspace
of the Republic of Poland with the public and private critical information and communication
infrastructure that constitutes its component and the security of information resources processed
therein.” Accessed on 3.10.2020.
42Full quote:
Cyber Security are the processes employed to safeguard and secure assets used to carry
information of an organization from being stolen or attacked. It requires extensive knowl-
edge of the possible threats such as Virus or such other malicious objects. Identity manage-
ment, risk management and incident management form the crux of cyber security strategies
of an organization.
https://www.cybrary.it/glossary/c-the-glossary/cyber-security/ accessed on 3.10.2020.
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international engagement, incident response, resilience, and recovery policies and
activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law
enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the
security and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure.43
Among the numerous typologies, the one proposed byM. Lakomy, who, from the
point of view of national security, has divided threats into structured and unstruc-
tured ones, is particularly noteworthy. The former are characterized by a high degree
of organization of their sources, technical sophistication and, from the point of view
of the attacker, domination of political, military, religious and economic motiva-
tions, and these include cyberterrorism, cyber espionage and military operations in
cyberspace. Unstructured threats, on the other hand, are characterized by a low level
of organization, generally posing a lesser threat to national security, with the
dominance of political, social and individual motivations. According to the author,
they include hacking, hacktivism, “patriotic hacktivism”, and cybercrime in the strict
sense.44
The threats to cybersecurity can also be divided by:
– subject: criminals, terrorists, state entities,
– motivation: the intention to obtain profit, to exert political pressure, to obtain
information, to gain military advantage, a form of a joke, the desire to become
known in a particular environment, to gain popularity or publicity,
– modus operandi: immediate or long-term action, action with publicity or
concealed action”.45
In my opinion, it is appropriate to define cybersecurity also through the prism of
threats that hinder the achievement of the desired state and are a challenge to
ongoing processes.
It can be assumed that, in the broad sense, cybersecurity will be threatened by
failures, accidents and, finally, attacks. Of course, failures and accidents will most
often be strictly dependent on technical conditions, or, for example, an unintentional
human error or, in general, random events. This is not the case for attacks which are
deliberate in nature.
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Cyberspace as an Area of Legal Regulation
Katarzyna Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
Abstract The rapid development of the Internet, which rose to prominence at the
turn of the twenty-first century, is one of the most significant technological break-
throughs in human history. Cyberspace has now become the environment for the
functioning of modern society, particularly the young generation. Under the influ-
ence of globalisation, computerisation and digitisation, human activity began to
penetrate the virtual world. This shift has contributed to raising the standard and
quality of life of citizens, increasing the productivity of entrepreneurs and the
efficiency of the state. However, the changes have resulted in society’s increasing
dependence on cyberspace and created the need to protect the public against
potential attacks. Specifying the definition of cyberspace security was required in
the course of developing the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland.
The dynamic civilisational changes which have been observed in the last few years
have arisen from a rapid growth in information and supporting ICT technologies.
The information revolution and the evolution of the information society, which
affect every sphere of human activity, are undoubtedly two of the major trends
shaping the contemporary information environment. Access to new technologies,
and the fact that they are so commonly used by the public, have created a need for
distinguishing another dimension of physical reality, namely cyberspace. The con-
vergence of information and communications technologies and the media, which has
been intensifying for at least a quarter of a century, and, in consequence, the
convergence of the info-, socio- and techno-spheres, has contributed to the emer-
gence of a global, timeless cyberspace, not defined by either geographical or political
borders.
The development of the Internet, the worldwide computer network, towards the
end of the twentieth Century, was one of the most significant technological
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breakthroughs in the history of humanity. At first it was used exclusively in scientific
research; as time went by, and as the tools making it easier to use the Internet were
developed, it became a key and fundamental element in the functioning of individ-
uals in all spheres of life.1 Falling in the Cold War period, the 1960s marked the
beginning of the computer network. In that period, a communications system was
created in the United States, which gave rise to the ARPANET network (Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network), considered to be the first prototype of the
Internet. The combination of information and telecommunications technologies
ushered in a new era of global communication. By the end of the 1990s, the growth
of the Internet had made many spheres of life which were based on computer
technology dependent on the net. It became a tool whereby people could enrich
their knowledge, a source of information, and an integration point.2 The domain
underwent rapid commercialisation and development. New services sprang into
existence—websites, social networks, electronic mail, forums, blogs, search
engines, instant messaging, multimedia streaming, to name a few. The expansion
of the physical infrastructure of the global network has resulted in a steady growth in
the number of Internet users. As the information society continues to develop rapidly
commensurately with the expansion of the reach of the Internet, other areas of
human activity extend into cyberspace. Instant access to the Internet from almost
every place on Earth, and its worldwide reach, in connection with low usage fees,
have made more and more entities (governments, institutions and businesses) and
individuals move large parts of their daily activities to the virtual network.3
Cyberspace has become a domain which pertains to many areas of human life.
Although still considered a “novum”, the term was first used in the 1980s by
W. Gibson, who described it as follows:
A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every
nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts [. . .]. A graphical representation of
data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable
complexity. . . Lines of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations
of data.4
Gibson pointed out some characteristic features of the environment: unlimited
time and space, virtuality, complexity, and the collation of all resources in one huge
database.5 Visualisation, in Gibson’s words “a graphical representation”, has
become characteristic of a trend called cyberpunk.6
1Ciekanowski and Wojciechowska-Filipek (2016), p. 91.
2Ciekanowski and Wojciechowska-Filipek (2016), p. 14.
3M. Grzelak, K. Liedel, Bezpieczeństwo w cyberprzestrzeni. Zagrożenia i wyzwania dla Polski –
z a r y s p r o b l e m u . h t t p s : / / w ww . b b n . g o v . p l / d o w n l o a d / 1 / 1 1 4 6 9 / s t r 1 2 5 -
139MichalGrzelakKrzysztofLiedel.pdf (accessed on 01.10.2020).
4Gibson (2009), Katowice, p. 59.
5Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 69.
6Cyberpunk is a subgenre of fantasy literature and cinematography which foregrounds the rela-
tionship between man and the advanced technology which surrounds him. The defining feature of
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At the beginning of the last decade of the last century, during the Gulf War
(1991), which was the first information war,7 there appeared a thesis that cyberspace
had become the fifth environment (besides land, sea, air, and the cosmos) in which
combat and warfare were being conducted (Warden’s model).8
P. Sienkiewicz set out to interpret the essence of the construct called cyberspace.
He distinguished the following basic perspectives from which the topic can be
approached.
• “Cyberspace is essentially a huge social network—a net of nets, the participants
in which, either individuals or groups (societies), utilise global resources pro-
vided by the Internet (generally speaking, the net)
• Cyberspace is identified with the virtual reality generated by the computer, the
network, and the Internet
• Cyberspace is simply the Internet, its resources, services, and users
• Cyberspace is merely an evolving, dynamic, complex, system (a system of
systems), and it should be seen as such, no matter whether we foreground its
technical, informational, or social aspects”.9
“In physical terms, cyberspace may be characterised by Maxwell’s four equa-
tions, which are
• Gauss’s law for electric fields
• Faraday’s law of induction
• Gauss’s law for magnetism
• Ampère’s law (further developed by Maxwell)”.10
The capability of analysing, generating, receiving, and measuring fluctuating
electric and magnetic fields was knowingly applied, for the first time, in a device
called the telegraph.11
D. E. Denning defines cyberspace (its technical aspect) as “[. . .] the space of
information created by all computer networks put together”.12 A similar definition is
formulated by G. T. Rattray. “A physical domain which is the result of the creation
of information systems and networks which enable mutual interactions through
electronic communication”.13 P. Sienkiewicz defines cyberspace in the technical
dimension. “[. . .] a global network made of a time-variable number of constituent
the genre is depiction of a vision of a future in which the environments of people, appliances, and
computers start to permeate one another.
7Campen (1996), p. 11.
8Warden (1995).
9Sienkiewicz (2015), pp. 89–102.
10Słota-Bohosiewicz (2015), pp. 155–166.
11Ibidem.
12Denning (2002), p. 24.
13Rattray (2004), p. 30.
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networks (TCP/IP), with unlimited and open resources and available services”.14 In
the above definitions cyberspace is compared to computer systems operating within
computer networks.
One of the definitions of cyberspace cited in literature is the one provided by the
United States Department of Defence. According to this definition, cyberspace is
A global domain within the information environment consisting of an interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, and embedded processors and controllers.
The above definition refers merely to the technological dimension of cyberspace.
It does not make any references to the social sphere—to mankind, the user of
cyberspace. In addition, the definition firmly ascribes the hardware aspect of infra-
structure with the leading role of the Internet, whereas the software aspect is
overlooked.15
In Europe one can refer to a series of definitions adopted in official documents
released by various countries, and by the European Union. The European Commis-
sion defines it in the following way. “Virtual space in which electronic data circulate,
and are processed by PC computers from all over the world.”.16 The basic element of
this definition is virtual space’s constituting a data system which is accessed through
ICT systems. The interpretation by the European Commission also disregards the
user sphere.
Another, more exhaustive definition, of cyberspace is proffered by the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, which says “Cyber-
space is a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and people/
users who interact with those systems”.17 The need to regulate the matters related to
cyberspace security has been reflected in a large number of strategic documents and
legislation. NATO’s new strategic concept18 and updated cyber-defence policy
identify cyber threats, in special cases, as potential reasons for exercising collective
defence.19
In accordance with the Polish regulations, cyberspace is defined as “virtual space
in which information is processed and exchanged by ICT systems, as set out in
Article 3(3) of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations
of the Entities Rendering Public Services,20 and the interrelations between the
14Sienkiewicz (2012), p. 324.
15Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 71.
16Wasilewski (2013), p. 229.
17R. Otis, P. Lorents, Cyberspace: Definition and Implications, the Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, Tallinn. http://dumitrudumbrava.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/cyberspace-
definition-and-impications.pdf (accessed on 01.10.2020).
18A Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organ i s a t i o n , L i s bon 2010 . h t t p s : / /www .bbn . gov . p l / d own l o ad / 1 / 15758 /
KoncepcjastrategicznaNATO.pdf (accessed on 01.10.2020).
19Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 72.
20I.e. consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 346, as amended, hereinafter the
Computerisation Act.
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entities and the relationships with users”.21 Cyberspace is therefore a generalisation
of the concepts of “systems” and “ICT networks”. An essential aspect of defining
cyberspace is the relationships between its users.
In that respect, this definition converges with the one proposed by CCDCoE22
since it includes both the human and the technical components of cyberspace. One of
the essential aims of its amendments was to introduce the category of cyberspace as
one of the constituents of national security. The introduction of the definition became
especially important to the institutions and bodies which were in charge of broadly
understood security, allowing one to create a power instrumentarium, necessary for
those entities to perform tasks in accordance with the constitutional principle of
legalism. The solutions adopted complied with NATO’s Strategic Concept from
2010,23 which was in effect at that time, and at the same time they complemented the
Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2011–201624 prepared
by the Council of Ministers.
In accordance with this document, the following definition of cyberspace was
adopted.
• “Cyberspace—a digital space for processing and exchanging information created
by ICT systems and networks, together with the connections between one another
and relationships with the users;
• The cyberspace of the Republic of Poland (hereinafter CRP)—cyberspace within
the territory of the Polish State, and in locations outside that territory, in which
representatives of the Republic of Poland (diplomatic posts, military contingents)
operate”.25
Cybersecurity had to be defined in view of the works which were meant to
develop the Doctrine of the Cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland. The document
contains the following definition.
A part of the State’s cybersecurity which covers a range of organisational, legal, technical,
physical, and educational ventures aimed at ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the
21The Act of 29 August 2002 on Martial War and the Powers of the Commander-in-Chief and the
Rules of His Subordination to the Constitutional Bodies of the Republic of Poland, i.e. consolidated
text The Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1932.
22NATO CCDCoE, officially the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, is one of
NATO Centres, based in Tallinn, Estonia. The centre conducts research and training in cybernetic
security.
23Translation by the National Security Bureau: Andrzej Juszczak, 17 January 2011. https://www.
bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/2694,dok.hml (accessed on 27.01.2020).
24Werner (2014), p. 36.
25The Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2011–2016. http://bip.msw.gov.
pl/bip/programy/19057,Rządowy-Program-Ochrony-Cyberprzestrzeni-RP-na-lata-2011-2016.html
(accessed on 28.10.2020).
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cyberspace of the Republic of Poland, together with its critical public and private ICT
infrastructure, and the security of the information processed within that infrastructure.26
This definition emphasises the functional aspect of cybersecurity, i.e. activities of
which the aim is to protect that space and its users.
One of the defining features of cyberspace is its network character. It is very often
associated with the information revolution, and is undoubtedly connected with the
rapid growth of telecommunications and the popularisation of the Internet.27 The
network character is to be understood as a constitutive attribute of cyberspace,
virtuality, a potential one, and as far as the communication advantages are
concerned, one should not overlook hypertextuality, multimediality, and
interactiveness. “The combination of constitutive features and their semantic inter-
relations is one of the ontological aspects of cyberspace”.28 Computer networks are a
system of interrelated workstations, peripheral devices (such as printers, hard drives,
scanners and workstations), and other devices. Computer networks, because of their
functionality, constitute the core of all computer systems. By working within a
computer network, one can share data, hardware and software, and manage all the
devices connected with that network from one computer.29
These days, cyberspace has become an environment in which contemporary
society, especially its young generation, lives and functions. Affected by globalisa-
tion, computerisation or digitalisation, human activity has begun to permeate the
virtual world. This has contributed to the raising of the living standards and the
quality of the lives of citizens, and has boosted the productiveness of entrepreneurs
and the efficiency of the State. The consequence of those changes, which are
becoming more and more evident, is society’s dependence on cyberspace. This
dependence requires the reliability of the ICT infrastructure, which in turn involves
protection against potential attacks.30 Cyberspace affords huge opportunities, such
as e-learning, e-administration, and telecommuting, but has its “dark side” as well. In
the field of cybersecurity one can observe an increase in the number of incidents of
various kinds. Cyber attacks can also have a destructive influence on the State’s
critical infrastructure, the functioning of which is based, to a large extent, on ICT
systems.31
Space associated with certain real places has been replaced with the space of
flows, as wrote M. Castells. Formerly, space was defined geographically, whereas
today it consists of various layers of unimaginable complexity.32
The table below sets out the development stages of cyberspace (Table 1).
26The Doctrine of the Cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland. https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/prace-
biura/publikacje/6818,Doktryna-cyberbezpieczenstwa-RP.html (accessed on 27.01.2021).
27Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 69.
28Sienkiewicz (2015), p. 92.
29Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 70.
30Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), p. 18.
31Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 84.
32Ibidem, p. 71.
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The raising of awareness related to secure cyberspace goes hand in hand with
rapid increases in the number of computer incidents, and new categories of threats.
Poland is also a target for attacks on its cyberspace. Similarly to other countries, it is
faced with the challenge of working out organisational and legal changes which will
ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity, and the security of the citizens who
function within that space.33
In the field of cybersecurity, there are such new terms as information security,
computer-network and computer-systems security, ICT security, and cybersecurity.
According to P. Potejko,
one can assume that information security consists of a set of activities, methods, and
procedures employed by competent authorities which are aimed at ensuring the integrity
of collected, stored and processed information resources by protecting them against unde-
sirable, unauthorised disclosure, modification or destruction.34
The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland35 defines IT security as
[...] the resilience of ICT systems, with a given level of trust, to counter any actions or
activities which violate the accessibility, authenticity, integrity, or confidentiality of the data
which are stored, shared, or processed, or related services afforded or rendered via those
computer networks and systems [. . .]36.
Table 1 An evolutionary stage model of cyberspace
Development
stage General description
Cyberspace—0 • “The Gutenberg Galaxy” (M. McLuhan)
• The development of print and the beginnings of telegraphy, telecommunica-
tions; radio, television
Cyberspace—1 • “Galaktyka Wienera” (P. Sienkiewicz) [T.N. – in Polish “Wiener’s Galaxy”]
• “The information society” (Masuda)
• Cybernetic concepts of the development of social systems, the evolution of
digital electronics, computer systems, satellite communications (TELSTAR),
the computer network (ARPANET), “PC boom”
• Artificial intelligence
Cyberspace—2 • “The Internet Galaxy” (M. Castells)
• The Internet (WWW), the knowledge-based economy, globalisation
Cyberspace—3 • “The Galaxy?” (we can’t predict)
• The Internet (Web 2.0), the globalisation of the social-communications
network, new forms of social behaviour
• “The knowledge society” (we can’t predict)
Source: Sienkiewicz (2012) op. 324
33Werner (2014), p. 31.
34Potejko (2015), p. 228.
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By comparison, the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union37 defines
cybersecurity as
the safeguards and actions which can be used to protect the cyber domain, in both the civilian
and the military fields, from those threats associated with or which might harm its
interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cybersecurity strives to preserve
the availability and integrity of these networks and infrastructure, and the confidentiality of
the information contained therein.38
In the States which are involved in the development of the information society,
cybersecurity is considered one of the most serious challenges in the realm of
national security. It refers to both the security of the State and of its individual
citizens. The appropriate functioning of public administration is highly important for
the maintenance of cybersecurity. The last few years have also brought a revolution
in the understanding of the concept of national security as regards the subject matter.
One has begun to notice the significance of not only military or political aspects, but
also economic, cultural, ecological and ideological facets, among others. Seeing
those changes, the Polish State has started to develop the National Security System,
the primary focus of which is to ensure broadly understood integrated national
security, in which cybersecurity occupies a very important place, covering all
other aspects of social life.39
The increased significance of cyberspace in the functioning of numerous aspects
of the State and society has brought the development of national and international
cybersecurity strategies, and the further development of cybersecurity management
systems.
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Cyberspace, Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism
Filip Radoniewicz
Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to synthetically characterize the phenom-
enon of cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyberwar. It presents attempts to define
computer crimes and their classification, history of criminalization of this phenom-
enon together with related difficulties. The author consistently distinguishes
cybercrime from cyberterrorism and cyberwar.
1 Cyberspace
The term “cyberspace”, the combination of the two words “cybernetics” and
“space”, meaning cybernetic space, was coined in the 1980s. It is thought that the
originator of this term was William Gibson, a Canadian writer, who used it in his
novel Neuromancer of 1984, to define computer-generated virtual realities, which
the protagonists inhabit. The notion found its place in mass culture, and it is currently
used to define virtual space, understood as space for communication via computer
networks.1 This term is sometimes (incorrectly) used as a synonym for the Internet.2
As regards Polish Law, cyberspace is defined, i.a., in Article 2(1a) of the State of
Emergency Act of the 21st of June 2002,3 Article 3(1)(4) of the Natural Disasters
Act of the 18th of April 2002,4 and Article 2(1b) of the Act of the 29th of August
2002 on Martial Law and the Competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
F. Radoniewicz (*)
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Policy, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie/War Studies University in Warsaw, Warsaw,
Poland
e-mail: filip.radoniewicz@radoniewicz.eu
1For more details, see Kosiński (2013), pp. 462–463.
2Cf. Liderman (2012), pp. 62–63; Wall (2013), pp. 10–11.
3Act of 21 June 2002 of the State of Emergency Act, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2016, item 886, as amended.
4Act of 18 April 2002 on Natural Disasters, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item
1897, as amended.
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and the Rules of the Commander-in-Chief's Subordination to the Constitutional
Authorities of the Republic of Poland,5 according to which the term is understood
as “a space for the processing and exchange of information, created by information
and communication systems, defined in Articles 3(3) of the Act of the 17th of
February 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations of Entities Performing
Public Tasks, including the links between them and their relations with users.”
Within the meaning of the said Act on Computerisation, a communication and
information system is a set of interfacing IT hardware and software, providing the
facility to process, store, send, and receive data via ICT networks, with the use of an
end device suitable for a given network type. According to this relatively compre-
hensive definition developed by the legislator, cyberspace includes not only com-
munication and information systems, comprising hardware and software facilitating
the performance of system functions (processing, storage and sending computer
data), but also computer data and interactions between devices and their users.6
2 Cybersecurity
The concept of cybersecurity is currently defined under Polish law in the National
CyberSecurity System Act of the 5th of July 2018.7 Given the significant role this
legal Act plays in the field of “cybersecurity law”, it may be assumed that the
definition can be applied across the entire legal system. Pursuant to Article 2(4) of
the NCSA, cybersecurity is
the ability of information systems to resist actions, which compromise the availability,
authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of processed data, or the related services provided
by those information systems.
Under Article 2(4) of the NCSA, the legislator referred to the notions of
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity, i.e., the so-called informa-
tion-security components (of computer data and communication and information
systems). Traditionally, the list has been limited to three “main” components. In
addition to confidentiality (covered by protection at the earliest point in time), the list
comprised availability and integrity. Availability means the facility to use the
5Act of 29 August 2002 on Martial Law and the Competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and the Rules of the Commander-in-Chief’s Subordination to the Constitutional Authorities
of the Republic of Poland (consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2016, item 851, as
amended).
6For more details see Aleksandrowicz and Liedel (2014), pp. 23–27; Banasiński (2018), pp. 23–27;
Kosiński (2013), pp. 462–463; Liderman (2017), pp. 62–63; Trąbiński (2018), pp. 70–74; D. Wall
(2013), pp. 10–11.
7Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System (consolidation text Polish Journal of
Laws of 2020, item 1369, as amended, herein after “NCSA”).
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information by authorized persons whenever necessary. According to the guidelines
included in the Recommendation of the OECD Council8 concerning Guidelines for
the Security of Information Systems C(92)188 of the 26th of October 1992, avail-
ability means that data is accessible and usable on a timely basis in the required
manner. Under Article 4(d) of Regulation 460/2004, availability means that data is
accessible and services are fully operational. According to the definition laid down in
Recommendation C (92)188, integrity is understood as the characteristic of data and
information being accurate and complete, and the preservation of accuracy and
completeness. It refers to the integrity of both data and computer systems. As for
information processed in an IT network, integrity means that the sent and received
data are identical. This feature is defined in a similar way in Article 4(f) of Regu-
lation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 10th
of March 2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security
Agency9 (repealed, but the replacement regulations did not include the definition),
as “the confirmation that data, which has been sent, received, or stored are complete
and unchanged.” It is worth mentioning that this is a theoretical scenario, which is
impossible in practice. The vast majority of the currently existing ICT networks,
including the Internet, are based on packet-switching technology (for more details,
see further remarks in the discussion on the definition of information systems). This
means that the data sent via such networks are divided into packets (millions of
packets in the case of large data portions), which are then sent (often along various
routes) and “compiled” together at the end point. It often happens that the some of
the packets “get lost on the way” (it is easy to check, there are small differences
between the sizes of the sent and the received file). Confidentiality means access to
data only by authorized persons, excluding third parties. It involves the protection of
data against the reading and copying of data by unauthorized individuals. The
guidelines set out in recommendation C (92)188 define confidentiality as the char-
acteristic of data and information being disclosed only to authorized persons, entities
and processes at authorized times and in the authorized manner. In turn, under
Article 4(g) of Regulation 460/2004, confidentiality is understood as the protection
of communications or stored data against interception and reading by unauthorized
persons.10
In addition to the (“core”) attributes discussed above, one can currently speak of
other properties of information. In line with the ISO 27001 standard (PL-EN
IDO/IEC 27001, an international standard specifying the requirements for
information-security management systems), information security is interpreted as
the maintenance of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.
However, other components, such as authenticity, accountability, and reliability,
may also be taken into consideration. Authenticity guarantees that the identity of a
8Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems of
26 November 1992, C(92)188/FINAL.
9OJ EU 2004 L 77/1.
10Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 143–144.
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given entity or resource is as declared. Accountability means the assurance that the
actions of such an entity can be assigned in a straightforward way only to this
specific entity. Reliability is a property designating cohesive and intentional conduct
and results.
These terms are defined in a similar way in the Regulation of the Council of
Ministers of the 12th of April 2012 on the National Interoperability Framework, the
minimum requirements for public records, the exchange of information in electronic
form, and the minimum requirements for communication and information systems.11
• Authenticity: a property consisting of the fact that the origin or contents of data
defining an object are as declared (§ 2(2))
• Availability: a property consisting of the fact that a given ICT-system resource
can be used on demand, in a specified time, by an entity authorized to work in the
communication and information system (§ 2 (4));
• Integrity: a property consisting of the fact that a given communication and
information system resource has not been modified in an unauthorized manner
(§ 2 (5));
• Confidentiality: a property consisting of the fact that information must not be
provided or disclosed to unauthorized natural persons (§ 2 (14)).
• Accountability: a system property, which involves the attribution of a specified
action to a natural person or process, and placing it within a specific time frame (§
2 (18)).
The concept of “cybersecurity”, as defined under Article 4(2) of the NCSA, was
meant to constitute the equivalent of the expression “the security of network and
information systems”, as defined in NIS Directive12 as the capacity of network and
information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, all actions, which
compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity, or confidentiality of stored or
transmitted or processed data, or the related services provided by, or accessible via,
those network and information systems. It is clear that the two definitions differ in
terms of defining elements. First, the term “information system” was used as the
equivalent of “network and information system”. Second, the legislator removed the
phrase “at a given level of confidence”, referring to “the ability to resist”,with a view
to ‘relativising’ the expression. It should be stressed that the phrase was present in
the first draft of the Act, i.e. in the version referring to social consultations (prior to
the work on the Bill in the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament, but was
not included in the final version of the Bill,13 due to the controversies, which had
11Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 12 April 2012 on the National Interoperability
Framework, the minimum requirements for public records, the exchange of information in elec-
tronic form, and the minimum requirements for communication and information systems, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2017, item 2247, as amended.
12OJ EU 12016 L 194/1.
13See: https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12304650, accessed on 01/12/2020.
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occurred during the consultations. First of all, the consultations indicated the need to
define the phrase.14 As shown above, the author of the Bill chose a simpler solution.
Another difference is the narrowing down in the schedule of actions listed in the
definition laid down in the Act by omitting the word “all” before “actions”, which
stressed the broadest possible scope of such activities, at the same time replacing the
conjunction “or” with “and” in the catalogue of such actions. Therefore, one is
dealing with conjunctions here, not alternatives, which seems to imply that the
actions referred to in the said provisions must be simultaneously directed against
the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of the processed data, or
the related services provided by those network and information systems. The next
difference also resulted in the narrowing down of the scope of the definition, as the
services “accessible via” information systems were omitted, and only “provided”
services were retained. The definition in the NIS Directive mentions stored or
transmitted or processed data, whereas the Polish legislator limited the list to the
concept of “processing”, which is a generic term in relation to storage and
transmission.
To conclude the discussion on the differences between the definitions, it should
be stressed that the definition in the NIS Directive was used in the National
Framework of the Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022
(Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 52/2017 dated the 27th of April 2017 on
the National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland), as well
as in the draft Cybersecurity Strategy.
3 The Notion of Cybercrime
To date, no legislator has decided to introduce the legal definition of a computer
crime into the legal system. There have been attempts to define this term as part of
penal-law studies. A comprehensive definition proposed by Ulrich Sieber during an
OECD Expert Committee meeting in Paris in 1983, later included in the OECD
report, according to which “computer crime is any illegal, unethical, or unauthorised
behaviour involving the automatic data processing and/or transmission of data”15
can be considered one of the first. A general definition of computer crime was
developed several years later for Interpol. According to this definition, computer
crime means “criminal activities in the scope of computer technologies”, which can
be divided into the following groups.
(1) The breach of resource-access rights
(2) Fraud with the use of computers
14See, for example, Remarks expressed by the Business Centre Club, the Polish Chamber of
Commerce for Electronics and Telecommunications, and the Polish Chamber of Digital Broadcast-
ing—See https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12304650, Accessed on 1 December 2020.
15Sieber (1998), pp. 20–21; cf. Czechowski and Sienkiewicz (1993), p. 52.
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(3) The modification of computer resources
(4) The reproduction of software
(5) Hardware and software sabotage
(6) Offences committed with the use of BBS
(7) The storage of illegal resources
(8) Crime on the Internet.16
Along with technological advancements, the terms describing the phenomenon of
computer crime are also evolving. The earliest ones are, of course, “computer
crime”, “computer-related crime”, “crime by computer”, and “digital crime”, the
last one having a broader scope than “computer crime.” The development of the
Internet in recent years has led to the creation of a strong, and practically inseparable,
relationship between information and telecommunication technologies. For this
reason, numerous suggestions for terms and definitions have been coined to describe
the phenomenon of computer crime. These include “Internet crimes”, “e-crimes”,
“net crimes”, virtual crimes”, and finally “cybercrimes”, “IT crimes”, and “data-
processing crimes.”17
Without doubt, the term, which has gained greatest popularity is “cybercrime”,
used both in the literature on the subject and in some international documents
(in particular, in the Convention on Cybercrime).
During the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders,18 held in Vienna in April 2000, it was found that cybercrime
referred to any crime, which can be committed by means of a computer system or
network, in a computer system or network, or against a computer system or network.
At the same time, the following classification of cybercrime was proposed.
(1) In a narrow sense (computer crime), meaning any illegal behaviour directed by
means of electronic operations, which targets the security of computer systems
and the data processed by them, i.e.
– unauthorized access
– damage to computers, computer data, or computer programmes
– computer sabotage
– unauthorized interception, and
– computer espionage
(2) Cybercrime in a broader sense (“computer-related crime”): any illegal behaviour
committed by means of, or in relation to, a computer system or network,
including such crimes as illegal possession, and offering or distributing infor-
mation by means of a computer system or network.19
16Fischer (2000), pp. 27–28.
17Adamski (2000), pp. 32–33. Cf. Fischer (2000), pp. 23–31; Wójcik (1999), pp. 52–57; Clough
(2013), p. 9.
18The Tenth United Nation Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.
19Cf. Smarzewski (2014), p. 267; Shinder and Tittel (2004), pp. 35–36.
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4 The Classification of Cybercrimes
First, it is necessary to point to the simplest possible dichotomous classification of
computer crime, divided into “old” and “new” offences. This refers to the
“novelty” of an offence as such (not as a computer crime). The first group includes
conventional (common) offences, which had gained a new or modified form due
to technological developments (e.g. fraud, harassment, dissemination of child
pornography). “New” offences are those, which came with the development of
computers and advancements in information technology, and its further conver-
gence with telecommunications. Obtaining unauthorized access to, or
unauthorized modification of, computer data can serve as a classic example
here.20
Both in the literature on the subject and in the legislations of various countries, it
is possible to find a similar “tripartite” division of cybercrime21 into computer
crimes, computer-facilitated crimes, and computer-supported crimes.22
The above classification was also adopted in the Convention on Cybercrime.23
Offences amounting to illegal acts categorized in the first group was grouped
together under the single title “Offences against the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of computer data and systems.” Offences in the second group are to be
found in the subsequent three Sections of the Convention, and they are referred to as
“computer-related offences”, “content-related offences”, and “offences related to
infringements of copyright and related rights.”
The last group in the tripartite division does not fall within the ambit of substan-
tive penal law, but rather procedural law, in particular the law of evidence. There-
fore, they are usually not considered in discussions on computer crime.
The issue of defining and classifying computer crimes has been taken up in the
Polish literature on the subject. Andrzej Adamski pointed out that under the penal
20Cf. Grabosky (2006), pp. 12–14.
21Clough (2013), p. 10. Cf. Dudka (1998), p. 105. For information on the classification of computer
crimes, see also Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 251–261; Kosiński (2013), pp. 463–465;
Siwicki (2012), pp. 241–252; Smarzewski (2014), pp. 264–267.
22At the Forensic Science Society Convention held in April 2001 in Huntingdon, a classification of
computer crime was made based on the criteria of the techniques applied by offenders, and the
nature of their acts. It is a detailed version of the tripartite division described above. The classifi-
cation features six categories of computer crime (cybercrime): computer-assisted crime (in which
the committing of such a crime is facilitated by using computers), computer-enabled crime
(in which computers enable the committing of such a crime), computer-only crime (which cannot
be committed without using computer technology), Internet-assisted crime (which can be commit-
ted both in a conventional (common) way and via the Internet), Internet-enabled crime (in which it
is easier to commit a given crime with the use of the Internet), and Internet-only crime (crime
possible only via the Internet), meaning those offences in which the data sets on servers or data
packets sent between network nodes are used by the perpetrators in the course of their actions
(Hołyst 2009, pp. 19–20).
23The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime of 23 November 2001, https://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 accessed on 1 December 2020.
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law, it is possible to differentiate between two meanings of the term “computer
crime”, from the substantive and procedural-law perspective,24 and from the
substantive-law perspective, in the latter of which two types of attacks can be
identified.
(1) Attacks in which computer systems, applications, data, and information, are the
subjects of crime, for example, hacking. The Polish legislator treats them
(similarly to other penal-law legislations) as separate types of offence in which
information is a generic object of protection. In the Polish Penal Code, such acts
were addressed in Chapter XXXIII Offences Against Information Protection
(offences in which computers, networks or computer data constitute the target of
the perpetrator’s actions), which corresponds to the first group of crimes, in
which computers are the subject of illegal activities (the computer as a target).
(2) Attacks in which the targets include various legally protected rights, whereas a
computer, computer network, data-processing systems and electronic devices
serve as tools. They are used for committing both common offences, e.g. fraud,
forgery, and unconventional crimes, such as money laundering (corresponding
to the second group of offences included in the aforementioned tripartite divi-
sion—“the computer as an instrument”).
From the procedural perspective, computer crimes are offences in which com-
puter systems can store evidence of criminal activities. Therefore, the group of
computer crimes from the procedural perspective includes, in particular, any
prohibited acts in which access to information processed in a computer system is
required for prosecution purposes. This includes situations in which a computer
system was an instrument used in an attack, and instances in which such a system
was the target of the attack.25
In the Polish literature on the subject, some attention has been given to the issue
of singling out Internet crime as a subcategory of computer crimes.
As B. Świątkiewicz noted, Internet crime cannot be treated as the equivalent of
computer crime, since the Internet is a tool used for committing a wide range of
offences, which are not necessarily reflected in the statutory criteria of a crime as laid
down in the Penal Code.26 First and foremost, it is certain that the term covers a
narrower scope. Michał Sowa suggests that “Internet crime” can be defined as
offences
“for which the opportunities provided by the Internet” (web services) or services provided by
people via the Internet allow the perpetrator to perform an intentional criminal act, or its
individual stages, or at least facilitate the performance of such a criminal act.27
24Adamski (2000), p. 30.
25Adamski (2000), pp. 34–35.
26Świątkiewicz (2005), p. 111.
27Sowa (2001), p. 28.
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Based on the above definition, it is possible to distinguish between Internet crime,
in the strict sense of the term (types of prohibited acts, in which the main activities
are conducted with the use of the Internet) and Internet crime in the broad sense
(in which the committing of a given prohibited act is facilitated by the use of the
Internet, including those offences in which the Internet is only a means to an end, or a
tool to achieve the expected results outside the network).28
5 Challenges Related to the Emergence of Computer Crime
There are numerous characteristics of new technologies, which facilitate criminal
activities, and, which at the same time hinder the prevention and prosecution of
crime.
First of all, it is the sheer reach of the phenomenon. The Internet has provided
communication opportunities on an unprecedented scale. It is estimated that approx.
one and a half billion people have Internet access, which accounts for 24% of the
world’s population. It is an enormous number of potential perpetrators and victims.
The second feature is availability. The use of computers and the Internet has never
been easier or cheaper. On the one hand, the prices of computer hardware and
computer-network communications have fallen considerably, and, on the other
hand, the use of technological advancements has become easier than in the past.
The times when computers were enormous and expensive devices, requiring addi-
tional advanced knowledge to be operated are long gone. The Internet can currently
be used on mobile phones. Computer programmes have a friendly graphical user
interface, and the vast majority of users cannot imagine operating a computer in the
so-called text mode (using command lines in MS Windows systems, or consoles in
Unix/Linux systems).
Third is the ability to remain anonymous (often not as reliable as it might seem),
which both Internet users and potential perpetrators of crimes committed via the
Internet can enjoy. It creates an illusion of full confidentiality (or even secrecy) of all
the activities performed by network users, and the related chance of avoiding
potential penal liability.
Fourth is the possibility to collect a substantial quantity of information across a
small space, from which the data can be easily retrieved, and in which it can be
reproduced and disseminated without limitations.
The fifth feature is its global reach, which means that the offences committed by
perpetrators in one country can have a negative effect in another country. This can
create extremely complex situations. For instance, this is the case when a perpetrator
based in country A carries out a DDoS attack (Distributed Denial of Service) against
a server located in country B, using computers located in countries C and D, while
residents of countries E and F can suffer the consequences of such activities.
28Sowa (2001), pp. 29–30.
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The last, yet equally important, factor, indicated in the literature on the subject,
which hinders counteracting computer crime, includes circumstances related to
investigating crimes and conducting penal proceedings. The ephemeral nature of
computer data is a source of problems related to collecting and securing evidence.
There are also problems arising from the international reach of the network, and the
private nature of many of them, which obstructs the access to, e.g., traffic data, which
is stored on servers only for a specified period of time. The obvious consequence of
the technical nature of computer crime is the fact that individuals dealing with the
prosecution of perpetrators must have knowledge of state-of-the-art technology and
the appropriate hardware.29
When discussing the issue of cybercrime definitions and classifications, it is
worth mentioning those acts, which cannot be placed in the category of computer
crime.
6 Cyberterrorism and Cyberwar
Susan W. Brenner makes a precise distinction between computer crime and the
phenomena of cyberterrorism,30 and cyberwarfare, treating them as notions separate
from cybercrime. She assigns a very broad sense to the former term, making the
assumption that it includes terrorist attacks which are planned, carried out, and
coordinated, via computers and computer networks, while the latter is defined as
actions taken by states using information technology with a view to achieving
military or other strategic goals.31
The second most frequently cited definition of cyber-terrorism, provided by
D. Denning, has a much narrower meaning. According to this author, cyber-
terrorism is a combination of terrorism and cyberspace. In general, it is understood
as unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks, and infor-
mation collected in networks to intimidate or coerce governments, or the residents,
of a given state, to fulfil political or social objectives. Moreover, in order to be
classified as cyberterrorism, a given attack should result in violence against people
and property, or cause such a degree of harm that it could evoke fear. Attacks
resulting in death or injuries, explosions, plane crashes, water pollution, or severe
economic loss, might serve as examples here. Major attacks against critical infra-
structures can be treated as cyber-terrorist attacks, depending on their outcomes. The
category does not include attacks, which lead to the disruption of non-critical
services, or mainly result in financial problems.32
29Clough (2013), pp. 5–8; Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 128–129.
30Unlike D.L. Shinder and E. Tittel, who classified cyberterrorism as cybercrimes involving the use
of violence. See remarks above.
31Brenner (2010), p. 16.
32Verton (2004), p. 20.
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7 Terrorism in EU Law
The first EU legal instrument aimed at counteracting terrorism was Council Frame-
work Decision of the 13th of June 2002 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism33
(further referred to as “Framework Decision 2002/475”). The document was
replaced by Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of the 15th of March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, which is
based on the Framework Decision, and substantially replicates its solutions (this
refers to, e.g., the definition of a terrorist offence), at the same time clarifying some
solutions and adding new ones.
Most of all, Directive 2017/541 established the minimum rules concerning the
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the field of terrorist offences,34
offences related to a terrorist group, and offences related to terrorist activities, as
well as measures for the protection of, support for, and assistance to, victims of
terrorism. The definition of a terrorist offence laid down in Article 3 of Directive
2017/541 (similar to the one included in Framework Decision 2002/475) is com-
posed of two elements, i.e. objective (actus reus) and subjective (mens rea) ele-
ments. For a prohibited act to be considered a terrorist offence, first of all, it must
meet an objective criterion, i.e., it must be one of the acts listed in an exhaustive
schedule included in Article 3(1)(a) to (i),35 or the threat to commit any of the acts
(Article 3(1)(j)). Second, a terrorist offence must meet at least one of the subjective
premises listed in the second part of the definition, i.e. it must be committed with one
of the aims listed in paragraph 2, including
33Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ EC
2002 L 164/3.
34Framework Decision 2002/475 and Directive 2017/541 refer to “terrorist offences”, while the
provisions of the Polish Penal Code of 6 June 1997 (consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2020, item 1444, as amended, hereinafter “PC”) refer to “offences of a terrorist nature”.
35The following acts were listed in Article 3(1): (a) attacks on a person’s life which can cause death;
(b) attacks on the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage-taking; (d) causing
extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility
(including an information system), a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place
or private property, likely to endanger human life, or result in major economic loss; (e) seizing
aircraft, ships, or other means of public or goods transport; (f) the manufacture, possession,
acquisition, transporting, supply or use of explosives or weapons, including chemical, biological,
and radiological or nuclear weapons, as well as research into, and development of, chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons; (g) releasing dangerous substances, or causing fires,
floods or explosions, the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting
the supply of water, power, or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to
endanger human life; (i) illegal system interference, as referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2013/40/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information
systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, in cases in which Article 9
(3) or points (b) or (c) of Article 9(4) of that Directive apply, and illegal data interference, as referred
to in Article 5 of that Directive in cases in which point (c) of Article 9(4) of that Directive applies
(see further remarks).
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(1) seriously intimidating a population
(2) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or
abstain from performing any act
(3) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional,
economic, or social structures of a country or an international organisation.36
Under Article 4 of Directive 2017/541, Member States are obliged to make sure
that directing a terrorist group,37 and participating in the activities of a terrorist
group, are acts punishable as criminal offences. It was pointed out that the latter
should also be understood as including supplying information or material resources,
or by funding its activities in any way, in the knowledge of the fact that such
participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.
Pursuant to the subsequent Articles of Directive 2017/541, Member States are
obliged to criminalise “offences related to terrorist activities”, involving certain
activities, which are not terrorists acts per se, but might constitute the preparation
to commit terrorist acts.38
Under Article 15(1) of Directive 2017/541, the offences referred to in the
Directive should be punishable by effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, criminal
penalties, which may entail surrender or extradition.
The terrorist offences referred to in Article 3 of Directive 2017/541, and in Article
14 of the said document (aiding and abetting, inciting and attempting offences laid
down in the Directive),39 should be punishable by custodial sentences heavier than
36The aforementioned Framework Decision 2002/475 was enacted into the Polish legal framework
by way of the Act of the 16th of April 2004 on amending the Penal Code and certain other Acts
(Journal of Laws of 2004, No. 93, item 889). For more details, see Chapter 23 of this monograph.
See also Radoniewicz (2015), pp. 192–196.
37According to the definition laid down in Article 2(3) of Directive 2017/541, the terms should be
understood as “a structured group of more than two persons, established for a period of time and
acting in concert to commit terrorist offences.” According to the definition included in the second
part of the cited provision, “structured group” means a group which is not randomly formed for the
immediate commission of an offence, and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its
members, continuity of membership or a developed structure.”
38They include the following offences: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence (Article 5);
recruitment for terrorism (Article 6); providing training for terrorism (Article 7); receiving training
for terrorism (Article 8); travelling for the purpose of terrorism (Article 9); organising or otherwise
facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism (Article 10); terrorist financing (Article 11), and
other offences related to terrorist activities, listed in Article 12: (a) aggravated theft with a view to
committing one of the offences listed in Article 3; (b) extortion with a view to committing one of the
offences listed in Article 3; (c) drawing up or using false administrative documents with a view to
committing one of the offences listed in points (a) to (i) of Article 3(1), point (b) of Article 4, and
Article 9.
39Aiding and abetting the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 8, 11 and 12 (and Article 14(1)),
inciting the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 (and Article 14(2)), and attempting to commit the
offences referred to in Articles 3, 6, 7, Article 9(1), point (a) of Article 9(2), and Articles 11 and
12, with the exception of possession as provided for in point (f) of Article 3(1), and the offences
referred to in point (j) of Article 3(1) (and Article 14(3)), should be punishable by law.
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those imposable under national law for such offences, which have no element of
“terrorist intent” (Article 15(2).
The offences listed in Article 4 of Directive 2017/541 (offences relating to a
terrorist group) should be punishable by custodial sentences, with a maximum
sentence of not less than 15 years for the offence referred to in point (a) of Article
4 (directing a terrorist group), and a maximum sentence of not less than 8 years for
the offences listed in point (b) of Article 4 (participating in the activities of a terrorist
group) (Article 15(3)).
When a criminal offence referred to in Article 6 (recruitment for terrorism) or
7 (providing training for terrorism) is directed towards a child, this may, in accor-
dance with national law, be taken into account when sentencing (Article 15(4) of
Directive 2017/541).
8 Cyberterrorism: Terrorism in Cyberspace
The first binding European Union legal Act relating to attacks against security in
cyberspace was Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of the 24th of February
2005, on attacks against information systems40 (Framework Decision 2005/222).
Work on the draft began in 2001, as a result of the European Commission’s
announcement of the so-called Communication on Cybercrime,41 containing certain
proposals for substantive and procedural-law provisions, directed at combating
computer crime, at both the national and Community levels. The outcome of those
activities was, i.a., a proposal for the aforementioned framework decision.42
In citing Framework Decision 2005/222, it was indicated that its objective was to
improve cooperation between the judicial authorities and law-enforcement services
of Member States, through approximating the rules on criminal law in Member
States in the field of attacks against information systems. The legislative activities at
the EU level were substantiated by the need to counteract attacks against information
systems, due to the possible relationship between this type of offence and organised
crime, and terrorist attacks against information systems, which formed part of the
critical infrastructure of the Member States.
First and foremost, under Framework Decision 2005/222, the most important
terms were defined (“information system”, “computer data”, “legal person” and
“without right”), and Member States were obliged to make sure that illegal access
40Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005, on attacks against information
systems, OJ EU 2005 L 69/67.
41Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2000)890 on Creating a Safer
Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating
Computer-related Crime of 26 January 2001.
42Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems, COM
(2002) 0173.
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to information systems, illegal system interference, and illegal data interference,
were punishable as offences. The document also refers to the issues of the liability of
legal persons, jurisdiction, and the use the network of operational points of contact
available twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, for the purpose of exchanging
information on attacks against information systems.
The limited number of offences referred to in Framework Decision 2005/222, the
need to incorporate new threats, and the wish to adapt the existing legal regulations
to new European Union initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, and to supplement
them in order to regulate the matter comprehensively, led to a decision to commence
work on a new legal instrument addressing the issue of cybercrime. The result was
the enactment of Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of the 12th of August 2013 on attacks against information systems and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA43 (Directive 2013/40).
In citing the Directive, it was stressed that attacks against information systems,
and, in particular, attacks linked to organised crime, and the potential for terrorist or
politically motivated attacks against information systems, were a growing menace,
and that they could pose a real threat to information systems forming part of critical
infrastructures of Member States and the European Union.
The contents of Directive 2013/40 are largely based on the provisions of Frame-
work Decision 2005/222/JHA, at the same time providing for certain new solutions
(new types of prohibited acts: the illegal interception of computer data, and offences
related to the use of “hacking tools”, and the specification of additional aggravating
circumstances to consider when sentencing offenders).
For the purpose of Directive 2013/40 (and previously for the purpose of Frame-
work Decision 2005/222), an “information system” is defined as a device or group of
inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme,
automatically processes computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed,
retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of devices for the purposes of its or
their operation, use, protection and maintenance (Article 2(a)).
The above definition can be characterised by a broad objective scope. Given the
above, an information system should be understood as both a single data-processing
device (e.g. a computer or a smart phone) and a computer network, including small
networks (e.g. LAN44), covering several computers, and large-scale structures
consisting of interconnected networks (e.g. MAN45).46
43Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on
attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, OJ
EU 2013 L 218/8.
44LAN—Local Area Network.
45MAN (Metropolitan Area Network)—covering numerous interconnected local area networks,
networks of this type are developed by public institutions, universities (university networks) or
private entities (enterprises).
46Due to the volume limits of this study, the issue will not be discussed in detail. For more details,
see Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 244–249; Radoniewicz (2019a), pp. 42–47.
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Under Article 2(b) of Directive 2013/40, the term “computer data” was defined as
a representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for processing in
an information system, including a program suitable for causing an information
system to perform a function.
Under Article 2(d) of Directive 2013/40, “without right” means conduct referred
to in this Directive, including access, interference, or interception, which is not
authorized by the owner, or by another rights holder, of the system, or of part of
it, or not permitted under national law.
Article 3 of the said Directive includes an obligation imposed on Member States
to ensure that, when gained intentionally, access without right to the whole or to any
part of an information system, is punishable as a criminal offence committed by
infringing a security measure. Access to information systems is understood as the
possibility of using their resources (i.e. using the data stored in the systems, and the
use of hardware, which, in fact, results in access to data and software used for
controlling such access).
Another offence defined in Directive 2013/40 is illegal system interference,
which consists of seriously hindering or interrupting the functioning of an informa-
tion system by inputting computer data, by transmitting, damaging, deleting,
impairing, altering, or suppressing such data, or by rendering such data inaccessible,
intentionally and without right (Article 4 of Directive 2013/40). This mostly includes
activities involving logic operations directed against information systems, with a
view to hindering or disrupting system functions by affecting the processing of the
computer data of the software used for the purpose.
Under Article 5 of Directive 2013/40, Member States are obliged to criminalise
logical attacks directed against computer data. The provision identifies illegal data
interference as deleting, damaging, impairing, altering, or suppressing computer data
in an information system, or rendering such data inaccessible. Such interference
includes both deleting data and installing software on the compromised computer,
facilitating further illegal activities (e.g. data theft), or carrying out a DDoS attack
(Distributed Denial of Service) by using malware to connect a compromised com-
puter to a botnet.
The first “new” prohibited act (in relation to Framework Decision 2005/222) was
illegal interception, defined in Article 6 of Directive 2013/40 as intercepting, by
technical means, non-public transmissions of computer data to, from, or within, an
information system, including electromagnetic emissions from an information sys-
tem carrying such computer data, intentionally and without right.
Another type of offence, which was not provided for in Framework Decision
2005/222, is referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2013/40. Under the said provision,
Member States are required to criminalise the intentional production, sale, procure-
ment, importing, possession, and distribution, or otherwise making available, of
tools (colloquially referred to as “hacking tools”) used, without right, to commit any
of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of Directive 2013/40, in which such acts
are performed with the intention to commit the said offences.
“Tools” means
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(1) a computer programme, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of
committing any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 6
(2) a computer password, access code, or similar data, by which the whole or any
part of an information system is capable of being accessed.
In line with Article 9(1) of Directive 2013/40, the offences referred to in the said
Directive (including incitement, aiding and abetting, and attempting to commit
offences under Articles 4 and 5—see Article 8(1) and (2)), should be punishable
by effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, criminal penalties. At the same time, it is
stipulated that the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 7 of Directive 2013/40 (which
means that it does not apply to incitement, aiding and abetting, and attempting to
commit offences) should be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at
least 2 years, at least for cases which do not involve a minor (Article 9(2)).
Furthermore, Article 9 of Directive 2013/40 provides for a number of aggravating
circumstances. However, they only apply to offences listed in Articles 4 and 5 (i.-
e. illegal system interference and illegal data interference). The first aggravating
circumstance includes a situation in which a significant number of information
systems have been affected through the use of a tool, referred to in Article 7 of
Directive 2013/40, designed or adapted primarily for that purpose. In such an event,
the perpetrator should be sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of at least
3 years (Article 9(3) of Directive 2013/40).
Under Article 9(4) of Directive 2013/40, aggravating circumstances, resulting in
the possibility of the perpetrator’s being sentenced for a maximum sentence of
imprisonment of at least 5 years, include the commitment of offences within the
framework of a criminal organisation, as defined in Framework Decision 2008/841/
JHA of the 24th of October 2008 on the combating organised crime,47 causing
serious damage, and the committing of an offence against a critical-infrastructure
information system.48
47Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, OJ
EU 2008 L 300/42. Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the said Decision, “criminal organisation” means a
structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert
with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention
order of a maximum of at least four years, or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly,
financial or other material benefit. “Structured Association” means an association which was not
randomly formed for the immediate committing of an offence, nor does it need to have formally
defined roles for its members, continuity of membership, or a developed structure (Article 1(2) of
Framework Decision 2008/841). A solution similar to the one stipulated in Framework Decision
2005/222 was adopted in Directive 2013/40, under which the penalty provided in Framework
Decision 2008/841 was not taken into consideration when establishing whether a given structured
association can be considered a criminal organisation.
48Under Article 2(a) of Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification
and designation of European critical infrastructures, and the assessment of the need to improve their
protection, OJ EU 2008 L 345/75, the term critical infrastructure means an asset, system, or part
thereof, located in Member States, which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions,
and the health, safety, security, economic, or social well-being of people, and the disruption or
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The last aggravating circumstance affecting penal liability (Article 9(5)) is a
situation in which the offences referred to in Articles 4 and 5 are committed by
misusing the personal data of another person (identity theft).49
The Directive was criticised for the failure to provide severe sanctions, especially
in relation to acts, which can be classified as terrorist attacks against IT systems. This
reservation can currently be considered outdated. Discussing the issue of making
more stringent the penal liability of a perpetrator accused of an offence of a terrorist
nature, one should take into account the legal regulations laid down in Directive
2017/541. Pursuant to point (i) of Article 3(1), in conjunction with Article 3(2) of the
said Directive (see remarks above), illegal system interference as referred to in
Article 4 of the Directive in cases in which Article 9(3) or points (b) or (c) of Article
9(4) of that Directive applies, and illegal data interference as referred to in Article
5 of that Directive, in cases in which point (c) of Article 9(4) of that Directive
applies, constitute a terrorist offence. This means that terrorist offences should
include acts involving illegal system interference committed with one of the aims
listed in Article 3(2) of Directive 2017/541, with the use of one of the tools referred
to in Article 7 of Directive 2013/40, designed or adapted primarily for that purpose,
in which a significant number of information systems have been intentionally
affected, or in which substantial damage has been inflicted. In addition, an unlawful
act under Article 5 should be considered a terrorist offence if it has been directed
against a critical-infrastructure information system.50
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International Regulations of Cybersecurity
Filip Radoniewicz
Abstract There is no doubt that, due to the global nature of modern ICT networks,
international cooperation plays a key role in ensuring cybersecurity, including in the
fight against cybercrime.
This chapter describes initiatives taken within international organizations to
ensure cybersecurity and the prevention of cybercrime. The presentation will start
with the initiatives of the OECD and the Council of Europe. This is due not only to
some kind of “Eurocentrism” but above all to the fact that these two organisations
were the first to address cybersecurity and cybercrime issues. In addition, the
Council of Europe Convention 185 on CyberCrime of November the 23rd, 2001,
an international agreement concluded in the Council of Europe, is a milestone in the
prevention of computer crime, remaining the only binding act of international law to
combat it. Its importance is best demonstrated by the constantly growing number of
signatories (and countries that model without signatures after the provisions, e.g.
Pakistan) and the fact that international organisations, or recommend that their
members accept (UN, G7/G8, European Union) or “copy” provisions, creating
their own model legal acts (e.g. Commonwealth).
1 General Remarks
Given the global character of modern tele-information systems, international coop-
eration undoubtedly plays an instrumental role in ensuring cybersecurity and com-
bating cybercrime. Therefore, efforts to establish legal frameworks of the interstate
cooperation aimed at ensuring computer data and information system security have
been made on the international arena since tele-information became supranational. It
should be stressed that, for any cybersecurity-oriented measures to be effective,
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international cooperation must be pursued not only at the national level, but it must
also involve private entities, representatives of the IT industry, and including in
particular Internet service providers.
Initiatives launched by international organisations to ensure cybersecurity and to
combat cybercrime are outlined below, starting with those devised by OECD and the
Council of Europe. This line of presentation was motivated not only by the Euro-
centric approach, but also by the fact that these two organizations had been the first
to deal with cybersecurity and cybercrime issues. Furthermore, Convention on
Cybercrime No. 185 of the Council of Europe of the 23rd of November 2001,1
being an international treaty drawn up within the Council of Europe, was a milestone
in the field of combating computer crime. It has also served a binding international
legal act adopted with this objective in mind. Its importance is best reflected in the
still growing number of signatories (as well as non-signatories, which otherwise
commit to follow its provisions, e.g. Pakistan) and in the fact that international
organizations either recommend their members to adopt the Convention (the UN,
G7/G8, the European Union) or “map” its content when drawing up their own
governing agreements (e.g. The Commonwealth of Nations).2
2 Organisation for Economic-Cooperation
and Development
Recommendation C (92)1883 was the first document on cybercrime within the
Organisation for Economic-Cooperation and Development (French: Organisation
de coopération et de développement economiques, abbreviated as OECD), adopted
on the 26th of November 1992 by the OECD Council. In 2000, following its
revision, it was deemed indispensable to draw up entirely new guidelines.4 Work
that was launched to this end took on momentum after 9/11, and eventually resulted
in the formulation of the Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for
the Security of Information Systems and Networks—Towards a Culture of Secu-
rity,5 which replaced Recommendation C(92)188. For nearly 13 years, it was the
landmark OECD legal act dealing with widely understood computer network secu-
rity. It drew attention to the increasing role of, and the fact that national economies,
international trade, as well as social, cultural and political life are becoming
1https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185, Accessed on 1 Septem-
ber 2020.
2Cf. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 261–262.
3Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems of
26 November 1992 (C(92)188/FINAL).
4Gercke (2011), Accessed on 1 September 2020.
5Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems
and Networks—Towards a Culture of Security of 25 July 2002, (C (2002) 131).
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increasingly dependent on information systems and networks, which should prompt
efforts to protect and foster confidence in such systems and networks. At the same
time, as was also stressed in the Recommendation, information systems and net-
works, as well as data stored on, or transmitted over, such systems and networks, are
subject to new and increasing threats (various types of unauthorized access, use or
alteration, malicious code transmissions, and mass denial-of-service attacks affect-
ing a significant number of computers and paralyzing tele-information systems). In
consequence, governments of Member States were advised, in particular, to develop
new or revise existing policies, practices, measures and procedures based on the
Guidelines attached to Recommendation C(2002)131, and at the same time to
promote a culture of security as set out in these Guidelines among all concerned
parties (which are understood as including all entities which develop, own and use
information systems and networks, and which provide related services,
i.e. governments, enterprises, other organizations and individual users). Given the
technological progress, work to revise the Guidelines commenced in 2012 and
resulted in adopting, on the 17th of September 2015, the Recommendation of the
Council on Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity
(C(2015)115).6 It was stressed in the Recommendation that the global interconnec-
tedness has created considerable opportunities, but the risks emerging throughout its
development are becoming more common and refined, and may affect the function-
ing of both the public and private sectors. The problem should, therefore, be now
approached from a bigger perspective, one that is not limited to technological
aspects. For this reason, the terms “cybersecurity” and “cyberspace” were aban-
doned in the Recommendation, and broader terms, “digital security risk” and “digital
environment”, were used instead. The Recommendation clearly stated that govern-
ments and private enterprises should share responsibility for combating digital
security risks. It laid down the principles of digital security risk management to be
followed by all concerned parties (governments, public and private organizations, as
well as natural persons whose social or economic activities are pursued, whether in
whole or in part, in the digital environment), along with guidelines for national
strategies to ensure digital security, the implementation of which should be
advocated by governments. These strategies are expected to present a clear and
‘whole-of-government’ approach, which should be flexible, technology-neutral and
coherent with other strategies fostering economic and social prosperity. It should
also cover best practices for the public sector, large, medium-sized and small
enterprises, and individual citizens.7
Among other OECD guidelines related to widely understood information tech-
nologies, the following are worth noting:
6Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social
Prosperity of 17 September 2015 (C(2015)115).
7See more in Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 152–156.
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1. Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of the 23rd of September
1980 (C(80)58)8 (still in force but revised in 2013), which was the first set of
principles established at the international level, which countries should be guided
by when developing regulations on the protection of privacy in connection with
cross-border flows of personal data;
2. Recommendation of the Council on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforce-
ment of Laws Protecting Privacy of the 12th of December 2007 (C(2007)67)9
(revised in 2013), including proposals of measures to be taken with a view to
streamlining international co-operation in the field of privacy protection in
connection with cross-border flows of personal data;
3. Recommendation of the Council on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforce-
ment of Laws against Spam of the 13th of April 2006;10
4. Recommendation of the Council on Protection of Critical Information Infrastruc-
tures of the 30th of April 2008 (C(2008)35)11 containing guidelines for countries
on ensuring the protection of critical information infrastructures (CIIs) at the
national and international level.12
To sum up OECD’s activities in the field of regulations on new technologies, it
should be stressed that, although the Organization was first to implement measures
aimed at combating cybercrime, its major interest is now limited to cybersecurity.13
3 Council of Europe
A discussion on the Council of Europe activities in the field of cybersecurity and
combating cybercrime should start with Recommendation No. R(89)9 on Computer-
Related Crime, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
the 13th of September 1989.14 The document required Member States to take into
account, in the course of legislative work on regulations directed at eliminating
computer crime, the proposed solutions included in the report attached to it.15
8Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 23 September 1980 (C(80)58(final).
9Recommendation of the Council on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws
Protecting Privacy of 12 December 2007 (C (2007) 67 (final).
10Recommendation of the Council on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws
against Spam of 13 April 2006 (C(2006) 57).
11Recommendation of the Council on Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures of 30 April
2008 (C(2008)35).
12See more Radoniewicz (2019).
13S. Schjølberg, The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime Legislation – The Road to
Geneva, http://www.cybercrimelaw.net, accessed on 10 October 2020, p. 17.
14Recommendation No. R(89)9 on Computer-Related Crime.
15See more in Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 158–160.
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The aforementioned Convention on Cybercrime was the first, and only, interna-
tional treaty on crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks.
Work on the Convention, which took over 4 years to complete, was carried out
with the participation of not only representatives of most Member States of the
Council of Europe (including Poland) but also by U.S., Japanese and Canadian
delegates (as observers), representatives of European institutions, and independent
experts. Its main objective was to develop a legal framework to facilitate interna-
tional crime prosecution. It proposed a range of solutions, which were innovative
(at least at that time, given that the Convention was drawn up at the end of the
previous century). Compared to some earlier documents adopted at the international
level, it featured an extended list of criminal offences (including illegal access,
illegal interception, system interference, acts involving hacking tools, computer-
related forgery, computer-related fraud, offences related to child pornography,16 and
offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights). Furthermore, it
contained provisions on recognizing criminal liability depending on the stage of
commitment, as well as aiding and abetting, and provisions on corporate liability
(including also the liability of organizations without a legal personality). Several
procedural solutions were also envisaged, including the preservation of data, search
and seizure of stored computer data, real-time collection of traffic data, and the
like.17
The obvious advantages of the Convention on Cybercrime include its open
character, with countries not belonging to the Council of Europe being allowed to
accede, and the fact that it contains optional clauses. The latter enable the Conven-
tion to be adopted with the exclusion of certain provisions, as a result of which on
implementing the Convention the signatory countries, within their national laws, can
reconcile the solutions it envisages with their own legal culture and tradition, and
with the regulations already in force within their respective jurisdictions.18 Consid-
ering the above, by the first of January 2021, the Convention on Cybercrime had
been signed by almost all Council of Europe Member States (more specifically, by
46 countries, with Russia being the only exception), and 44 of these had ratified
it. Furthermore, the Convention was signed by 4 countries from outside Europe
(Canada, Japan, the United States, and the Republic of South Africa, and the first
three have already ratified it). Other 18 states (i.a., Australia, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Israel, Panama) acceded to it. It is also worth noting that several countries,
including Egypt and Pakistan, while not signing the Convention on Cybercrime,
used its provisions as a basis when developing their own domestic regulations.
16The Convention on Cybercrime only refers to one group in this category—offences related to
child pornography. Initially, it was meant to additionally include offences driven by racism or
xenophobia. Eventually, these were included in a separate Additional Protocol to the Convention on
Cybercrime regarding the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed
through computer systems of 28 January 2003. See further comments.
17Cf. Adamski (2001), pp. 9–11; Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 162–164; Tarnogórski (2009),
pp. 207–210.
18Cf. Adamski (2001), pp. 9–17.
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The Convention on Cybercrime entered into force on 1 July 2004 after it had
already been ratified by five signatory countries. Although Poland was one of the
first countries to sign the Convention (on 23 November 2001), it did not ratify its
provisions until the 29th of January 2015. To date, two amendments have been made
to the Criminal Code with a view to adjusting its content to the provisions of the
Convention.19
The aforementioned Additional Protocol of 28 January 2003 to the Convention
on Cybercrime20 regarding the penalisation of offences motivated by racism or
xenophobia, committed using computer systems (hereinafter the Protocol),21 is the
only binding international law act developed within the Council of Europe which
deals with the issues of crimes motivated by racism or xenophobia.
The fact that the provisions on crimes motivated by racism and xenophobia were
included in a separate protocol, and not in the Convention on Cybercrime, resulted
from the dissenting views expressed by delegates of the countries involved in its
creation. Differences in the constitutional standards of free speech in individual
countries substantially hindered a common standpoint. As a result, in order not to
delay work on the Convention, it was decided that the provisions regarding such
matters be included in a separate act.22
1. Distributing, or otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic material to the
public through a computer system (Article 3);
2. Threatening (persons or groups of persons) with the commission, through a
computer system, of a serious criminal offence as defined under its domestic
law, motivated by racism or xenophobia (Article 4);
3. Insulting publicly, through a computer system, persons or groups of persons,
based on racist or xenophobic motives (Article 5);
4. Distributing or otherwise making available, through a computer system to the
public, material which denies, grossly minimises, approves or justifies acts
constituting genocide or crimes against humanity, as defined by international
law and recognised as such by final and binding decisions of the International
Military Court, established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, or of any
other international court established by relevant international instruments and
whose jurisdiction is recognised by that party (e.g. the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, or the International Criminal
Court in Hague)—Article 6.
19Act of 18 March 2004 on amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Proceedings and the
Code of Offences, Polish Journal of Laws No. 69, item 626 and the Act of 24 October 2008 on
amending the Criminal Code and certain other acts, Polish Journal of Laws No. 214, item 1344.
20Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe of 23 November 2001 (https://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 Accessed on 1 September 2020).
21Protocol of 28 January 2003 to the Convention on Cybercrime https://rm.coe.int/168008160f,
accessed 1.12.2020.
22Adamski (2001), p. 49.
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The Protocol entered into force on 1 March 2006. In accordance with its Article 9
(1), it is open for signature by the states which have signed the Convention, which
implies that it is also open to countries which are not members of the Council of
Europe, both from Europe and outside of it. Such countries can accede to the
Convention on Cybercrime provided that they participated in work on its develop-
ment (as did the United States, Canada and Japan), or once they are invited to the
Committee of Ministers or have obtained the consent from all the signatories.
Among other documents adopted by the Council of Europe, the subject-matter in
question was also indirectly discussed in the following:
1. Convention No. 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, done at Strasbourg on 28 January 1981;23
2. Convention No. 201 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation
and Sexual Abuse, on 25 October 2007;24
3. Recommendation CM/R(99) 5 on the protection of privacy on the Internet of the
23rd of February 1999;25
4. Recommendation CM/R(2009)1 electronic democracy (e-democracy) of the 18th
of February 2009;26
5. Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries.
4 Organisation for Security and co-Operation in Europe
Security of the data processed in computer systems has not formed the area of
interest of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
However, this does not mean that cybersecurity issues are entirely neglected is
OSCE activities. Examples testifying to the contrary include four decisions by the
Committee of Ministers: two on combating the use of the Internet for terrorist
purposes,27 in which it was indicated that the use of the Internet by terrorist groups
for such purposes as member recruitment, collection and transfer of funds, organi-
sation of terrorist acts or propaganda, must be prevented. However, this must be
23Convention No. 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, done at Strasbourg on 28 January 1981 (https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/
convention108-and-protocol, accessed on 1.12.2020).
24Convention No. 201 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,
done at Lanzarote on 25 October 2007 (https://rm.coe.int/1680084822 accessed on 1.12.2020).
25Recommendation CM/R(99)5 on the protection of privacy on the Internet of 23 February 1999
Recommendation Rec (99)5 on the Protection of Privacy on the Internet.
26Recommendation CM/R(2009)1 electronic democracy (e-democracy) of 18 February 2009 Rec-
ommendation CM/Rec(2009)1 on Electronic Democracy (e-Democracy).
27Ministerial Council Decision of 7 December 2004 No. 3/04 on combating the use of the Internet
for terrorist purposes and Ministerial Council Decision of 7 December 2006 No. 7/06 on combating
the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.
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done in observance of human rights, and in particular the right to privacy and the
freedom of expression of opinions and views. This objective is to be facilitated by
information exchange between the concerned parties and by establishing strategies
for effectively combating this phenomenon. The other two decisions concern
enhancing OSCE efforts to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of
information and communication technologies.28
5 United Nations
First and foremost, it is worth noting that the United Nations initially attached
importance mainly to preventing computer crime by referring to theoretical consid-
erations and empirical studies conducted by criminologists in this field. In recent
years, this approach has been changing gradually, as reflected in the so-called
Salvador Declaration (see further comments).
Special attention to cybersecurity issues on the UN forum was paid for the first
time at the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, held from 27 August to 7 September 1990 in Havana (such
congresses regarding the prevention of crime are organised by the UN every 5 years,
recently—i.e. since the Congress in Bangkok in 2005—as Congresses on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice), and at the Symposium on the Prevention and
Prosecution of Computer Crime, organised by the Foundation for Responsible
Computing, which was an event accompanying the Congress. The discussions
held at the Congress led to the General Assembly of the United Nations adopting,
on the 14th of December 1990 at the initiative of Canadian representatives, Resolu-
tion 45/121 on Combating the Criminal misuse of Information Technologies.29
As proposed by Hubbard and S. Schjølberg,30 the subsequent resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations can be divided into the following
groups:
1. Resolutions 53/70 of 3 December 1998, 54/49 of 1 December 1999, 55/28 of the
20th of November 2000, 56/19 of the 29th of November 2001, 57/53 of the 22nd
of November 2002, 58/32 of the 18th of December 2003, 59/61 of the 3rd
of December 2004, 60/45 of the 8th of December 2005, 61/54 of the 6th of
December 2006, 62/17 of the 5th of December 2007, 63/37 of the 2nd of
28Decision No. 5/16 of 9 December 2016 on enhancing OSCE efforts to reduce the risks of conflict
stemming from the use of information and communication technologies and Decision No. 5/17 of
8 December 2016 on enhancing OSCE efforts to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use
of information and communication technologies.
29Cf. Adamski (2000), pp. 9–10; Sieber (1998), pp. 162–163.
30A.M. Hubbard, S. Schjølberg, Harmonizing national legal approaches on cybercrime, http://
www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity//docs/Background_Paper_Harmonizing_National_and_Legal_
Approaches_on_Cybercrime.pdf, p. 6; accessed on 10.10.2020.
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December 2008, 64/25 of the 2nd of December 2009, 65/41 of the 8th
of December 2010, 66/24 of the 2nd of December 2011, 67/27 of the 3rd of
December 2012, 68/243 of the 27th of December 2013, 69/28 of the 2nd of
December 2014, 70/237 of the 23rd of December 2015, 71/28 of the 5th
of December 2016, 73/27 of the 5th of December 2018, of 73/266 of the 22nd
of December 2018, 74/28 of the 12th of December 2019, and 74/29 of the 12th of
December 2019—all referred to as Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, which contain
rather general provisions, indicating the threats which may be posed by advanc-
ing IT, and recommending that countries adopt the guidelines periodically for-
mulated in the information security reports drawn up by the Group of
Government Experts on Information Security;
2. Resolutions 55/63 of the 4th of December 2000 and 56/121 of the 19th of
December 2001 (both referred to as Combating the Criminal Misuse of Informa-
tion Technology), in which more specific measures were indicated which should
be taken at the international level, and implemented in national legal systems,
with the aim of effectively preventing cybercrime. According to their authors, it
was seen as indispensable to establish such legal regulations that would guarantee
the protection of all aspects of computer data and system security
(i.e. confidentiality, integrity and accessibility) from unauthorised impairment,
and to ensure that criminal abuse is penalized in all countries. The need to take
measures facilitating the cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the
prosecution and penalization of perpetrators of computer misuse acts was also
highlighted.
3. Resolutions 57/239 of the 20th of December 2002 (Creation of a global culture of
cybersecurity), 58/199 of the 23rd of December 2003 (Creation of a global
culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures)
and 64/211 of the 21st of December 2009 (Creation of a global culture of
cybersecurity and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information
infrastructures), which all focused on the need to guarantee an increased security
of computer systems and data processed in such systems. Resolution 57/239
focused mainly on the consequences of the interdependence between computer
infrastructure and other sectors of the global infrastructures critical for public
administration, while Resolution 64/211 encouraged Member States and interna-
tional organizations, when developing strategies related to cybersecurity and the
protection of critical infrastructures, to share their experience with other coun-
tries. In addition, the annex to the resolution featured guidelines intended to
facilitate the creation of an effective system to ensure cybersecurity.31
At the aforementioned Eighth United Nations Congress, taking place in Havana
in 1990, Resolution 45/121 on Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information
Technologies was developed, together with the United Nations Manual on the
31Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 196–200.
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Prevention and Control of Computer-Related Crime, which was published in 1994.
In the declaration issued at the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders in Vienna,32 which was annexed to Resolution
55/59 of the General Assembly of 4 December 2000, computer crime was referred to
in a very general manner (in Point 18 which dealt, inter alia, with the planned policy
for issuing guidelines on the prevention of this phenomenon). In the declaration
entitled Synergies and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, annexed to Resolution 60/177 of the General Assembly of
16 December 2005 “Follow-up to the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice”,33 ending the Eleventh Congress in Bangkok,
attention was again paid to the significance of criminal law harmonisation, as a
factor indispensable for the efficient fight with cybersecurity, and the instrumental
roles of both by the UN and other international organisations were highlighted. In the
so-called Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies for Global Chal-
lenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Systems and Their Development in
a Changing World, adopted at the Twelfth United Nations Congress in Salvador
(12–19 April 2010), as the document concluding the event (annexed to Resolution
65/230 of the General Assembly of 21 December 2010), a recommendation was
made for the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ),
in cooperation with Member States, representatives of international communities
and private sector entities, to develop draft versions of new solutions, both at the
national and international levels, in response to the threat posed by cybercrime. At
the Thirteenth United Nations Congress, which took place on 11–19 April 2015 in
Doha (Al-Dauha), Qatar, attention was focused on the issue of integrating crime
prevention and criminal justice into the wider United Nations agenda to address
social and economic challenges, and to promote the rule of law both at the national
and international levels, also by involving society at large. As regards cybersecurity
issues, the Congress participants once again stressed the need to take specific
measures to establish a secure cyberspace. As regards preventing and combating
Internet crime, emphasis was placed on such issues as identity theft, botnets, online
recruitment for terrorist and human trafficking purposes, and the need to protect
children. Furthermore, the significance of enhancing international cooperation as a
condition precedent to ensuring cyberspace security was also stressed. The Doha
Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice into the Wider
United Nations Agenda to Address Social and Economic Challenges and to Promote
the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, and Public Participation,34
32The Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first
century); http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/562/93/PDF/N0056293.pdf?
OpenElement, accessed on 1 December 2020).
33Follow-up to the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice;
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/498/22/PDF/N0549822.pdf?OpenElement,
Accessed on 1 December 2020).
34The Doha Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice into the Wider
United Nations Agenda to Address Social and Economic Challenges and to Promote the Rule of
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the provisions of which were adopted by acclamation on the first day of the
Congress, was the concluding document of the Thirteenth United Nations Congress.
It summarised the 60-year achievements of the UN congresses and activities in the
field of preventing crime. It also marked an attempt at responding to contemporary
challenges emerging in this respect. With a view to implementing the objectives
envisaged in the Doha Declaration, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
using Qatar’s financial support, launched an ambitious programme with global
coverage, aimed at supporting countries in crime prevention efforts, developing
criminal justice, preventing corruption and promoting the rule of law. Next congress
was scheduled on 20–27 April 2020, and was to take place in Kyoto (a city
which hosted the Fourth United Nations Congress in 1970). However, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, it had to be rescheduled.
It is common knowledge that the speed of action is of utmost important in
conducting criminal proceedings on cybercrime, considering that digital evidence
is non-permanent (“perishable”). To accelerate and facilitate information exchange,
inter alia, by more intensive cooperation with the private sector, a joint initiative has
been launched by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED),
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the International
Association of Prosecutors—Lawful Access to Digital Data Across Borders.
The UN Security Council also implements activities in the field of cybersecurity
and fight against cybercrime. In Resolution 1373 (2001) of 27 September 2001, it
called Member States to intensify the exchange of information on the ICT use by
terrorist groups, and to block any terrorist recruitment attempts via the Internet. In
Resolution 2129 (2013) of 17 September 2013, it stressed that the Internet and social
media were increasingly used for facilitating various terrorist acts, including com-
munication, abetting, recruitment, training, preparations, planning, financing, and
information collection.
Recognising the need to engage the private sector in combating organised crime
and terrorism, CTED has launched the Tech Against Terrorism initiative, its objec-
tive being to encourage private sector entities to take measures aimed at self-
regulation and at counteracting the use of their platforms by terrorist groups.
In addition, Security Council Resolutions 2341 (2013) of 13 February 2017
imposed on CTED the obligation to verify Member States’ efforts to protect critical
infrastructures against terrorist attacks, and to identify threats and future challenges
likely to emerge in this field.
Law at the National and International Levels, and Public Participation; http://www.unodc.org/
documents/congress//Declaration/V1504151 English.pdf, accessed on 1 June 2020).
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6 The International Telecommunication Union
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), with its seat in Geneva, is a
United Nations specialised agency which is currently the most dynamically operat-
ing body in the field of ensuring cyberspace security by harmonising the legal orders
in various countries, and by establishing international regulations. The ITU duties
include standardising and regulating the telecommunications market, promoting
international cooperation in the field of telecommunication, providing technical
assistance to developing countries, and taking measures aimed at establishing a
global telecommunication network combining multiple technologies.35 The Pleni-
potentiary Conference composed of representatives of the ITU Member States is the
chief political body of the Union. The Conference gathers every 4 years and sets the
principal directions of the ITU policy, as well as elects members of the Council and
defines the organisation’s financial plans. The Council is entrusted with supervising
the ongoing policies, strategies and activities of the Union in the periods between the
consecutive Plenipotentiary Conferences. The General Secretary elected for a four-
year term of office manages the General Secretariat, which is an office dealing with
ITU resource and activity administration. The General Secretary is a legal represen-
tative of the Union.
The ITU conducts its activities in three principal fields which are supervised by
separated structures, i.e. the radiocommunication sector (ITU-R), the standardisation
sector (ITU-T) and the telecommunication development sector (ITU-D). ITU-T is in
charge of examining and adopting guidelines pertaining to technical, operational and
pricing issues, aimed at telecommunication standardisation globally. These are
divided into series (each assigned a different letter of the alphabet), and feature
separate and more detailed categories. The X series is entitled Data networks, open
system communications and security, and it contains guidelines on general security,
information and network security, application and service security, cyberspace
security, the exchange of information on cybersecurity, and cloud computing secu-
rity.36 The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which
gathers every 4 years, is a non-ITU institution. However, it sets the general direction
of the activities of the standardisation (ITU-T) and radio communication (ITU-R)
sectors. It is in charge of approving the list of technical topics related to telecom-
munications (referred to as queries) which can form the subject-matter of research
and are submitted to the research groups operating within those sectors, which are
established on an as-needed basis and comprise experts from various countries.
These groups are in charge of drawing up responses which, in principle, take the
form of a draft recommendation or a partial recommendation on a given issue, which
is then subject to WTSA’s approval. In addition, WTSA can adopt resolutions. For
instance, the most recent WTSA, which gathered between 25 October and




3 November 2016 in Hammamet, adopted Resolution 50 (Rev. Hammamet, 2016)
on Cybersecurity, and Resolution 52 (Rev. Hammamet, 2016) on Countering and
Combating Spam.37
The Plenipotentiary Conference is yet another body issuing resolutions on the
subject-matter discussed in this article, including Resolution 179 (Rev. Busan, 2014)
of the Plenipotentiary Conference on ITU’s role in child online protection, and
Resolution 181 (Guadalajara, 2010) of the Plenipotentiary Conference on definitions
and terminology relating to building confidence and security in the use of ICT.
The executive body is the permanently operating secretariat with the Secretary
General in the lead.
In 2001, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution 56/183
of 21 December 2001 on the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS),38 in
which it approved the concept of conductingWSIS as proposed by ITU. The Summit
was divided into two stages, the first of which took place on 10–12 December 2003
in Geneva, and the second on 16–18 November 2005 in Tunis.
The principal objectives of the first stage of WSIS included developing a shared
viewpoint and adopting a statement expressing the political willingness to lay the
foundations for “information society for all”, taking into consideration the diversi-
fied interests of all participants while also heralding the implementation of initial
measures to attain this objective. The first stage resulted in adopting, on the 2nd of
December 2003, the Geneva Declaration of Principles (Building the Information
Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium) and the Geneva Plan of Action.
The second stage of WSIS was aimed, in particular, at initiating the implementation
process of the provisions of the Geneva Plan of Action, and at searching for solutions
in such fields as Internet management and financial mechanisms on the Internet. On
18 November 2005, the Tunis Agenda on Information Society was announced, in
which the role of international cooperation in combating cybercrime was stressed,
entailing both collaboration between law enforcement authorities, and the
establishing of dedicated legal frameworks by governments jointly with parties
concerned (representatives of the IT industry and NGOs).39
On 17 May 2007, the ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) was initiated. It
acts as a framework for establishing international dialogue and cooperation to
facilitate the coordination of global measures, serving as a response to the challenges
related to combating cybercrime and building a secure information society. It is
based on five strategic pillars (legal measures, technical and procedural measures,
organisational structure, capacity-building, and international cooperation), its objec-
tive being to develop model cybercrime legislation that is interoperable with existing
37https://www.itu.int/en/publications/ITU-T/pages/publications.aspx?lang¼e&parent¼T-RES&
version_date¼2016; accessed on 1 September 2020.
38http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/56 183 unga 2002.pdf, accessed on
1 September 2020.
39Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 206–207.
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national and regional legislative measures, and potentially applicable in the global
context.40
7 Group of Eight
At the meeting of representatives of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministries of the
countries belonging to the Group of Eight,41 held on 10 December 1997 in
Washington, a programme for combating computer crime, which was drawn up by
the Subgroup on High-Tech Crime,42 was adopted featuring ten principles of
combating cybercrime, together with a ten-point action plan.43 The primary objec-
tives included eliminating “hacker havens”, coordinating the prosecution of
cybercrime regardless of where it was committed, as well as training and equipping
law enforcement officers with adequate tools to combat high-tech crime.44
The Ministerial Conference on Combating Transnational Organized Crimes
which took place on 9–20 October 1999 in Moscow was dominated by such issues
as financing terrorist activities, human trafficking or cybercrime. The last two issues
were further discussed in annexes to the document45 summarising the event. The
40Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 207–208.
41The Group of Seven (G7)/the Group of Eight (G8) is not an international organisation but a sort of
a “semi-institution”—a political and economic forum involving the most influential countries in the
world, including France, Japan, Canada, Germany, USA, the United Kingdom, Italy, representa-
tives of the European Union, and Russia. Their leaders gather at annual political and economic
summits. The first such gathering took place in 1975. The G7/G8’s main objectives include
strengthening international cooperation, coordinating foreign policies of its Member States, and
improving international commodity turnover. See Łoś-Nowak (2009), pp. 291–293.
42On 15–17 June 1995, at the G8’s Summit in Halifax, a dedicated expert group was established,
which was entrusted with designing solutions to improve the procedures related to combating
organised crime. Its work resulted in formulating, in 1996, a set of Forty Recommendations which
were adopted at the G8’s Summit in Lyon on 27–29 June 1996. The group was, therefore, named
the G8’s Lyon Group for fighting international organised crime. Several subgroups were established
within its framework, the activities of which involve diversified issues of combating crime,
including the aforementioned Subgroup on High-Tech Crime established in 1997. Other subgroups
focus on fighting human trafficking or on providing legal assistance. The principal duties of the
G8’s Lyon Group related to criminal procedures, international cooperation and effective prosecu-
tion of computer crime. At the G8’s meeting held on 19 October 2001 in Rome, following the
11 September 2001 attacks, representatives of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministries decided that
the G8’s Lyon Group be merged with the G8’s Rome Group dealing with fighting terrorism.
Following that merger, the G8’s Lyon/Rome Group was formed.
43Principles to combat against high-tech crime and Action Plan to combat against high-tech crime.
44See also The Information Economy Report drawn up in 2005 at the UN Conference on Trade and
Development, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdteecb20051ch6_en.pdf, accessed on
1. September 2020.
45Communiqué of the Ministerial Conference of the G8 Countries on Combating Transnational
Organized Crime.
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said document included basic principles to combat cybercrime, which were later
restated in numerous international strategies dealing with this subject-matter.46 The
practical effect of the Conference was the expansion of the international network of
24/7 points of contact operating within the Group of Eight.47 At the Conference in
Paris, attention was once again drawn to the need to eliminate the so-called lawless
digital heavens or Internet heavens, and to the role which the Convention on
Cybercrime could play as an international agreement open also to those countries
which are not members of the Council of Europe, thus potentially serving as a global
regulation. At the G8 Government-Industry Workshop on Safety and Security in
Cyberspace held in May 2001 in Tokyo, the issues of data retention and securing
data for criminal proceedings were dealt with.
At the Washington meeting of representatives of the Justice and Home Affairs
Ministries of the countries belonging to the Group of Eight, the continual develop-
ment of (and amendments to) the national regulations on penalising computer misuse
acts, in order to reflect the actual technological progress, was recognised as a
condition precedent to effectively combating Internet misuse for terrorist and crim-
inal purposes. Such an approach should accelerate international criminal proceed-
ings on computer crime. With reference to the Convention on Cybercrime, it was
pointed out that measures were taken to encourage countries to accede to that
document.48 At another meeting of representatives of the Justice and Home Affairs
Ministries which was held in Sheffield (Great Britain) on 16–17 June 2005, Member
States were recommended to develop regulations which would guarantee a prompt
response to serious cyberthreats and network incidents.49
At a meeting held in Moscow in 2006,50 representatives of G8’s Justice and
Home Affairs Ministries and Prosecutors focused on the issues of terrorism and
cybercrime. They stressed that these phenomena are inter-related, and the
establishing of effective measures against cybercrime was, therefore, recognised as
the condition precedent to effectively combating terrorist acts in the domain of
modern technologies.51
46Gercke (2011). p. 177.
47The network of points of contact serving the purpose of information exchange for conducting
proceedings in cybercrime cases, operating on a permanent (24/7) basis, parallel to the 24/7 network
operating under the Convention on Cybercrime. See Adamski (2011), p. 179.
48The statement by G8’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministries of 11 May 2004, the Summit of G8’s
Justice and Home Affairs Ministries held in Washington on 10–11 May 2004, http://www.g8.
utoronto.ca/justice/justice040511_comm.htm, accessed on 1 September 2020.
49See General objectives adopted at the Summit of G8’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministries on
16–17 June 2005, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/justice/justice_uk2005.htm, accessed on
September 2020.
50The Summit of G8’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministries and Prosecutors held in Moscow on
15–16 May 2006.
51See the press conference of representatives of G8’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministries, http://
www.g8.utoronto.ca/justice/justice2006.htm, Accessed on 1 September 2020.
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At the conference of G8’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministries held on
23–25 May 2007 in Munich, the attendees undertook to work on the penalisation,
also through domestic measures, of computer misuse acts committed via the Internet
for terrorist purposes.52
On 7–9 July 2008, at the summit of G8 Member States in Hokkaido Tokyako,
Japan, a report drawn up by the Rome/Lyon Group was presented,53 which once
again outlined the various ways of exploiting new technologies by terrorist groups.
A further extension of the network of 24/7 points of contact was also recommended,
including in particular the extension of its coverage (at that time, the network
covered around 50 countries).
At the 2009 meeting of G8’s Justice and Home Affairs Ministries and Prosecu-
tors, which was held on 29–30 May 2009 in Rome, the report prepared by the G8’s
Lyon/Rome Group for the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice (CCPCJ) was discussed.54 In the statement55 containing a summary of the
Summit, attention was drawn to the technological progress and new forms of Internet
misuse, such as the criminal misuse of social networks, encryption services, VoIP
services, the Domain Name System, and other new and evolving criminal attacks on
information systems.
At the Summit in Muskoka, Canada, held on 25–26 June 2010, cybercrime was
only mentioned in the context of Internet misuse by terrorists. Attention was drawn
both to the problem of networks being put under terrorist threat, and their misuse by
terrorists for communication purposes56 (i.e. for disseminating ideologies, recruiting
new members, training terrorists or coordinating terrorist activities).57
On 24–25 May 2011, Paris was home to the e-G8 Forum The Internet: Acceler-
ating Growth, in which Internet-related issues were discussed in attendance of
representatives of scientific circles and enterprises operating in the widely under-
stood IT industry (e.g. Microsoft, HTC, Google, Facebook, Alcatel, France Tele-
com, Eutelsat).58 The Conference immediately preceded the G8 Summit scheduled
on 26–27 May 2011 in Deauville (France). It was attended by representatives of the
e-G8 Forum participants who brought a special message to governments (Message




54Cf. http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/G8.html, Accessed on 1 September 2020.
55http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/declaration1giu2009,0.pdf, accessed on
1 September 2020.
56See Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, Point 42, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
summit/2010muskoka/communique.html#peace, accessed on 1 September 2020.
57Cf. The statement from the G8 Summit held in Heiligendamm on 8 June 2007 on combating





social and economic development and recognised it as an “engine for change” (with
the Arab Spring as an example). Governments of the G8 Member States were called
to provide an unconstrained, fast and secure Internet. Although the Message met
with a full understanding, and even approval, of the addressees, it did not translate
into any specific recommendations.59 At the subsequent G8/G7 summits60 (the 2012
Summit in Camp David, the 2013 Summit in Lough Erne, the 2014 Summit in
Brussels, and the 2015 Summit in Schloss Elmau), the issues of cybercrime were not
dealt with, while at the 2016 Summit in Ise-Shima (Japan, the 26th–27th of May
2016), cyberspace security was again one of the most important subjects of the
debate. In the declaration61 adopted at that Summit, it was stressed that a secure
cyberspace was one of the main contributors to economic growth and prosperity. An
undertaking was, therefore, made to establish close cooperation against the mali-
cious use of cyberspace both by state and non-state parties, including terrorist units.
The existing international law was again recognised as applicable to states’ opera-
tions in cyberspace. An undertaking was made to protect and promote human rights
on the Internet, and to support a multilateral approach to Internet management
entailing a full and active involvement, inter alia, of governments, private sector
entities, civic societies, technological communities and international organisations.
The specific duties and roles of countries in the tele-information environment aimed
at ensuring security, stability and prosperity were stressed. Finally, a promise was
made to establish a new G7 working group for cyberspace, with a view to facilitating
concerted measures to ensure security and stability in cyberspace.
At the 2017 Summit in Taormina (Italy, 27 May 2017), attention was drawn to the
fact that cyber attacks targeted at critical infrastructures worldwide highlighted the
need to strengthen international cooperation aimed at ensuring cyberspace security
as a condition precedent to economic growth and prosperity.62
At the subsequent summits, taking place on 8–9 June 2018 in Charlevoix,
Canada,63 and on 24–26 August 2019 in Biarritz, France,64 the issues of cybercrime
and cybersecurity were barely touched upon. The 2020 Summit was planned to be
held in March in Camp David. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was
cancelled and a series of videoconferences were organised instead.
59Gercke (2011), p 181.
60In consequence of the events taking place in Ukraine in 2014, the G7 formula was restored, with
Russia’s membership being “on suspension”. Thus, the 2014 Summit which was initially planned to
be organised in Sochi was eventually held in Brussels (without Russia’s attendance).
61G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2016shima/ise-shima-
declaration-en.html, Accessed on 1 December 2020.
62Taormina Leaders’ Communiqué; http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2017taormina/
communique.html, accessed on 1 December 2020.
63The Charlevoix G7 Summit Communiqué, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/
index.html, accessed on 1 December 2020.
64G7 Biarritz Leaders’ Declaration; http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2019biarritz/declaration-of-
leaders.html; accessed on 1 December 2020.
International Regulations of Cybersecurity 69
References
Adamski A (2000) Prawo karne komputerowe, Warsaw
Adamski A (2001) Przestępczość w cyberprzestrzeni. Prawne środki przeciwdziałania zjawisku
w Polsce na tle projektu konwencji Rady Europy, Toruń
Adamski A (2011) Cyberprzestępczość – rozwój regulacji prawnej w Europie. Doświadczenia
krajowe na tle implementacji prawnych instrumentów zwalczania cyberprzestępczości, London,
11–12 November 2010). Prokuratura i Prawo 6
Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz K (2019) Cyberodpowiedzialność, Toruń
Gercke M (2011) Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries. https://www.itu.
int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/ITU_Guide_A5_12072011.pdf. Accessed 10 Oct 2020
Hubbard AM, Schjølberg S. Harmonizing national legal approaches on cybercrime. http://www.itu.
int/osg/spu/cybersecurity//docs/Background_Paper_Harmonizing_National_and_Legal_
Approaches_on_Cybercrime.pdf. Accessed 10 Oct 2020
Kubicka J (2007) International organizations – The United Nations Organization – its activity and
reforms. Dąbrowa Górnicza
Łoś-Nowak T (2009) (ed) Organizacje w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Istota – Mechanizmy
działania – Zasięg, Warsaw
Radoniewicz F (2016) Odpowiedzialność karna za hacking i inne przestępstwa przeciwko danym
komputerowym i systemom informatycznym, Warsaw
Radoniewicz F (2019) In: Kitler W, Taczkowska-Olszewska J, Radoniewicz F (eds) Ustawa o
krajowym systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa. Komentarz, Warsaw
Schjølberg S. The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime Legislation – The Road to
Geneva, http://www.cybercrimelaw.net. Accessed 10 Oct 2020
Sieber U (1998) Legal Aspects of Computer-Related Crime in the Information Society – Comcrime-
Study, Würzburg
Tarnogórski R (2009) Konwencja o cyberprzestępczości – międzynarodowa odpowiedź na
przestępczość ery informacyjnej. In: Madej M, Terlikowski M (eds) Bezpieczeństwo
teleinformatyczne państwa, Warsaw
Filip Radoniewicz PhD; legal advisor; adjunct in the Department of Cybersecurity Law and New
Technologies at the Institute of Law, War Studies University, Warsaw; expert at the Academic
Centre for Cybersecurity Policy, (War Studies University) and in the Ministry of Justice; he worked
as an assistant judge (in the Fourth Criminal and Sixth Penitentiary Department of the Regional
Court in Lublin); graduate of post-graduate studies: “European Union Law” at the Jagiellonian
University, “Human Rights and Freedoms”, co-organized by the Institute of Legal Sciences of the
Polish Academy of Sciences and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, and “Computer
Network Administration” at the Lublin University of Technology; author or co-author of approx-
imately fifty publications, mainly in the field of broadly understood criminal law, new technology
law and human rights. Selected publications: F. Radoniewicz (2016) Odpowiedzialność karna za
hacking i inne przestępstwa przeciwko danym komputerowym i systemom informatycznym/Crim-
inal liability for hacking and other offences against computer data and information systems/,
Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa; Ustawa o krajowym systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa. Komentarz /Act
on the National Cybersecurity System. Commentary/ (2019) ed. W. Kitler, J. Taczkowska-
Olszewska, F. Radoniewicz, CH. Beck, Warszawa.
70 F. Radoniewicz
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
International Regulations of Cybersecurity 71
Cybersecurity in the European Union Law
Filip Radoniewicz
Abstract The first legal acts adopted within the framework of the European Com-
munities were adopted in the early nineties. However, they were not binding. They
contained calls for appropriate actions, identification of some solutions, proposals
for draft legal acts, strategies and action plans to improve network security.
This chapter, however, highlights the most important binding acts: the first
binding EU legal instrument to combat computer crime: Council Framework Deci-
sion 2005/222/JHA of the 24th of February 2005 on attacks against information
systems, Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the
12th of August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA and Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of the 6th of July 2016 concerning measures for a high
common level of security of network and information systems across the Union.
1 Introduction
When discussing European Union activities in the field of cybersecurity and com-
bating cybercrime, it appears advisable to go back to the 1990s, when the first
non-binding legal Acts were adopted to regulate these matters. They called for the
implementing of the appropriate measures, indicating specific solutions or proposals
for the draft legal Acts, as well as the developing of strategies and action plans to
improve network security. In this context, the following documents are worth
noting:
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1. Council Decision 92/242/EEC of the 31st of March 1992 in the Field of Security
of Information Systems;1
2. Council Recommendation 95/144/EC of the 7th of April 1995 on Common
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria;2
3. Communication COM(2000)890 EU from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions of the 26th of January 2001: Creating a safer information society
by improving the security of information infrastructures and combating
computer-related crime (the so-called Communication on Cybercrime);
4. The Resolution of Parliament of the 19th of May 2002 Calling for Legislative
Measures Against High-Tech Crime;3
5. Communication COM(2001)298 from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions, of the 6th of June 2001: Network and information security:
Proposal for a European policy approach;4
6. Council Recommendation of the 25th of June 2001 on Contact Points
Maintaining a 24-h Service for Combating High-Tech Crime;5
7. The Council Resolution of the 28th of January 2002 on a Common Approach
and Specific Actions in the Field of Network and Information Security;6
8. Communication COM (2006)251 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, of the 31st of May 2006: A strategy for a secure information
society: Dialogue, partnership and empowerment;
9. Communication COM (2006)288 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, of the 15th of July 2006 on counteracting spam, spyware and
malicious software;
10. Communication COM (2007)267 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions of the 22nd of May
2007: Towards a general policy on the cybercrime prevention, extending the
so-called Communication on Cybercrime of 2001;
1Council Decision 92/242/EEC of 31 March 1992 in the Field of Security of Information Systems
(OJ EU L 123/19).
2Council Recommendation 95/144/EC of 7 April 1995 on Common Information Technology
Security Evaluation Criteria, OJ EC 1995 C 93/27.
3The Resolution of Parliament of 19 May 2002 Calling for Legislative Measures Against High-
Tech Crime, Unpublished.
4Unauthorised access to information systems, disruptive attacks on information systems, malicious
software, misrepresentation (using other person’s data with fraudulent intentions—this not only
concerned identity theft but also spoofing).
5Council Recommendation of 25 June 2001 on Contact Points Maintaining a 24-h Service for
Combating High-Tech Crime Official Journal C 187 of 3.07.2001, p. 5.
6The Council Resolution of 28 January 2002 on a Common Approach and Specific Actions in the
Field of Network and Information Security, OJ EC 2002 C 43/2.
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11. Communication COM (2009)149 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions of the 30th of March 2009 on Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection: Protecting Europe from large scale cyber attacks and disruptions:
enhancing preparedness, security and resilience” together with a report on multi-
annual wide-scale European consultations regarding network security;7
12. Commission Staff Working Document—Assessment of the EU 2013 Cyberse-
curity Strategy;8
13. Council Decision of the 23rd of September 2013 on the Security Rules for
Protecting EU Classified Information (2013/488/EU);9
14. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strat-
egy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace.10
15. The eEurope – An Information Society for All initiative was launched at the end
of 1999.11 The Communication regarding the Commission’s initiative was
prepared for the special meeting of the European Council in Lisbon on the
23rd–24th of March 2000, the objective of which was to streamline the activities
facilitating the creation of an information society. It was stressed in the Com-
munication that the computerisation process must cover all aspects of European
residents’ lives, including in particular work, home, school, university,
healthcare, transport, and contacts with public administration. The document
identified ten fields on which special emphasis should be placed with a view to
building an information society. According to Kuliński, these fields can be
divided into three groups, centred on infrastructure (ensuring low-cost access
to the Internet, and building fast Internet connections intended for scientific and
academic circles),
16. research and education (in particular, providing Internet connections in schools,
and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in implementing advanced
technologies),
17. applications (accelerating the development of e-commerce, smart cards,
e-health, e-government, smart transport).12
At the aforementioned special meeting of the European Council, which took
place in Lisbon on the 23rd–24th of March 2000, the eEurope programme was
7Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 233–236.
8Commission Staff Working Document—Assessment of the EU 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy SWD
(2017) 295 final of 13.9.2017.
9Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the Security Rules for Protecting EU Classified
Information (2013/488/EU), OJ EU 2012 L 27/1.
10Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe
and Secure Cyberspace JOIN(2013) 1 final.
11Commission Communication COM (1999) 687: eEurope – An Information Society for All.
12Kuliński (2010), pp. 23–24. Cf. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 266–269.
Cybersecurity in the European Union Law 75
approved, and the so-called Lisbon Strategy was adopted. The Lisbon Strategy was a
long-term socio-economic development programme for the European Union, the
purpose of which was to make Europe the most dynamic and competitive economic
region in the world by building the knowledge-based economy (i.e. an economy
directly based on production, distribution, and the use of information and
knowledge).13
In June 2000, at the meeting in Santa Maria de Feira, eEurope 2002 – An
Information Society for All. Action Plan was adopted.
The measures implemented within the framework of the eEurope 2002
programme were maintained in the eEurope 2005 programme, and then in the
i2010 Strategy announced in Commission Communication COM(2005)229 of the
1st of June 2005: i2010 – A European Information Society for Growth and Employ-
ment. Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (COM
(2010)2020), which was approved by the European Council on the 17th of June
2010, serves as a follow-up to the i2010 programme. It is within its framework that
the European digital agenda has been implemented. Its objective is to develop a
uniform digital market enabling EU Member States to derive permanent economic
and social benefits.
At the meeting of the European Council which took place on the 4th–5th of
November 2004 in Brussels, an action plan in the fields of justice and internal affairs
was adopted. It was referred to as the Hague Programme, as it was developed during
the Netherlands’ Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
The Hague Programme’s implementation was continued in the so-called Stock-
holm Programme—An Open and Safe Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens—
adopted during Sweden’s Presidency at the meeting in Brussels on the 10th–11th of
December 2009. It was implemented within the framework of the action plan
adopted by the Commission on the 20th of April 2010. It recommended that an
internal security strategy be developed for the EU, directed at increasing the protec-
tion of citizens and at effectively combating serious crime, organised crime, and
terrorism, by strengthening cooperation between the police and the judicial services
in criminal cases, and Member States’ cooperation in the field of border manage-
ment, citizen protection and assistance in the event of natural disasters or catastro-
phes. Other guidelines regarding the development planning of the AFSJ (the area of
freedom, security and justice) were laid down by the European Council on 26th–27th
of June 2014. However, these were not turned into a programme, as had been done
with previous guidelines, but were included in the European Union conclusions. In
the document entitled The Continuation of Work on a Comprehensive Approach to
Cybersecurity and Cybercrime, ensuring cybersecurity was considered a principal
measure directed at providing EU citizens with real security space.14
13See more e.g. Radoniewicz (2019a), pp. 13–14.
14Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 269–270.
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On the 6th of May 2015, A Digital Single Market Strategy15 was adopted, its
purpose being to develop a uniform legal framework for the EU digital market.
2 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of the 24th
of February 2005 on Attacks Against Information
Systems
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of the 24th of February 2005 on
attacks against information systems16 was the first binding EU legal instrument the
objective of which was to combat computer crime. In principle, the document
included definitions of the most pertinent concepts (“information system,” “com-
puter data,” “legal person” and “without right”), and obliged Member States to
consider illegal access to information systems and illegal system interference as
punishable offences. Reference was also made to the liability of legal persons,
jurisdiction, and the establishing of a network of points of contact’ maintaining a
24-h service, available 7 days a week, to facilitate the exchange of information on
attacks against information systems. The limited number of crimes defined in
Framework Decision 2005/222, along with the need to recognise new threats, as
well as the intent to adjust the regulations to new EU initiatives in the field of
cybersecurity, and to supplement them in order to arrive at a comprehensive regu-
lation of this subject matter, eventually led to a decision on developing a new legal
instrument concerning cybercrime. Work on the new regulation coincided with the
adopting of the Treaty of Lisbon, which made it possible to use the directive for
regulating cybercrime issues.
3 Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of the 12th of August 2013 on Attacks
Against Information Systems
In Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 12th
of August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA,17 the provisions of Framework Decision
15A Digital Single Market Strategy Communication COM (2015)192 from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the
Regions. Cf. Radoniewicz (2019a), pp. 14–15.
16Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information
systems, OJ EU 2005 L 69/67.
17Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on
attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, OJ
EU 2013 L218/8.
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2005/222 were generally upheld, but a number of new solutions were added. New
types of criminal offences were envisaged (e.g. the illegal interception of computer
data, and crimes involving “hacking tools”), and additional circumstances were
defined, along with committing crime within a criminal organisation, as provided
for in Framework Decision 2005/222 (though with more stringent sanctions), which
Member States should obligatorily treat as increasing criminal liability. These
included ‘botnet’ attacks, causing serious harm (such issues as causing serious
harm or influencing material interests were also envisaged in the Framework Deci-
sion, but that provision was of a non-obligatory character), committing an offence
against an information system with critical-infrastructure status, and another per-
son’s true identity’s being used by the perpetrator.18
4 Directive 2017/541 (EU) of the European Parliament
and of the Council of the 15th of March 2017
on Combating Terrorism
Directive 2017/541/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of the 15th of
March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA19 and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA,20 is the major
legal instrument whose purpose is to combat terrorism in the European Union.
Under Article 3 of Directive 2017/541, in order for an illegal act to be considered
a terrorist offence, it must meet the objective criterion of being one of the acts listed
in the closed-ended list contained in that article, or involve a threat of such an act’s
being committed. In addition, it must satisfy at least one of the premises listed further
in the definition, concerning the perpetrator’s purpose, i.e. it must be committed with
the intention of
1. seriously intimidating a population, or
2. unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or
abstain from performing any act, or
3. seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional,
economic, or social structures of a country or an international organisation.
The list referred to above contains, inter alia, the illegal acts as defined in Articles
4 and 5 of Directive 2013/40 (illegal system interference and illegal data interfer-
ence, respectively) provided that any of the aggravating circumstances listed in the
directive are found to have occurred (as regards the act defined in Article 4, when the
18See more e.g. Radoniewicz (2017), pp. 303–317.
19About Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA see e.g. Radoniewicz (2015), pp. 192–196.
20Directive 2017/541/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 March 2017 on
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ EU 2017 L 88/6.
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perpetrator’s action involving the use of hacking software affected a large number of
information systems, or the act caused serious damage to or was directed against an
information system with critical-infrastructure status; and as regards the act as
defined in Article 5, when the act was committed against an information system
with critical-infrastructure status).21 Furthermore, Member States were obliged to
take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal of online content consti-
tuting a public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, or to block access to such
content when its removal is not feasible (Article 21 of Directive 2017/541).22
5 Directive 2008/114/EC of the 8th of December 2008
on the Identification and Designation of European
Critical Infrastructures
With a view to raising the security level of critical infrastructures of supra-national
significance, Council Directive 2008/114/EC of the 8th of December 2008 on the
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures, and the assess-
ment of the need to improve their protection, was adopted.23 Under Article 2(a) of
the Directive, “critical infrastructure” means an asset, system, or part thereof located
in Member States, which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions:
health, safety, security, the economic or social well-being of people, the disruption
or destruction of which would have a significant impact on a Member State as a
result of the failure to maintain those functions; and “The European critical infra-
structure”, or “ECI”, as defined in Article 2(b) of the Directive, means a critical
infrastructure located in Member States whose disruption or destruction would have
a significant impact on at least two Member States. The significance of this impact is
assessed in terms of cross-cutting criteria. These include the effects resulting from
cross-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure. Under Article 3(2) of the
Directive, the cross-cutting criteria comprise the casualties’ criterion, the economic-
effects’ criterion, and the public-effects’ criterion. While the Directive is focused on
the energy and transport sectors, its extension is planned to include other sectors,
e.g. the information-and-communication-technology (ICT) sector.
21See more: Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 266–267.
22See more e.g. Radoniewicz (2019b), pp. 193–205.
23Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of
European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (Text
with EEA relevance), OJ EU 2008 L 345/7.
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6 Directive 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks
and Services (A Framework Directive)
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 7th of
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications
networks and services (A Framework Directive)24 lays down a common regulatory
framework for electronic-communications networks, i.e. transmission systems,
which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical, or other electromag-
netic means, including satellite networks, fixed and mobile terrestrial networks,
electricity-cable systems, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and
cable-television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed, as well
as for electronic-communications services, which consist of the conveyance of
signals on those networks, and the associated equipment and services related to
electronic-communications networks and services, which facilitate or support the
provision of services by such networks. It also lays down tasks of national regulatory
authorities, and establishes a set of procedures to ensure the harmonised application
of the regulatory framework throughout the Community (Article 1(1) of Directive
2002/21/EC).
The issue of network security is discussed in Chapter IIIa of Directive 2002/21/
EC, which was added by way of a directive 2009/140/EC of the 25th of November
2009,25 which became effective on the 19th of December 2009.
Under Article 13a (1) of Directive 2002/21/EC, Member States were obliged to
ensure that undertakings providing public-communications networks or publicly
available electronic-communications services take the appropriate technical and
organisational measures to properly manage the risks posed to the security of
networks and services. These measures are expected to ensure a level of security
commensurate to the risk presented, having regard to the state of the art. In
particular, measures should be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security
incidents on users and interconnected networks.
Member States are also required to ensure that undertakings providing public-
communications networks take all the appropriate steps to guarantee the integrity of
their networks, and thus ensure the continuity of the supply of the services provided
over those networks (Article 13a (2) of Directive 2002/21/EC), and that undertak-
ings providing public-communications networks or publicly available electronic-
24Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework
Directive), OJ EC 2002 L 108/33.
25Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communica-
tions networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic commu-
nications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic
communications networks and services (OJ EU 2013 L 337/37).
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communications services take the appropriate technical and organisational measures
to properly manage the risks posed to the security of networks and services (Article
13a (3) of Directive 2002/21/EC).
With a view to implementing the provisions of Article 13a, the responsible
national regulatory authorities need to be vested with the power to issue binding
instructions, including those regarding time limits for implementation, to undertak-
ings providing public-communications networks or publicly available electronic-
communications services (Article 13b (1) of Directive 2002/21/EC).
Under Article 13b (2) of Directive 2002/21/EC, undertakings providing public-
communications networks or publicly available electronic-communications services
should be required to notify the responsible national regulatory authority of every
breach of security or loss of integrity, which has had a significant impact on the
operation of networks or services.
Member States are expected to ensure that the responsible national regulatory
authorities have the power to require undertakings providing public-
communications networks or publicly available electronic-communications services
to
(a) provide the information needed to assess the security and/or integrity of their
services and networks, including documented security policies; and
(b) submit to a security audit performed by a qualified independent body or a
responsible national authority, and make the results thereof available to the
national regulatory authority. The cost of the audit will be met by the undertak-
ing (Article 13b (2) of Directive 2002/21/EC).
Article 13b (3) of Directive 2002/21/EC provides for vesting national regulatory
authorities with all the powers necessary to investigate cases of non-compliance and
the effects thereof on the security and integrity of networks.
7 Directive 2006/24/EC on the Retention of Data Generated
or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly
Available Electronic Communications Services or
of Public Communications Networks
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 15th of
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC,26 aimed to
26Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC, OJ EU 2006 L 105/54 (no longer in force).
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harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the obligations of the providers of
publicly available electronic-communications services or of public-communications
networks in respect of the retention of so-called transmission data (i.e. traffic and
location data, and related data necessary to identify the subscriber or registered user)
which are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are
available for the purposes of the investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious
crimes, as defined by each Member State in its national law (Article 1). At the same
time, the Directive (in Article 3) obliges Member States to adopt measures to ensure
that these data (specified in detail in Article 5) are retained in accordance with the
provisions thereof, to the extent that they are generated or processed by providers of
publicly available electronic-communications services, or of a public-
communications network within their jurisdiction, in the process of supplying the
communications services concerned. The obligation to retain data includes the
retention of data in the event of unsuccessful call attempts where those data are
generated or processed and stored (as regards telephone data) or saved while users’
logging in (as regards Internet data), by providers of publicly available electronic-
communications services, or of a public-communications network within the juris-
diction of the Member State involved in the process of supplying the communica-
tions services concerned. Under Article 6, these categories of data are retained for
periods of not less than six months and not more than two years from the date of the
communication. This Directive was implemented by Member States (obviously
including Poland) but it was then deemed invalid by the Court of Justice decision
of the 8th of April 2014.27 However, the decision did not cause all the provisions
adopted in the course of the Directive transposition to be repealed. The basis for data
retention in EU law is thus still provided by Article 15(1) of the Privacy Directive.
8 Regulation No 910/2014 on Electronic Identification
and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions
in the Internal Market (eIDAS)
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the
23rd of July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic trans-
actions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC28 (eIDAS) lays
down a new system of secure electronic interactions across the EU between busi-
nesses, citizens, and public authorities.
27Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd vs. the Minister for
Communications et al., ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
28Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, OJ EU 2014 L 257/73, (hereinafter referred as eIDAS).
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1. It also lays down the conditions under which Member States recognise electronic-
identification means of natural and legal persons falling under a notified
electronic-identification scheme of another Member State,
2. It lays down the rules for trust services, in particular for electronic
transactions, and
3. It establishes a legal framework for electronic signatures, electronic seals, elec-
tronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic registered-delivery services,
and certificate services for website authentication (Article 1).
Under the regulation on trust services, qualified and non-qualified trust-service
providers29 are obliged to take the appropriate technical and organisational mea-
sures, having regard to the latest technological developments, to manage the risks
posed to the security of the trust services they provide, while also ensuring that the
level of security is commensurate to the degree of risk. In particular, they are
expected to take measures to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents,
and to inform stakeholders of the adverse effects of any such incidents.
Qualified and non-qualified trust-service providers must, without undue delay,
but in any case within 24 h after having become aware of it, notify the supervisory
body, and, where applicable, other relevant bodies, such as the authorised national
body for information security or the data-protection authority, of any breach of
security or loss of integrity which has a significant impact on the trust service
provided, or on the personal data maintained therein. Furthermore, where the breach
of security or loss of integrity is likely to adversely affect a natural or legal person to
whom the trust service has been provided, the trust-service provider must also notify
the natural or legal person of the breach of security or loss of integrity without undue
delay. Where appropriate, in particular if a breach of security or loss of integrity
concerns two or more Member States, the notified supervisory body is obliged to
inform the supervisory authorities in the other Member States concerned, and
ENISA (The European Network and Information Security Agency; currently—The
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity).
29Under Article 3(19), in conjunction with Article 3(20) of the Regulation on trust services, the term
“trust-service provider” means a natural or a legal person who provides one or more trust services,
either as a qualified (i.e. satisfying certain additional requirements stipulated in the regulation) or as
a non-qualified trust-service provider. “Trust service” means an electronic service normally for
remuneration which consists of:
(1) the creation, verification, and validation of electronic signatures, electronic seals, or electronic
time stamps, electronic registered delivery services and the certificates related to those
services; or
(2) the creation, verification, and validation of certificates for website authentication; or
(3) the preservation of electronic signatures, seals, or certificates related to those services.
Finally, “qualified trust service” means a trust service which meets the applicable requirements
laid down in the regulation on trust services.
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9 Directive 2016/1148 Concerning Measures for a High
Common Level of Security of Network and Information
Systems Across the Union
The draft version of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 July 2016, concerning measures for a high common level of security of
network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive)30 was presented
in 2013 as a major element in the Cybersecurity Strategy, its underlying objective
being to ensure a high level of security of network and information systems (hence
the Directive is commonly abbreviated as the NIS Directive) at the EU level, i.e. to
increase the security of tele-information systems forming the basis for the function-
ing of the modern societies and economies of EU Member States, which is to
improve the functioning of the EU internal market. To this end, Article 2(1) of the
NIS Directive provides for
1. laying down obligations for all Member States to adopt a national strategy on the
security of network and information systems
2. creating a cooperation group in order to support and facilitate strategic coopera-
tion and the exchange of information among Member States, and to develop trust
and confidence amongst them creating a computer security incident response
team (CSIRT) network in order to contribute to the development of trust and
confidence between Member States, and to promote swift and effective opera-
tional cooperation
3. establishing security and notification requirements for operators of essential
services and for digital service providers
4. laying down obligations for Member States to designate the responsible national
authorities, single points of contact, and CSIRTs, with tasks related to the security
of network and information systems.
The requirements concerning security and incident reporting, as stipulated in the
NIS Directive, are not applicable to undertakings which are subject to the require-
ments arising from Articles 13a and 13b of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002, on a common regulatory framework
for electronic communications networks and services (A Framework Directive)
(i.e. to undertakings providing public-communications networks or publicly avail-
able electronic-communications services), or to trust-service providers which are
subject to the requirements arising from Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014
of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 23rd of July 2014 on electronic
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
30Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems
across the Union, OJ EU 2016 L 194/1, (hereinafter referred as “NIS Directive”).
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The NIS Directive is without prejudice to the actions taken by Member States to
safeguard their essential state functions, in particular to safeguard national security,
including actions protecting information whose disclosure Member States consider
contrary to the essential interests of their security, and to maintain law and order, in
particular to facilitate the investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal
offences (Article 2(6)). It should be stressed that it provides for minimum
harmonisation, as, under Article 4, Member States may adopt or maintain provisions
with a view to achieving a higher level of security of network and information
systems.
For the purpose of the NIS Directive (Article 4(1)), “network and information
systems” are defined as
(a) electronic-communications networks within the meaning of point (a) of Article
2 of Directive 2002/21/EC
(b) any devices or groups of interconnected or related devices, one or more of
which, pursuant to a programme, perform automatic processing of digital
data; or
(c) digital data stored, processed, retrieve or transmitted by elements covered under
points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection, and
maintenance.
The security of network and information systems is understood as the ability of
network and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action
which compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity, or confidentiality of
stored or transmitted or processed data, or the related services offered by, or
accessible via, those network and information systems (Article 4(2)). The operator
of essential services means a public or private entity of a type referred to in Annex II
(energy, transport, banking, financial-markets infrastructure, healthcare,
water-supply and digital infrastructure). Digital services were specified in Annex
III (online marketplace, online search engine, cloud-computing services).
In compliance with the NIS Directive, Member States are obliged to identify the
operators which are subject to the Directive within each of the sectors listed in Annex
II. It is not required to identify all services, but only those of major significance to
social and economic interests, and which could be subjected to significant disruptive
effects. The significance of a disruptive effect is determined by taking into account
the factors listed in Article 6 of the NIS Directive. These refer to the number of users
relying on the service provided by the entity concerned, the dependency of other
sectors (referred to in Annex II) on the service provided by that entity, the impact
which incidents could have on economic and societal activities or public safety, the
relative impact of social and economic interests, market share, geographical spread,
etc. Chapter II governs the national frameworks on the security of network and
information systems. Article 7 obliges each Member State to adopt a national-
security strategy, while at the same time defining the issues to be considered therein.
Article 8 obliges each Member State to designate competent authorities on the
security of network and information systems (supervising their compliance with
the provisions implementing the NIS Directive) and single points of contact. The
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Directive provides for establishing computer security incident response teams
(CSIRTs) (Article 9) charged with the management of risks and incidents in the
sectors defined in Annex II, and in the services listed in Annex III. Furthermore, the
NIS Directive provides for cooperation at the national level between competent
authorities, single points of contact, and CSIRTs (Article 10). Cooperation between
Member States was regulated in Chapter III, which envisages establishing a Coop-
eration Group (Article 11) composed of representatives of Member States, the
Commission, and ENISA, and entrusted with providing strategic guidance for the
activities of the CSIRT network, exchanging information and best practices, etc.
Article 12 obliges Member States to establish a national CSIRT network, the
principal duty of which will be to ensure coordinated response to incidents. The
NIS Director provides for certain security and incident-reporting obligations to be
imposed both on operators of essential services (Article 14) and on digital service
providers (Article 16).31
There are numerous documents related to the NIS Directive, including legal Acts
of a binding and non-binding character:
1. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of the 30th of January
2018 laying down the rules for the application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards further specification of the
elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for managing the
risks posed to the security of network and information systems, and of the
parameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact.32
2. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/179 of the 1st of February 2017
laying down the procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the
Cooperation Group, pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, concerning measures for a high com-
mon level of security of network and information systems across the Union.33
3. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: Making the most of NIS—towards the effective implementation of
31Savin (2017), pp. 347–348.
32Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for
application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for
managing the risks posed to the security of network and information systems and of the parameters
for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact, OJ EU 2018 L 26/48.
33Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/179 of 1 February 2017 laying down procedural
arrangements necessary for the functioning of the Cooperation Group pursuant to Article 11(5) of
the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ EU
2017 L 28/7.
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Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of
security of network and information systems across the Union.34
4. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of the 13th of September 2017
on coordinated responses to large-scale cybersecurity-incidents and crises.35
5. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council—Resilience,
Deterrence, and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU.36
10 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 Establishing the European
Electronic Communications Code
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 11th
of December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code
(Recast) (Text with EEA relevance)37 recast and replaced Directives 2002/19/EC,
2002/20/EC and 2002/21/EC (with subsequent amendments), the provisions of
which were meant to be transposed to the legal order of EU Member States by
2003. The new provisions included in Directive (EU) 2018/1972 should be
implemented in the legal order of EU Member States by the 21st of December
2020, and will be deemed applicable from that date. The Directive entered into force
on the 20th of December 2018.38
34Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Making the
most of NIS—towards the effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the
Union COM(2017) 476 final 2.
35Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September 2017 on coordinated response
to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises, OJ EU 2017 L 239/36.
36Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council—Resilience, Deterrence, and
Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU JOIN(2017) 450 final.
37Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) Text with EEA relevance.
PE/52/2018/REV/1, OJ EU 2018L 321/36.
38Article 125 of the Code stipulates that Directives 2002/19/EC [Directive 2002/19/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the access to and the interconnection of
electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) (OJ EC 2002 L
108/7], 2002/20/EC [Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authori-
sation Directive) (OJ EC 2002 L 108/21], 2002/21/EC [Directive 2002/21/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services (A Framework Directive) (OJ EC 2002 L 108/33], and
2002/22/EC [Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
(Universal Service Directive) (OJ EC 2002 L 108/51], listed in Annex XII, Part A, will be repealed
on 21 December 2020 without prejudice to the obligations of Member States relating to the time-
limits for the transposition into national law and the dates of application of the Directives set out in
Annex XII, Part B. Article 5 of Decision 243/2012/UE [Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing a multi-annual radio spectrum policy
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Directive 2018/1972 is a set of new or updated solutions regulating activities in
the communications sector, i.e. issues pertinent to electronic-communications net-
works (tele-communications networks), communications services, and associated
equipment and services. It also defines the expertise of national regulatory bodies
and other responsible entities, and also envisages a range of procedures serving the
purpose of harmonising the regulatory frameworks across the EU. Its aim is to
promote the internal market in the field of electronic-communications networks
and services, e.g. by stimulating competition and increasing investments in 5G and
high-capacity networks, leading to the proliferation of such networks, the achieve-
ment of sustainable competition, the development of the interoperability of
electronic-communications services, accessibility, network and services securing,
and the provision of other benefits to end users, so as to ensure that all EU citizens
and businesses can use high-quality communications, enjoy a guaranteed high level
of consumer protection, and choose from a wide range of innovative digital services.
This involves ensuring the provision, throughout the Union, of good-quality, afford-
able, publicly available services through effective competition and choice, to deal
with circumstances in which the needs of end-users, including those with disabilities,
in order to access the services on an equal basis with others are not being satisfac-
torily met by the market, and to lay down the necessary end-user rights (Article 1
(2) of Directive 2018/1972).
In compliance with Directive 2018/1972, national regulatory bodies and other
responsible bodies, as well as BEREC,39 the Commission, and Member States,
should seek to attain the following general objectives.
1. To promote connectivity with and access to, and the take-up of, very-high-
capacity networks, including fixed, mobile, and wire-less networks, by all citi-
zens and businesses of the Union
2. To promote competition in the provision of electronic-communications net-
works and associated facilities, including efficient infrastructure-based compe-
tition, and in the provision of electronic-communications services and
associated services
3. To contribute to the development of the internal market in the field of commu-
nications networks and services in the EU by
(a) removing the existing obstacles to investments in electronic-communications
networks, associated facilities and services, and electronic-communications
services
programme. Text with EEA relevance (OJ EU 2012 L 81/7)] is removed, effective on
21 December 2020.
39The Commission, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) is
expected to ensure that EU regulations are complied with in a consistent manner to facilitate the
efficient functioning of the single electronic-communications market across the EU. It provides
advice to EU institutions, whether at their request or on its own initiative. BEREC includes the
so-called regulatory authorities council, which is composed of heads of the national regulatory
bodies from each EU Member State (or designated senior representatives of those bodies).
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(b) rendering such networks and facilities accessible
(c) providing such services across the Union
(d) facilitating the consolidation of terms and conditions governing investments
in such networks, facilities and services, as well as rendering them accessible
and ensuring their provision
4. To develop common rules and predictable regulatory approaches as regards
(a) favouring the effective, efficient, and coordinated use of radio spectra
(b) open innovation
(c) the establishment and development of trans-European networks
(d) the provision, availability, and interoperability of pan-European services and
end-to-end connectivity
5. To promote the interests of the citizens of the Union by ensuring connectivity and
the widespread availability and take-up of very-high-capacity networks, includ-
ing fixed, mobile, and wire-less networks, and of electronic-communications
services by
(a) enabling the generating of maximum benefits in terms of choice, price, and
quality, on the basis of effective competition
(b) maintaining the security of networks and services
(c) ensuring a high and common level of protection for end-users through the
necessary sector-specific rules, and
(d) addressing the needs—such as affordable prices—of specific social groups, in
particular end-users with disabilities, elderly end-users, and end-users with
special social needs, and by providing choice and equal access for end-users
with disabilities.
Member States were obliged to ensure that entities providing public-
communications networks or publicly available electronic-communications services
take appropriate and commensurate technical and organisational measures to man-
age the risks posed to the security of networks and services. These measures must
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented, having regard to the state
of the art. In particular, measures, including encryption, where appropriate, are
required to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users, and on
other networks and services (Article 40(1)). The coordination of Member States will
be facilitated by ENISA in order to avoid diverging national requirements that might
create security risks and barriers to the internal market (Article 40(2)).
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11 Regulation (EU) No 2019/881 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019
on ENISA (The European Union Agency
for Cybersecurity) and on Information
and Communications Technology Cybersecurity
Certification, and Repealing Regulation (EU) No
526/2013
Finally, two entities, i.e. the European Agency and the European Cybercrime Centre,
are worth mentioning. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) was
set up as The European Network and Information Security Agency on the 15th of
March 2004 by way of Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of the 10th of March 2004 establishing the European Network
and Information Security Agency.40 Its objective is to provide assistance to EU
Member States regarding broadly understood cybersecurity issues, and to drive the
development of the information society. Under Article 27 of Regulation No
460/2004, the European Network and Information Security Agency was established
for a period of five years, starting from the 14th of March 2004. Its duration was then
extended twice by way of two subsequent regulations [Regulation No 1007/2008 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of the 24th of September 2008
amending Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and
Information Security Agency as regards its duration,41 and Regulation (EC) No
580/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 8th of June 2011
amending Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and
Information Security Agency as regards its duration42]. Then, the Agency operated
under Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of the 21st of May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security (ENISA),and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004,43 in
40Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004
establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency (Text with EEA relevance),
OJ EU 2004 L 77/1.
41Regulation (EC) No 1007/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September
2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information
Security Agency as regards its duration (Text with EEA relevance), OJ EU 2008 L293/1.
42Regulation (EU) No 580/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011
amending Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information
Security Agency as regards its duration Text with EEA relevance, OJ EU 2011 L 165/3.
43Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013
concerning the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 Text with EEA relevance, OJ EU 2013 L 165/4.
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which its duration was envisaged to continue for seven years. As was rightly noted
by C. Banasiński and W. Nowak, this limited duration, even if subsequently
extended, significantly reduced the Agency’s authority, hindering any long-term
planning, and affecting in a negative way the situation of the entities to which its
services were addressed. It was also contradictory to the NIS Directive which (see
further comments) entrusted the Agency with certain tasks.44 Regulation (EU) No
2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 17th of April 2019 on
ENISA (The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and
communications technology cybersecurity certification, and repealing Regulation
(EU) No 526/2013,45 put an end to the temporary character of the Agency. Not only
did it envisage the Agency’s duration to be unlimited, but it also vested new rights
and duties in the Agency (inter alia, relating to certification and normalisation).
The Regulation, along with determining the objectives and duties of ENISA, and
regulating its organisational matters, provides a framework for the establishment of
European cybersecurity certification schemes, for the purpose of ensuring an ade-
quate level of cybersecurity for ICT products, ICT services, and ICT processes in the
Union, as well as for the purpose of preventing the fragmentation of the internal
market with regard to cybersecurity certification schemes in the Union (Article 1(1)).
The framework provides for a mechanism to establish European cybersecurity
certification schemes, and to attest that ICT products, ICT services, and ICT pro-
cesses, which have been evaluated in accordance with such schemes comply with
specified security requirements for the purpose of protecting the availability, authen-
ticity, integrity, or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data, or the
functions or services offered by, or accessible via, those products, services, and
processes throughout their life cycle (Article 46(2)).
12 The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)
In turn, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) established by way of the Commu-
nication from the Commission to the European Parliament, and the Council, “Tack-
ling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre”,46 is in
charge of coordinating EU efforts aimed at tackling cybercrime. In addition, it
operates as a technical-expertise centre specialising in this field. Its capacities,
therefore, overlap with those of ENISA.
44Banasiński and Nowak (2018), p. 151.
45Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications
technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity
Act) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ EU 219 L 151/15.
46Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Tackling
Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre COM/2012/0140 final.
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National Cybersecurity System Act
Filip Radoniewicz
Abstract The Act of the 5th of July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System
(hereinafter referred to as “NCSA”), as indicated in the explanatory memorandum to
this act, is on the one hand an attempt to comprehensively regulate the national
cybersecurity system, which is a response to the constantly growing and dynamically
changing cyber threats, which may affect the security of the state, the economy and
society, and on the other hand it is the implementation of the Directive (EU) 2016/
1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 6th of July 2016
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and informa-
tion systems across the Union (the NIS Directive). The purpose of this chapter is a
brief description of the act and a synthetic presentation of the solutions it contains,
which will be discussed in detail later in the monograph.
1 Introduction
The Act of the 5th of July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System1 (hereinafter
the NCSA), as indicated in the substantiation to its draft version is, on the one hand,
an attempt at comprehensively regulating the national cybersecurity system, in
response to the ever-growing and dynamically evolving cyber threats, which may
potentially compromise the security of the State, the economy and society; on the
other hand, it is intended to implement the above-mentioned NIS Directive.
The national cybersecurity system is organised to ensure cybersecurity at the
national level, including the undisrupted provision of essential services and digital
services, by attaining a sufficient level of security of information systems serving the
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purpose of providing such services, and by ensuring incident handling (Article 3 of
the NCSA).
The Act regulates three problem areas: the organisation of the national cyberse-
curity system, and the duties and obligations of the entities, which form its part; the
procedure for supervising and inspecting compliance with the provisions of the Act;
and the scope of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland (which is
discussed in Chapter 13 of the NCSA).
The legislator has envisaged some exclusions in this respect, whether in whole or
in part. Namely, providers of trust services and entities conducting treatment activ-
ities, established by the Head of the Internal Security Agency or the Head of the
Intelligence service are wholly excluded from the Act, while telecommunications
enterprises are excluded in the part regarding security and incident reporting
requirements.
For the purpose of the NCSA, 19 definitions were formulated which, in view of
the significance of this regulation, should be considered systemic definitions. First
and foremost, the information system is understood as the ICT system (the
teleinformation system) referred to in Article 3(3) of the Act of the 17th of February
2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations of Entities Performing Public Tasks,
along with electronic data processed in that system (Article 2(14) of the NCSA).
Second, cybersecurity is viewed as the ability of information systems to resist any
action that compromises the confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of
processed data or related services rendered via such systems (Article 2(4) of the
NCSA).2
In Article 2(5) of the NCSA, an incident is defined as an event, which has, or may
have, an adverse impact on cybersecurity. The legislator has distinguished four
categories of incidents: a critical incident (Article 2 (6) of the NCSA), a serious
incident (Article 2 (7) of the NCSA), a substantial incident (Article 2 (8) of the
NCSA), and an incident occurring within a public entity (Article 2 (9) of the NCSA):
1. serious incidents (Article 2 (7) of the NCSA), which cause, or may cause, serious
detriment to quality or which result, or may result, in the discontinuation of the
provision of an essential service (as defined in Article 14 (3) of the NIS Directive,
incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of essential services);
2. substantial incidents (Article 2 (8) of theNCSA), which have a substantial impact on
the provision of a digital servicewithin themeaning ofArticle 4 of the Implementing
Regulation 2017/151 (as defined in Article 16 (3) of the NIS Directive, incidents
having a substantial impact on the provision of digital services);
3. incidents occurring within a public entity (Article 2 (9) of the NCSA), the
classification of an incident to this category is not based on its significance (the
impact threshold) but on the object of such impact, which is the ICT network used
for the processing of data connected with the implementation of public duties, by
public entities referred to in Article 4(7)-(15) of the NCSA, hence, all incidents,
which cause, or may cause, serious detriment or discontinuation of a public duty;
2See more e.g. Radoniewicz (2019), pp. 27–51.
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4. critical incidents (Article 2 (6) of the NCSA), which are incidents of the most
serious character, resulting in serious detriment to security or public order,
international interests, economic interests, activities of public institutions, civic
rights and freedoms, or human life and health, classified by the relevant CSIRT
MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV.3
2 Entities of the National Cybersecurity System
The national cybersecurity system covers, in particular, operators of essential ser-
vices (e.g. banks and enterprises from the energy sector), providers of digital
services (e.g. entrepreneurs conducting activities via e-commerce platforms), author-
ities competent for cybersecurity, i.e. public institutions whose competences include
supervising a given essential sector of economy (competent ministers, i.e. the
minister competent for energy, the minister competent for transport, the minister
competent for of maritime economy, the minister competent for inland navigation,
the minister competent for health, the Minister of National Defence, the minister—
competent for computerisation and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority), the
Computer Security Incident Response Teams established within the Internal Secu-
rity Agency (CSIRT GOV), the Research and Academic Computer Network,
National Research Institute (CSIRT NASK), the Ministry of National Defence
(CSIRT MON), sectoral cybersecurity teams, the Point of Single Contact for cyber-
security, the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, the College for Cyber-
security, and public entities listed in Article 4 of the NCSA. The above-listed entities
can be divided into:
1. administration entities—mainly serving supervisory and inspection functions
(listed in Article 4 (17)-(20) of the NCSA) or coordinating incident handling
(listed in Article 4 (3)-(6) of the NCSA);
2. participants: operators of essential services, digital service providers, and public
entities listed in Chapter 5 of the NCSA;
3. other entities, entities difficult to unambiguously classify, e.g. providers of
cybersecurity services.4
3 CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK and CSIRT GOV
While implementing the provisions of the NIS Directive on establishing Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), new entities were not established, but
the use was made of those already operating at the national level, on which the
3See more Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz et al. (2021), passim.
4Radoniewicz (2019), p. 54.
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obligations arising from the Directive were imposed. These included: CERT.GOV.
PL, MIL-CERT.PL and CERT POLSKA, i.e. currently CSIRT GOV, CSIRT MIL
and CSIRT NASK, respectively.
CSIRT GOV, the Government Computer Security Incident Response Team,
operating since January 2008 within the Internal Security Agency (as CERT.GOV.
PL). It is in charge of coordinating the handling of incidents reported by the entities
listed in Article 26 (7) of the NCSA (government administration, the National Bank
of Poland, and Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego). In addition, it is entrusted with
identifying, preventing and detecting threats to security, which are important for
ensuring the continuity of the functioning of the national ICT systems, utilised by
public administration authorities or a system of ICT networks forming part of critical
infrastructure. CSIRT MON (formerly MIL-CERT.PL), operating within the Com-
puter Incident Response System of the Ministry of National Defence (SRnIK RON),
performs duties in the field of coordinating the processes of preventing, detecting
and responding to computer incidents in the ICT systems and networks of that
Ministry. CSIRT MON coordinates the process of handling incidents reported by
the entities subordinated to or supervised by the Ministry of National Defence,
including entities whose ICT systems or networks are included in a consolidated
register of facilities, installations, devices and services forming parts of critical
infrastructure, referred to in Article 5b (7) (1) of the Act of the 26th of April 2007
on Crisis Management, and entrepreneurs of particular economic and defensive
significance. NASK (the Research and Academic Computer Network) is a national
research institute operating since 1993, which conducts scientific activities, runs the
national (.pl) domains register, and provides advanced ICT services. Since 1996,
CERT POLAND, currently CSIRT NASK, has been operating within its framework,
coordinating the process of handling incidents, which violate network security in the
“civil area” and, which occur within public networks, i.e. incidents reported by other
entities (not classified to any of the above-mentioned groups), including by operators
of essential services (excluding operators of critical infrastructure), digital services
providers, and local government authorities. Generally speaking, CSIRT NASK’s
competences cover all incidents reported by those entities, which do not fall within
the competences of CSIRT GOV and CSIRT MON (while the latter two are always,
regardless of the category of the reporting entity, in charge of terrorist incidents, and
CSIRT MON is also in charge of any incidents related to national defence). It is thus
referred to as the CERT of last resort, being the entity to whom all citizens (or, more
generally, all natural persons and organisational units) may report incidents. Fur-
thermore, if an entity cannot establish direct contact or receive the expected support
from the party directly involved in the incident, the reporting party files its query
with the CSIRT as a last resort.5 The tasks of, CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK and
CSIRT GOV are detailed described the chapter entitled “The main tasks of the team
network to respond to computer security incidents in the light of the Act on the
national cybersecurity system in Poland”.
5See Banasiński and Nowak (2018), pp. 161–162; Trąbiński (2018), pp. 76–78.
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4 The Competent Authorities for Cybersecurity
The competent authorities for cybersecurity are supreme authorities (i.e. competent
ministers, depending on the sector indicated in Appendix I to the Act, in which a
given operator of an essential service or a digital service provider conducts its
activities, the minister competent for energy, the minister competent for transport,
the minister competent for maritime economy, the minister competent for inland
navigation, the minister competent for health, the Minister of National Defence, or
the minister competent for computerisation), and one central authority (the Polish
Financial Supervision Authority), issuing decisions on recognising an entity as the
operator of an essential service (and also confirming the expiry of decisions made to
that effect) and supervising those entities. Their duties are discussed in the chapter
“The authorities competent for cybersecurity”.
5 The Minister Competent for Computerisation
and the Minister of National Defense
The minister competent for computerisation and the Minister of National Defense
play a special role in the national cybersecurity system. The cited regulations
referred to them are described in detail in separate chapters in part II of the
monograph. The contact point run by the minister competent for computerisation
ensures the exchange of information between various entities responsible for cyber-
security. Its duties include collecting serious or substantial incident reports from
other EU Member States, and passing them to CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT
GOV or sectoral cybersecurity teams; passing serious or substantial incident reports
concerning two or more EUMember States to other Member States; representing the
Republic of Poland in the Cooperation Group; cooperating with the European
Commission in the field of cybersecurity; coordinating the cooperation between
authorities competent for cybersecurity and public authorities with the competent
authorities in EU Member States; and ensuring information exchange for the Coop-
eration Group and CSIRT network purposes.6
6See more: chapter 16 “Role of Minister competent for computerisation in Cybersecurity system”.
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6 The Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity
This is a single-person function appointed and recalled by the President of the
Council of Ministers to coordinate activities and to implement the government’s
policy directed at ensuring cybersecurity. The Plenipotentiary’s primary duties
include:
(1) analysing and assessing the functioning of the national cybersecurity system
based;
(2) supervising the risk management process within the national cybersecurity
system based;
(3) reviewing governmental documents, including draft legal acts, pertinent to the
implementation of cybersecurity-related duties;
(4) popularising new solutions and initiating activities to ensure cybersecurity at the
national level;
(5) initiating cybersecurity training at the national level;
(6) issuing recommendations on the use of IT equipment or software at the CSIRT
request (Article 62(1) of the NSC Act).
7 The College for Cybersecurity
The College for Cybersecurity is a collegial opinion-making and advisory authority,
operating within the Council of Ministers, regarding cybersecurity issues and activ-
ities conducted in this field by CSIRT, the Ministry of National Defence, CSIRT
NASK, CSIRT GOV, sectoral cybersecurity teams and authorities competent for
cybersecurity. The College is led by the President of the Council of Ministers and is
composed of the minister competent for internal affairs, the Minister competent for
computerisation, the Minister of National Defence, the minister competent for
foreign affairs, the Head of the Chancellery of the President of the Council of
Ministers, the Head of the National Security Bureau, and the Minister competent
for coordinating the activities of special forces. The College meetings are also
attended by the Director of the Government Centre for Security, the Head or Deputy
Head of the Internal Security Agency, the Head or Deputy Head of the Military
Counterintelligence Service, and the Director of the Research and Academic Com-
puter Network and the National Research Institute.
In addition, the College draws up recommendations for the Council of Ministers
on the activities directed at ensuring cybersecurity at the national level (Article
65 (2) of the NCSA).
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8 Incident Response Teams for a Given Sector or Subsector
The Act has envisaged the possibility for a computer security incident response team
to be established by the authorities competent in cybersecurity, for any of the sectors
or subsectors listed in the appendix to the Act (which is, therefore, not an obligatory
body), i.e. a sectoral cybersecurity team (as referred to in Article 4 (6) of the NCSA)
in charge of receiving serious incident reports within that sector or subsector. Such a
team shall also be responsible for providing support in the handling of such
incidents, supporting operators of essential services in performing their duties arising
from the Act, analysing serious incidents, identifying associations between inci-
dents, and formulating conclusions on incident handling, as well as for cooperating
with the competent CSIRT (Article 44 (1) of the NCSA). Sectoral cybersecurity
teams were not included in the initial draft act. A suggestion to include the possibility
for these entities to be established was put forward during social consultations, and it
appeared in numerous opinions, in which the fact that such teams would take
account of the specificity of a given sector, thus enabling the support to be adjusted
to operators of essential services, was seen as a major advantage. More about the
Government Plenipotentiary and the College for Cybersecurity, see the chapter “The
duties and legal status of the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity and the
College for Cybersecurity”.
9 Operators of Essential Services
These are entities whose organisational units are situated in the territory of the
Republic of Poland, and in respect of whom the authority competent for cybersecu-
rity has issued a decision on recognising them as operators of essential services
(i.e. services of the highest significance for the maintenance of social or economic
activities, included in the list of essential services), e.g. banks, enterprises from the
energy sector, etc. It seems that a situation cannot be ruled out in which natural
persons conducting business activities are classified as such, along with legal
persons and organisational units without a legal personality whose legal capacity
arises from separate provisions (e.g. commercial law companies and partnerships).
The authorities competent for cybersecurity issue a decision on recognising an
entity as the operator of an essential service. The list of operators of essential services
is maintained by the minister competent for computerisation. Operators of essential
services are obligated, in particular, to ensure the security of the information systems
they use for the provision of essential services, Operators of essential services
cooperate with the sectoral cybersecurity team (if applicable). In addition, they are
obliged to ensure the carrying out, at least on a biennial basis, the security audit of
the information system used for the provision of the essential service.
With the purpose of performing their cybersecurity duties, operators of essential
services establish internal structures responsible for cybersecurity or enter into
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agreements with third parties for the provision of cybersecurity services. The
organisational and technical conditions for entities providing cybersecurity services,
and internal structures responsible for cybersecurity, are determined by the minister
competent for computerisation, by way of a regulation, which must consider the
Polish Norms, along with the need to ensure the security of the internal structures
responsible for cybersecurity, entities providing cybersecurity services to operators
of essential services, and information processed within such structures or entities.
10 Digital Service Providers
Digital service providers are legal persons or organisational units without a legal
personality with a registered office or management bodies in the Republic of Poland,
or whose representatives operate organisational units in the territory of the Republic
of Poland, and which provide digital services, i.e. services rendered electronically,
within the meaning of the Act of the 18th of July 2002 on the Provision of Services
Electronically (see more in the latter part of this article), as listed in Appendix 2 to
the Act, i.e. e-commerce platforms, cloud computing services and search engines
(Article 17 of the NCSA). Digital service providers take the appropriate and com-
mensurate technical and organisational measures, as defined in Implementing Reg-
ulation 2018/151, to manage the risks posed to information systems used for the
provision of digital services. These measures must guarantee cybersecurity com-
mensurate with the actual risk. The obligations of operators of essential services and
digital service providers and the liability of these entities are discussed in Part III of
this monograph.
11 Entities Providing Cybersecurity Services
Entities providing cybersecurity services are entities, with which operators of essen-
tial services may conclude agreements with the purpose of performing their cyber-
security duties (the outsourcing of security services). These involve estimating the
risk to essential services and managing that risk; implementing the appropriate
technical and organisational measures, commensurate with the estimated risk;
collecting information on threats and vulnerabilities; incident management; using
preventive measures to limit the incident’s impact on the security of the information
system; using the means of communications enabling the proper and safe commu-
nication within the national cybersecurity system (Article 8); appointing a person in
charge of contacts with authorities competent for cybersecurity, the competent
CSIRT and the Point of Single Contact supervised by the minister competent for
computerisation, and (if applicable) the sectoral cybersecurity team, and notifying
these bodies of this fact; conducting educational activities addressed to users;
providing the competent authority with information specifying in which EUMember
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States these entities have been recognised as operators of essential services, and the
date of termination of the provision of such services (Article 9 of the NCSA);
developing, implementing and updating the required documentation (Article
10 (1)-(3) of the NCSA); handling incidents within their own systems; reporting
serious incidents; cooperating in the handling of serious and critical incidents with
the competent CSIRT, and (if applicable) the sectoral cybersecurity team; eliminat-
ing the identified vulnerabilities (Article 11(1)-(3) and Article 12 of the NCSA); and
passing to the competent CSIRT information on other incidents, threats to cyberse-
curity pertinent to risk estimation, vulnerabilities and technologies used (Article
13 of the NCSA).
12 Entities Referred to in Article 4(7)-(15) of the Act
on the National Cybersecurity System
Another group of entities included in the national cybersecurity system is indicated
in Article 4(7) of the NCSA. These are, in the first place public finance sector units
referred to in Article 9 (1)-(6),(8),(9),(11) and (12) of the Act of the 27th of August
2009 on Public Finance.7
The concept of the finance sector, rather than being expressly defined, has been
described by reference to entities forming its part. Although the express legal
definition is missing, major characteristic features of the finance sector entities
may be outlined.8
More specifically, the finance sector is composed of organisational units set up
under the applicable acts (the PF Act and specific acts) with the sole purpose of
fulfilling public duties, which are financed from public resources and are subject to
planning, balancing, control, accountancy and reporting, as well as discipline based
on uniform principles. Some of the entities forming part of the public finance sector
are listed by their names (the National Health Fund, the Social Insurance Institution,
the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund, and the Polish Academy of Sciences) while
others by their type (budgetary units, public authorities, State-owned or local
government owned legal persons).9
The entities indicated (indirectly) in Article 4 (7) of the NCSA, i.e. public finance
sector entities referred to in Article 9 (1)-(6), (8), (9), (11) and (12) of the PF Act,
include:
(1) public authorities, including government administration bodies, State inspec-
tion and law enforcement bodies, as well as courts and tribunals,
7Act of 27 August 2009 on Public Finance consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item
869, as amended (hereinafter: the PFA).
8Cilak (2020).
9Lipiec-Warzecha (2011), p. 84.
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(2) local government bodies and their unions,
(3) budgetary units,
(4) local government-owned budgetary establishments,
(5) executive agencies,
(6) budget management institutions,
(7) the Social Insurance Institution and the resources it manages, as well as the
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund and the resources managed by the President
of the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund,
(8) the National Health Fund (in Polish: NFZ),
(9) state-owned higher education institutions, and
(10) The Polish Academy of Sciences and the organisational units it establishes.
Other entities, not previously discussed, listed in Article 4(7)-(15) of the NCSA:
(1) research institutes;
(2) the National Bank of Poland;
(3) Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego;
(4) the Office of Technical Inspection;
(5) the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency;
(6) the Polish Centre for Accreditation;
(7) the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, and
regional funds for environmental protection and water management;
(8) commercial law companies and partnerships performing public utility duties
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Act of the 20th of December 1996 on
Municipal Services.10
The regulations referred to public entities indicated in Article 4 (7)-(15) of the
NCSA are described in the chapter “Obligations of public entities in the National
Cybersecurity system” in III part of the monograph.
The compliance with the provisions of the NCSA is controlled and supervised11
by:
1. the minister competent for computerisation, as regards the compliance of the
entities providing cybersecurity services with statutory requirements;
2. authorities competent for Cybersecurity, as regards:
(a) the performance of the statutory obligations to counteract cybersecurity
threats and to report serious incidents by operators of essential services,
(b) the compliance of digital service providers with security requirements as part
of the digital services rendered by those entities, as defined in Implementing
10Act of 20 December 1996 on Municipal Services, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2019, item 712, as amended.
11This matter is dedicated the chapter 20 “The system of control and supervision of operators of
essential services, digital-service providers and entities providing cybersecurity services” in part III
of the book.
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Regulation 2018/151, the performance of their statutory obligations to report
substantial incidents.
13 Penalties Provided for in the Act on the National
Security System
Article 21 of the NIS Directive puts Member States under the obligation to envisage
effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for the infringements of national
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, and to take all measures necessary to
ensure that they are implemented.
The Polish legislator has laid down regulation providing for administrative
liability to be incurred by three groups of entities:
1. operators of essential services,
2. digital service providers, and
3. managers of operators of essential services.
In respect of operators of essential services and digital service providers, the
legislator has only envisaged financial penalties, their amounts ranging from 1.00
PLN (where no lower limit of the penalty has been set) to 200,000 PLN. However, if
the authority competent for cybersecurity, having conducted an inspection, finds that
a given operator of an essential service or a given digital service provider violates the
provisions of that Act, causing:
1. a direct and serious threat to cybersecurity in the field of defence, State security,
security and public order, or human life and health,
2. a threat of causing a serious property damage or serious disruptions in the
provision of essential services,
the authority competent for cybersecurity imposes a monetary penalty of up to
1,000,000 PLN (Article 73 (5) of the NSC Act).
Almost all violations for which penalties have been envisaged in the national
cybersecurity system refer to the non-performance or improper performance by the
operator of an essential service of the obligation imposed by the provisions of the
Act (failure to report a serious incident to the responsible CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK or CSIRT GOV within twenty four hours of its detection; therefore, an
incident reported after the expiry of the said period will also be construed as a
violation). Two other violations refer to hindering the inspection process and a
failure to conform to post-inspection recommendations.
The proceedings regarding financial penalties imposed under the NCSA are
governed by the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure,12 which arises
from the content of Article 189a of the CAP requiring the application of the
12Act of 14 June 1960—the Code of Administrative Procedure (consolidated text, Polish Journal of
Laws of 2020, item 256, as amended (hereinafter: “CAP”).
National Cybersecurity System Act 103
provisions of Section IVa of the CAP in respect of imposing or applying an
administrative financial penalty or granting a relief from the enforcement of the
penalty.13
14 The Cybersecurity Strategy
The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland is a document adopted by way
of a resolution of the Council of Ministers, determining the strategic objectives, and
the relevant political and regulatory measures directed at attaining and maintaining a
high level of cybersecurity. It is developed for a five-year period with possible
amendments throughout its duration (Article 68 and Article 69 (1) of the
NCSA).14 The draft Strategy is developed by the minister in charge of
computerisation in cooperation with the Plenipotentiary, other ministers, and the
responsible managers of central offices. The work on the draft version of the Strategy
may also be attended by a representative of the President of the Republic of Poland.
The Strategy specifies, in particular:
(1) the objectives and priorities regarding cybersecurity;
(2) the entities engaged in the implementation of the Strategy;
(3) the measures directed at implementing the objectives assumed in the Strategy;
(4) the means for readiness, response and restoration, including principles of public-
private cooperation;
(5) an approach to risk assessment;
(6) activities related to educational, informational and training programmes in the
field of cybersecurity;
(7) activities related to research and development plans in the field of cybersecurity.
Strategy is dedicated the separate chapter in this part of the monograph.
15 Legal Acts Modified by the Act on the National
Cybersecurity System
The Act on the National Cybersecurity System adjusts a number of legal acts to the
provisions of the NIS Directive:
13More about monetary penalties—see chapter 21 “Monetary penalties in the National Cybersecu-
rity System Act” in part III of this book.
14The currently binding strategy was adopted by way of Resolution No. 125 of the Council of
Ministers of 22 October 2019 on the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for
2019–2024 (Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2019, item 1037).
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(1) the Act of the 7th of September 1991 on the Education System;15
(2) the Act of the 4th of September 1997 on Branches of Government
Administration;16
(3) the Act of the 24th of May 2002 on the Internal Security Agency and on the
Intelligence Service;17
(4) the Act of the 29th of January 2004—Public Procurement Law;18
(5) the Act of the 16th of July 2004—Telecommunications Law;19
(6) the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management;20
Furthermore, in connection with the amendment to Article 5a (2) of the Act on
Crisis Management introduced under the reference Act (see Article 82 of the
NCSA), it was deemed necessary to amend the Agreement of the 19th of August
2010 on determining the detailed scope and means of cooperation of the Govern-
ment Centre for Security and the Internal Security Agency.21
16 Legal Acts Issued Under the Authorisations Included
in the Act on the National Cybersecurity System
Under the authorisations stipulated in the NCSA, seven implementing acts have been
issued to date.22
1. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the 31st of October 2018 on serious
incidents thresholds;23
15Act of 7 September 1991 on the Education System, consolidated text, Journal of Laws of 2020,
item 13277, as amended.
16Act of 4 September 1997 on Branches of Government Administration, consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1220, as amended.
17Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal Security Agency and on the Intelligence Service, consolidated
text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 27, as amended.
18Act of 29 January 2004—Public Procurement Law, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2019, item 1843, as amended.
19Act of 16 July 2004—Telecommunications Law, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2019, item 2460, as amended.
20Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020,
item 1856, as amended.
21Official Journal of the ISA of 2010 No. 3, item 28, as amended.
22I.e. by 1 December 2020.
23The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 October 2018 on serious incidents thresholds
Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 2180.
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2. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the 16th of October 2018 on
documents regarding cybersecurity of the information system used for the provi-
sion of essential services;24
3. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the 2nd of October 2018 on the
scope of activities and the working procedure of the College for Cybersecurity;25
4. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the 11th of September 2018 on a
list of essential services and significance thresholds of the consequences of
incidents disrupting the provision of essential services;26
5. The Regulation of the Minister of Digital Affairs of the 10th of September 2018
on the organisational and technical conditions for entities providing cybersecurity
services, and internal structures responsible for cybersecurity;27
6. The Regulation of the Minister of Digital Affairs of the 12th of October 2018 on
the list of certificates authorising the performance of audits;28
7. The Regulation of the Minister of Digital Affairs of the 4th of December 2019 on
the organisational and technical conditions for entities providing cybersecurity
services, and internal organisational structures of operators of essential services
responsible for cybersecurity;29
Under Article 42 (1) (5), in connection with Article 41(3) and (7) of the NCSA,
Ordinance No. 20 of the Minister of Maritime Economy and Inland Navigation of
the 16th of April 2019 on the guidelines regarding the reporting of incidents within
the national cybersecurity system in the water transport subsector, and in the potable
water supply and distribution sector,30 was issued.
In addition, under Article 52 (1) of the Act of the 6th of September 2001 on Road
Transport,31 in connection with Article 21 (1) of the NCSA, Ordinance No. 43/2018
24The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 16 October 2018 on documents regarding
cybersecurity of the information system used for the provision of essential services ,Polish Journal
of Laws of 2018, item 2080.
25The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 2 October 2018 on the scope of activities and the
working procedure of the Committee for Cybersecurity Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1952.
26The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 September 2018 on a list of essential services
and significance thresholds of the consequences of incidents disrupting the provision of essential
services Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1806.
27The Regulation of the Minister of Digital Affairs of 10 September 2018 on the organisational and
technical conditions for entities providing cybersecurity services, and internal structures responsible
for cybersecurity Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1780.
28The Regulation of the Minister of Digital Affairs of 12 October 2018 on the list of certificates
authorising the performance of audits Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1999.
29The Regulation of the Minister of Digital Affairs of 4 December 2019 on the organisational and
technical conditions for entities providing cybersecurity services, and internal organisational
structures of operators of essential services responsible for cybersecurity Polish Journal of Laws
of 2019, item 2479.
30Official Journal of the Ministry of Maritime Economy and Inland Navigation of 2019, item 20.
31Act of 6 September 2001 on Road Transport Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item 2200, as
amended.
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of the Chief Inspector of Road Transport on appointing the Plenipotentiary for
cybersecurity at the Chief Inspectorate of Road Transport of the 20th of September
2018 was issued.32
Under 175a(2)(a) of the Telecommunications Law, added by way of Article
80 of the NCSA, the Minister of Digital Affairs issued the Regulation of the 20th
of September 2018 on the criteria of recognising the violation of security or integrity
of networks or telecommunications services as a violation significantly affecting the
functioning of networks or services.33 At the same time, under Article 175a (2) of
Telecommunications Law, the Minister of Digital Affairs issued a new Regulation of
the 20th of September 2018 on the template form for providing information on the
violation of security or integrity of networks or telecommunications services as a
violation significantly affecting the functioning of networks or services,34 which
replaced the previously binding regulation bearing the same title. However, the
authorisation granted in Article 32aa(9) of the Act on the Internal Security Agency
and the Intelligence Service, added by way of Article 79 of the NCSA, that the
President of the Council of Ministers determine, by way of a regulation, the
conditions and procedure for conducting, coordinating and implementing the warn-
ing system, and in particular to determine the measures necessary for its establish-
ment and maintenance, and the template agreement referred to in Par. 7 (in which the
ISA makes arrangements with the critical infrastructure operator regarding the
technical aspects of participation in the warning system and the system configuration
model), driven by the need to ensure security of the ICT systems significant from the
point of view of the continuity of the functioning of the State, has not been
implemented yet.
Some other documents were issued under the NCSA, e.g.:
1. The Communication of the Minister of Digital Affairs of the 7th of January 2020
on the agreement between CSIRT GOV and CSIRT NASK regarding the dele-
gation of duties;35
2. Communication No. 1 of the Head of the Internal Security Agency of the 29th of
August 2019 regarding the conclusion of an agreement on the delegation of duties
related to incidents reported by the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency;36
3. Communication No. 2 of the Head of the Internal Security Agency of the 28th of
November 2019 regarding the conclusion of an agreement on the delegation of
32Official Journal of the Chief Inspector of Road Transport of 2018, item 43.
33Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1830.
34Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1831.
35Official Journal of the Ministry of Digital Affairs of 2020, item 1.
36Communication No. 1 of the Head of the Internal Security Agency of 29 August 2019 regarding
the conclusion of an agreement on the delegation of duties related to incidents reported by the Polish
Air Navigation Services Agency Official Journal of the Internal Security Agency of 2019, item 15.
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duties related to incidents reported by the Research and Academic Computer
Network to the National Research Institute;37
4. Communication No. 3 of the Head of the Internal Security Agency of the 28th of
November 2019 regarding the conclusion of an agreement on the delegation of
duties related to incidents reported by companies being members of the Capital
Group of PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A.;38
5. Resolution No. 125 of the Council of Ministers of the 22nd of October 2019 on
the National Policy Frameworks on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland for
2019–2024;39
6. The Communication of the Minister of Digital Affairs of the 19th of September
2019 on the agreement between CSIRT GOV and CSIRT NASK regarding the
delegation of duties.40
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The New National Security Strategy
of the Republic of Poland
Jacek Sobczak
Abstract The approval of the new security strategy of the Republic of Poland in
May 2020 required paying attention to the terminological aspects of the concepts
used in this document, as well as to legal issues, which were mainly connected with
the problem of whether this act should be formally countersigned or not. An equally
important issue was to draw attention to the fact that, in practice, two strategies were
being developed in Poland’s legal system—one approved by the President of
the Republic of Poland in his decision of May 12, 2020, and the other, which was
in the form of a resolution of the Council of Ministers, applicable from 9 April 2013.
The current strategy was preceded by earlier strategies and the White Paper on
National Security of the Republic of Poland. The strategy of May 12, 2020 is a
comprehensive document that sheds light on all elements of national security. Its
content addresses such phenomena as hybridity, operation in cyberspace, the need
for new technologies, and artificial intelligence.
1 Terminology Issues
Pursuant to Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty
to Defend the Republic of Poland,1 the President of the Republic of Poland, to
safeguard the sovereignty and security of the state, and the integrity and indivisibility
of its territory, at the request of the Prime Minister, approves the National Security
Strategy.2 The legislator did not provide a precise definition of “security strategy”
J. Sobczak (*)
Akademia Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna w Warszawie/University of Economics and Human
Sciences in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
e-mail: j.sobczak@vizja.pl
1Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland, consolidated
text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1541, as amended.
2The text of Article 4a of the Act on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland was
introduced in the Act pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Act of 29 May 1989 on Transferring the Powers
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and the “Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland”,
leaving these issues to the legal commentators. In the literature, the term “strategy”
refers to all measures taken to achieve a certain goal.3 More precisely, “strategy” is a
domain of military science, which involves preparation for and carrying out war
operations, and the respective campaigns and battles.4 A strategy specifies the
quantity and quality of the resources needed to achieve military goals, and the
quantity and quality of all types of reserves, in terms of both staff and materials,
as well as the organisation and preparation methods of the armed forces, the devising
of plans and their use in warfare, and the development of the areas of operations and
strategic directions.5 A strategy involves defining long-term objectives, and the
methods for achieving them through adopting specific courses of action and distrib-
uting resources.6
A “national security strategy” is usually understood as “a choice made on the
basis of intelligence and strategic analyses of the appropriate and essential measures
available to the state in order to achieve its goals and fulfil the tasks specified in the
security policy7”. A strategy is also defined as “the theory and practice of state
operations with a view to achieving set goals in the domain of security, general and
long-term”. It is also perceived as “a domain of the national strategy encompassing
its creation and preparation, and the use of the state’s potential in order to prevent
any threats to its existence and development” and as “the theory and practice
Previously Held by the Council of State to the President of the Polish People’s Republic and Other
State bodies (Polish Journal of Laws of 1989, No. 34, item 178, 19 July 1989). The original Article
4a only stated that the President of the Polish People’s Republic as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, at the request of the Minister of National Defence, specifies the main development
directions for the armed forces and their preparation for state defence. After changing the name of
the Polish State to the Republic of Poland, the name of the Head of the State was changed, and the
name “President of the Republic of Poland” was introduced in the Act on the Universal Duty to
Defend the Republic of Poland through the Act of 25 October 1991, amending the Act on the
Universal Duty to Defend the Polish People’s Republic and Certain Other Acts (Polish Journal of
Laws of 1991, No. 113, item 491). The power to approve the national security strategy was granted
to the President of the Republic of Poland in Article 35(1) of the Act of 29 August 2002Martial Law
and the Competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Rules of the Commander-in-
Chief’s Subordination to the Constitutional Authorities of the Republic of Poland (Polish Journal of
Laws of 2002, No. 156, item 1301). The same provision granted the President of the Republic of
Poland the power to issue, at the request of the Prime Minister, by way of a decision, the Political
and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland, and other secondary documents to the
security strategy.
3The term “strategy” derives from the word strategos, which means “army leader”, i.e. a com-
mander of an army or fleet. In colloquial language, “strategy” is defined as “a way of acting in order
to achieve a specific goal, operating in line with developed assumptions, a forward-thinking action
plan”. See Dubisz (2003), pp. 1411–1412.
4See Szymczak (1989), p. 346; Olechnicki and Załęcki (1997), p. 205, define strategy as a planned
and often practiced method of achieving a set goal.
5See Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN, Vol. 11, p. 39.
6Beaufre (1988), p. 161.
7Marczak (2008), p. 129.
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oriented towards advancing and deploying the state’s potential in order to achieve
the objective of counteracting any threats to its existence and development, general
and long-term8”. W. Kitler views the national security strategy as “a national
strategy domain understood as a choice made on the basis of the strategic analysis
of the appropriate and necessary measures available to the state in order to achieve its
goals and satisfy the interests specified in the national security policy, general and
long-term”.9 D. Robertson points out that, unlike tactics, a strategy requires long-
term preparations, and both terms can be used in each conflict situation. He empha-
sises that in the contemporary defence terminology, strategies are considered to be
political, and tactics are viewed as purely technical decisions by the army aimed at a
better achievement of the strategic goals set by the political leaders.10 Some literature
sources consider strategy as a praxeological category, i.e. serving to combine the
available documents, instruments, and methods of efficient operations in order to
achieve the set goal.11
In analysing the notion of “a national strategy”, R. Kuźniar concluded that a
strategy does not set political goals, and yet a strategic instinct and discipline,
characteristic of the constraints of a strategic approach, is an obligatory (though
insufficient) condition for the optimum realisation of the state’s interests (security
and development), which should not depend on the whims of politics.12
The notion of the “security of the state”was not defined in the Act itself. The legal
commentators have pointed out that, despite the term’s being universally associated
with national security, it is not synonymous with it. In the literature, “national
security” is defined as “an objective state of the certainty of physical survival and
the freedom to develop, at the same time being a vital need, and thus also a national
goal and interest (raison d’état), which assumes the securing and strengthening of
vital values (. . .) achieved in the external and internal spheres”.13 “The security of
the state” is understood as a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the state and its
sovereignty,14 as well as its political, social, and economic development.15 It is also
pointed out that “the security of the state” is “the state’s and society’s ability to
ensure the conditions for its survival as a civic community institution, the biological
survival of the population, territorial integrity, political independence, internal
8Słownik terminów zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Warsaw 2002, p. 131.
9Kitler (2011), p. 39.
10Robertson (2009), pp. 420–421.
11Brodie (1973), p. 452.
12Kuźniar (2004), p. 9.
13Stańczyk (1996), p. 21; Mickiewicz (2018), p. 35.
14On sovereignty, see Czaputowicz (2018), pp. 15–55.
15Czaputowicz (2013), p. 15. Cf. also Zięba (1997), pp. 8–22. He states that security of the state,
formulated as a foreign policy objective, is an expression of the internal needs, interests, and values
of a specific society (nation), and its political system. He notes, “the national security policy has the
aim of protecting the state and society (the nation or nations in the case of a multinational state) from
external threats. He agrees with US researchers that “national security may be defined as a nation’s
ability to protect its internal values from external threats”. Berkowitz and Bock (1965), p. X.
The New National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 113
stability, and quality of life” (. . .) it is shaped by activities including taking oppor-
tunities, undertaking challenges, reducing risk, and eliminating external and internal
threats to ensure continuance, identity, functioning, and the freedom to develop for
the state and the nation (society)”.16 Attention is drawn to the fact that security also
has an international dimension.17 Building a security strategy is a difficult task due to
the dynamically changing international environment. Currently it is interpreted as a
guarantee of meeting broadly defined needs, rights and aspirations of a nation
(society) referring to the way and quality of life, systemic and cultural identity and
development opportunities.18
2 The Countersignature Issue
The wording of Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act on the Universal Duty to Defend the
Republic of Poland can raise doubts as to the nature of the Act, especially whether
the authorisation referred to in these provisions has the nature of a countersignature.
Undoubtedly, in line with Article 144 of the Constitution, the President’s official acts
issued exercising his/her constitutional and statutory powers require the signature of
the Prime Minister, who, by such a signature, accepts responsibility therefor to the
Sejm. There is no doubt that the President cannot issue state leadership acts without a
suitable mandate in legal regulations. The basis of such a mandate can be the
Constitution and the Acts. These official laws can take the form of regulations,
decrees, and decisions, and the legal commentators agree on this matter. It is pointed
out that not every action of the President expressed in the form of a specific
document should be regarded as an official act, as the name “act” is reserved for
documents for which the President resolves an issue. Not every time the President’s
activity takes a written form addressed to a specific group of recipients can one speak
of a President’s official act as stipulated in Article 144 of the Constitution. If such a
document addressed to a specific group of recipients does not contain any Resolution
on rights or responsibilities, it is not a President’s official act but only a manifestation
of his/her official activities as the Head of the State. These may include congratu-
latory letters, speeches, and so-called official addresses.19 Therefore, P. Sarnecki
distinguishes President’s official acts and written acts of the Head of the State. Their
shared feature is that they contain information on the Presidential office, but do not
bear any characteristics of legally binding decisions.20
16Zając and Zięba (2011), p. 10 et seq.
17Słomczyńska (2007), pp. 21–88. Cf. also Zięba (2018), pp. 17–34.
18Nowakowski (2008), p. 75; Gołda-Sobczak (2017), pp. 129–152; Sobczak (2013), pp. 187–213;
Sobczak and Kakareko (2017), pp. 842–862.
19Kozłowski (2016), p. 708.
20Sarnecki (2000), p. 59.
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The situation described in Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the
Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland differs significantly from that
described in Article 144(2) of the Constitution, which states that a President’s
official act should be signed by the Prime Minister in order to be valid, whereas in
the case of the National Security Strategy the President receives the text of the
Strategy from the Prime Minister for approval. Thus, it is the Prime Minister who
presents the strategy to the President for approval. The wording of the quoted
provision of the Act of 21 November 1967 shows that the Strategy is not binding
without approval, being only a draft. Assessing the legal situation, one can venture
the statement that the President is the one who countersigns an Act presented to
him/her by the Prime Minister. The literature emphasises that the President is not
always the initiator of the issuing of an official act, as he/she may receive such an act
from the Prime Minister. K. Kozłowski points out that most official acts of the Head
of the State subject to countersignature are prepared by the government, and
subsequently presented to the President for approval. As Kozłowski mentions, this
also refers to defence in general. He also indicates, referring to the position presented
by P. Sarnecki, “the countersignature requirement should not cover the actions of the
President, being ‘a continuation’ of certain official acts clearly exempt from the
countersignature requirement, i.e. such which can be referred to as ‘secondary’21”.
The approval of the National Security Strategy was not mentioned among official
acts exempt from a countersignature, i.e. those identified in Article 144(3) of
the Constitution, which specifies the powers of the President exercised outside the
political control system of the Sejm. However, it is worth mentioning that the
literature sources emphasise the fact that authorisations corresponding to any of
the powers mentioned in the provision with the same ratio legis for their exclusion
should also be excluded from the countersignature requirement, despite the lack of a
specific provision in Article 144(3) of the Constitution.22 It thus can be claimed that
if the President’s legislative initiative and the decree on the promulgation of an act is
exempt from the countersignature obligation, the same should apply to the National
Security Strategy. Another argument is that, without the decision of the Prime
Minister on submitting a request to the President for the approval of the Strategy,
the President is unable to approve the Strategy.23 Also, the President is not
authorised to announce a Strategy independently without the request of the Prime
Minister. In practice, the National Security Strategy is approved by a decision of the
21Sarnecki (2000), pp. 57–58; Granat (2002), p. 95 et seq.
22Kozłowski (2016), pp. 709–710. Sarnecki (2000), pp. 57–58.
23The literature contains a highly questionable statement that the President countersigns the
Security Strategy because Article 4a (1) (1) “emphasises this role in the Security Strategy, which
is approved by the President and the Prime Minister”. Sobera (2015), p. 184. It should be stressed
that, contrary to W. Sobera’s view, the Prime Minister does not approve the Security Strategy but
submits a request to the President to approve it. The Prime Minister may of course have an impact
on the content of the Strategy, and if he/she does not approve of the document, he/she may defer the
submission of the request. It is also difficult to agree with the view that the President is the person
who countersigns the Security Strategy. Such a situation is not provided for in the Constitution.
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President of the Republic of Poland announced in the Official Gazette of the
Government of the Republic of Poland. The Strategy document is appended to the
decision.24
3 Security Strategies of the Republic of Poland 1990–2007
The literature sources emphasise that one of the most important and urgent chal-
lenges for Poland after 1989 was the formulation of a national strategy, and
developing a suitable independent security policy, including a defence policy.25 At
the turn of 1990, the Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland was developed and
adopted by Resolution of the State Defence Committee of 21 February 1990. A
change in the political situation as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the adoption of two documents at the State
Defence Committee meeting on 2 November 1992: Assumptions in the Polish
Security Policy and the Security and Defence Strategy Policy of the Republic of
Poland. After becoming a member of NATO, Poland created a new holistic draft of a
new security and defence strategy.26 On 4 January 2000, the Council of Ministers
adopted the Security Strategy, and 5 months later, on 23 May 2000, the Defence
Strategy.27 Both documents were announced within one year from accession, and
the adoption of NATO’s strategic concept at the Washington summit in 1999.
Another strategy entitled the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland
was developed in 2003. However, it was assessed as a much-needed and useful
document, coming up against the new trends in the domain of international and
national security which began to form after 11 September 2001 (9/11), despite its
undoubted flaws. The new Strategy was adopted at the session of the Council of
Ministers in April 2007, and the President of the Republic of Poland approved it on
13 November 2007.28 The document aimed at an integrated approach to national
security, stating that Poland’s security was impacted on by processes and events in
the state, the region, and Europe. It indicated three tiers of national interests—vital,
important, and significant. However, as stated by S. Koziej and A. Brzozowski, it
does have structural shortcomings.29 The National Security Strategy was met with a
24See the Decision of the President of the Republic of Poland of 12 May 2020 on the approval of the
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Official Gazette of the Government of the
Republic of Poland of 2020, item 413.
25Koziej and Brzozowski (2015), p. 19.
26Koziej (1998a, b), passim.
27As a result of the implementation of the Defence Strategy, the Council of Ministers passed
implementing regulations to the Act on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland,
which, based on the Strategy’s assumptions, specified certain elements in the state’s defence
system.
28The strategy was presented to the President by the Prime Minister as required in the Act, but,
before the approval of the Strategy, the Prime Minister and his Government resigned.
29Koziej (1998a, b), passim.
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lively response from legal commentators, and a quite-critical assessment from
academic circles.30
The 2007 strategy was replaced by another, which on 5 November 2014 was
approved by President Bronisław Komorowski. Before the strategy was developed,
the Strategic National Security Review and the White Book on National Security
were prepared in 2013.31
4 The White Book on the National Security of the Republic
of Poland
The White Book on National Security was presented on 24 May 2013 in the
Presidential Palace as the outcome of two years of work by almost 200 experts
appointed in November 2010. The work was conducted within the Strategic National
Security Review and Report, which ended in September 2012. The outcome of the
work was the classified Report of the Committee on the Strategic National Security
Review, and it contained key conclusions and recommendations on the security
policy of the Republic of Poland, which constituted the basis of the White Book. Its
primary role in principle was to disseminate knowledge on security and spreading
public awareness in this area.
The book is an extensive study containing 265 pages, which began with a
synthesis containing a diagnosis of the state of security, a projection of the security
environment development, and a concept of preparing security systems. The next
parts comprised an introduction explaining the methodology and the principles of
the study, and four chapters. These included a diagnosis of the state of national
security, with a quite detailed account of the historical evolution of Poland’s
security,32 Poland’s potential in the domain of security, national interests, and
30Żurawski vel Grajewski (2013), p. 111 et seq.; Nowakowski et al. (2014), pp. 479–543; Koziej
and Brzozowski (2014), pp. 11–40.
31Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego https://www.bialystok.ap.gov.pl/arch/teksty/biala_
ksiega.pdf. Accessed on 5 July 2020, 5:27 p.m.
32The evolution of the history of security was presented from the origins of Poland’s statehood until
the present times. However, no attempts to establish continuous patterns were made, only pointing
to the necessity to pay special attention to the range and forms of cooperation between the two major
Poland’s neighbours, Russia and Germany. The assessment of the pre-partition period made it
possible to infer that it is in Poland’s vital interests to have the ability to organise and maintain an
efficiently operating state. It was stressed that it is unacceptable to disrupt the balance between the
freedom of individuals or groups and the responsibility of the state. Emphasis was placed on
cultivating national identity and preventing the development of an unfavourable union of interests
among neighbours. Referring to the period of the Second Polish Republic and World War II, it was
indicated that in addition to observing a neighbours’ policy it was necessary to modernise the
defence potential of the country and carry out a rational calculation of the effectiveness of the
established unions. Assessing the period of the Third Polish Republic, it was concluded that after
1989 Poland managed to reach most strategic goals, as it joined the North Atlantic Treaty
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strategic goals in the field of security. The subsequent part presented a projection of
the security environment development in the global, regional, and national dimen-
sions and security conditions development scenarios. The third chapter presented the
concept of strategic activities, i.e. operational strategies, discussing the basis of and
the fundamental idea behind the operational strategies, and also the strategic tasks of
subsystems: national security operational and support subsystems. The last chapter
contained a formulation of the concept for the preparation of national security
systems, i.e. a preparatory strategy. The discussed issues included the bases of and
the fundamental ideas behind the preparatory strategies, and the preparation of three
national security subsystems: national and operational security management, and
support. The book ends with a summarised conclusion and is supplemented with an
extract of the main strategic recommendations of the national security review, a list
of the main conceptual categories, a list of primary laws relating to national security
and a list of individuals participating in the strategic security review.
Without going into a detailed presentation of the content of the White Book, it is
worth emphasising that, in addition to so-called hard security issues, covering state
defence and protection, special attention is drawn to new social and economic
domains and sectors, as well as cross-sector security fields which are bringing new
challenges and threats to the state, associated with financial, energy, demographic,
cybernetic, climate and environmental security. Attention should also be paid to the
main conceptual categories, contained in Annex No. 2. A characterisation was
provided, i.a., of the following notions: security,33 security environment, the state’s
Organisation (1999) and the European Union, and established a strategic partnership with the
United States, engaging in subregional cooperation (the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Group,
the Central European Initiative, the Council of the Baltic Sea States).
33Security in the White Book is considered a basic category, defined as the theory and practice of
ensuring the possibility of survival (existence) and the realisation of an entity’s own interests,
including, in particular, by taking advantage of opportunities (favourable circumstances), facing
challenges, reducing risks, and counteracting (preventing and opposing) all kinds of threats to the
given entity and its interests. It emphasises that “contemporary security is integrated (comprehen-
sive, multidimensional) in nature and can – depending on the adopted criteria – be subdivided into
various types, fields, sectors, divisions and areas”. As indicated in the publication, depending on the
type of entity involved, the following types of security may be distinguished: individual (personal)
security, group security, national security (including state and territorial security, at the province,
district, and commune levels), international security (regional and global), including interstate
security (alliances and coalition arrangements) and transnational security. It was noted that
“depending on the subject (content) of security, it is possible to distinguish as many types, fields,
sectors, divisions, areas etc. as many potential spheres of activity of the given entity are possible
(security issues arise in every sphere of activity)”. As emphasised in the White Book, within the
framework of the integrated national security of the Republic of Poland (the security of the state) it
is possible to distinguish two constitutional areas thereof: internal and external security, as well as
four primary fields of security: defence (national defence, i.e. the military security of a state),
protection (civilian, non-military security), and social and economic security (one may, in fact, also
speak of “socio-economic security”, including the social and economic support of security efforts).
It was stated that within the above fields, one might distinguish—in accordance with the Polish state
activity structure, encompassing a number of departments of public administration—national
security sectors such as diplomacy for security, military issues, intelligence and counterintelligence,
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strategic goals in the sphere of security, the national security strategy,34 and the
national security system.35 This terminological arrangement seems quite crucial,
taking into consideration the fact that scientific studies, political commentary jour-
nalism, and normative acts of law include a number of concepts and attempts to
define specific notions. The volume limits of this article do not allow a presentation
of all the definitions formulated in the White Book, obliging the author to focus on
the most important ones.
Unfortunately, the White Book seems to be rather unfamiliar to the public, as well
as to the specialists, lawyers, and academics dealing with national security. The
expectations of the White Book’s authors have not been fulfilled, as they hoped that
its publication would contribute to and stimulate a broad social debate and transfor-
mational activities, strengthening the synergy of the national security system through
the integration of the national security management subsystem.
5 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014
The Strategy was developed by the Interdepartmental Group for the Development of
the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland appointed by way of Decree
No. 63 of the Prime Minister of 4 September 2013.36 By establishing the
Interdepartmental Group for the Development of the National Security Strategy of
the Republic of Poland, the Prime Minister indicated that its task would be to define
the national interests and strategic objectives of the Republic of Poland in the sphere
public security, emergency rescue, social security (including, inter alia, the protection of heritage,
education for security, the media in the security system), economic security (including, inter alia,
energy, financial and infrastructural security). Due to the very nature of integrated security there are
also security areas which span multiple sectors or fields, such as cybersecurity. Biała Księga, p. 248.
On cybersecurity, see Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 7–24. Cf. also Sienkiewicz (2009),
p. 27; Worona (2020), pp. 27–136. On the function of the media in security protection, see
Skrzypczak (2015), pp. 25–34; Jancz, pp. 57–66; Wiśniewski (2012), pp. 223–246.
34National security (state security) strategy was defined as the concept, adopted by the given
state, of ensuring security, identifying, in particular, national interests and strategic objectives,
evaluating the future development of the strategic security environment, and the rules and methods
of attaining strategic objectives in the envisaged conditions (the implementation of operational
objectives) as well as of the preparation (maintenance and transformation) of a national security
system (the implementation of preparatory objectives). Biała Księga, p. 249. The conceptual
categories also include definitions of the operational, preparatory, and sectoral national security
strategy and also the state security strategic potential.
35The national security (state security) system was defined as the entirety of resources, means,
and forces (entities) earmarked by the state for the performance of tasks in the field of security,
organised (into subsystems and components), maintained and prepared in a manner requisite for the
purpose of performing such tasks. It consists of a control system (subsystem) as well as a number of
executive subsystems (systems), including operational subsystems (defence and protection sub-
systems) and support subsystems (social and economic). Biała Księga, p. 250.
36Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2013, item 719.
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of security, analysing and projecting the development of external and internal
national security circumstances, and formulating the main directions and the oper-
ating methods of the state and the preparations of its security systems, with the
objective of developing a draft national security strategy of the Republic of Poland,
and submitting it to the Council of Ministers.
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland is a quite extensive
document divided into four chapters, each divided into smaller sections, and pre-
ceded by a brief introduction presenting the objective and the composition of the
Strategy. The subsequent chapters present Poland as a subject of security, charac-
terise Poland’s security environment in the global, regional, and national dimen-
sions, and the concept of strategic actions, i.e. operational strategy; the chapter
discusses defensive actions, protective actions, as well as social and economic
actions in the area of security. The last, fourth chapter, is devoted to the concept of
strategic preparations, i.e. a preparedness strategy, discussing the national security
management subsystem, and the concomitant defence, protection, social, and eco-
nomic subsystems. The document ends with a brief conclusion identifying the
entities responsible for the Strategy’s implementation, and explaining that its content
was developed in the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of
Poland and the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the
Republic of Poland, specifying the long- and mid-term strategy of the country’s
development. It was also stated that the verification of arrangements included in the
document would take place as part of strategic national security reviews. The
publication replaces the Strategy approved by the President of the Republic of
Poland of 13 November 2007.37
The adopted framework of the study does not allow a thorough analysis or a
more-detailed description of the content of the mentioned strategy, which has
already been studied by legal commentators in the above-mentioned texts. It is
also worth noting the considerable progress of the content of the subsequent
documents, and that in each of the subsequent strategies the concept of the security
of the state was rendered differently, which resulted, on the one hand, from a change
in external conditions, and on the other, the situation of the western security
structures of both NATO and the European Union.
37The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%
20RP.pdf, Accessed on 5 July 2020, 4:10 p.m. The Strategy was analysed in detail by Kupiecki
(2015), pp. 11–36.
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6 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2020
The next National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was approved by way
of the decision of the President of 12 May 2020.38 At the same time, it was clearly
stated that the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014 had been
rendered null and void. The text of the Strategy begins with an introduction, in which
it is explained that the Strategy defines a comprehensive vision of shaping the
national security of the Republic of Poland in all its dimensions. The Strategy
takes into consideration the subject-oriented aspect, i.e. the internal dimension of
national security, and the international community, i.e. regional cooperation, collab-
orations on the global scale and within international organisations. It stresses that it
also takes into account the object-oriented aspect, encompassing all dimensions of
the national security system. As emphasised in the document, national interests and
strategic objectives within the domain of national security are expressed in line with
the national values as stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.39 The
strategy also states that “the provisions of the Strategy should be further extended
and reflected in the national strategic documents pertaining to the national security
and development of Poland”. As noted, the Strategy considers the context of
Poland’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European
Union.
The introduction to the Strategy determines the security environment, pointing
out that the greatest threat is the neo-imperial policy of the authorities of the Russian
Federation, pursued by means that include military force. It affirms that the aggres-
sion against Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea,40 and the hostilities in eastern
Ukraine, all violated the basic principles of international law, and undermined the
pillars of the European security system. As noted in the document, the Russian
Federation is intensively developing its offensive military capabilities, conducting
large-scale military exercises based on scenarios assuming a conflict with the NATO
Member States, activities of a hybrid nature below the threshold of war which pose
the risk of the outbreak of a conflict, undertaking comprehensive actions using
non-military means, including cyber attacks and disinformation, with the aim of
rebuilding its power and spheres of influence.41
It is argued that the primary factor shaping Poland’s security is its strong
embedding in the transatlantic and European structures, and the development of
38Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2020, item 413.
39This statement might raise some doubts. It should be stated, however, that the intended meaning is
the axiological system forming the basis for the Constitution and the guaranteed liberties, rights, and
obligations of individuals and citizens. More on the issue in Piechowiak (2020), passim; id.,
Piechowiak (2013), pp. 39–70; Brzozowski (2006), pp. 17–28; Complak (2007), pp. 23–27,
49–56; Garlicki (2010), p. 95 et seq.; Winczorek (1996), pp. 13–14; Sobczak and Sobczak
(2017), pp. 38–63; Sobczak (2012), pp. 285–318.
40On cybersecurity, see Gołda-Sobczak (2016), pp. 192–236.
41See Eggert (2005), pp. 50–51 i 62.
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bilateral and regional cooperation with key partners. As noted in the document, the
bonds between the United States of America and its European allies are evolving,
and there is a risk of undermining the coherence of positions and actions. Another
risk factor is perceived in persistent regional and internal conflicts in the Southern
European Neighbourhood, and the growing migration pressure. At the global level, a
significant risk-posing phenomenon is that of the increasing strategic rivalry between
the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian
Federation.
It is concluded that the development of new technologies, both civilian and
military, contributes to a significant increase in the deployment of unmanned and
autonomous systems, automated and robotised weapon platforms using artificial
intelligence, and long-range precision weapon systems. The rapid development of
digital technologies generates previously unknown threats. The strategy states that as
fixed and mobile communication networks can pose a threat to security, it is
necessary to develop modern and secure telecommunication networks. In the context
of the digital revolution, it is asserted that the specific role of cyberspace and
information space should be considered, as they create conditions for disinformation
and the manipulation of information, which necessitate effective strategic commu-
nication activities.42
Ensuring energy security is considered of key importance for Poland, and the
perceived challenge is to maintain the competitiveness of electricity production in
Poland, in line with the climate and energy policies of the European Union.43 The
document highlights the significance of the state’s financial security and economic
stability. The identified threats include the long-term deficit in the replacement level
fertility rate in Poland, and the significant increase in the number of elderly people,
which present a challenge for public finance.
The strategy recognises threats to the healthcare system, and the necessity to
counteract the effects of lifestyle diseases and eliminate social inequalities in access
to healthcare. It identifies the accelerating climate change, prolonged droughts,
pollution, and the emissions of harmful substances as threats to security. It also
indicates the need to improve the management of national security and to integrate a
number of fragmented solutions. The authors further argue that, faced with
progressing globalisation, the Polish economy has to face up to increasingly strong
competition on foreign markets. As stated in the document, the strength of the Polish
economy translates into the strength of the state’s defence potential. The strategy
strongly emphasises that Poland should strive to reinforce the external pillars of its
security through its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the
European Union, and the strategic partnership with the United States of America, as
42More on information security in Liderman (2012), pp. 43–179; Oleksiewicz and Krztoń (2017),
passim; Oleksiewicz et al. (2017), passim.
43On energy security, see Nowacki (2010), pp. 189–278; Mickiewicz and Sokołowska (2010),
passim; Chmielewski (2009), pasim; Kaczmarski (2010), passim; Gawłowski et al. (2010), passim;
Pronińska (2012), passim.
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well as regional cooperation for security. It recognises the positive impact of the EU
Common Security and Defence Policy and the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooper-
ation.44 It concludes that Poland attaches great importance to the development of
regional cooperation, e.g. within the Bucharest Nine, the Visegrad Group,45 the
Weimar Triangle, the Three Seas Initiative, and collaboration with the countries of
the Baltic Sea region.46
The subsequent part of the Strategy presents values, national interests, and
strategic objectives in the domain of national security. The abovementioned primary
national interests in the field of national security include safeguarding independence,
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of the state and its citizens. Other
interests include shaping the international order, based on solidarity and respect
for international law, strengthening national identity, and preserving national heri-
tage, and ensuring conditions for sustainable and balanced social and economic
development and environmental protection. The main values include the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of the state, the security of its citizens, human and civil
liberties and rights, human dignity, justice, national identity and heritage, the
democratic state of law, solidarity, international order based on the principles of
international law and environmental protection. Finally, the authors state that the
said aspects of the national interest form the pillars of Poland’s national security.
This concept inspires the subsequent part of the Strategy, which presents the first
pillar as concerning the security of the state and its citizens, and the second as
Poland’s situation in the national security system. The third pillar is national identity
and heritage, and the fourth involves social and economic development and envi-
ronmental protection.
The issues within the first pillar include the necessity for integrating national
security management, including state-defence management and the building of
adaptation capabilities. The numerous elements in these activities cover attempts
to integrate the national security management system and to develop the ability for
swift adaptation to new challenges and threats.47 This is to lead to creating an
interagency coordination mechanism for the management of national security
through setting up a committee of the Council of Ministers, responsible, at the
strategic level, for dealing with issues in the sphere of policies, strategies, and
programmes pertaining to national security management, in a manner ensuring
their consistent and coherent implementation. The committee should be linked
with the new role and responsibilities of the Government Crisis Management
Team and the Government Centre for Security. It is stated as necessary to involve
the Marshals (Speakers) of the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland in this
preparation for the sake of managing national security, by adjusting the mechanisms
and instruments supporting the President of the Republic of Poland in a way which
44Marczuk (2014), pp. 169–218.
45On the security of the Visegrad Group countries, see Bień-Kacała et al. (2016), pp. 59–70.
46Cf. Stolarczyk (2004), pp. 11–51; Maj et al. (2016), passim.
47Czachór (2016), pp. 175–192; Żebrowski (2009), pp. 213–246.
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reflects changes in the spheres of security and defence, including state-defence
management. It is also seen as necessary to adjust the national crisis management
system to the NATO Crisis Response System, by also extending it to the field of
political and military conflict, and facilitating the smooth transition from the state of
peace to the state of crisis and war, as well as ensuring that it provides effective tools
to prevent and combat threats, including hybrid situations.48 Further, it is considered
necessary to review, prioritise, and interlink strategy and planning documents, and
also to implement mechanisms in the areas of national security and defence, and the
socio-economic development of the country. It is posited that the preparation and
implementation of a communication system is essential for the purpose of managing
the national security system, including state-defence management; also for ensuring,
within the framework of a comprehensive and integrated national security system, at
all levels of government and local government administration, the cohesion of civil
and defence planning, as well as the possibility of the selective implementation of
tasks, as required. The document states that the Act on National Security Manage-
ment will be developed to implement the above-described measures.
As part of further activities under the first pillar, i.e. the security of the state and its
citizens, the Strategy focuses on state defence and common defence. It asserts that it
is necessary to increase the state’s resilience to threats by creating a system of
common civil defence, based on the efforts of the entire nation, and building an
understanding for the development of the Republic of Poland’s resilience and
defence capabilities. It places special emphasis on building a system of common
civil defence and resilience to threats, including hybrid threats, through ensuring the
universal nature of civil defence and the protection of the population.49 The strategy
sees it necessary to develop the capacity of the health system and public adminis-
tration structures to fight against epidemic threats, especially against highly infec-
tious and particularly dangerous diseases. As noted, it is also necessary to develop
diagnostic facilities and the strategic reserve programme. The strategy recognises the
need for the transfer of know-how and capacities allowing the shaping of national
security, based on the broad involvement of public authorities, including local
government, educational, higher educational and scientific institutions, and the
economy. It approaches building social capital by developing cooperation skills,
networks of formal and non-formal social organisations, and by shaping the com-
munity of values within Polish society. It identifies the need to redefine the civil-
defence system and the population-protection system by making it universal, and to
develop a law comprehensively regulating the subject matter of civil defence. The
document describes plans of increasing resilience to threats by ensuring effective
energy supplies, preventing the uncontrolled movement of people and the relocation
of the population, and the collection, protection, and management of food and water
resources. Further goals include the creation of resilient telecommunication
48On security in crisis situations see Koziński (2010), passim.
49On the common civil defence system, see Grosset (2011), passim; Aleksandrowicz (2014);
Piasecka (2011), pp. 31–44.
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networks and Information and Communications Technology systems, population
information and alert systems, and resilient transport networks. This is associated
with the assumption of implementing a homogeneous system of human resources
management, including the administration of personnel reserves.
The document expresses the need to develop the state’s capacity to prevent and
respond to terrorist threats and to fight organised crime, including criminal activities
in cyberspace. The authors consider it appropriate to strengthen legal certainty by
ensuring effective legal protection for citizens, an efficient judiciary system, and the
proper enforcement of court decisions. They recognise the necessity to continue to
strengthen the counter-intelligence protection of the state authorities and critical
infrastructure in a way commensurate with increasing activities of foreign intelli-
gence services, in both the military and civilian domains.
The strategy states that it is crucial to develop the capacities of national intelli-
gence services to identify risks at an early stage. It also points to the necessity to
create conditions, in the area of spatial planning and development, allowing the
effective and efficient analysis of the requirements of national security, and to
provide optimal legal and organisational conditions for acting flexibly in the event
of an external threat to state security in times of peace, crisis, and war.50 The authors
consider it appropriate to strengthen interagency coordination with a view to devel-
oping the capabilities of the national industrial and technological defence base
within state security, including the selective launching of actions to mobilise the
economy, and to meet the needs of the Polish Armed Forces. Finally, they identify
the need to increase capabilities in the fields of cryptology and the production of
telecommunication appliances equipped with cryptographic modules, and to build
capacities for technological development and the production of strategic resources in
times of peace, crisis and war.
Another issue discussed within the first pillar is the need to strengthen the Polish
Armed Forces and their operational capabilities. The strategy assumes efforts to
increase the growth rate of defence spending, to reach 2.5% of GDP in 2024. It
points to the necessity of continuing the adaptation of the command structure of the
Polish Armed Forces to reflect the needs resulting from changes in the security
environment. It also describes it as vital to supplement the personnel and equipment
of the Armed Forces, and to adapt training programmes and capabilities to conduct
asymmetric operations. It provides for enhancing the mobility of troops and the
efficiency of their support and logistics systems. The authors consider it essential to
improve the management of personnel resources and to streamline the qualification
and recruitment processes, as well as education and professional training. They
stress that there is a necessity to build a national integrated situational awareness
system, based on various means of reconnaissance, communication, command, and
control, including national Earth observation satellite systems, and unmanned aerial
vehicle systems. The strategy recognises the need to ensure the state’s capability for
effective air defence, as well as operational capabilities, including long-range missile
50Potrzeszcz (2013), passim; Sobczak (2013), pp. 187–213.
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defences. It is also thought appropriate to develop the operational capabilities of the
Polish Armed Forces, in particular of the Special Operations Forces. Another task is
to gain operational capabilities to conduct military operations in cyberspace, and
develop Cyber Defence Forces. The document points to the need to improve the
mobilisation system, including the training of personnel reserves, also noting the
necessity to build the operational capabilities of the Navy. It expresses the decision
to implement the programme of building the Territorial Defence Forces, so that the
Polish defence industry could meet the long-term needs of the Polish Armed Forces.
A lot of attention is paid to cybersecurity.51 It was determined to increase
resilience and information protection levels in the military sector, while promoting
practices enabling citizens to better protect their information.
The strategy also declares that it is necessary to ensure the safe operation of the
state and citizens in information space. This involves creating the ability to protect
this space, and the systemic response to disinformation. It was thought necessary to
create a uniform system of state strategic communication, simultaneously creating
procedures defining cooperation to counteract disinformation.
As part of the second pillar, strengthening the capabilities of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation and the European Union is considered necessary. Among
numerous measures to attain this objective, the decision made to pursue the increase
and consolidation of the military presence of NATO on its Eastern flank is worth
noting. Maintaining a dual-track policy towards the Russian Federation within the
framework of NATO, consisting of enhanced deterrence and defence, combined
with the readiness to engage in a conditions-based dialogue, is considered advisable,
and so is engaging in the development of the European Union’s Common Security
and Defence Policy, including within the framework of the European Union’s
Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund. The document
declares that divisions among European Union Member States should be
prevented.52
Within this pillar, the strategy also discussed the need to develop cooperation in
bilateral, regional, and global formats, including with the United States and key
European partners. It promises actions aimed at strengthening the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of
Moldova, including support for their efforts to fulfil their European and Euro-
Atlantic aspirations. It also raises the need to take steps to enhance the effectiveness
of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe.53 It stresses that national interests will be pursued in the spirit of solidarity
with allies and partners. Finally, it assumes expanding the transport network and
51On cybersecurity, see Banasiński (2018), passim; Gzicki (2013), pp. 44–45; Kosiński (2015),
pp. 212–274.
52Aleksandrowicz (2011), pp. 68–102; Wawrzyk (2009), passim; Siupiński (2013), passim;
Marczuk (2012), pp. 310–432 and 499–544.
53Zajadło (2005); Rudkowski (2006), pp. 99–237.
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seaports, extending the inland waters development programme, and building the
Solidarity Transport Hub.
As part of the third pillar, the document emphasises the need to strengthen
national identity, rooted in the Christian heritage and universal values. It highlights
the notions of shaping and developing patriotic attitudes, refining instruments and
procedures for the protection of cultural heritage, and promoting the development
and protection of traditional family values, Polish national identity, culture, and
traditions. It promises to strengthen the links between the Polish diaspora and the
home country, and also to strive to increase the involvement of the former in
activities related to the promotion of Poland.
Another objective established within the pillar involves strengthening the positive
image of the Republic of Poland, and its cultural and economic attractiveness. It is
pointed out that this should be pursued through public and cultural diplomacy, along
with social communication technology, taking into account the state’s historical
policy.54 The document suggests it is vital to promote the Polish language, culture,
science, and history, and the nation’s Christian heritage. In addition, it recognises the
need to strengthen the “brand” of the Polish economy and to support Polish
companies in the process of internationalisation. Last but not least, the strategy
highlights the need to improve cooperation with Polish community social organisa-
tions, in order to promote Polish culture and economy.
As part of the fourth pillar, the strategy holds as fundamental that steps should be
taken to improve the conditions for the protection and development of families, and
to increase the health security of citizens. It also identifies the need to take measures
to improve the demographic situation, including an increase in the birth rate.55 It
concludes that a policy dedicated to senior citizens must be implemented to ensure
social and health security for the elderly, and to mobilise this group to remain
professionally active.56 It points to the need of improving patient care in the
healthcare system, including by increasing the quality and availability of healthcare
services, together with taking action in illness prevention and health education, and
early diagnosis and rehabilitation. The document recognises the need to increase the
number of health professionals and enhance their expertise, while preventing their
migration abroad.57 Finally, the authors consider it essential to continue to develop
physical culture, by ensuring universal access to sport, and by modernising the
existing sports and leisure infrastructure, and constructing new facilities.
The document also draws attention to coordinating migration policy with the
economic, social, and security policies by considering both the current and projected
54As regards diplomacy measures aimed at security, see Macioszek (2003), especially 11–43 and
119–156; Grab (2018), pp. 19–118 and 198–220.
55Serafin and Parszowki (2011), passim; Pływaczewski (2017), passim; Chojnowski (2018), see
especially pp. 389–412; Cichy and Szyjko (2015), see especially pp. 228–263.
56Cf. Jagusiak (2015), especially pp. 48–141.
57Cf. Szuniewicz (2016), pp. 33–78; Kowalewski (2015), pp. 64–84; Wedel-Domaradzka (2013),
pp. 108–125.
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needs on the labour market. At the same time, it emphasises the need to integrate
migrants within Polish society, to ensure social cohesion, and to counteract possible
threats to public order and security related to migration processes.
Further elements in the fourth pillar include economic and energy security. In
terms of economic security, the strategy aims to support measures to increase
resilience to international financial crises, in particular by strengthening the stability
of the public finance system. It highlights the need to continue working towards a
change to the structure of public expenditure, and to increase resources for
development-oriented activities. It recognises the importance of ensuring efficient
cash flows in times of disruption to the functioning of the banking system. It
promises to strengthen the supervisory capacity and ability to counter threats related
to the destabilisation of financial markets, speculative attacks on the Polish currency,
and capital drain.
The document also points to the need to ensure the energy security of the state,
based on traditional energy sources, by creating the conditions for the development
of alternatives. It assumes increasing the diversification of oil and gas supply
sources, and expanding the existing natural gas import capacities. It considers it
advisable to carry out further work on extending the transmission system, and to
continue diplomatic, legal, and administrative efforts to halt the construction of the
transmission infrastructure which is increasing the dependence of Central Europe on
gas supplies from the Russian Federation.58
Moreover, as part of the fourth pillar, the strategy refers to the need to protect the
natural environment.59 It highlights the urgency to create the conditions for the
effective enforcement of environment-related legislation, and to establish a coherent
policy for the protection, restoring, and management of water resources. It also
recognises the need to intensify efforts to combat air pollution, to develop
electromobility, and to promote the use of alternative fuels. It stresses the necessity
of adjusting national policies and actions to the climate objectives agreed on in the
fora of international organisations and attempting to preserve all the functions of the
natural environment, including forests as one of the key elements in the country’s
ecological safety.
It recognises the need to manage human capital, and scientific and technological
potential for the economic development of the country. It promises to provide the
conditions conducive to the development of innovation, to promote exact sciences in
order to increase technological expertise, especially in the field of security, and to
promote the development and implementation of modern technologies, and the use
of their effects for national security.60 The document also highlights the need to
increase investment in research and development to reach the European average, and
to enhance the effectiveness of the use and commercialisation of its results.
58See more in Banasik and Rogozińska (2019), pp. 199–212.
59On ecological security, see Korzeniowski (2012), p. 203; Stępniewska (2018), pp. 213–215.
60See Glińska and Kowalewska (2011), pp. 114–113.
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In the concluding section of the strategy, the authors state that the mechanisms for
the implementation of its provisions will be further defined in the Act on National
Security Management. Pending its adoption, the strategy is intended to be
implemented within the framework of the currently binding law. The persons
implementing the provisions included in the strategy are obliged to consider the
national interests and strategic objectives in the domain of national security in all
projects planned for implementation, and in day-to-day operations.61 It is stressed
that the verification of the implementation of the tasks set out in this Strategy, and the
development of proposals to update it, may take place as part of national security
strategic reviews.
The mere fact that this strategy has been developed should be regarded as
favourable, as it was quite clear that the provisions of the previous strategy
(of 2014) were neither approved nor actually implemented by the government.
This strategy, however, was not preceded by any debate involving
non-governmental third-party experts or representatives of various political powers.
This seems to contradict the obligation arising from the previous document, which
envisaged a strategic review of national security. It can be noted that the National
Security Strategy of 2020 has a slightly different layout and structure compared to
the documents of 2007 and 2014. This seems to clash with the logic of a strategic
cycle which assumes four stages of formulating a strategic concept, i.e. identifying
national interests as the starting point for further discussions; assessing and
projecting the security environment; developing a concept of the objectives and
duties of an operational strategy, i.e. the means to ensure the implementation of
national interests; and determining the concept of the so-called preparatory strategy,
i.e. the means to prepare an independent security system. It is worth noting that the
Strategy fails to specify the strategic measures which Poland could and should take
under various threat scenarios. The national interests of the Republic of Poland can
thus be only presumed. An unquestionable strength of the Strategy is the accurate
definition of existing national, regional, and global military and economic threats.
Another positive aspect is the fact that it addresses such phenomena as hybridity,
activities in cyberspace, and the demand for new technologies, including artificial
intelligence. The intent to build an integrated security management system, which
was expressed in the Strategy, and issues regarding the state’s resilience and defence
universality, are also noteworthy. The duties regarding the capacities of the armed
forces are fairly ambitious and justifiable, but there is no mention of the order in
which they will be implemented. As regards the third pillar, one can get the
impression that this is a presentation of some political agenda which has already
been discussed many times. Given the purpose of this document, its frequent
references to the Christian heritage appear quite striking. Moreover, in contrast to
previous documents, it fails to refer to the Constitution and its axiological system,
which can be regarded as an omission. Definitely too little space is devoted to what
appears the most important in the long run, i.e. the armed forces and their defence
61Nowak and Nowak (2011), pp. 39–70 i 147–158.
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capacities. Finally, the promise to develop the Act on National Security Management
is noteworthy, but it should be preceded with a wider discussion, attended also by
those who are perhaps the most concerned with this issue, i.e. the representatives of
armed forces.
7 Conclusions
The new National Security Strategy is an interesting, yet not flawless, document,
which was preceded by earlier documents dealing with the same issues. It imposes
highly ambitious and interesting obligations whose justifiability is hard to question,
in terms of both the government and society as a whole. However, while the Strategy
is of much significance, its ranking within the normative acts system is rather low.
The Act of 6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development
Policy62 should also be borne in mind. Within the framework of their statutory
duties, the Council of Ministers have passed a number of resolutions formulating
development strategies for various fields of the state’s functioning and economic
sectors.63 The objectives and duties envisaged in those strategies clearly correspond
62Act of 6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy, consolidated
text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1295. See Jaśkiewicz (2014).
63Resolution No. 102 of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 2019 on adopting the National
Regional Development Strategy 2030, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of
Poland of 2019, item 1060; Resolution No. 123 of the Council of Ministers of 15 October 2019 on
adopting the Strategy for Sustainable Rural Development, Agriculture, and Fisheries 2030, the
Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2019, item 1150; Resolution
No. 105 of the Council of Ministers of 24 September 2019 on adopting the Strategy for Sustainable
Transport Development 2030, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of
2019, item 1054; Resolution No. 114 of the Council of Ministers of 1 October 2019 on adopting the
Strategy for Capital Market Development, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic
of Poland of 2019, item 1027; Resolution No. 6 of the Council of Ministers of 26 January 2017 on
adopting the Polish Space Strategy, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of
Poland of 2017, item 203; Resolution No. 58 of the Council of Ministers of 15 April 2014 on
adopting the Strategy for Energy Security and Environment – a perspective by 2020, the Official
Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2014, item 469, as amended; Resolution
No. 104 of the Council of Ministers of 18 June 2013 on adopting the Strategy for Human Capital
Development 2020, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2013, item
640; Resolution No. 61 of the Council of Ministers of 26 March 2013 on adopting the Social Capital
Strategy 2020, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2013, item 378;
Resolution No. 17 of the Council of Ministers of 12 February 2013 on adopting the Efficient State
Strategy 2020, the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2013, item 136;
Resolution No. 7 of the Council of Ministers of 15 January 2013 on the Innovation Strategy for
Economic Efficiency – Dynamic Poland 2020” 2020, the Official Gazette of the Government of the
Republic of Poland of 2013, item 73; Resolution No. 60 of the Council of Ministers of 30 April
2014 on adopting the Development Strategy for Western Poland by 2020, the Official Gazette of the
Government of the Republic of Poland of 2014, item 452; Resolution No. 3 of the Council of
Ministers of 8 January 2014 on adopting the Development Strategy for Southern Poland by 2020,
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to those presented in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland
approved on 12 May 2020. Additionally, by way of the Resolution of the Council
of Ministers of 9 April 2013, passed under Article 14(3) of the Act of 6 December
2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy, the Strategy of the
Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 202264 was
adopted. It contains a diagnosis of the national security system in the context of
internal and external conditions, along with the challenges, development trends, and
visions of the national security system, the Strategy’s objectives and interventions,
the Strategy’s implementation system, and the financial framework. In the author’s
opinion, the Strategy adopted by way of Resolution No. 67 is more detailed, and
focused on the defensive potential, than the Strategy adopted on 12 May 2020, and
there is the impression that both Strategies appear competitive to each other. At this
point, any more detailed considerations on the subject matter can hardly be
presented, but one cannot ignore a certain dualism resulting from the fact that the
Strategy of 2013 was adopted by way of a Resolution of the Council of Ministers and
the Strategy of 12 May 2020 was by way of the President’s decision passed on the
motion of the Council of Ministers. Clarifying potential doubts when the provisions
of these two documents are found to be contradictory is likely to pose serious
problems for lawyers.
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The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic
of Poland
Waldemar Kitler
Abstract Directive 2016/1148 obliged each Member State to have a national
strategy in the field of network and information system security, defining strategic
goals and specific policy actions to be implemented. The adoption of the “Cyberse-
curity Strategy of the Republic of Poland” is also a requirement to implement the
provision of Article 68 of the Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity
System.
The strategy for the years 2019–2024, which defines targets in the field of
cybersecurity, set the main goal, i.e. increasing the level of resilience to cyber threats
and increasing the level of information protection in the public, military, and private
sectors and promoting knowledge and good practices enabling citizens to better
protect their information.
As part of the activities planned in the Strategy until 2024, the Government of the
Republic of Poland will systematically strengthen and develop the National Cyber-
security System. The activities include systemic organisational, operational, techno-
logical, and legal solutions, creating social attitudes and conducting scientific
research in order to ensure compliance with high cybersecurity standards in the
area of software, devices and digital services. Government activities will be under-
taken with respect for the rights and freedoms of citizens and by building trust
between individual market sectors and public administration.
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The adoption of the NIS Directive1 by the European Parliament and the Council
(EU) obligated Member States to develop their own national strategies on the
security of network and information systems. Under Article 7(1) of the NIS
Directive,
Each Member State shall adopt a national strategy on the security of network and informa-
tion systems defining the strategic objectives and appropriate policy and regulatory mea-
sures, with a view to achieving and maintaining a high level of security of network and
information systems, and covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex 2 and the services
referred to in Annex 3.
In consequence, on 27 April 2017 the National Framework of Cybersecurity
Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–20222 was adopted by way of Resolution
No. 52/2017 of the Council of Ministers, along with the accompanying document
entitled “The Action Plan for Implementing the National Framework of Cybersecu-
rity Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017-2022.” It is also worth noting that in
the same year the Minister competent for Digital Affairs adopted a document entitled
“The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2017-2022.” All the
above-mentioned documents envisaged the continuation of measures implemented
by the government administration with the aim of improving the level of security in
the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland, as well as the document entitled “The
Governmental Cyberspace Protection Programme of the Republic of Poland for
2009-2011 – assumptions,” discussed on 9 March 2009 by the Standing Committee
of the Council of Ministers, and the Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of
Poland adopted by the Government in 2013.3 It should be stressed at this point that,
before the entry into force of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland
for 2019–2024, the role of a similar-stature document had been played by the
National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland for
2017–2022, adopted by way of Resolution No. 52/2017 of the Council of Ministers
of 27 April 2017 on the National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic
of Poland for 2017–2022.
Two years after the adoption of the NIS Directive, the Polish Sejm passed the Act
of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System,4 following which, under
1Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament, and of the Council (EU), of 6 July 2016,
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems
across the Union (OJ EU 2016 L 194/1).
2Resolution No. 52/2017 of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2017 on the National Framework
of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017-2022 (KPRM), RM-111-52-17.
3Resolution No. 111/2013 of the Council of Ministers of 25 June 2013 on the Cyberspace
Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, KPRM, RM-111-103-13.
4Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1560 as amended.
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Article 68 thereof, the legislator developed formal grounds for the adoption of the
Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland by the Council of Ministers.5
2 The Cybersecurity Strategy vs. Normative Acts
and Strategic Documents
The provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland stipulate that
the Council of Ministers shall conduct the internal affairs and foreign policy of the
Republic of Poland (Article 146(1)), and to the extent, and in accordance with, the
principles specified by the Constitution and Acts, it shall, in particular, guarantee the
implementation of Acts (Article 146(4)(1)); safeguard the internal security of the
state and public order (Article 146(4)(7)); and ensure the external security of the state
(Article 146(4)(8)). The national security of the Republic of Poland, in both the
subjective and objective scopes, is dependent on the undisrupted functioning of
cyberspace, to the same extent as its very existence and development. In conse-
quence, ensuring the resilience of information systems against actions which com-
promise the confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of processed data,
or the related services provided by those information systems, is among the major
challenges faced by the Polish administration, in particular at the central level.
Cybersecurity, including the national cybersecurity system which is being
constructed to secure the accomplishment of the set objectives, is now a key sphere
of national security, in its both internal and external dimensions. In addition,
considering the increasingly blurred boundaries between these two dimensions, the
strategy must take into account any actions, regardless of state borders, which violate
the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of the processed data or
related services provided through network and information systems.
The strategy, by outlining the mode of accomplishing the security policy objec-
tives regarding cyberspace, determines the directions of the state’s activities and the
method of fulfilling its potential. However, certain doubts can arise in connection
with its normative status, despite its being developed and adopted under the NCSA.
The draft version of that document, which, at the request of the Minister compe-
tent for computerisation, was developed in cooperation with the Government Plen-
ipotentiary for Cybersecurity6 other Ministers and the appropriate managers of
central governmental offices (see Article 70 of the NCSA), is to be adopted by the
Council of Ministers by way of a Resolution. In compliance with Article 68 of the
5The name adopted in the said Act (see Article 45(1)(1)). It was also used in the title of the draft Act
in “The list of the legislative and programme work of the Council of Ministers,” reading as “A draft
Act of the Council of Ministers on the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” draft
No. ID210. Eventually, that name was also used in Resolution No. 125 of the Council of Ministers
of 22 October 2019 on the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2019-2024 (The
Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 30 October 2019, item 1037).
6Hereinafter referred to as “the Plenipotentiary”,
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NCSA, the strategy is to be adopted by the Council of Ministers under an internal
legal act, i.e. by way of a Resolution. However, the Polish legislators did not adopt a
legal definition of the term cybersecurity strategy (of the Republic of Poland), but it
indicated, by way of an Act, the elements which this document should feature
(Article 69(2) of the NCSA) and determined its legal form. Among other documents
related to national security of strategic importance, this is one of the few examples of
making a strategy a state-level document. In the vast majority of cases, the legislator
merely authorised the responsible bodies to develop, announce, and adopt specific
strategies. The latter situation involved the National Security Strategies of the
Republic of Poland of 2007 and 2014, for which the legal grounds were provided
by Article 4a(1)(1) and Article 6(1)(1) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the
Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland,7 the Strategy for the Development
of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022, and the Strategy for
Responsible Development by 2020 (including a 2030 perspective), both adopted by
way of Resolutions of the Council of Ministers under Articles 9 and 12a of the Act of
6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy.8 As a
result, the executive authorities, and in particular the Government authorities, used to
have a decisive voice when it came to the structure of the strategic documents of this
stature. This time, however, the legislator determined the framework of the substan-
tive structure of the Strategy, although this decision was somewhat imposed to
ensure compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 7(1) of the NIS
Directive.
In connection with the above, the legal effect of the directives (which have the
character of programmatic norms) included in the Strategy can be questioned, inter
alia, due to the fact that their provisions regarding purpose and content might not be
directly binding on public authorities, or other entities in the national cybersecurity
system, which, in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland,
operate on the basis of and within the law. Resolutions and other internal legal
acts form a separate set of normative acts, and govern only the relationships between
the organisational units forming part of the apparatus supervised by the body which
issues a given Resolution or internal legal act. Resolutions of the Council of
Ministers may be addressed to subordinate units, and, thus, any strategies adopted
on that basis bind only those subordinate units (Article 93(1) of the Constitution of
the Republic of Poland), and they may not serve as the basis for decisions taken in
respect of citizens, legal persons, or other entities (Article 93(2) thereof). Given the
substantive content of the Strategy (Article 69 of the NCSA) and some elements
included in the national cybersecurity system (Article 4), the above doubts can be
justified. This concerns in particular the National Bank of Poland, Bank
7Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland, consolidated
text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1541, as amended.
8Act of 6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy, Polish Journal
of Laws of 2009 No. 84, item 712, as amended.
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Gospodarstwa Krajowego, companies and partnerships, and some entities
performing cybersecurity services.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the national cybersecurity system includes
some entities which cannot be subject to the provisions of the Strategy. Under
Article 4 of the NCSA, the national cybersecurity system consists of: operators of
essential services—digital service providers; CSIRT MON; CSIRT NASK; CSIRT
GOV; sectoral cybersecurity teams; units operating within the public-finance sector
referred to in Articles 9(1-6), (8), (9), (11) and (12) of the Act on Public Finance;
research institutes; the National Bank of Poland; Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego;
the Office of Technical Inspection; the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency; the
Polish Centre for Accreditation; the National Fund for Environmental Protection and
Water Management, and regional funds for environmental protection and water
management; companies and partnerships performing public-utility duties within
the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Act on Municipal Services; entities providing
services in the field of cybersecurity; bodies in charge of cybersecurity;9 the Single
Point of Contact for cybersecurity;10 the Government Plenipotentiary for Cyberse-
curity; and the College for Cybersecurity.11
It can be concluded that, given the status of the Strategy, it can have a direct
impact on government administration authorities, and, given its legal status in
relation to generally applicable law, its impact on other public authorities, entrepre-
neurs, and citizens is only indirect.
It should also be stressed that several government administration bodies were
appointed by the legislator for the purpose of developing, and then adopting, the
Strategy. These included the Minister competent for computerisation, who was
obliged to cooperate with the Plenipotentiary, other Ministers, and the appropriate
managers of central offices (in developing the draft version of the Strategy), and the
Council of Ministers (passing a Resolution on adopting the Strategy). The mere fact
of finalising the draft version of the Strategy reflects the good will and agreement of
the authorised bodies as to its content, by which they express their standpoint on the
9The competent bodies in the field of cybersecurity are as follows: for the energy sector—the
Minister competent for energy; for the transport sector excluding the water-transport subsector—the
Minister competent for transport; for the water-transport subsector—the Minister competent for the
maritime economy and the Minister competent for inland shipping; for the banking sector and the
financial-market infrastructure—the Polish Financial Supervision Authority; for the healthcare
sector, excluding the entities referred to in Article 26(5)—the Minister competent for health; for
the healthcare sector including the entities referred to in Article 26(5)—the Minister of National
Defence; for the potable-water supply and distribution sector—the Minister competent for water
management; for the digital-infrastructure sector, excluding the entities referred to in Article 26
(5)—the Minister competent for computerisation; for the digital infrastructure sector, including the
entities referred to in Article 26(5)—the Minister of National Defence; for digital service providers,
excluding the entities referred to in Article 26(5)—the Minister competent for computerisation; and
for digital service providers, including the entities referred to in Article 26(5)—the Minister of
National Defence (Article 41 of the NCSA).
10Hereinafter referred to as “the Single Point of Contact”.
11Hereinafter referred to as “the College”.
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subject matter. The ultimate Act, for it to be adopted, engages the whole Council of
Ministers, and requires a consensus to be reached by way of discussions attended by
the majority of the Council of Ministers at Council meetings (§ 15(1) and (2) of the
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 29 October 2013 Internal Working
Regulations of the Council of Ministers).12 The Resolution of the Council of
Ministers becomes binding on all its members who “[. . .] shall be collectively
responsible to the Sejm for the activities of the Council of Ministers” (Article 157
(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland).
Summing up, it can be stated that, in view of the current legal status, the Strategy
adopted by the Council of Ministers can be applicable across the Government’s
administration, but without covering other public entities or institutions, local
government authorities, businesses not owned by the state, or non-governmental
organisations.
3 The Vision, Main Goal, and Specific Objectives
of the Strategy
In compliance with Article 60(1) of the NCSA,
The Strategy determines the strategic objectives, and the appropriate political and regulatory
measures, aimed at attaining and maintaining a high level of cybersecurity. The Strategy
shall cover the sectors referred to in Annex 1 hereto, and the digital services and the public
entities referred to in Article 4(7)-(15).
The Council of Ministers, in adopting the Resolution on the Cybersecurity
Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2019-2024, strengthened the strategic objec-
tives by introducing the heading “Vision, main goal, specific objectives.”
The vision assumes that
The efficient and safe operation of information systems and means of electronic communi-
cation are related to the successful growth of the Republic of Poland, the increasing wealth
and effectiveness of the economy, and the performance of its institutions and entities,
including the social activities and everyday functioning of individual members of society.
Therefore, as part of the actions planned in the Cybersecurity Strategy by 2024, the
Government shall systematically enhance and develop the national cybersecurity system.
The said actions include systemic organisational, operational, technological, and legal
measures, as well as the shaping of social attitudes, and conducting research and develop-
ment projects, to ensure the achievement of high cybersecurity standards of software,
hardware, and digital services. The Government shall take these actions by building confi-
dence between the private sector and the public administration, while respecting the rights
and freedoms of the citizens—(Point 4.1 of the Strategy).
12The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 29 October 2013 Internal Working Regulations of
the Council of Ministers. The Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2016,
item 1006, as amended.
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In Article 69(1) of the NCSA, the legislator stipulated that the Strategy should
determine the strategic objectives and the appropriate political and regulatory mea-
sures, aimed at attaining and maintaining a high level of cybersecurity. This resulted
from the provisions of the NIS Directive which, in the definitions section, stipulated
the ‘national strategy on the security of network and information systems’ entails a frame-
work providing strategic objectives and priorities on the security of network and information
systems at the national level—(Article 4(3)).
Furthermore,
Each Member State shall adopt a national strategy on the security of network and informa-
tion systems, defining the strategic objectives and the appropriate policy, and regulatory
measures, with a view to achieving and maintaining a high level of security of network and
information systems, and covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex 2 and the services
referred to in Annex 3. (Article 7(1), sentence 1).
Such an approach is consistent with the prevailing view of the essence of the
strategy as such, which J. Penc defined as a concept of
[. . .] systemic action (an action plan) which involves formulating a set of long-term business
objectives, and modifying these objectives, depending on changes occurring in the business
environment, and determining the resources and means for these objectives to be fulfilled
(. . .).
A similar way of reasoning regarding the Strategy was adopted when
implementing the national development policy, in which it was defined as “[. . .] a
process of creating and implementing a long-term plan, attaining a certain standing,
and securing a relatively permanent operational model,” and the strategy of an
organisation as “a set of non-concurrent operating modes, adjusted to its potential
and circumstances, enabling its long-term objectives to be fulfilled.” In consequence,
developing a strategy implies
[. . .] selecting the field of operation in which the organisation is seeking to establish its
presence, and determining the means necessary for its survival and development, i.e. for
gaining a stronger competitive edge within the sectors, and on the markets, in which it is
pursuing its activities.
The state is to ensure the national existence and development conditions which
are free from disruptions (and, in particular, threats), which fact was reflected in
Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, reading
The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory, and
ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of its citizens, safeguard
the national heritage, and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment, pursuant to
the principles of sustainable development.
Also, numerous legislative acts contain the standards defined by the legislators in
laying down the duties of public authorities, and other public entities and institu-
tions, businesses, social organisations, and citizens, regarding the state’s
(or national) security. All these regulations involve, to a large extent, the fulfilment
of the state’s external and internal functions, including, in particular,
law-enforcement, organisational, executive, regulatory and planning functions.
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In determining the strategic objectives, the Council of Ministers lays down the
cybersecurity goals which are expected to be attained in the future. These correspond
to the anticipated operational outcomes expressed through programmatic norms and
directives which cannot be made into legal norms. For this reason, the Strategy may
be neither an Act nor a regulation, as its provisions govern a certain operational
programme of public administration, within the framework of the national cyberse-
curity strategy, but they are rather unspecific and imprecise, while their legal
enforcement would be hindered.
An illustration of the determining of strategic objectives is provided in Article
3 of the NCSA, reading
The national cybersecurity system is aimed at ensuring cybersecurity at the national level,
including the undisrupted provision of essential services and digital services, by attaining a
sufficient level of security of information systems serving the purpose of providing such
services, and by ensuring incident handling.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, one should note that, in determining the strategic
objectives, the Council of Ministers is driven by substantive factors and the princi-
ples of defining the organisation’s goals. In the first case, this refers to following the
provisions of both the NIS Directive and the NCSA and the EU Internal Security
Strategy and national strategies (regarding security and development).
The Strategy for 2019–2024, determining the cybersecurity objectives, also
contains the main goal, i.e.
Increasing the level of resilience to cyber threats and the protection of information in the
public, military and private sectors, as well as promoting knowledge and good practices to
enable the public to better protect information.
The main goal is followed by five specific objectives.13
• Specific objective 1—The development of the national cybersecurity system,
(including the implementation and evaluation of the functioning of the provisions
regarding the national cybersecurity system; enhancing the efficiency of the
functioning of the national cybersecurity system; the development of an infor-
mation sharing system for the purpose of national security management; enhanc-
ing the cybersecurity of essential and digital services and critical infrastructure;
the development and implementation of a risk assessment methodology at the
national level; and increasing the capacity to counteract cybercrime, including
cyber espionage and incidents of a terrorist nature).
• Specific objective 2—Increasing the resilience level of information systems of the
public administration and private sectors, and building the capacity to effectively
prevent and respond to incidents (including the development and implementation
of National Cybersecurity Standards, and the dissemination of good practices and
recommendations; supply chain security; and security tests and audits).
13See The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2017-2022, Appendix to Resolution
No. 125 of the Council of Ministers of 22 October 2019 Official Gazette of the Government of the
Republic of Poland of 2019, item 1037.
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• Specific objective 3—Increasing the national capacity in the sphere of cyberse-
curity technology (including the development of industrial and technological
resources for the purposes of cybersecurity; focus on developing public-private
cooperation; stimulating research and development in the field of cybersecurity;
and building the capacity to perform a full spectrum of military operations in
cyberspace);
• Specific objective 4—Enhancing public awareness and skills in the field of
cybersecurity (including increasing the expertise of the staff of entities applicable
to ensuring the cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland; creating conditions for
the safe use of cyberspace by citizens; and developing public awareness towards
the safe use of cyberspace);
• Specific objective 5—Establishing a strong international position of the Republic
of Poland in the sphere of cybersecurity (including: active international cooper-
ation at the strategic and political levels; and active international cooperation at
the operational and technical levels).
4 The Means for Fulfilling the Strategy’s Objectives
and the Entities Involved in Its Implementation
The legislators obligated the Council of Ministers to determine the means for
achieving the Strategy objectives. These should, in principle, ensure the level of
security of network and information systems commensurate with the risk presented,
by preventing and minimising the impact of incidents on the security of the network
and information systems which are used for the provision of essential services. These
will be technical and organisational measures, accompanied by normative (legal)
and administrative measures ensuring that the authorised bodies, the operators of
essential services, and providers of essential services, are vested with the necessary
rights. These are contained, to a greater or lesser extent, in the specific objectives.
The means for accomplishing the objectives are determined both via program-
matic norms and technical directives, as the former are intended to set the goals to be
fulfilled, and the latter specify various entities, priorities, means, and other activities,
in accordance with Article 69(2) of the NCSA. This aspect of the strategy is reflected
in the current achievements and traditions related to developing strategic documents,
and in the content of the National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy of the
Republic of Poland14 for 2017–202215 adopted by way of Resolution No. 52/2017
of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2017.
If we assume that policy measures are any activities undertaken by public
authorities with a view to attaining the set objectives, then attention should be paid
to the fact that, in the reference Strategy, the Council of Ministers designates, in
14hereinafter “the National Framework”.
15KPRM/RM-111-52-17.
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varying degrees, activities at the international and national levels (economic, mili-
tary, educational, scientific and technical, normative, and special), in compliance
with the NCSA.
In turn, regulatory measures are implemented to ensure compliance with both the
NIS Directive and the NCSA, in order to attain and maintain a high level of
cybersecurity. Therefore, the regulations should seek, under the NCSA, inter alia,
to ensure the consistency of the developed cybersecurity system as regards supervi-
sion over financial markets, the adjustment of the banking sector’s and the financial
markets’ infrastructure, the conclusion of agreements for the provision of essential
ICT services, and the security of network and information systems of operators of
essential services and digital service providers.
Prior to entry into force of the NIS Directive and the NCSA, the national
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services had
been defined in Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications
networks and services (Framework Directive).16 The Directive lays down a common
legal framework for the provision of electronic communications services, electronic
communications networks, and associated facilities and services. It also lays down
the tasks of national regulatory authorities, and establishes a set of procedures to
ensure the harmonised application of the regulatory framework throughout the
Community (Article 1(1) of Directive 2002/21/EC).
Similar to political measures, regulatory measures should also ensure the
attaining and maintaining of a high level of cybersecurity.
Under Article 69(1), the Strategy shall cover the sectors referred to in Annex
1 hereto, and the digital services and the public entities referred to in Article 4(7)-
(15) (Official Journal EU L 194/1 of 19.07.2016, p 1). Considering that the NIS
Directive lays down the obligations serving the purpose of ensuring the cybersecu-
rity of information systems in the services sectors which are essential for the
maintenance of social and economic activities, the legislators, by performing
minor substantive modifications, indicated (Annex 1 to the NCSA) the sectors,
subsectors and types of entities in respect of which the body in charge of cyberse-
curity has issued a decision on recognising an operator of essential services (see
Article 5(2)). These are energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure,
healthcare, water supply and digital infrastructure. The sectors, subsectors, and types
of entities providing essential services were defined in further detail, together with
significance thresholds of the consequences of incidents disrupting the provision of
essential services, in an Annex to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of
11 September 2018, a list of essential services and significance thresholds of the
16Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework
Directive), OJ EC 2002 L 108/33 (hereinafter: Directive 2002/21/EC).
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consequences of incidents disrupting the provision of essential services.17 The
Regulation, within its scope of application, serves the purpose of implementing the
NIS Directive.
The entities involved in the Strategy implementation, which need to be indicated
in its provisions, are in fact listed in the Act. These are the entities which, under
Article 4 of the NCSA, comprised the national cybersecurity system, i.e. the oper-
ators of essential services listed in Annex 1 to the said Act; digital service providers
(see the commentary to Chapter 4); CSIRT MON; CSIRT NASK; CSIRT GOV;
sectoral cybersecurity teams; units operating within the public finance sector referred
to in Article 9(1-6), (8), (9), (11) and (12) of the Act on Public Finance; research
institutes; the National Bank of Poland; Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego; the Office
of Technical Inspection; the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency; the Polish
Centre for Accreditation; the National Fund for Environmental Protection and
Water Management, and regional funds for environmental protection and water
management; companies and partnerships performing public utility duties within
the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Act of 20 December 1996 on Municipal Services;
entities providing services in the field of cybersecurity; competent authorities for
cybersecurity; the Single Point of Contact; the Government Plenipotentiary for
Cybersecurity; and the College for Cybersecurity.
5 The Means for Readiness, Response and Restoration
The specification of the means for readiness, response, and restoration, including the
principles of public-private cooperation, constitutes another element of the Strategy.
Their description was also, though to a minor extent, included in the content of the
specific objectives.
The entire set of the means for readiness, response, and restoration had been
previously implemented in the field of the state’s defensive readiness and alert
levels, as well as in crisis management. However, systemic cybersecurity solutions
were lacking. In the statement of grounds for the Act, it was stated that Poland had no
“[. . .] statutory provisions determining the detailed scope of the competences of
specific bodies in the field of cybersecurity, in relation to sectors defined in the
Directive18”. Prior to adopting the Act, the National Framework envisaged the
determining of the scope of responsibilities, obligations, and rights of the system
participants, and the ways of interacting with and between other system participants.
More specifically, they assumed the defining of the competences of the appropriate
17Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 September 2018, a list of essential services and
significance thresholds of the consequences of incidents disrupting the provision of essential
services, Polish Journal of Laws of 2018 r., item. 1806.
18Statement of grounds, p. 11, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr¼2505 Accessed on
10.10.2020.
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bodies in charge of supervising information systems in the sectors within which
essential services and digital services are provided.19 Nonetheless, one should bear
in mind that the National Framework was not a national product, but its development
was based on the draft version, and then the final version, of the NIS Directive. The
Act merely sanctioned, at the appropriate level, the provisions of the document
adopted by the Council of Ministers, by way of a Resolution.
Despite the benefits of adopting the new Act and determining the means for
readiness, response, and restoration, the need to allocate competence between
several legal administrations, i.e. the state’s defensive readiness, crisis management,
and the three states of emergency (natural disaster, the state of exception, and martial
law), must be borne in mind.
Ensuring cyberspace security requires concerted efforts from the private and
public sectors. Building an effective public-private partnership system based on
trust and shared responsibility can constitute a major security pillar in cyberspace.
The public administration shall, at the same time, improve its potential to advise market
sectors in the field of ICT security. The government shall also actively engage in the existing
and emerging forms of European public-private cooperation, and thus promote Polish
business at the international level.20
As stressed by M. Ganczar
The EU legislators have noted that most of the network and information systems are utilised
by private entities; therefore, it has been continually implementing the previous assumptions
regarding the creation of a contractual public-private partnership for cybersecurity.21
The author also stressed that the operators and providers of essential services
should be encouraged to create their own and informal cooperation mechanisms in
this field.
6 Risk Assessment
The risk-assessment approach constitutes a major element of the Strategy, which
results from the requirements laid down in the EU directive and the national Act. As
stipulated in the NIS Directive, “Risk-management measures include measures to
identify any risks of incidents, to prevent, detect and handle incidents, and to
mitigate their impact” (recital 46, sentence 1 of the NIS Directive). It should also
be stressed that, from the point of view of the EU legislators,
In practice, the degree of risk for operators of essential services, which are often essential for
the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities, is higher than for digital service
providers. Therefore, the security requirements for digital service providers should be less
19Ibidem.
20The National Framework..., Point 7.2.
21M. Ganczar (2017), p. 87.
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stringent. Digital service providers should remain free to take measures they consider
appropriate to manage the risks posed to the security of their network and information
systems. Because of their cross-border nature, digital service providers should be subject to a
more harmonised approach at the Union level. Implementing acts should facilitate the
specification and implementation of such measures—(recital 49).
From the legislators’ point of view, risk is “[. . .] a combination of the likelihood
of the occurrence of an adverse event and its consequences,” whereas risk manage-
ment means “[. . .] coordinated activities in the field of cybersecurity management in
relation to the estimated risk” (Article 2(12) and Article 2(19) of the NCSA,
respectively). Such a risk interpretation is characteristic of almost all legal regula-
tions, inter alia, those concerning crisis management and the protection of classified
information.
The risk-assessment approach is an integral element of risk management which,
according to the generally acceptable standards, includes risk assessment which
covers risk identification; risk analysis and evaluation; decision-making; risk han-
dling; and monitoring and reviewing, whereas
This process concerns any risk and must form an integral part of an organisation’s practical
activities, and must have an executor capable of providing the appropriate methods and tools
for its implementation.22
Risk assessment (or risk estimation, as in Article 2(13) of the NCSA), according
to the generally applicable rules, should thus cover selecting risk sources (incidents)
or threats which have or could have an adverse impact on cybersecurity; identifying
and creating a list of risks influencing cybersecurity objectives; determining the
consequences for information systems of any actions which violate confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and authenticity of processed data or the related services
provided through such systems; defining the causes of the sources of risks and
threats; assessing the efficiency of existing security systems; determining the loca-
tion, time, and circumstances of risk occurrence; and risk classification in compar-
ison with acceptable values.23
The development and implementation of a risk-assessment methodology at the
national level is considered a priority in the specific objective of the Strategy
regarding the establishing of a National Cybersecurity System. Accordingly, “A
joint static and dynamic risk-assessment methodology which takes into account the
specificity of individual sectors, critical-infrastructure operators, operators of essen-
tial services, and digital service providers, shall be introduced for the purpose of
cybersecurity management at the national level. This shall ensure the comparability
of estimates, also regarding risk levels, in particular for the purpose of national--
security-risk reports, developed in accordance with the crisis-management regula-
tions. Risk assessment shall become a continuous process which will enable the
identifying of the risk level in near real time.
22See D. Wróblewski (2015), p. 37.
23More on the issue, ibid., pp. 44–48.
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The methodology and tools facilitating static and dynamic risk assessment in
communication and information systems are being developed as part of the National
Cybersecurity Platform, a project funded by the National Centre for Research and
Development; the completion of this work has been scheduled for the end of 2020.24
7 Educational, Informational and Training Programmes
in the Field of Cybersecurity
Activities related to educational, informational, and training programmes in the field
of cybersecurity constitute an integral part of the Strategy. This wording has been
slightly altered, and seems less precise, compared to the provisions of the NIS
Directive, as the latter stipulates that it concerns guidelines referring to programmes
developed in this field. In fact, this definition is more specific, as these are executive
bodies which conduct specific educational, informational, and training activities
consistent with their range of competence. The Council of Ministers should provide
indications, within the Strategy, regarding the general principles of implementing
various undertakings in this area.
The legislators have entrusted duties in the reference scope to numerous entities
in the national cybersecurity system, in accordance with their expertise. The major
players include the Minister competent for computerisation (see the commentary to
Article 45(1)); the Single Point of Contact (Article 49(1)); CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK and CSIRT GOV (Article 26(3)); and the Minister of National Defence
(Article 51).
Cybersecurity tests and audits will be a no-less-important undertaking, and a
vehicle for implementing the Strategy. Periodic audits are among measures which
allow the assessment of the effectiveness of the currently implemented information
security management systems, and the adequacy of the safeguards introduced. Audit
methodologies should take into account the applicable standards, good practices, and
specificity of the respective sectors. The aim of such an approach is to achieve
comparability in audit outcomes. Periodic tests (including penetration testing),
which provide for a real assessment of the system’s resilience to threats, are another
security assessment measure. The outcomes of these tests are the basis for the
verification of the safeguards deployed. In order to utilise the public capacity in
the sphere of cybersecurity, so-called bug bounty testing will be disseminated, which
is a search for software vulnerabilities conducted by people not associated with the
software developer, usually with the general consent of the developer.
24See the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2019-2024...op. cit., p. 13.
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8 Developing, Reviewing and Updating the Strategy
Article 69 indicates that the Strategy was to be developed for a five-year period with
possible amendments throughout its duration. While the document will remain in
force for 5 years, it is to be reviewed (in terms of up-to-dateness) every 2 years. At
the strategic level, the process of developing long-term tactics oriented towards
identifying and implementing organisations’ objectives usually takes no less than
5 years, at the tactical level 2–5 years, and at the operational level up to 2 years. The
Strategy, reflecting the arrangements made by leading entities in the field of cyber-
security, including the Council of Ministers, which has adopted it by way of a
Resolution, is a document of strategic significance. Hence, its duration is 5 years.
The legislator, however, has envisaged amendments to be made within its content,
on an as-needed basis, and at any time, and its review at an arbitrarily set time,
i.e. every 2 years (Article 71 of the NCSA).
It should be stressed once more that, in the case of this Strategy, we are dealing
with quite an innovative approach by the legislator in assigning a status to a
document which had not previously occurred in the processes of developing and
announcing cybersecurity strategies. To date, a similar requirement to determine
strategic objectives, and the appropriate political and regulatory measures, to indi-
cate the sectors referred to in Annex 1 to the Act, as well as digital services and
public entities, and to specify the leading specific content of the Strategy, its duration
and reviews, has not been included in any other strategies regarding national
security, national defence, or military strategies.
In 2015, following amendments to the Act of 4 September 1997 on Government
Administration Departments,25 the scope of this department was made to include
cybersecurity issues. Following the adoption of the NCSA, another amendment was
made to the Act on Government Administration Departments, which involved new
wording for Article 12a(1)(10). In consequence, the scope of the computerisation
department was limited to civil matters related to cybersecurity,26 while its military
aspects became the domain of the defence department.
This way, the Minister’s leading role in Strategy development arises from the
duties assigned to the Ministers chairing specific government administration depart-
ments, which involve initiating and developing the Council of Ministers’ policies for
given departments, and submitting initiatives, draft assumptions, draft Acts, and
draft versions of normative Acts, at Council of Ministers meetings, on the principles
and according to the procedure defined in the Internal Work Regulations of the
Council of Ministers (Article 34(1) of the GAD Act). We are, therefore, dealing with
the principle of competency, according to which each body has a set of rights and
obligations determined in systemic regulations.
25Act of 4 September 1997 on Government Administration Departments, Consolidated text Polish
Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1220, as amended.
26See Article 12a (1) and Article 19(1)(1a) of the Act on Government Administration Departments.
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The Act indicates the Minister competent for computerisation as the leading body
entrusted with developing draft versions of the Strategy. However, given the sys-
temic expertise of the Government Plenipotentiary, other Ministers, and the
authorised managers of central offices, and in particular their responsibilities within
the national cybersecurity system, cooperation with them is justified for substantive
reasons, and in view of the related scope of responsibilities of administration bodies
in this field. The Minister can also collaborate with members of the Council of
Ministers and government administration authorities to act for the common good and
in the public interest, on the principles and according to the procedure defined in
the NCSA.
It is also worth stressing that, although the legislators have not specified this issue
in the Act, the NIS Directive, and more specifically Article 7(2) thereof, stipulates
that Member States may request the assistance of ENISA (the European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity) in developing national strategies on the security of
network and information systems.
While the work on the draft version of the Strategy can also be attended by a
representative of the President of the Republic of Poland, the legislators have not
determined who, and under which procedure, decides on the need for the President’s
representative to be involved. Nor has it been expressly stated that the role of that
representative should be fulfilled by the Head of the National Security Bureau.
Under Article 126 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the President is
the supreme representative of the Republic of Poland, and the guarantor of the
continuity of state authority, who ensures the observance of the Constitution, and
safeguards the sovereignty and security of the state, as well as the inviolability and
integrity of its territory. Our interest, however, focuses especially on the President’s
role in the international affairs of the Republic of Poland, as an authority
safeguarding national security. Also in this field, the President collaborates with
the Council of Ministers as a whole, and with individual Ministers as Council
members. Due to the convergence of capabilities, and at the same time their
separation, the Minister competent for computerisation, by inviting a representative
of the President of the Republic of Poland to attend work on the draft version of the
Strategy, contributes to a reliable and efficient operation of public institutions.
The Strategy is of key significance for national security, and for compliance with
international obligations. As a result, given the stature of the body which adopts it
(the Council of Ministers) and the competences of the President of the Republic of
Poland regarding national security, and the cooperation obligation of executive
bodies, including when they act through their representatives, in the field of national
and EU cybersecurity policies, reflects the implementation of the constitutional
principle of collaboration, and avoidance of competition between, public authorities.
Article 71 of the NCSA stipulates that the Minister competent for
computerisation, in cooperation with the Plenipotentiary, other Ministers, and the
appropriate managers of central offices, shall review the Strategy every 2 years. The
authority of this body arises from its being entrusted by the legislator with a mission
to develop the draft version of the Strategy in cooperation with the entities indicated
in Article 70 of the said Act.
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In addition, the periodic character of the Strategy reviews arises from the pro-
visions of the NIS Directive, inter alia, on updating the list of identified digital
service providers (at least every 2 years), and on the reviewing of the Directive by the
European Commission, and reporting to the European Parliament and the Council.
Article 7(3) of the NIS Directive stipulates “Member States shall communicate
their national strategies on the security of network and information systems to the
Commission within three months from their adoption.” As a result, the Polish
legislator has obligated, under Article 72 of the NCSA, the Minister competent for
computerisation to submit the Strategy to the European Commission within 3 months
of its being adopted by the Council of Ministers.
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The Functioning of State Power Structures
and Cybersecurity
Marzena Toumi
Abstract The national security of Poland in the twenty-first century is strongly
influenced by the processes taking place in the contemporary global security envi-
ronment. These changes are characterised by high dynamics and complexity as well
as the occurrence of asymmetric threats, among which the most dangerous are
threats in cyberspace. The functioning of the state and the implementation of its
constitutional obligations are increasingly dependent on the development of modern
technologies, the information society and the smooth functioning of cyberspace,
which is largely dependent on the security of the ICT infrastructure, which allows
the use of cyberspace, information resources and services accumulated therein.
Rapid progress in the field of digital technologies necessitates the effective use of
the latest technologies while creating an opportunity for the Polish state to leave the
role of only a user and join the group of countries with an effectively functioning
digital economy, providing solutions and co-creating international standards. To
meet these expectations, the President of the Republic of Poland signed the Act on
the National Cybersecurity System on 1 August 2018, implementing Directive 2016/
1148 (NIS Directive).
State power is a form of universal or general power over the whole population in a
given territory. It is exercised by a special power apparatus elected from among
society as a whole.
In the literature on the subject matter, the features of state power include its
primary character, indivisibility, permanency, exercisability under legal regulations,
implementation only in an organised manner, the possibility to legally use coercive
measures (also direct), and exercisability in a given territory.1
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1Representatives of state power, in order to gain citizens’ endorsement, use various arguments
which are meant to legitimise their powers. These arguments pertain both to the sources of power
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State authority in a democratic system has a collective character, as it comprises
both direct state authority and social (ultimate) authority.
Direct authority is composed of the political personnel of state bodies and public
servants (bureaucracy). The managing bodies of a state organisation, political
parties, interest groups, and mass media, constitute the power elite. Direct state
authority ensures both internal and external security, protects socio-economic rela-
tions, and creates the conditions conducive to self-assembly, e.g. through social
governance. Social authority is exercised by the nation, i.e. all citizens who partic-
ipate in electing the political leadership and influencing its rule.
State authority can, therefore, be said to jointly cover the power elite and the
nation. There is no single sovereign entity which would finally and ultimately decide
on the ways state power should be exercised (the rule of the people exercised by the
elites they elect).
The major powers vested in state authority include legislative powers, i.e. the
powers to enact universally binding legal regulations under the Constitution,
i.e. without violating any constitutional civic rights and freedoms; to take measures
to amend the obligations arising from already enacted regulations (administrative
decisions made by the government, general administration, and specialised ser-
vices); and to impose sanctions on those infringing the legal regulations (via the
judiciary and direct coercion bodies, such as the army, the police, and the prison
service).
The bodies vested with decision-making powers constitute the state power
apparatus, i.e. a system of state bodies, interrelated in terms of organisation, along
with offices and institutions which serve the central decision-making authority
(e.g. the government) in implementing current state policies.2
State power should fulfil the following four core functions: integrative, distribu-
tional, security-making, and structure-building. This article focuses, in particular, on
the third function.
One of the duties of state power is, therefore, to create a “security umbrella”, to
protect those who fall within the impact of the state’s decision-makers and
(legal power) and also, increasingly, to the ways in which it is exercised (efficient and competent) as
well as to the consequences of their actions (successful, meeting social needs), cf. Kuciński
(2008), p. 113.
2The state apparatus includes (1) legislative bodies (the Sejm and the Senate) (2) executive bodies
(the President and the Council of Ministers), which are entrusted with performing state duties aimed
at implementing the Law. government administration authorities are also endowed with executive
power. The National Broadcasting Council, whose powers are provided for in the Constitution of
the Republic of Poland, is also an executive body, and has the right to issue regulations. In the
Election Code, the National Electoral Commission was appointed as the sui generis executive body
(although its powers are not provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and it does
not have the right to issue regulations, it may issue instructions binding on lower-level electoral
bodies) (3) coercion bodies (e.g. the police, the army)—a group of state bodies whose aim is to
ensure the implementation of the Law. They are in charge of maintaining public order, as well as of
ensuring the external and internal security of the country (4) judicial bodies—the Supreme Court,
common courts, military courts, and administrative courts (5) inspection bodies (e.g. the Supreme
Chamber of Control) which supervise compliance with the Law.
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authorities. The latter fulfil their security functions by employing various decision-
making tools, and with a considerable use of legal instruments.3
The national security system is understood as the entirety of resources, means,
and forces (entities) earmarked by the state for the performance of tasks in the field of
security, organised (into subsystems and components), maintained and prepared in a
manner capable of fulfilling the purpose of performing such tasks.4 The objective of
the National Security Strategy is to counteract emerging threats to the survival of
both the nation and the state, to territorial integrity, to political independence and
sovereignty, to the efficient functioning of state institutions, and to socio-economic
development. It covers elements of both external and internal security, oriented
towards ensuring nationwide security in combination with the socio-economic
development of the country.5
The national security system comprises all the bodies and institutions constituting
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which are in charge of ensuring security
in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and other relevant acts.
These include Parliament, the President of the Republic of Poland, the President of
the Council of Ministers, the Council of Ministers, central government administra-
tion authorities, and other central state bodies and public institutions. The armed
forces, as well as government services and institutions, also form crucial elements in
the national security system. They are obliged to prevent and counteract external
threats, to ensure public security, to conduct rescue operations, and to protect people
and property in extraordinary situations. In addition, the system covers local gov-
ernment authorities and other legal entities, including entrepreneurs who form the
industrial defence potential, and implement duties in the field of national defence.
The national security system consists of the national security control subsystem,
and several executive subsystems. The control subsystem is formed by public
authorities and managers of organisational units implementing duties related to
national security, and command authorities of the Armed Forces of the Republic
of Poland. Executive subsystems are the means and forces earmarked for the
Ministers leading government administration departments, central-government
administration authorities, province governors (voivodes), local government author-
ities, and other public institutions and entities responsible for implementing duties in
the field of national security as arising from the applicable Acts.6
Processes occurring in the contemporary global security environment have a
material impact on the national security of Poland in the twenty-first century.
These are characterised by powerful dynamics and complexity of changes, and by
the emergence of asymmetric threats, the most serious including terrorism, the
3Kuciński (2008), pp. 108–109.
4The White Book on the National Security of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2013, p. 36.
5The Strategy of the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022
(2013), adopted by way of Resolution No. 67 of the Council of Ministers of 9 April 2013, Journal
Monitor Polski 2013, item 377.
6Dubiel (2018), Accessed on 20 September 2020.
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery,
international organised crime, and threats in cyberspace.7 The functioning of the
state and the performance of its constitutional duties increasingly depends on the
development of modern technologies, the information society, and the uninterrupted
functioning of cyberspace. The last of these, in turn, is largely dependent on the
security of the communications infrastructure which facilitates the use of cyber-
space, and of information resources and services which function within it.
Cyberspace is understood as “a space for the processing and exchange of infor-
mation created by information and communication systems,” as defined in Article 3
(3) of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations of
Entities Performing Public Tasks,8 “including the links between them and their
relations with users.” Virtual space also tends to be increasingly treated as the
territory of a given country. The cyberspace of the Republic of Poland is the
cyberspace within the territory of Poland and outside, and basically covers any
places where representatives of the Republic of Poland operate (e.g. diplomatic
posts or military contingents).9
In the contemporary world, cyberspace is a major channel of information
exchange, and the issues of electronic data transfer are increasingly pertinent to
public institutions.10 This is due to the progressing digitisation of offices and public
institutions, as a result of which the computerisation of office infrastructures is
triggering the growing use of information technologies in the electronic collecting,
processing, and transferring of confidential information between entities in the
national economy. This also involves the computerisation of the processes utilising
the resources of the personal data of the customers served by these economic entities,
and of citizens’ data available to offices and public institutions.11
As part of the state’s digitisation process, such technologies are used by public
institutions (government and local government administration institutions, as well as
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies), specialised services (e.g. the police, the
emergency services, and the fire service), and media, banking, and finance institu-
tions as part of their service portfolios, transport (by air and rail), and energy and
7The Strategy . . . . (2013), p. 4.
8Act of 17 February 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations of Entities Performing Public
Tasks, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 346, as amended.
9The Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, a document adopted by the Ministry
of Administration and Digitisation and the Internal Security Agency (2013), Warsaw, p. 5. Such a
definition of the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland does not cover the storage and processing of
information, e.g., in a cloud, which is not necessarily located within the Polish territory. This
provision is exclusive of new technologies, e.g. data storage in Azure, AWS (cf. The Cyberspace
Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland (departmental comments by ISSA Poland) in: http://
mac.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/polityka-CBR-stan-na-18-09-2012-konsultacje-
resortowe-.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2020.
10Borkowski (2013), pp. 112–134.
11Gołębiowska (2015), p. 29.
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water supply networks.12 Most of these fields form part of the so-called critical
infrastructure, which is understood as a network of interrelated systems enabling
public, economic, and social institutions to fulfil their basic duties, such as
maintaining security and public order, and rendering core social services.13
The use of e-government14 brings numerous benefits both for the administration
system itself, such as improved communication (both internal and external), and
increased operational transparency, which results, inter alia, from services
standardisation and procedures automation (eliminating the human factor), and for
individual citizens and society—a faster and more efficient handling of official
matters increases customer satisfaction and contributes to building a positive
image of public administration. E-government provides employees with easier
access to information and facilitates information exchange, both within a unit
(a given office) and between various units. It also makes it quicker to gather
(in one place) voluminous information regarding an entity (e.g. its public-law
obligations; tax arrears or no tax arrears; payments of premiums to the Social
Insurance Institution, etc.), which then facilitates prompt verification of the infor-
mation (data) submitted to the institution, and, in consequence, the prompt detection
of irregularities, and, where necessary, the instituting of explanatory proceedings.15
In compliance with the provisions included in the government’s strategic docu-
ment The Strategy for Responsible Development, adopted by the Council of Minis-
ters in 2017, e-government was seen as a factor determining a well-functioning
state.16 The use of digital technologies is a key element in ensuring the transparency
and effectiveness of tasks implemented by public administration.17 Despite all its
benefits, digitisation also involves the risk of a much greater susceptibility to attacks
launched by cybercriminals,18 who can include both criminal groups operating for
profit-oriented or terrorist motives and groups led by foreign states. Such activities
are aimed at obtaining information, effecting political or economic destabilisation, or
12Suchorzewska (2010), pp. 318–338.
13Dawidziak et al. (2009), pp. 55–56.
14The term e-government, i.e. electronic public administration, describes a system (and, more
specifically, an organisational, legal, institutional, and computer system) which makes it possible
to handle administrative matters electronically, Ejdys (2018), p. 5.
According to the European Commission, e-government stands for the use of IT tools and systems
in order to provide better-quality public services for citizens and enterprises, Glossary of the
European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/glossary#letter_e, accessed
on 14. September 2020.
15Mituś (2013). Sprawne i skuteczne funkcjonowanie e-administracji przynosi korzyści na trzech
poziomach: ludności i podmiotów gospodarczych, organów administracji oraz społeczeństwa i
gospodarki jako całości, cf. Lulkiewicz, E-administracja (2013), p. 217.
16A Strategy for Responsible Development (2017), the Council of Ministers, Warsaw 2017, p. 226.
17See: Śledziewska et al. (2016), pp. 119–130.
18According to Interpol, cybercrime is currently a more-profitable activity than drug trafficking
(with revenue from such activity in some countries exceeding 1% of GDP), cf. D. Bałut, K. Budek,
Cyberbezpieczeństwo dla przedsiębiorców: Nowa era zagrożeń, https://marketingibiznes.pl/it/
cyberbezpieczenstwo/; accessed on 9 September 2020.
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causing social discontent.19 Notably, any act of disturbing the functioning of cyber-
space, whether global or local, affects economic security, the sense of security
among citizens, the effective functioning of public-sector institutions, the course of
production and service processes, and, in consequence, overall national security.20
Therefore, more intensified measures in the field of cybersecurity (i.e. ensuring
the protection of the domain of information processing and of interactions within
tele-information networks) are indispensable to responding to the growing threat
from cybercriminals.21 It is public administration’s duty, in the age of information, to
synchronise activities performed by entities operating within various sectors to
manage complex networking sites, and to adapt its operational mode so as to be
able to explore new technologies, as it is one of the major users of new tools and tele-
information technologies, and its functioning is based on the processing of informa-
tion which forms the principal resource of administration,22 while information
security issues are an element in the laws on national security.23 For this reason,
the public duties (viewed as legal obligations) oriented towards security in cyber-
space are a significant aspect of the secure and efficient functioning of the state, and
are implemented by way of cooperation between public services and entities in
charge of cybersecurity, both at the national (the private sector and NGOs), and
international, levels (NATO, the European Union, the UN and supranational asso-
ciations).24 Such cooperation plays a major role in the fight against the growing
number of incidents being caused by illegal actions in cyberspace, which precipitate
financial and image losses.
19As e-Government primarily utilises websites as the domain for the exchange of information
between administration bodies and citizens, these should meet basic security requirements,
i.e. ensure adequate access, integrity and data confidentiality. Otherwise, information might become
inaccessible, or might lose its integrity and confidentiality, as a result of impacts originating from
various sources, e.g. targeted measures aimed at distributing malware, which performs actions on a
computer without the consent or knowledge of its user, for the benefit of a third party; disguising
oneself as a trustworthy entity, e.g. a renowned institution or person, with the aim of fraudulently
obtaining sensitive information (phishing and pharming); cross-site scripting, which involves
injecting a malicious code into a given website which takes the user to another website; SQL
Injection, which involves criminals exploiting various vulnerabilities, e.g., in apps which allow
access to personal data to be obtained by unauthorised persons; or ransomware, the purpose of
which is to take over and encrypt a user’s data, and then provide such data to the user on condition
that “a ransom” is paid.
20The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022, Warsaw 2017, p. 4.
21It should be a requirement for public administration to use only the type of electronic equipment
which has obtained a special national security certificate. A major element in ensuring a so-called
safe supply chain is to assess and certify products, with the establishing of a “national evaluation
system” being considered a priority. Cyberbezpieczeństwo w Polsce: ochrona urządzeń końcowych
przed cyberatakami. Analiza sytuacji i rekomendacje działań, A report prepared by Cyfrowa
Polska, Warsaw 2019, pp. 10–11.
22Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 26.
23Cf. Kamiński (2019b), pp. 57–76; Kamiński (2019a), pp. 28–34.
24Bączek (2016), p. 244.
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In the Republic of Poland, duties in the field of cyberspace security are
implemented by public authorities (legislative, executive, and judicial), and their
subsidiary administrative authorities.25 A significant role of the legislative authori-
ties (the Sejm and the Senate) regarding cybersecurity is to develop legislation and to
determine the principal directions of the state’s activities.26 The judicial authorities
are entrusted with administering justice in criminal cases, which often involve
generally understood national security, and its trans-sectoral domain,
i.e. cyberspace security, which is subject to the regulations determining the rules
of conduct.27 The key role in this respect is ascribed to the executive power. The
Council of Ministers leading the government’s administration, by performing duties
to foster the protection of cyberspace, fulfils its constitutional obligations, and bears
the main responsibility for ensuring the appropriate level of security for cyberspace
and the citizens who function within it.28
On 1 August 2018, the President of the Republic of Poland signed the Act on the
national cybersecurity system thus implementing within the Polish legal system the
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) concerning measures
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the
Union (Directive 2016/1148).29 The full implementation of NIS Directive also
required adopting two regulations by the Council of Ministers, i.e. on serious
incident thresholds,30 and on a list of essential services and significance thresholds
for the consequences of incidents disrupting the provision of essential services.31
The national cybersecurity system so established is aimed at ensuring cyberse-
curity at the national level, including in particular the uninterrupted provision of
essential services and digital services, by attaining a sufficiently high level of
security of information and communication systems serving the purpose of provid-
ing such services, and by ensuring incidents handling.32
The system covers operators of essential services33 (e.g. in the energy, transport,
healthcare, and banking sectors), digital service providers, CSIRTs (Computer
25Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), p. 360.
26Kitler (2011), pp. 76–77.
27Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019). pp. 360–361. See more: Radoniewicz (2016).
28Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), p. 353.
29Official Journal EU L 194/1.
30The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 October 2018 on serious incidents thresholds
(Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 2180).
31The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 September 2018 on a list of essential services
and significance thresholds of the consequences of incidents disrupting the provision of essential
services (Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1806).
32Article 3 of NCSA.
33Operators of essential services, and companies and institutions rendering services in one of the six
critical areas, from the point of view of the national economy, i.e. energy, transport, banking,
healthcare, potable water supply (and distribution), and the digital infrastructure.
An essential service is considered to be dependent on IT systems. Under Article 17 of the Act on
the national cybersecurity system, a digital service provider (DSP) is a legal person or an
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Security Incident Response Teams) at the national level, sectoral cybersecurity
teams, entities providing services in the field of cybersecurity, responsible bodies
in the field of cybersecurity, and single points of contact within the framework of EU
cooperation in the field of cybersecurity.
The Act indicates three CSIRTs established at the national level: CSIRT NASK
(operating within the Research and Academic Computer Network—the National
Research Institute in Warsaw), CSIRT GOV (operating within the Internal Security
Agency), and CSIRTMON (operating within the Ministry of Defence). Each CSIRT
at the national level has a clearly determined constituency—entities which have a
reporting obligation towards that CSIRT, and to which it provides support.
CSIRT MON coordinates the process of handling incidents reported by bodies
subordinated to, or supervised by, the Ministry of Defence, including entities whose
information and communication systems or networks are included in a consolidated
register of facilities, installations, devices, and services forming parts of critical
infrastructure, and enterprises of particular economic and defensive significance,
for which the Minister of Defence acts as the entity organising and supervising state
defence duties.34
CSIRT GOV35 coordinates, on incidents reported by the government administra-
tion, units operating within the public finance sector, the National Bank of Poland,
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, and operators of critical infrastructure.36
CSIRT NASK coordinates on incidents reported by other entities, including
operators of essential services (other than operators of critical infrastructure), digital
service providers, and local governments.37 CSIRT NASK can also be referred to as
a CERT of last resort, as it is the entity to whom also natural persons (irrespective of
their citizenship status or lack of citizenship) and organisational units (irrespective of
computerization unit providing a digital service which does not have legal personality, has its base
or management on the territory of Poland, or whose representative runs an computerization unit on
the territory of Poland. Small and microenterprises have been excluded from that Act. A list of
operators of essential services is maintained by the Minister competent for digital affairs. Operators
are entered in and removed from the list at the request of a body responsible for cybersecurity; more
on the issue: Radoniewicz (2019), p. 55.
34https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/zespol-reagowania-na-incydenty-bezpieczenstwa-
komputerowego-csirt, accessed on 28 August 2020.
35Operating since January 2008 within the Internal Security Agency as CERT.GOV.PL.
36In compliance with the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management, Polish Journal of Laws of
2007 No. 89, item 590, as amended and the Act of 27 August 2009 on public finance, Polish Journal
of Laws of 2009 No. 157, item 1240, as amended. CSIRT GOV is mainly entrusted with
identifying, preventing, and detecting threats to security, which are important for ensuring the
functional continuity of the national tele-information systems utilised by public-administration
bodies, or a system of tele-information networks included in a consolidated register of facilities,
installations, devices, and services forming parts of the critical infrastructure, as well as tele-
information systems of owners and holders of facilities, installations, and devices forming parts
of the critical infrastructure, https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/zespol-reagowania-na-incydenty-
bezpieczenstwa-komputerowego-csirt, accessed on 28 August 2020.
37See: The Deployment of the Baseline Capabilities of National/Governmental CERTs, ENISA –
www.enisa.europa.eu; see also Banasiński and Nowak (2018), pp. 161–162.
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their base) can report incidents if no other CSIRTs are considered competent in
their case.
Furthermore, CSIRT MIL and CSIRT GOV (in compliance with the Act on Anti-
Terrorist Activities and the Act on the Military Counterintelligence Service and the
Military Intelligence Service) are competent for handling incidents which constitute
acts of terrorism.38 When it comes to incidents related to national defence, CSIRT
MON is always the competent body.
Close cooperation between the CSIRTs established at the national level is the
principal assumption of the Act. All the CSIRTs established at the national level are
obliged to cooperate both with one another and with competent authorities in the
field of cybersecurity, the Minister competent for computerisation, and the Plenipo-
tentiary for Cybersecurity, as well as to ensure a consistent and complete risk
management system at the national level, to perform duties related to counteracting
cybersecurity threats of a supra-sectoral and cross-border character, and to ensure the
coordinated handling of reported incidents (Article 26(1)).
Another major element introduced by the Act on cybersecurity is the possibility
of the performing of equipment and software inspections by CSIRTs, with a view to
identifying any vulnerabilities which might be used to threaten the integrity, confi-
dentiality, accountability, authenticity, or accessibility of processed data, which
might then affect public security or significant national security interests. Based on
such inspections, CSIRTs can present recommendations for removing such vulner-
abilities in the equipment or software used by entities operating within the national
cybersecurity system.39
Operators of essential services are also obliged to implement effective security
measures, to estimate cybersecurity-related risks, to provide information on major
incidents, and to handle such incidents in cooperation with the CSIRTs established at
the national level. The entities listed are also obliged to appoint persons responsible
for the cybersecurity of the provided services, for incident reporting and handling,
and for the dissemination of information on cybersecurity. The national cybersecu-
rity system also includes public administration authorities and telecommunications
companies.
In addition, the requirements regarding cybersecurity have been extended to
cover digital service providers, i.e. e-commerce platforms, cloud-computing ser-
vices, and search engines. Given the international nature of these entities, the
obligations binding on digital service providers are covered by the regulatory régime
harmonised at the EU level (at this point, the Act relates to the relevant Commission
Implementing Decision).
38Act of 10 June 2016 on Anti-Terrorism (Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 796); the Act of
9 June 2006 on the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service,
(Polish Journal of Laws of 2006, No. 104, item 709).
39https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/zespol-reagowania-na-incydenty-bezpieczenstwa-
komputerowego-csirt, accessed on 28 August 2020.
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The national cybersecurity system also includes public entities such as the
National Bank of Poland, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, the Office of Technical
Inspection, the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency, the Polish Centre for
Accreditation, the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Manage-
ment, and regional funds for environmental protection and water management, as
well as research institutes and commercial law companies performing public-utility
duties.
Under Article 21 of the Act on the national cybersecurity system, each of these
entities is obliged to appoint a person in charge of maintaining contacts with entities
operating within the national cybersecurity system, as regards public duties depen-
dent on IT systems.
Furthermore, each public entity is obliged to manage incidents within its struc-
tures, and to ensure that they are properly handled. Any major incidents must be
reported to the competent CSIRT within 24 hours of their being identified (Article 11
(4)). Any decisions made to this end shall require prior consultation with the operator
of essential services or the digital service provider which has reported an incident.
CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV, acting via Single Points of
Contact, shall inform other EU Member States of any major incident, as long as it
involves two or more EU Member States (Article 29).
The Act has also introduced a formula for Critical Incident Response Teams
which act as auxiliary bodies in matters of handling critical incidents, and which
comprise the CSIRTs established at the national level and the Government Centre
for Security (as a secretariat), to facilitate cooperation with the Government Centre
for Crisis Management. Representatives of the competent bodies can also be invited
to participate in the work of these Teams.
In compliance with the said Act, information on vulnerabilities and incidents, and
the risks of their occurrence, as well as cybersecurity threats, is not subject to the Act
on Access to Public Information.40 Nonetheless, the competent CSIRT MON,
CSIRT NASK and CSIRT GOV may publish such information (to the extent
necessary) on the websites of the Public Information Bulletin of the Minister of
Defence, the Research and Academic Computer Network—National Research Insti-
tute, or the Internal Security Agency, as appropriate, if such a transfer of information
is likely to contribute to increasing the cybersecurity of the IT systems used by
citizens and entrepreneurs, and to ensuring the secure operation of such systems. No
published information may, however, violate the provisions on the protection of
confidential information or other legally protected secrets, or the provisions on
personal-data protection. (Article 35(5)).
Each of the key sectors of the economy is supervised by the competent body in
the field of cybersecurity. These include Ministers competent for individual
40Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information (consolidated text Polish Journal of
Laws of 2019, item 1429, as amended).
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administration departments,41 who, by way of memoranda of understanding, can
entrust some of their duties to subsidiary or supervised units. In practice this means
that sectoral regulators (if any) may fulfil such functions instead of the competent
Ministers.
The competent body in the field of cybersecurity is in charge of analysing entities
operating in a given sector, and issuing decisions on the recognition of operators of
essential services. In addition, it prepares recommendations on actions to strengthen
the cybersecurity of that sector, and is in charge of calling on operators to remove
any vulnerabilities which could lead, or could have led, to serious incidents,
conducting inspections of operators of essential services, cooperating with other
EU Member States via Single Points of Contact, participating in training, and
processing personal data necessary for its duties to be fulfilled.42
In justified cases, the authorities competent for cybersecurity and the Single Point
of Contact cooperate with law enforcement authorities and the entity competent for
personal data protection (Article 42(7)).
The civil aspects of the cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland remain within the
remit of the Minister competent for computerisation. That Minister, in cooperation
with the Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, and other Ministers, is responsible, inter
alia, for developing the Cybersecurity Strategy,43 implementing information poli-
cies regarding the national cybersecurity system, fulfilling reporting obligations
towards EU institutions, and launching, as of 1 January 2021, an information and
communication system enabling automated incident reporting and handling, ICT
41Under Article 41 of the NCSA, the competent authorities in the field of cybersecurity are as
follows: for the energy sector—the Minister competent for energy; for the transport sector,
excluding the water-transport subsector—the Minister competent for transport; for the water-
transport subsector—the Minister competent for the maritime economy and the Minister competent
for inland shipping; for the banking sector and the financial-market infrastructure—the Polish
Financial Supervision Authority; for the healthcare sector—the Minister competent for health;
and for the potable-water supply and distribution sector—the Minister competent for water man-
agement. In addition. for the digital infrastructure sector and digital service providers—the Minister
competent for computerisation; and for healthcare, digital infrastructure and digital service pro-
viders (to the extent as defined in the Act)—the Minister of Defence (entities subordinated to the
Minister of Defence and companies of particular economic and defense significance).
42The Act on the National Cybersecurity System in: https://cyberpolicy.nask.pl/ustawa-o-
krajowym-systemie-cyberbezpieczenstwa, accessed on 10 September 2020.
43The Security Strategy lays down the strategic objectives, and the appropriate political and
regulatory measures which make it possible to attain (and maintain) a high level of cybersecurity.
The Security Strategy also specifies the priorities, the entities engaged in its implementation, and the
activities regarding educational and informational programmes, as well as research-and-develop-
ment plans. It is adopted by way of a Resolution by the Council of Ministers. On 22 October 2019,
the Council of Ministers adopted a Resolution on the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of
Poland for 2017-2022 (Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of Poland of 2019, item
1037). The document has been in force since 31 October 2019, replacing the National Framework
of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017-2022. The Minister competent for
computerisation, in cooperation with other members of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for
implementing the provisions of the said document, and for presenting, by 30 March of each year,
information on the implementation of the Strategy.
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risk estimation, and warnings about cybersecurity threats, recommending fields of
cooperation with the private sector, implementing information measures regarding
good practices, educational programmes, campaigns and training courses aimed at
expanding knowledge on and raising awareness of cybersecurity. The Minister also
runs the Single Point of Contact, which is responsible for cooperating with the
European Commission and submitting annual reports; it also cooperates with other
Member States in the field of cybersecurity, and coordinates cooperation between
competent national authorities (Articles 45–50).
The major duties of the Minister of Defence include facilitating international
cooperation between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and the respon-
sible bodies of NATO, the EU, and other international organisations, in the field of
defence, and, more specifically, cybersecurity. The Minister of Defence is also
responsible for guaranteeing the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic
of Poland, within the national, alliance, and coalition systems; for conducting
military activities in the event of a cybersecurity threat’s triggering the need for
defence measures; for developing the abilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic
of Poland of ensuring cybersecurity by launching specialised training initiatives; for
acquiring and developing tools for building capabilities for ensuring cybersecurity in
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland; for assessing the impact of incidents on
the national defence system; and for managing activities related to incident handling
during martial law (Articles 51–52).
As the cybersecurity issues are horizontal, i.e. they involve several Ministries and
governmental agencies, the Act envisaged establishing the College for Cybersecurity
and the Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, for the purpose of coordinating related
policies on the national scale. The Plenipotentiary is to pursue international cooper-
ation, to support the scientific research and development of technologies in the field
of cybersecurity, to take measures to raise the public’s awareness of cybersecurity
threats, and to promote the safe use of the Internet. That person is also entrusted with
analysing and assessing the functioning of the national cybersecurity system, super-
vising the process of risk management within the national cybersecurity system,
issuing opinions on governmental documents, including draft legal Acts appropriate
for the implementation of cybersecurity duties, and issuing recommendations on the
use if IT tools or software at the request of the responsible CSIRT.
The Plenipotentiary is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Council of
Ministers from among secretaries or under-secretaries of state, and is accountable to
the Council of Ministers (Articles 60–63).
The College for Cybersecurity is an opinion-making and advisory body to the
Council of Ministers regarding cybersecurity issues and activities conducted in this
field by CSIRTs, the Ministry of Defence, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, sectoral
cybersecurity teams, and authorities competent for cybersecurity (Article 64). The
Committee is led by the President of the Council of Ministers, and is composed of
the Minister competent for internal affairs, the Minister competent for
computerisation, the Minister of Defence, the Minister competent for foreign affairs,
the Chancellery of the President of the Council of Ministers, the Head of the National
Security Bureau, and the Minister competent for coordinating the activities of special
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forces. Committee meetings are also attended by the Director of the Government
Centre for Security, the Head or Deputy Head of the Internal Security Agency, the
Head or Deputy Head of the Military Counterintelligence Service, and the Director
of the Research and Academic Computer Network—National Research Institute
(Article 66). The scope of responsibilities of the College for Cybersecurity was
outlined in Article 65 of the Act.44
The implementation of the National Cybersecurity System Act is a challenge both
for the administration and private sectors. Constructing an efficiently functioning
system in various sectors is another huge challenge arising from that Act (as it entails
establishing sectoral cybersecurity teams and amending sector-specific provisions).
The competent bodies must, in the first place, develop expertise regarding supervi-
sion over cybersecurity issues. The incident-reporting obligation is a major change
for the private sector, which also becomes challenging for the administration when it
comes to developing specific tools45—e.g. an information and communication
system—which, in principle, is to support the national cybersecurity system. The
practical implementation of these activities will be crucial for the safe functioning of
the state’s power structures.
The rapid development of the Internet, coupled with ICT expansion, have caused,
inter alia, the globalisation of economic, social and political phenomena.
The functioning of the state and the implementation of its constitutional duties
increasingly depends on the development of modern technologies, the information
society, and the uninterrupted functioning of cyberspace. The last of these, in turn, is
largely dependent on the security of the ICT infrastructure which facilitates the use
of cyberspace, and the information resources and services which function within
it. Continuous education and raising the awareness of public servants regarding
issues related to cyberspace security, and in particular appropriate and effective
protection, should be a major responsibility of the state. Special attention should be
paid to educating those in charge of public procurement in offices and public
institutions. Ultimately, entities ordering equipment and services which can poten-
tially be threatened by cyber attacks should choose such solutions which guarantee
digital safety.
The results of inspections regarding the management of information security in
local government units, conducted by the Supreme Chamber of Control in 2018,
showed that awareness among persons fulfilling major functions in the National
Cybersecurity System regarding the importance of information security issues was
insufficient. The shortage of both financial resources to implement major undertak-
ings, and of information security experts, was also brought to light, these being two
major aspects which the national authorities should seek to address.
Security in cyberspace is the newest, and currently the most demanding, field of
national security, which combines defence and protection, civil and military, and
44See also: Brzostek (2019), pp. 146–147.
45This is quite a novelty in the Polish legal order, as previously—except for the communications
sector—there was no obligation to report incidents.
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also public and private, aspects. Ensuring cybersecurity in Poland, and constructing
a system resistant to threats, constitute an ongoing process, which, as should be
noted, is becoming more deliberate and planned, despite the emerging challenges
and difficulties which were not known before.
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Personal Data Protection in the Context
of the Act on the National Cybersecurity
System
Monika Nowikowska
Abstract The dynamic development of technology has led to significant changes in
the concept of cyberspace. Currently, it is primarily a virtual space in which we
communicate with each other using computers, phones and tablets connected by a
network. Cyberspace protection has now become one of the most frequently
discussed security-related topics. At a time when information systems allow the
collection of huge amounts of information, supervision over data security is one of
the key challenges of each country and individual network users. This article
describes the principles of personal data protection by national CSIRTs, which are
responsible for handling and responding to computer security incidents.
The principles of personal data protection in cyberspace have been regulated under
Polish law in several legal acts. The fundamental act which stipulates the protection
of personal data, is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997.1
The right to personal data protection is a unique legal construct intended to protect
the values referred to in Article 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The
Constitution provides that everyone is entitled to the legal protection of his or her
private life, family life, honour, and reputation, as well as the right to decide on their
personal life.2 In the relevant literature, the individual’s right to the protection of his
or her personal data is referred to as “information autonomy”.3 The right to the
protection of personal data is categorically associated with the right to privacy,
recognising it as its unique form.4
M. Nowikowska (*)
Instytut Prawa/Institute of Law, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie/War Studies
University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
e-mail: m.nowikowska@akademia.mil.pl
1The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Polish Journal of Laws No. 78, item
483, as amended.
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3Safjan (1999), p. 9.
4Polok (2008), p. 26.
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Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/
EC (The General Data Protection Regulation) (GDPR), is also of fundamental
importance in this regard.5 The issue of personal data is also governed by the Act
of 10 May 2018 on personal data protection,6 which repealed several provisions of
the former Act, and introduced new ones, which regulate, inter alia, the status of the
President of the Personal Data Protection Office, as well as the procedure for
initiating and conducting proceedings in connection with the infringement of per-
sonal data in the common courts, and the Act. The group of legislative acts
regulating the principles of personal data processing in cyberspace also includes
the Act on the National Cybersecurity System.
According to Article 1 of the GDPR, the EU legislators, when determining the
adoption and application of uniform solutions for the processing of personal data in
all EU Member States, pursue two equally important objectives: first, they protect
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular the right to
the protection of their personal data; and second, they ensure the free transfer of
personal data between Member States.
According to the GDPR, “personal data” refers to any information concerning an
identified or identifiable natural person (data subject); an identifiable natural person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an internet
identifier, or one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural, or social identity of a natural person.7
Polish literature sources emphasise that it is irrelevant to the principles of
personal-data processing (including the determination of the scope and type of
obligations incumbent on processors and personal-data controllers) that the
processing of the data occurs in cyberspace.8 Ensuring cybersecurity is understood
as ensuring the security of data and services, and, consequently, providing confi-
dentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity. These characteristics are included
in the literature as attributes of information security. Data confidentiality means the
protection of communications or stored data against interception and reading by
unauthorised persons. Data integrity is the confirmation that the data sent, received,
or stored, are complete and unchanged. The concept of accountability is understood
as ensuring that the activities of an entity can be unambiguously attributed only to
that entity.
5Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (The General Data Protection Regula-
tion), OJ EU 2016 L 119/1, as amended.
6Act of 10 May 2018 on personal-data protection, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2019,
item 1781, as amended.
7Taczkowska-Olszewska and Nowikowska (2019), p. 245.
8Taczkowska-Olszewska (2019), p. 76.
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Thus, the information/security attributes indicated in the Act fulfil a twofold
function—i.e. they determine the standard of security in cyberspace, and simulta-
neously constitute a criterion for assessing the level of cybersecurity. The absence of
any of the attributes indicated in the Act, or any infringement of the required
standard of protection of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity,
means the occurrence of an incident which, within the meaning of the Act, is an
event which has or might have an adverse effect on Cybersecurity.9
Pursuant to the adoption on 6 July 2016 by the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union of Directive 2016/1148,10 all Member States were
required to adopt a national strategy for the security of network and information
systems. The preamble of the NIS Directive emphasises that IT networks, systems,
and services perform an important role in society. Their reliability and security are
crucial for economic and social activities, in particular for the functioning of the
internal market. The scale, frequency, and impact of security incidents are increas-
ing, and are posing a serious threat to the functioning of network and information
systems. These systems can also become the object of deliberate harmful actions
aimed at damaging or disrupting their operation. Moreover, these types of incident
can hinder business activity, cause significant financial losses, undermine user
confidence, and result in serious losses to the Union’s economy.
In numerous cases there is a risk of personal data’s being compromised as a result
of incidents. In such a context, cybersecurity authorities and the President of the
Personal Data Protection Office should cooperate and exchange information on all
relevant issues in order to address any personal-data breaches resulting from such
incidents.11 Furthermore, the exchange of information on risks and incidents within
the CSIRT cooperation group and network can involve the processing of
personal data.
Such processing should generally be in accordance with the GDPR. However, it
should be noted, in accordance with Article 2(2)(d) of the GDPR, that the processing
of personal data in matters relating to national security is not governed by this
Regulation. The Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection,
and prosecution of prohibited acts, or the enforcement of penalties, including
protection against and the prevention of threats to public security.12
The principles of sharing information and processing personal data in the national
cybersecurity system are regulated in detail in Chapter 7 of the Act on the National
Cybersecurity System. In terms of information sharing, the legislators have intro-
duced the principle that information about vulnerabilities, cybersecurity incidents
9Sieńczyło-Chlabicz et al. (2019), p. 145 et seq.
10Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems
across the Union, OJ EU 2016 L 194/1.
11Szostek (2017), p. 257 et seq.
12Nowikowska (2019), p. 163.
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and threats, as well as the level of risk of an incident, for reasons of state security,
and for the protection of the legally protected confidentiality of the providers of
essential services and digital-services suppliers, are excluded from the scope of the
Act on Access to Public Information. The relevant CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or
CSIRT GOV may, following consultation with the notifying providers of essential
services, publish on the website of the Public Information Bulletin of the Minister of
National Defence, the Scientific and Academic Computer Network—the State
Research Institute, or the Internal Security Agency information concerning serious
incidents, when it is necessary to prevent the occurrence of the incident or ensure
dealing with it. A similar solution was adopted for reports of significant incidents
from digital service providers. In the latter case, CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or
CSIRT GOV may request the Cybersecurity Authority to oblige the digital service
provider to make that information public when this is necessary to prevent the
incident, or to effect dealing with the incident, as well as when, for any other reason,
disclosure of the incident is in the public interest.
The divulging of such information must not violate the regulations on the
protection of classified information, or of other legally protected secrets, or the
regulations on personal data protection. Following the May 2018 entry into force
of Regulation 2016/679, the NCSA legislators took into account the requirements of
the GDPR for entities included in the national cybersecurity system, particularly
with regard to the processing of data by CSIRTs, and by sectoral cybersecurity teams
in connection with the support and coordination of incident handling. In order to
perform tasks such as the monitoring of cybersecurity threats and incidents at the
national level, the risk assessment of an identified threat, or issuing communications
about identified cyber threats, CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, and
sectoral cybersecurity teams, may process data obtained in connection with cyber-
security incidents and threats, including sensitive personal data, within the scope,
and for the implementation, of these tasks. These entities may process personal data
obtained in connection with cyber incidents and threats
(1) concerning users of information systems and telecommunications terminal
equipment
(2) concerning telecommunications equipment intended to be connected directly or
indirectly to network terminals
(3) collected by providers of essential services and digital service providers, for the
purposes of the provision of services
(4) collected by public entities in the implementation of public tasks, concerning the
entities reporting the incident.
For the purposes of performing the tasks specified in the Act on the National
Cybersecurity System, CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, and other
sectoral cybersecurity teams, may transfer data to each other to the extent necessary
to perform these tasks, and to cooperate with the President of the Personal Data
Protection Office. The data are deleted or anonymised as soon as it is determined that
they are not essential for the performance of the assignment, or within 5 years from
the end of the incident to which they relate. Insofar as the processing of data is
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unrelated to national security, the Act provides for restrictions on the scope of certain
obligations and rights for the controller or processor of personal data. Such restric-
tions include, but are not limited to, the data subject’s right of access, the right of
rectification, the right to limit the processing in the event when the accuracy of the
data is challenged, and, in the event of an objection, the notification of the data
subject about the recipients informed of the rectification or deletion of the personal
data, where the exercise of this right would prevent CSIRT from accomplishing its
tasks.
To summarise the above, it can be stated that the main task of CSIRTs is not to
collect and process personal data—this is a secondary activity emanating from other
tasks. In the course of monitoring cybersecurity incidents and threats or analytical
activities, CSIRTs might encounter data which are generally non-personal data, but,
as a result of the appropriate correlation of the information, might become such data,
and be used to identify the perpetrator of an incident. Personal data which might be
generated during the handling of an incident can include network-traffic content,
data provided during the incident report, databases obtained as part of computer
forensics, as well as logs and event logs. Due to the specificity of CSIRT, it is not
possible to create an exhaustive list of the processed data. The explanatory memo-
randum of the Act emphasises that CSIRTs have no interest in personal data per se,
but can be part of other data processing activities, especially with regard to a broad
understanding of what personal data is. In such a case, intervention seems justified
and proportionate.13
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Space Security and Cybersecurity in Poland
Małgorzata Polkowska
Abstract This article refers to the definitions of: “space security” and “cybersecu-
rity”. Both terms are strictly connected to the national defense and can be part of
international law and national law of security. It seems that those two aspects of
security are well regulated in Europe and Poland. Making such a regulation on
international level is still a challenge. Poland is more active in space and legislation
since the Polish Space Agency was created. The Security in Space began the very
important factor for the national defense. Polish entrepreneurs involved in space
business should be aware of this while undertaking space activities. Space has
reached an easy access and became the target for intruders. That is why the
regulators of cybersecurity and space security should be aware of this new threat
and cooperate together in case to make the law practicable and effective.
1 Introduction
In such a broad term as “security”, both: “space security” and “cybersecurity”
aspects can be found. Both terms are strictly connected to the national defense and
can be part of international law and national law of security. It seems that those two
aspects of security are well regulated in Europe and Poland. Making such a regula-
tion on international level is still a challenge. While talking about cybersecurity
(which seems more Earth oriented issue) we cannot forget about space security
(connected to Outer Space) and all regulations connected.
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2 Polish Space History and Polish Space Business
The history of Space in Poland is much longer than expected. The beginnings of
Polish astronomical activity date back to the fifteenth Century and the Copernican
revolution. The most famous figure of this period was Nicolaus Copernicus, whose
work “On the rotation of celestial spheres” presented in detail the heliocentric vision
of the planetary system. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Jan Hevelius
(mathematician, astronomer) and Kazimierz Siemienowicz (engineer, rocket con-
structor) contributed to the development of Polish cosmic thought. In the twentieth
Century, Polish scientists were involved in cooperation with the USSR, among
others, in the Interkosmos programme. The first Polish device for measuring solar
radiation was sent into orbit on board of the Copernicus satellite—500 (in 1973).
Other achievements include the experiment of crystallization in microgravity con-
ditions. Three years later the Space Research Centre of the Polish Academy of
Sciences (CBK) was established for space exploration and development of space
technologies. In the 1970s, the practical use of satellite images and satellite com-
munications in Poland also began. The 1970s also saw participation in several space
missions (by 1999, a total of 60 Polish devices for performing experiments in
physics had been deployed). In 1978, the Polish astronaut Mirosław Hermaszewski
travelled in Space on board the Soviet ship Soyuz-30. The purpose of the journey
was an 8-day mission to carry out experiments at the Soviet station Salut-6.
The research of Polish scientists included mainly astrophysics (solar system), the
study of planets and small celestial bodies of the solar system, the study of the sun,
the study of phenomena occurring in space plasma in interplanetary and peri-
planetary space, Earth exploration by satellite geodesy and satellite remote sensing
(checking the degree of pollution of ponds, forests, soil moisture, weather forecasts),
the discovery of planets outside the sun, cooperation in the construction of a
telescope in South Africa.
After 1989, political changes made it possible to develop cooperation with
countries outside the Eastern bloc. In 1994, Poland signed an agreement with ESA
on cooperation in the peaceful use of space, which was extended in 2002. On its
basis, Poles could participate in ESA’s scientific programmes, which resulted in the
presence of Polish devices on most of ESA’s flagship research missions (Cassini-
Huygens, Integrat, Mars Express, Rosetta, Venus Express and Herschel). The
beginning of the twenty-first Century and Polish accession to the EU brought an
intensification of cooperation with ESA. In 2007, an agreement on a European
Collaborating State (PECS) was signed with ESA, and thanks to the creation of
this mechanism, 45 projects were financed by Polish companies, research institu-
tions and universities in cooperation with ESA1 Space activities like few other areas
of economic activity require extremely intensive international cooperation. For
Poland, the main direction of such cooperation is Europe, where, apart from
1Polkowska and Ryzenko (2016), p. 339.
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individual countries, space activities are conducted by the European Union (EU) and
a dedicated organization-ESA.
In the 2007–2013 financial perspective, the EU allocated about EUR 4.9 billion
for space projects, i.e. EUR 700 million annually. Poland, with its share of about
3.2% in the general EU budget, proportionally co-financed EU space programmes
with the amount of about 22.4 million Euro annually. In the current financial
perspective 2014–2020, the EU plans to spend a total of approximately EUR 11.8
billion on space activities (nearly 2.5 times more than in the previous one), of which
the estimated share of Poland will amount to approximately EUR 378 million.
These figures show Poland’s relatively large financial involvement in the financ-
ing of European space-related activities. However, until recently, there were no
mechanisms to facilitate access to these funds for space activities in Poland. This
was mainly due to the fact that EU space projects are implemented within the
framework of industrial cooperation, which is shaped in the programmes of a
separate organisation—ESA. As a result, the possibilities of actual participation in
EU projects are extremely limited for countries that are not members of ESA.
In November 2012 Poland joined ESA, which opened the way for faster devel-
opment of space technologies and satellite techniques through the possibility of full
participation in most of the Agency’s programmes. Poland has become the 20th
member of ESA, paying a contribution of around €30 million per year. Poland’s
membership in ESA provides an opportunity to create and strengthen the relevant
skills and potential of Polish industry, develop cooperation between the environ-
ment, access to joint programmes, ensure coherence between ESA and Poland.
At the same time, the possibility to engage in industrial cooperation in ESA
programmes has opened the way to real participation in EU space projects. It is fully
understandable that the opportunity to ensure a partial flow of Polish investment in
the EU space programme back to Poland, in the form of investment in cutting-edge
sectors of the economy, is of great importance for Polish economic policy.
Currently, the Polish space policy community, based on 6 years of experience of
actual implementation of international cooperation with ESA, still formulates a
similar answer to the question “why should Poland invest in space?”
In the context of these considerations, it is necessary to present the way in which
expectations in relation to measurable benefits from Polish membership in ESA are
determined. The following elements should be taken into account:
(1) geographical return—return to Poland of the majority of funds transferred to
ESA;
(2) inflow of EU funds allocated to space programmes;
(3) growth in sales of Polish companies participating in ESA programmes;
(4) increase in the number of new jobs in the area of high technologies;
(5) increase in the level of innovativeness of the participating entities—secured
intellectual property rights and the effects of their commercialisation
A large number of companies interested in participating in ESA programmes
confirms that Poland has a significant potential of innovative enterprises, and at the
same time these companies are interested in the development of new technologies—
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on condition that it is possible to obtain public support. It is still too early to assess
the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The translation of such works into actual
market sales of these companies will take place at the earliest after 3–4 years, and in
the case of companies developing strictly space technologies even after several
years.
Cooperation with ESA is aimed at increasing the competence of the Polish
industry and consequently its greater involvement in the implementation of the
European space programme. Poland’s participation in ESA programmes gives
wider access to technology, the possibility of transferring new technologies to
industry, participation in expenditures on modern industries and opens up opportu-
nities for scientific cooperation. It is extremely important that ESA has a geograph-
ical return, so contracts are allocated in proportion to the share of the Agency’s
funding.
3 Polish Space Legislation
Poland is more active in space and legislation since the Polish Space Agency was
created (POLSA). This Agency is a governmental executive body, subject to the
Prime Minister. It consists of civilian and military personnel. It was established by
the Act of 26 September 2014 and became fully operational at the end of 2015.2 This
act has been amended in 2018. The agency participates in fulfilling the strategic
goals of the Republic of Poland by supporting the utilization of satellite systems and
the development of space technologies. The main tasks of POLSA cover the
following 5 areas: coordinating the activity of the Polish space sector on the national
and international level, representing Poland in relations with international space
sector organizations, supporting national science and business projects associated
with space technologies, popularizing the use of satellite data by public administra-
tion and increasing the defensive capabilities of the country. The agency is executive
in nature in accordance with the Act from 27 August 2009 in public financing
(Article—Act of 26 September 2014) and it can create local branches of the agency.
The headquarters of the Agency is located in Gdansk (Article 3. The activities of the
Agency are under the auspice of the President of the Council of Ministers (Article 2).
The duties of the agency are described in Article 3. The President of the POLSA
Council is composed of representatives of the government- one from each adminis-
tration and four representatives of scientists and the industry with recognized
achievements in research or business and chosen based on their knowledge compe-
tence in areas concerning POLSA activities (Article 14).3
Polish Space law is still waiting for the Parliamentary approval. Several versions
of the draft have been developed; at present, the Government Legislation Centre
2Act on Polish Space Agency, Polish Journal of Laws of 2014, item 1533.
3Polkowska (2016), pp. 68–69.
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website has published a draft law on space activities and the National Register of
Space Objects. The Act regulates: the rules of performing space activities and the
rules of maintaining the National Register of Space Objects. Earlier, however, the
amendment of the Act on POLSA will be processed. The changes proposed in the
draft act are aimed at: to streamline and clarify the scope of tasks of the Polish Space
Agency, as an executive agency to provide the necessary expert support and
technological knowledge to other public administration bodies involved in space
activities, and responsible for the preparation and coordination of the implementa-
tion of the National Space Programme; and to adapt the supervision of POLSA to the
solutions in force in other European countries, especially in the Member States of the
European Space Agency (ESA), as well as to introduce improvements in the
organisation of POLSA.
Polish Space Strategy was published by the Polish Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment in February 2017. The objectives are: increasing competitiveness of the
Polish space sector and its share in turnover (increasing participation in the EU space
programmes: SST Support Framework), development of satellite applications,
strengthening capacities in the area of security and defense using space (establish-
ment of Space Situational Awareness System), creating favorable conditions for the
development of space sector in Poland, building human resources for the Polish
space sector. The strategic issue is to obtain 3% of the EU market in 2030. National
Space Plan (2019–2021) from 2018 states about the establishment, development and
operation of a National Space Situational Awareness System (SSA) in cooperation
with the EU SST consortium. The objective of the project is to enhance the security
of citizens and infrastructure (Earth and space) in the context of space threats, to
build national Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities and to prepare for
commercial exploitation of services provided in the area of SSA. The first stage of
the activity is to launch basic functionalities of the national SST system (Space
Surveillance and Tracking), inter alia, through the development of infrastructure and
capabilities enabling the implementation of tasks envisaged within the framework of
Poland’s future membership in the European SST consortium. 19th of December
2018- Poland joined the European SST Consortium related to the tracking of space
debris threatening infrastructure in space and on Earth.4
Poland has become a full member of the European Space Surveillance and
Tracking Consortium. The accession agreement was signed on 19 December
2018 at the seat of the Polish Space Agency in Warsaw. Joining the consortium
will enable national entities to participate in projects financed by the EU, whose
budget in the current and future financial perspective may amount to more than EUR
350 million. Membership in the consortium will allow for faster development of the
Polish SST system, which will provide our country with data necessary to protect the
planned missions of Polish satellites and will support national security and defense
in monitoring threats from artificial space objects. Participation in the European
programme also brings great scientific and business potential. Ensuring the
4Polkowska (2019).
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operability of the observation sensors forming the Polish SST infrastructure, the
possibility of their modernization and the demand for new ones—all this will
facilitate a faster growth of competence in the area of SST and optical and radar
observations for Polish entities, which already today gain experience by
implementing projects under the optional SSA programme in ESA.
In view of the progressing commercialization of products related to situational
awareness in space, domestic entities providing solutions and services in this area
will be able to direct their offer also to the global market, which will grow as a result
of the New Space trend, the increasing number of micro and smaller satellites, the
planned development of mega-constellations and new areas such as satellite in-orbit
servicing or, in the longer term, the sourcing of raw materials from celestial bodies.5
The Polish National Space Programme comes from December 2018 and still is in
public consultations. Polish Space Agency (POLSA)6 will be responsible for the
implementation of the programme. POLSA has considered a few areas of public
support within the programme, such as, “Development of satellite systems”—with
one of the priority projects: “Space Situational Awareness System”. The vital goal of
the project is to provide a long-term access to the European and national space
infrastructure and the services crucial for securing its operations. As a consequence,
a network of sensors (telescopes, lasers, radars) responsible for space object obser-
vation and tracking is to function on the territory of Poland and staff is to be trained
in order to perform tasks in the frame of SST.7
4 Polish and the European Approach in SSA: Rising Stakes
for Civilian Space Programmes
The European Space Situational Awareness System (SSA) consists of three separate
segments: Space Surveillance and Tracking, especially in the context of Space
Debris (Space Weather) and Near Earth Orbit (NEO) observation. The European
SSA system has dual-use civilian and military applications. Additional components
to the SSA system may be added in the near future. They are built on the basis of
military requirements and compiled by the European Defence Agency (EDA). The
conference also devoted a lot of space to the development of the STM (Space Traffic
Management)8 system, which does not yet exist in Europe, unlike the USA. The
goals for Space Situational Awareness are the following: society heavily dependent
on critical space and ground assets, critical assets need to be protected against
5www.polsa.gov.pl.
6The Polish National Space Programme (www.polsa.gov.pl).
7Polkowska (2019).
8
“Space Traffic Management (STM) is the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting
safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free from
physical or radio-frequency interference.”
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adverse effects from space, SSA Programme Declaration calls for independent
European access to SSA data and services. There are three main areas: Space
Weather, Near Earth Objects, Space Debris clean space. The participants in ESA
SSA programs are 19 participating states. The good progress in the development of a
SSA system in Europe has been observed and many actors involved: Member States,
ESA, and EU. Distribution of roles needs to be finalized: development vs exploita-
tion. There is still a performance gap in surveillance radars that is why there is a need
to agree on a suitable governance scheme for the exploitation of future high
performance European surveillance radar. There is a development of a high perfor-
mance radar can be achieved within 3 years SWE and NEO systems will reach
pre-operational status by 2020.9
Thus, Europe has started its own preparatory programme of the SSA. International
negotiations on permanent exchange of information and coordination, mainly with
the USA, are also foreseen. Poland should also participate in these studies, which this
year is to eventually become a member of the European SSA Consortium, where they
play the biggest role: France, Germany, Great Britain (not in Consortium after
Brexit) and Italy.10 Much of the data to be dealt with by the established Consortium
can be found in public satellite catalogues created by the USA and other countries,
which are available on the Internet and can be freely used. That is why transatlantic
cooperation is so crucial. Orbital paths are constantly changing or are disturbed by a
number of factors, such as inconsistent degrees of attraction, solar activity or the
effects of gravity of other orbital objects. International cooperation on SSA data
sharing is weakened by issues such as liability and property concerns, data formatting
standards and compliance with catalogued tools, and finally security (some satellites
do not provide data to the public). These issues are still being discussed in various
international fora, including UNCOPUOS (United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space). The author follows these discussions on an ongoing basis
and makes use of them in her scientific work. Space security has a multidimensional
concept. It can be understood as Security in Outer Space, Outer Space for Security or
Security for Space. The first means the protection of the space infrastructure against
natural and man-made threats or risks, ensuring the safety and sustainability of space
activities. The second means the use of space systems for security and defence
purposes. Security for Space means the protection of human life and the Earth
environment against natural threats and risks coming from space.
There are also several meanings of such definitions as: Space Situational Aware-
ness (SSA) which can be understood as current and predictive knowledge and
understanding of the outer space environment including space weather and location
of natural and manmade objects in orbit around the Earth; SEPP (Space Environment
9N. Bobrinsky, Forging ahead: from SSA to space safety, presentation at the 12th ESPI Autumn
Conference, Vienna, September 2th 2018.
10P. Faucher, SST Support Framework: Safeguarding European space infrastructure. Overview,
governance model, security relevance and future perspectives, presentation at the EUSST webinar
16 November 2020.
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Protection and Preservation), which is preventive and curative mitigation of negative
effects of human activity in outer space on the safety and sustainability of the outer
space environment and Space Infrastructure Security (SIS) as assurance of the
infrastructure ability to deliver a service that can justifiably be trusted despite a
hazardous environment.
There are some challenges to space infrastructure security, such as unintentional
hazards (space debris, accidental interferences), intentional threats (ASAT, mali-
cious interferences, and cyber attacks), Space weather hazards (geomagnetic storms,
solar storms).
There are rising challenges to space infrastructure security. Space is an increas-
ingly congested and contested resource. Space is multiple and diverse, there are
different mitigation and protection measures. There are many actors playing in the
Space, so interdependence between them has been noticed. There are various trends
in Space, such as increasing space activity, new concepts, connected space, strategic
target, “space control” capabilities, etc. The most important is growing dependence
on space for society and economy at large.11
Growing security threats to civilian space programmes (access to space, cyber-
security in space, safe operations in space). Space is a critical infrastructure: satellites
(jamming, spoofing, blinding), ground stations (hacking). Threats (military,
non-military, natural) are understood and accepted and now are more properly and
precisely assessed. Readiness to face and respond to threats is growing in govern-
ments and private sector. It seems that there is a possibility to invest in handling
threats are developing and to find political solutions in managing threats.12
5 Space and Cyber Security
The constant growth in Space industry due to the globalization was one of the
factors, which changed the meaning of the definition of “space security”. The new
emerging trends in “NewSpace” era caused the big amounts of risks. Launches are
getting cheaper, satellites are getting smaller and more capable, venture capitalist
funded private sector companies are entering the space market, new applications and
services are driving the commercial market for connectivity, civil space spending is
increasing. These factors are connected to the cyber threats as well. If the sector is to
realize the government’s aspiration of taking 10% of the global market by 2030, the
foundations must be safe, secure and sustainable—and therefore address cybersecu-
rity. From a cybersecurity perspective this will result in a larger attack surface both in
the space and ground segments and demonstrate a growing need to assure the
11S. Moranta (2018), Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations, presentation
at the 12th ESPI Autumn Conference Vienna, September 27th 2018.
12K. Uwe Schrögl (2018), Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Civilian Space Programmes,
8 presentation at the 12th ESPI Autumn Conference Vienna, September 27th 2018.
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security of the integrated network, the manufacturing supply chain and the informa-
tion transmission, analysis and storage.13
Governments, critical infrastructure, and economies rely on space-dependent
services—for example, the Global Positioning System (GPS)—that are vulnerable
to hostile cyber operations. However, few spacefaring states and companies have
paid any attention to the cybersecurity of satellites in outer space, creating a number
of risks.14 The commercialization of space provided the cybersecurity concerns for
many reasons, including market incentives to lower costs and innovate quickly,
often at the expense of software and hardware security. For example, networks of
linked small-satellites can provide internet access, communications, data storage and
transmission, imaging, and remote sensing. This next generation of satellites har-
nesses innovations in computing, electronics, miniaturization, imaging, sensors, big
data, and artificial intelligence. Satellite services for Earth observations from space
are growing. They support many policy and commercial purposes and contribute to
agricultural productivity, transportation efficiency, and environmental monitoring.
Commercial space activities use cutting-edge technologies and produce valuable
data and are, thus, targets for cyber espionage, including economic cyber espionage,
and cybercrime.15
This situation is challenging. Some international agencies are involved in the
project related to cybersecurity in space, such as the Space Generation Advisory
Council (SGAC) in support of the United Nations Programme on Space Applica-
tions.16 One of the projects of the group refers to cyber risks in space. The objective
of the project is referring to safety and security of the state. Satellite provide
information and services to support global communications, the economy, security
and defense, safety and emergency management, the environment and health. Their
strategic value inevitably raises the issue of cybersecurity. The information they
provide thus becomes a lucrative and enticing prospect for hackers. No more,
considering how satellites and their associated infrastructure are critical to sustaining
an increasingly globalised, and interconnected world. The space sector is unique in
the field of cybersecurity. It is an industry where civil, commercial and military





16SGAC is a global non-governmental, non-profit organisation and network which aims to repre-
sent university students and young space professionals ages 18–35 to the United Nations, space
agencies, industry, and academia, representing many states, including Poland. SGAC was con-
ceived at UNISPACE III in 1999, whereby states resolved, as part of the Vienna Declaration, “To
create a council to support the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
through raising awareness and exchange of fresh ideas by youth. SGAC holds Permanent Observer
status at the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) and
regularly takes part in the annual meeting, as well as its Legal and Scientific and Technical
Subcommittees.
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applications seamlessly co-exist, creating a haphazard situation for cybersecurity
experts and telecommunication engineers.17
6 Concluding Remarks
Poland has been much involved in Space. That is why the Space Agency was
created. Due to the big interest in Space industry the cooperation in Space is
growing. Security in Space began the very important factor for the national defense
and sovereignty as well. It seems that the cybersecurity issues are closely related to
the security in Space. The Polish entrepreneurs involved in Space business should be
aware of this while undertaking space activities. Space has reached an easy access
and became the target for intruders. That is why the regulators of cybersecurity and
space security should be aware of this new threat. The scope of the regulations of
cyber threats has been broadened since the New Space era begun (smaller satellites
and cheaper access to space for the public). This factor should be definitely taken
into account for those, responsible for making national policies and strategies or
security regulations in Poland.
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Part II
Competences, Obligations and Tasks of
Entities Responsible for Ensuring
Cybersecurity Under the National
Cybersecurity System (“Imperious
Entities”)
Cybersecurity as a Public Task
in Administration
Katarzyna Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz
Abstract Contemporary models of public administration have been formed by
various political, social and economic conditions. Public tasks are carried out on
the basis of legal provisions under the conditions of applying specific decision-
making rules and organisational techniques, which include specific principles, pro-
cedures and practice—experience. These features characterise public administration
as a system of operations, also in relation to cyberspace. The transformations
associated with the computerisation and dissemination of information and commu-
nication technologies have meant that the duty of public administration in the
information age is, on the one hand, to synchronise the activities of entities belong-
ing to different sectors, and on the other, to manage complex networks, as well as to
adapt the functioning of public administration to using new technologies. The goal
of cybersecurity management is to provide optimal cost protection; to determine
which risks can be avoided and how, using both organisational and technical
solutions, the risk can be minimised to an acceptable level.
1 General Remarks
Numerous processes have shaped the contemporary public administration environ-
ment in Poland. The political transformation which took place in Central and Eastern
Europe after 1989 consisted of the simultaneous creation of new foundations for
political freedoms, private property, and market economy conditions, as well as of
the values and mechanisms of the civil state. Various political, social, and economic
conditions have shaped the contemporary public administration models. The state
system and political considerations have contributed to the transformation of the
centrally planned economy into a free market economy. After new governance
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standards were implemented, a demand developed for high-quality public services
provided within public administration structures. This stems from the actual function
of administration. The term ‘administration’ derives from the Latin ‘ministrare’,
which means to lead, serve, manage1 (and the prefix ‘ad’ emphasises the service-
related aspect).2 One of the first definitions was put forward by W. Jellinek. It dates
back to the time when the canon of the rule of law was born, and it refers to the
tripartite separation of powers in the state. It proclaimed that “[. . .] administration is
an activity of the state which is neither legislation nor justice”.3 In recent years, there
has been a general trend towards a shift from the administration to the management
of public affairs, which is reflected in the introduction of the concept of “good
governance” in the public sector.4
The modern state, whose administration relies on new technical solutions, has
become susceptible to disruptions in the operation of hardware, IT networks,
systems, databases, and the information processes based on these solutions. Nowa-
days, ensuring the security of information resources and systems which serve, in
particular, to fulfil public tasks, has emerged as a serious issue. The efficient
operation of public-sector entities is conditional, among other things, on the efficient
performance of public tasks related to ensuring cybersecurity at every stage of the
activities of public institutions.5
Public administration is extensively defined by legal commentators, but all these
definitions relate to the state (or local government), society, and the
citizen. J. Starościak6 describes it as
[. . .] an organisational function with features such as the initiating nature of activities,
solving specific situations, and carrying out organisational work, not only by creating
binding norms within the legal order, specific legally defined forms of administrative activity
of the state.7
According to H. Izdebski and M. Kulesza,
Public administration is understood as a set of activities, operations and undertakings, both
organisational and executive (the functional element), carried out in the public interest (the
object element) by various entities, authorities, and institutions (the subject element) on the
basis of Acts, and in the forms specified by law (functional element).8
Most generally, citing E. Ochendowski,9 this term is understood to mean any
organised activity aimed at achieving specific objectives. On the other hand,
according to J. Boć
1Latin administratio—administrating, managing; administrare—to be of assistance.
2Ochendowski (2002), p. 18; Izdebski and Kulesza (2004), p. 23, and Hausner (2005).
3Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 11.
4Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 8.
5Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 7.
6J. Starościak (1975), p. 10.
7Lisiak-Felicka and Szmit (2016), p. 55.
8Izdebski and Kulesza (2004), p. 93.
9Ochendowski (2002), p. 19.
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Public administration is the fulfilment of the collective and individual needs of citizens,
resulting from the coexistence of individuals in communities, by the state and its dependent
authorities, as well as by local and regional authorities.10
Public administration is defined as a set of activities, operations, and
organisational and executive undertakings carried out in the public interest by
various entities, authorities and institutions, on the basis of Acts and in the forms
established by law. It serves the general public, and covers the scope of matters of a
public nature.11 In defining public administration, we therefore refer to functions and
actions which link the administration to its active and state-dependent activities.
State and local government authorities create organisational structures to meet the
needs of citizens. The computerisation process, which is being introduced with a
view to facilitating the effective performance of public services and tasks, is a means
by which modern administration intends to meet such needs.
Public tasks are performed pursuant to the law in compliance with certain rules of
decision making and organisational techniques, which consist of certain rules, pro-
cedures and practice—experience. These characteristics define public administration
as a system of operations.12 The efficient and effective functioning of public
administration depends to a significant extent on its organisational structure, which
consists of various units vested with the powers specified in the Acts, and forming a
specific organisational system to perform public tasks.13
The transformations associated with computerisation and the popularity of infor-
mation and communication technologies14 have resulted in, among other things, the
convergence of economic, social, and political phenomena. On the one hand, the
duty of public administration in the information age is to synchronise the activities of
entities belonging to various sectors, to manage complex social networks, and to
adapt the functioning of public administration to the use of new technologies. On the
other hand, it should be noted that administrative authorities are some of the most
important users of modern ICT tools and techniques, since the functioning of the
administration involves, or is based on, the processing of information; information is
therefore an essential resource for administration.15 In a democratic state of law,
public-administration tasks have the status of legal obligations. In a state of law, the
administration can influence the shape of legal acts which contain the legal norms
characterising its tasks; however, it may not decide what its tasks are. It might have
some freedom and influence on the shape and scope of the tasks to be carried out, but
10Boć (2004), p. 16.
11Monarcha-Matlak (2008), p. 19.
12Monarcha-Matlak (2008), p. 19.
13Lang (1997), p. 15.
14Information and communication technologies (ICT)—all activities relating to the manufacture
and use of telecommunications- and information-technology equipment and associated services,
and the collection, processing, and provision, of information in electronic form using digital
technologies and any electronic communication tools. http://lawp.eu/pdf/ict_definicja.pdf, accessed
10 September 2020.
15Szczepaniuk (2016), p. 26.
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the sources and limits of that freedom always stem from legislation adopted by the
responsible legislative bodies. The state performs its tasks through public authorities.
Central and local government authorities and other state authorities are responsible
for public tasks. This is a statutory procedure, carried out in the public interest.
Polish legislation does not offer a legal definition of public tasks. However, many
definitions can be found in academic papers.16 On the basis of the definition of
public administration presented by J. Boć, it is possible to derive the term ‘public
tasks’, as tasks assumed by the state, consisting of meeting collective and individual
human needs resulting from the coexistence of people in communities. The devel-
opment of communities and the changing reality is enforcing changes to the field of
the tasks taken over by the state. These tasks are implemented on the basis of the
provisions of the law.17
According to A. Błaś:
[. . .] the performance of administrative tasks is the duty of the public administration
authority to which they have been entrusted by law to take up an active role in the
implementation of these tasks.18
The literature on the subject stresses that administrative tasks should be supported
by the very-broadly defined rule of good governance. It is also worth mentioning the
understanding of
[. . .] public administration as a set of activities, operations, and organisational and executive
undertakings, carried out in the public interest by various entities, authorities, and institu-
tions, on the basis of Acts, and in the forms established by law.19
According to S. Biernat,
Public tasks may be carried out by public entities without any powers of authority, or even
by non-public entities. The main criterion for defining a task as a public task is the fact that
the state or local authority is legally responsible for its implementation. The mere perfor-
mance of tasks within the organisational structures of the state or local government is not a
criterion which qualifies it as public tasks. The responsibility of the authorities is maintained
when other entities are authorised to carry out public tasks, but the forms of activity and their
scope change.20
P. Schmidt defines public tasks as “a set of activities, operations, and
organisational and executive undertakings carried out in the public interest by
various entities, authorities, and institutions, on the basis of Acts and in forms
established by law”.21 On the other hand, T. Kocowski describes public tasks as
“a legal obligation for an entity clearly indicated in legal norms to achieve or
16Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 20.
17Boć (2004), p. 17.
18Boć (2004), p. 44.
19The definition according to Izdebski and Kulesza (2004), p. 79.
20Biernat (1994), pp. 29–30.
21P. Schmidt, Prywatyzacja zadań publicznych w zakresie zapewnienia dostępu do kultury,
followed by K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz in: K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 20.
194 K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz
maintain a certain state which is important and desirable in terms of the public
interest”.22 These two definitions, though different in content, have many compatible
properties. Public tasks is a collective term for tasks carried out by the state, which
performs them through public administration. On the basis of the applicable regula-
tions, public tasks are implemented through planned and rational action aimed at
reaching specific objectives.23
In J. Zimmermann’s view, the main indicator for considering a task public is
where the state or local and regional authorities are responsible under law for
carrying it out.24 According to M. Stohl, the concept of a “public task” is associated
with public (public-utility) objectives to be achieved by the administration. In turn,
these objectives are identified with the public interest.25 According to E. Knosala,
there are currently no clear criteria for distinguishing between the public and the
private domain. This means that the outlines of public tasks are no longer as clearly
defined as in the past.26 Public tasks are those which serve to meet collective needs
and the needs of a particular community.27 Public tasks are generally attributed to the
state, but under the influence of political factors it decides which tasks will be
performed by its authorities on an exclusive basis, which can (and must) be entrusted
to other public authorities, and which can be performed by non-public entities.28
A typical feature of public tasks is that their performance is an obligation of
public authorities, not an entitlement. This concept is determined by individual legal
norms, which are indeterminate, due to the fact that it is the state that decides
independently and ultimately whether a given function is a public task or not. It is
not necessary for public tasks to be implemented within the structure of public
administration (e.g. if the performance of a public task has been privatised). The law
provides a legal basis for public administration, and sets out a framework for the
performance of public tasks. Respect for the law is based on the constitutional
principle of legalism (the rule of law) expressed in Article 7 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Poland. Public tasks cited in the Constitution include guaranteeing
22T. Kocowski, Prywatyzacja zarządzania majątkiem publicznym, prywatyzacja majątkowa,
prywatyzacja zadań publicznych i prywatyzacja wykonania zadań publicznych followed by
K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz in: K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 20.
23A.K. Mikicka, Partnerstwo publiczno-prywatne jako prywatyzacja sensu largo zadań
publicznych jednostek samorządu terytorialnego followed by K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz in:
K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 20.
24J. Zimmermann, Prawo administracyjne followed by K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz in:
K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 20.
25J. Zimmermann (ed.), Cele publiczne i zadania publiczne, Koncepcja systemu prawa
administracyjnego followed by K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz, in: K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz
(2014), p. 20.
26E. Knosala, Zarys nauki administracji followed by K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz: (2014), p. 20.
27Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 20.
28Dobkowski (2004), p. 106.
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the security and inviolability of the territory of the Republic of Poland, freedom,
human and civil rights, the security of citizens, and environmental protection;29
Government administration authorities and local government units, and other
state authorities, are responsible for public tasks, i.e. legally defined conduct postu-
lated for the sake of common good.
According to legal commentators, public tasks may be performed by public entities without
any powers of authority, or even by non-public entities. The main criterion for considering a
given task as public is that the state or local authority is legally responsible for its
implementation.30
The Constitutional Tribunal31 (TK), in its Resolution of 27 October 1994, case
file No. W 10/93,32 ruled that all tasks of local government which serve to satisfy the
collective needs of local communities, as well as national needs, were public tasks.
According to the TK, “Both commissioned tasks and local government’s own tasks
are public tasks as defined by the applicable law”.
In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, the definition of the commune’s
own tasks as public tasks is not inconsistent with the undoubted fact that the
commune, as an entity responsible for the municipal assets, manages it in a manner
appropriate for the performance of its own tasks.33 It should be mentioned here that
the set of systems which constitute critical infrastructure is also part of municipal
assets. Special tasks in the field of cybersecurity are entrusted to local government
entities under, i.a., the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management. According to
Article 3 (2) of the Act on Crisis Management, critical infrastructure should be
understood as systems and functionally integrated facilities, including installations,
devices, building structures, and services crucial for the security of the state and its
citizens, and serving to guarantee the efficient functioning of public administration
authorities, as well as of institutions and enterprises.34
Therefore, public tasks for the security of cyberspace have high priority in the
safe and efficient functioning of the state. The responsibility for ensuring cyberse-
curity rests with all network users, but public administration authorities have a
particularly important role to play, as their priorities include ensuring security and
public order. The Council of Ministers, in leading Government administration,
performs its constitutional duties by carrying out tasks for the protection of
29See Article 126(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. See more Chałubińska–
Jentkiewicz et al. (2021), passim
30Martysz et al. (2015), p. 10190.
31Hereinafter referred to as the “TK”.
32Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of 27 October 1994, case file No. W 10/93 OTK 1994,
No. 2, item 46.
33M. Kłaczyński, Komentarz do ustawy z dnia 6 września 2001 r. o dostępie do informacji
publiczne, followed by K. Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 21.
34Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 21.
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cyberspace. It also has the primary responsibility for ensuring a high level of security
for cyberspace and the citizens functioning within it.35
The expansion of modern communication and information technologies has
meant that the administration is responsible for the quality and maintenance of
communication routes and road networks, and nothing has changed in this respect.
It is clear that the creation of the technical infrastructure and the system of access to it
by specific users requires substantial financial resources, which can only be provided
by private entities interested in benefitting financially from these activities. In this
respect, the function of public administration is to ensure the security of IT systems
and networks, and to select entities which ensure continuity and a high quality of
services, while guaranteeing access conditions for the widest-possible range of
recipients.36
As has already been mentioned, one of the basic public tasks is to ensure a safe
and efficient state, including the security of cyberspace. Cybersecurity is all the more
important because the dangers in cyberspace can adversely affect national security,
which in turn is the foundation of public tasks.37
National security is also the most important value, national need, and priority objective, of
the activities of the state, individuals, and social groups, and at the same time a process
comprising a variety of measures to ensure sustainable, unhindered, national (state) exis-
tence and development, including the defence of the state as a political institution and the
protection of individuals and society as a whole, as well as their assets and the natural
environment, from threats which significantly restrict its functioning or pose a threat to
fundamental rights.38
The key national needs include needs of a systemic nature (e.g. strengthening the
social and economic system and legal order), social needs (ensuring health protec-
tion, social security, and counteracting all forms of discrimination), economic needs
(e.g. national development, economic growth), ecological needs (environmental
protection), and cultural needs (nurturing national heritage, respect for differences
in outlooks on life, and ethnicity).39 Each of these national needs can be adversely
affected by cyber threats, which is why the security of cyberspace is so important for
the proper functioning of the state.40
State administration, as a complex structure, performs public tasks in the field of
cybersecurity through a set of activities, actions, and organisational undertakings.
The administration’s primary tasks include efforts to guarantee public safety and
order. The administration ensures the security of IT systems and networks and
selects entities ensuring continuity and high service quality, while guaranteeing
access conditions for the widest-possible audience; it secures the functioning of
35Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 26.
36Jaxa-Dębicka (2008), p. 267208.
37Chałubińska–Jentkiewicz (2014), p. 22.
38Kitler (2011), pp. 22–31.
39Kitler (2011), p. 37.
40Bączek (2006), p. 244.
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the national trust service infrastructure and supervises trust service providers. It is the
executive sector of the state which carries out activities to pursue the public interest
through cooperation between public authorities and services. These authorities are
responsible for ensuring a high level of security for cyberspace and its users.
It should be stressed that the adopted policy is an important instrument for
implementing public tasks in cyberspace.
Generally speaking, a policy is a set of coherent, precise, and lawful rules,
principles, and procedures, according to which a given organisation, or administra-
tion, builds, manages, and provides information resources.41
2 The Main Benefits of a Well-Designed Security Policy
• Allocating responsibility for system development to a separate group of people, so that
no one has full authority within the system
• Establishing organisational structures responsible for managing information security
• Controlling the process of issuing cards and codes’ not being left to programmers/
developers who have access to account data
• Introducing a distinction into open and protected information
• Distributing operational functions between different people
• Effective programming of information-security principles among the management and
employees of the organisation
• Documenting changes in the system to facilitate its periodic checks
• Supervising software modifications and system testing
• Regular training of users on information security
• Backups’ being stored in a different room than the one in which the server is located
• Monitoring the system and detecting any anomalies.42
As can be seen, the issue of cybersecurity in today’s administration is of crucial
importance. Therefore, the information-security and cybersecurity management
system is part of the organisation-management system. It is often based on an
approach related to business risk, and refers to the establishment, implementation,
monitoring, maintenance, and improvement of information security in particular.
The aim of cybersecurity management is to provide optimal protection in terms of cost; to
identify which risks can be avoided and how, using both organisational and technical
solutions, risks can be minimised to an acceptable level43
At every institution covered by the National Cybersecurity System Act, the unit’s
head must establish a cybersecurity management system based on the existing
standards and best practices. These should define, among other things, the roles of
the administrators and security inspectors of information processed on open com-
munication and information systems and networks. The information-security
41Wojciechowska-Filipek and Ciekanowski (2016), p. 157.
42Matuszczyk and Matuszczyk (2006), pp. 99–101.
43Liderman (2002), p. 78.
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management system will thus become an integral part of the institution’s security
policy.44 Public entities modify, develop, and implement, as appropriate, security
policies for the communication and information systems used by these entities to
perform public tasks.45 In drafting their security policies, public entities take into
account the responsibilities stipulated by the Act of 17 February 2005 on the
Computerisation of the Operations of Entities Performing Public Tasks,46 regarding
the minimum information security requirements for communication and information
systems.47 A public entity should also take into account the provisions of the Polish
Standards in the field of information security, in particular the group of standards in
the PN ISO/IEC 27000 series, along with other related standards.48 Coordinating the
information-security policy of organisational units will ensure a common minimum
level of security. All institutions, when taking into account cybersecurity, are
obligated to establish, implement, monitor, operate, review, maintain, and improve
their Information Security Management Systems49 (see further comments).50 The
Minister competent for computerisation, in accord with the Ministry of National
Defence (the MON), the Internal Security Agency (the ABW), and the Military
Counterintelligence Service (the SKW), with the intention of guaranteeing a uniform
information security policy for organisational units, has the power to draw up
guidelines for cybersecurity management systems.51
When the appropriate regulations are implemented at the statutory level, the
following will be ordered.
• Reporting on cybersecurity incidents to a designated governmental centre on
cybersecurity;
• Drawing up Disaster Recovery Plans (DRPs) and Business Continuity Plans (BCPs),
after the occurrence of an incident, including national standards or, in the absence
thereof, international standards, acceptable principles not included in official standards,
or widely recognised good practices
44Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2017-2022. https://mc.gov.pl/
aktualnosci/strategia-cyberbezpieczenstwa-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-na-lata-2017-2022 Accessed
on 24.05.2020.
45Rządowy Program Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni RP na lata 2011-2016. http://bip.msw.gov.pl/bip/
programy/19057,Rządowy-Program-Ochrony-Cyberprzestrzeni-RP-na-lata-2011-2016.html
Accessed on 28 May 2020.
46Consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item 570.
47Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni, Warsaw 25.06.2013. https://mac.gov.pl/files/polityka_
ochrony_cyberprzestrzeni_rp_wersja_pl.pdf Accessed on 24.05.2020.




50Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2017–2022. https://mc.gov.pl/
aktualnosci/strategia-cyberbezpieczenstwa-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-na-lata-2017-2022 Accessed
on 24.05.2020.
51Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni, Warszawa 25.06.2013. https://mac.gov.pl/files/ polityka_
ochrony_cyberprzestrzeni_rp_wersja_pl.pdf Accessed on 24.05.2020.
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• Managing the cybersecurity of information and the introduction of safeguards, including
national standards or, in the absence thereof, international standards, acceptable princi-
ples not included in official standards, or widely recognised good practices;
• Operating within a network of information about hazards.52
The ISMS (Information Security Management System) is understood (as defined
in the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards) as a part of the management system, based
on the concept of business risk management, responsible for establishing, monitor-
ing, implementing, operating, reviewing, maintaining, and improving information
security,53 the management system itself being understood as a set of guidelines,
policies, procedures, processes, and related resources (i.e. material resources—such
as computers and machines; human resources—such as employees, with their skills
and experience; and intangible resources—such as computer programs and
organisational culture) aimed at ensuring that the organisation completes its
tasks.54 At least two elements in the normative definitions should be stressed:55
• The systemic approach, in particular as the information security management system is
composed not only of “paper” records (procedures, standards, ordinances, etc.) but also
of all the resources relating to information security
• Basing information security on the business risk management concept.56
According to § 20(1) of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 12 April
2012 on the National Interoperability Framework (KRI), the minimum requirements
for public records and the exchange of information in electronic form, and the
minimum requirements for communication and information systems57 the entity
performing public tasks develops and establishes, implements and operates, moni-
tors and reviews, and maintains and improves, an information security management
system, ensuring the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information, taking
into account such attributes as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and
reliability. The requirements for the information security management system in
the KRI Regulation are considered to be fulfilled if the system
52Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2017–2022. https://mc.gov.pl/
aktualnosci/strategia-cyberbezpieczenstwa-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-na-lata-2017-2022 Accessed
on 24.05.2020.
53ISO/IEC 27000:2014 Information technology – Security techniques – Information security
management systems – Overview and vocabulary.
54Gillies (2011), pp. 367–376; Humphreys (2007), pp. 11–44.
55Lisiak-Felicka and Szmit (2016), p. 62.
56PN-ISO/IEC 31000:2012 – Zarządzanie ryzykiem – Zasady i wytyczne. http://pbsg.pl/polski-
komitet-normalizacyjny-pbsg-polrisk-i-zakonczyly-z-sukcesem-prace-nad-opracowaniem-pierw/
Accessed on 22.05.2020).
57Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 12 April 2012 on the National Interoperability
Framework (KRI), the minimum requirements for public records, the exchange of information in
electronic form, and the minimum requirements for communication and information systems,
consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item 2247, as amended, the “KRI Regulation”.
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has been developed on the basis of the Polish Standard PN-ISO/IEC 27001, and the
establishment of safeguards, risk management, and auditing is carried out on the basis of
Polish Standards related to this standard, including:
• PN-ISO/IEC 17799168—with regard to the establishment of safeguards
• PN-ISO/IEC 27005—with regard to risk management
• PN-ISO/IEC 24762—with regard to IT-disaster recovery within business continuity
planning.58
As regards the information security management system, the most important
standards are
• PN-ISO/IEC 27001:2014–12 – Information technology – Security techniques – Infor-
mation security management systems – Requirements: specifies the requirements for the
establishment, implementation, maintenance, and continuous improvement of the infor-
mation security management system with regard to its organisation. It also includes the
requirements for estimating and handling information-security risks
• PN-ISO/IEC 27002:2014-12 – Information technology – Security techniques – Code of
practice for information security controls, contains recommendations for information-
security standards in organisations, and information security management practice,
including the selection, implementation, and management of security, taking into account
the environment(s) in which information-security risks are present in the organisation.
Chapters 5 to 18 relate to the safeguards listed in Annex A of the 27001 security
standard.59
It should be noted that the new possibilities for the administration’s operation,
and, in particular, the virtualisation of its activities, also generate an ever-increasing
risk of interference with information security. Risk management is the element of
key importance in the process of protecting cyberspace. It determines and justifies
measures taken to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. The first stage in risk
management is the identification of all cases of hazards, and the identification of their
sources and impacts. Each identified risk should then be evaluated and categorised,
using the defined risk categories and parameters, and prioritised.60 This is very
important in the context of taking potential preventive action against key risks, in
line with the risk management and implementation strategy adopted in order to
regularly monitor the status of each risk.61 The adopted action plan will direct most
of the resources (technical and non-technical) against the most likely risks.
Information-security risk assessment should be performed repeatedly during busi-
ness operations. It should be stressed that risk management is not intended to provide
total protection, but to ensure a level of protection proportionate to the importance of
the resources being protected. Risk management is a process which consists of both
identifying hazards and assessing risks, by deciding which risks are to be avoided,
and which ones to control, and how. An organisation, such as an administrative unit,
can take action to avoid risks by refraining from high-risk operations, such as, for
example, introducing “top secret” information into the system. It can also transfer the
58Lisiak-Felicka and Szmit (2016), p. 64.
59Lisiak-Felicka and Szmit (2016), p. 64.
60Wojciechowska-Filipek and Ciekanowski (2016), p. 160.
61Crapko (2012), pp. 215–266.
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risk to another entity with the use of a legal mechanism, e.g. to insure itself against a
given risk. The administration can also consciously control risks in two ways.62
One of these is to minimise risk by implementing business continuity plans to
ensure that users have access to the most important organisational functions in an
emergency situation. In the event of a crisis situation, organisations should apply
data- and information-security procedures.
• Have a backup archive at another location if possible
• Data stored on hard drives should be copied to two independent external media, and
regularly returned and stored in a safe place
• If you have important paper documents, you should photocopy or scan them, and store
them in a safe place, such as a safety deposit box
• Prepare precise instructions in the event of an emergency shutdown of equipment,
especially computer hardware.63
The second way to control risk is prevention by using safeguards.
Ways of reducing risk:
The second way to control risk is risk prevention by using safeguards.
Ways of reducing risk:
• Risk avoidance
• Risk control
• prevention through safeguards
• non-technical safeguards
• technical safeguards
• minimising by implementing business continuity plans
• Risk transfer.64
On the last day of January of each year, with the intention of achieving an
acceptable level of security, all government administration units referred to in
Point 1.4 (sub-points 1–4) of the Polish Cyberspace Protection Policy65 provide
the Minister competent for computerisation with a report summarising the results of
risk assessment (according to the model developed by the Minister competent for
computerisation). The report includes general data relating to the hazards, risks, and
vulnerabilities identified in each of the sectors in which the institution operates and
for which it is responsible. The report also presents information on methods for
dealing with risk. The Minister competent for computerisation, in cooperation with
the institutions involved, formulates a uniform methodology for conducting risk
analyses. This methodology is obligatory for Government administration institu-
tions. The Governmental Computer Security Incident Response Team CERT.GOV.
PL submits to the Minister competent for digital affairs, with a view to achieving a
62Wojciechowska-Filipek and Ciekanowski (2016), p. 160.
63Murdoch (2003), p. 22.
64Murdoch (2003), p. 22.
65Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni, Warszawa 25.06.2013. https://mac.gov.pl/files/polityka_
ochrony_cyberprzestrzeni_rp_wersja_pl.pdf, hereinafter “the Policy” Accessed on 24.05.2020.
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unified approach, catalogues covering vulnerabilities which undermine cybersecu-
rity, and the specification of possible threats.66
Authorised representatives for cybersecurity (hereinafter referred to as the PBC)
have been appointed within government-administration units.
The PBC performs the following tasks regarding cybersecurity.
• Drawing up and launching procedures for responding to computer incidents, which will
function within the organisation
• Developing contingency plans and their testing
• Performing tasks resulting from the provisions of legal acts dedicated to ensuring security
in cyberspace
• Identifying and conducting periodic risk analyses
• Preparing procedures to ensure the notification of the appropriate CERTs.67
The position of the Cybersecurity Representative within the structure of the
organisational unit is not indicated by the Policy; however, this role should be
performed by a person responsible for the implementation of the ICT-security
process.68
In summary, a cybersecurity policy is a set of precise and consistent procedures
and rules, according to which a given public-administration institution manages,
builds, and makes available information and communication resources and systems.
It determines which resources are to be protected and the methods applied to this
end. The ISMS, on the other hand, is a continuous process which must be constantly
improved and adapted to changing circumstances. Each stage is divided into activ-
ities which involve security policy, risk management, and resources. Combining all
activities into a continuous process of secure information management facilitates
secure functioning in the new digital reality.
In the Republic of Poland, cybersecurity tasks, like other security tasks, are
carried out by public authorities and their subsidiary administrative authorities.
According to constitutional division, a public authority possesses legislative, judi-
cial, and executive powers.69
These tasks arise from the general public task of ensuring national
security. W. Kitler cites, inter alia,
the protection of the constitutional order, understood as the activities of state authorities and
institutions, and the system of legal rules guaranteeing the continuity of the constitutional
state system, including the protection of the state as a legal and political organisation, as well
as the protection of freedom and human and civil rights, and the protection of classified
information and personal data; the protection of the life and health of the people, and of
goods and the environment, from the negative effects of human activities, technical failures
and natural forces.70
66Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni. . . .., p. 160.
67Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni. . . .., p. 161.
68Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni. . . .., p. 162.
69See Article 10(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
70Kitler (2011), pp. 76–77.
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It should be noted that all these values can be affected by the risks arising from the
use of cyberspace. The role of the legislative authority, which includes the Sejm, the
lower House of the Polish Parliament and the Senate, in the field of cybersecurity,
mainly arises from its system-forming functions, including legislation. This encom-
passes legislation and the definition of the main directions of the state’s activities,71
which is related to the effectiveness of the Polish legal system and the activities
carried out by administrative bodies.
Public authorities also include the judiciary. Its main tasks, which it also carries
out within the ambit of cybersecurity, include the administration of criminal justice.
These often relate to national security in general, as well as to its trans-sectoral field,
that is to say, cybersecurity, with its rules of conduct.
However, the executive branch plays the key role in the field of cybersecurity. Its
responsibilities relate to managing cybersecurity, through “influencing the behaviour
of others and supervising their actions, but also by taking specific measures, having
the tools and managing the assets related to the achievement of its objectives”.72 The
Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that executive power in Poland is held
by the President and the Council of Ministers.73 Pursuant to Article 126(2) of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, “The President of the Republic of Poland
shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security
of the state as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory”.74 This provision
is general, but a more specific function follows from Article 230 (1), which states
In the case of threats to the constitutional order of the state, to security of the citizenry or
public order, the President of the Republic may [. . .] introduce for a definite period no longer
than 90 days, a state of emergency in a part of or upon the whole territory of the state.
This is all the more important, as, under the State of Emergency Act, these threats
can be caused by actions in cyberspace.75
A special role in ensuring the security of cyberspace lies with the Council of
Ministers, consisting of the Prime Minister and Ministers. As noted by W. Kitler,
“The Council of Ministers is the ‘leader’ of the public administration”,76 as it is
responsible for implementing laws and controlling and coordinating the activities of
government administration bodies. The Council of Ministers is responsible for
external security, internal state security, and public order, which includes the
implementation of cybersecurity tasks. Other tasks related to cybersecurity include
crisis management on the territory of the Republic of Poland, actions for the
protection of critical infrastructure, and, in situations of special threat, including
those arising from cyberspace, which cannot be removed by ordinary constitutional
71Kitler (2011), p. 195.
72Kitler (2011), p. 207.
73Article 10(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
74Article 126(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
75Article 2(1) of the Act on the State of Emergency.
76Kitler (2011), p. 212.
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means, the Council of Ministers may adopt a Resolution to request the President to
impose a State of Emergency or Martial Law, and in certain cases it may itself
impose a State of Natural Disaster.77 The leading role in the Council of Ministers is
played by the Prime Minister, who presides over the Council of Ministers, that is to
say, exercises leadership, coordination, and control tasks in respect of it. The second
body of the Council of Ministers is made up of the Ministers themselves, who head
the various departments. They define the principles, methods, and ways of
performing public tasks, in the offices and organisational units subsidiary to them.
Cybersecurity as a trans-sectoral field involves all administrative authorities.
Public tasks focused on this field are performed by various types of state entities,
guards, services, and inspections subordinate to the Prime Minister or individual
Minister. Given the responsibilities assigned, the leading role in this respect is played
by the Internal Security Agency, the Ministry competent for Digital Affairs, the
Minister of the Interior and Administration, and the Minister of National Defence.
The most important bodies responsible for cybersecurity include the Internal
Security Agency (the ABW), whose Head reports directly to the Prime Minister.
The ABW is competent for the internal security of the state and its constitutional
order.78 These responsibilities also include cybersecurity, including tasks which the
ABW performs through the Department of Information and Communication Secu-
rity and the Department of Classified Information Protection. The former includes
the Governmental Computer Security Incident Response Team, which is the main
state entity responsible for identifying, combating, and neutralising cyber threats.79
It was modelled on European and American units operating in the field of computer
incidents.
The next important institution in the protection of cyberspace is the entity
established on 5 July 2016—the National Cybersecurity Centre.80 The Centre
functions as an early-warning unit, which, working on a 24/7/365 basis, manages
and monitors the procedure of issuing information about network threats (Dyżurnet.
pl81). The NC Cyber is developing a national-protection plan, in cooperation with
the administration, business, and the scientific communities. The NC Cyber operates
within the structures of the NASK, and consists of four divisions—Operations,
Research & Development, Analysis, and Training. Within the Operations Division
there is the National CERT team, i.e. a group which, among other things, responds to
network security incidents, constantly monitors threats in cyberspace, and antici-
pates upcoming trends and threats. Thanks to cooperation with such entities as
77Article 228-232 of the Constitution Republic of Poland.
78Article 1 of the Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal Security Agency and on the Intelligence
Service, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 27, as amended.
79P. Borkowski, Polska wobec zjawiska cyberterroryzmu, http://www.psz.pl/116-bezpieczenstwo/
piotr-borkowski-polska-wobec-zjawiska-cyberterroryzmu Accessed 4 December 2020.
80
“The NC Cyber”.
81Dyżurnet.pl is the point of contact for receiving reports of illegal content on the Internet
(in practice, most of it relates to paedophilia and child pornography, but there are also those
which involve racial, ethnic and religious hatred).
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banks, mobile-phone operators, power-line managers, energy distributors, etc.,
CERT specialists have direct access to the IT infrastructure of the whole country.
If a cyber attack from outside is detected, it is intended to make it easier to defend
against it at the Polish IT border. As part of their cooperation with the NC Cyber, the
individual institutions have deployed their specialists, who monitor the situation in
cyberspace 24 hours a day, to its Headquarters. Their presence is designed to
facilitate rapid response in the event of an adverse situation.82
The NC Cyber acts as a security operation centre (SOC) in the field of cyberse-
curity, carries out audits of companies and public administration authorities which
encompass critical infrastructure, and issues orders and recommendations. The NCC
NASK is the place where information on threats from the various actors involved in
the project is collected as part of the National Cyberspace Protection System. The
NASK’s NC Cyber specialists conduct analyses and make recommendations on the
basis of this information. The NC Cyber develops contingency plans, organises
training and exercises for persons responsible for the security of the state adminis-
tration, and stipulates minimum security requirements for institutions. The NC
Cyber will prepare incident-reporting schemes, which will include critical-
infrastructure managers, banks, and other business sectors.83 The Centre plays a
key role in the process of implementing the EU NIS Directive in Poland.
3 Conclusions
In conclusion, in recent years we have seen a spike in interest in cybersecurity,
resulting in an increasing number of individuals and organisations emerging to deal
with this problem. However, in order to carry out public tasks in this area more
effectively, it is necessary for administrative, military, and civil fields to cooperate
and exchange information. It is also essential in these fields to build structures and
systems protecting the information which forms the basis of their operations.
A key role for the security of cyberspace is played by the Minister of National
Defence, one of whose main tasks in peacetime is to lead the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Poland. The Armed Forces are not only responsible for cybersecurity,
but they themselves could become the target of potential attacks, which could lead to
losses for the whole country. The Armed Forces have also been subject to
computerisation and digitisation activities, resulting in the emergence of cyber-
sensitive vulnerabilities.84 New technologies and networks are being used more
and more often in operational reconnaissance,85 or in the information war. These
82https://mc.gov.pl/aktualnosci/ncc-na-strazy-cyberbezpieczenstwa Accessed on 24.05.2020.
83http://www.cyberdefence24.pl/398863,na-bazie-cert-polska-rusza-narodowe-centrum-
cyberbezpieczenstwa Accessed on 01.12.2020.
84Bączek (2006), p. 136.
85Sadlok (2011), Accessed on 04.05.2020.
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processes are intensifying with the development of nanotechnologies and automated
and robotic devices. Military operations are also permeating cyberspace, which
means that more countries are deciding to develop offensive capabilities to deter
potential aggressors.86 The changes related to digitisation have led to the creation of
special units dealing with cybersecurity within the structures of the Polish Armed
Forces.
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Abstract Authorities competent for cybersecurity matters are indicated in Article
41 of the NCSA. The legislator created a catalogue of organs, at the same time
specifying the scope of their properties. The legislator, while creating the catalogue
of competent authorities, indicated among them ministers managing government
administration departments. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority is an
exception.
Various legal doubts arise in analysing the legal status of authorities and the scope
of their tasks. First of all, the authorities competent for cybersecurity were explicitly
indicated as an element of the National Cybersecurity System, but their exact
indication as public entities was missing.
Secondly, attention should be paid to the overlapping of competences of author-
ities competent for cybersecurity with the competent authorities in the field of crisis
management.
The specified catalogue of the scope of tasks of the organs was limited to listing
their individual tasks. In the implementation of tasks, public administration bodies
use their imperious forms of activity.
It is also worth noting that the competent authorities consult and cooperate with
relevant national law enforcement and national data protection authorities. The
presence of various legal problems and issues was the motivation behind this article.
According to Article 8 of the NIS Directive, each Member State shall designate one
or more national authorities competent for the security of network and information
systems, covering at least one sector. Member States may assign this role to an
existing authority or authorities. Their task is to monitor the application of the
Directive at the national level. The Polish legislators have named a list of these
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authorities.1 By identifying successively the sectors related to cybersecurity, their
responsibility has been defined and assigned to successive Ministers.
The position of a Minister as a member of the Council of Ministers is emphasised
in Article 149 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. It has been specified that
the tasks of Ministers in charge of departments of government administration are
defined by the appropriate Acts.2 As P. Czarny stressed, the Constitution does not
explicitly state that a given department should cover similar or related matters, which
constitute a certain part of the government administration’s activities under the
authority of a single Minister.3 However, Article 149(1) provides for the principle
of one-person management by a Minister within the department entrusted to him or
her. This is combined at the constitutional level with individual responsibility before
the Sejm for matters falling within its ambit, pursuant to Article 157(2) of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland.4 It should be stressed that a department is
managed in accordance with the provisions of the Acts governing the activities of
individual government administration institutions, which define more precisely the
specific powers of a Minister towards them. Due to the general nature of the concept
of management, it may also be of a controlling, supervisory (both in substantive and
personal terms), and coordinating nature. However, such provisions cannot be
interpreted restrictively. The concept of management implies a general power to
influence the activities of subsidiary institutions, except for the use of instruments
prohibited by law. The law should also provide for the possibility of assigning
certain powers, within the scope of the broadly understood management of
organisational units subsidiary to a Minister, to the Council of Ministers or the
Prime Minister. The independence of a Minister in managing a department is limited
not only by the provisions of the Acts, but also by Article 146(1) and (3) and Article
148(4) of the Constitution. A Minister is also bound by the “political line”
established by the Council of Ministers, and the methods of its implementation
specified by the Prime Minister.5 It should be stressed that management is a standard
administrative-law scenario of an administrative authority. As part of it, a Minister
may apply numerous and various authoritative means of influence on the managed
entities, which do not benefit from legally guaranteed independence. These means
do not have to be laid down by law, although they must not conflict with the law. The
choice of these means depends on the will of the managing authority. Open means
can also be applied.6 The essence of management is that it exists only in a centralised
system, in which, as part of management, a superior authority may use all means of
influence, e.g. an official order, by which it determines the substance of the action to
1Article 41 of the NCSA.
2Act of 4 September 1997 on Government Administration Departments (consolidated text, Polish




6Góralczyk Jr (2016), pp. 126–132.
210 A. Brzostek
be taken by a managed entity, but it is the superior authority which bears full legal
responsibility for its implementation. The absence of legal indications as to the scope
of management and the means of its implementation could give rise to a presumption
of unlimited action affecting a subsidiary authority. This perception is limited by
virtue of the powers which only the law may confer on individual authorities. A
managing authority does not have the right to withdraw or take over these powers,
but can only determine the manner in which they are to be exercised.7
The Act on Government Administration Departments, by identifying public
administration departments, also defined their scope of action. This indication is
reiterated in the National Cybersecurity System Act, except that this specification
points to the authorities competent for cybersecurity.8 The following sectors and
authorities were identified.
1. The energy sector—the Minister competent for energy.
2. The transport sector, excluding the water transport subsector—the Minister
competent for transport.
3. The water transport subsector—the Minister competent for the maritime econ-
omy and the Minister competent for inland navigation.
4. The banking sector and financial-markets infrastructure sector—the Polish
Financial Supervision Authority (KNF).
5. The healthcare sector—the Minister competent for health.
6. The healthcare sector9—the Minister for National Defence.
7. The drinking water supply and distribution sector—the Minister competent for
water management.
8. The digital infrastructure sector—the Minister competent for computerisation.
9. The digital infrastructure sector—the Minister for National Defence.
10. For digital service providers—the Minister competent for computerisation.
11. For digital service providers—the Minister for National Defence.
Each of the entities indicated (apart from KNF) is a Minister managing a
department of government administration, with a strictly defined material brief and
position within the structure of public administration. It is not specified what is
meant by the indicated responsibility of these authorities as authorities accountable
7Zimmermann (2016), p. 227.
8Article 41 of the NCSA.
9In points 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, only in respect of the entities specified in Article 26(5) of the National
Cybersecurity System Act. The tasks of the CSIRT MON include the coordination of handling
incidents reported by: entities subordinate to or supervised by the Minister of National Defence,
including entities whose communication and information systems or networks are covered by the
uniform list of facilities, installations, devices, and services comprising the critical infrastructure
referred to in Article 5b(7)(1) of the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management; enterprises of
particular economic and defence importance in respect of whom the authority organising and
supervising the performance of tasks for the defence of the state within the meaning of Article5
(3) of the Act of 23 August 2001 on the Organisation of Tasks for State Defence Performed by
Enterprises (consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1669) is the Minister for
National Defence.
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for cybersecurity. According to the theory of administrative law, it can be assumed
that this is a material competence. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Code of Adminis-
trative Procedure (CAP)10 the material competence of a public administration
authority shall be defined by the regulations on the sphere of its activities. The
legal provisions on the sphere of activities to which the National Cybersecurity
System Act refers are provisions belonging to substantive administrative law,
authorising or obligating public administration authorities to resolve individual
matters cited in these provisions by way of decisions.11
According to the Constitution, Ministers manage specific departments of govern-
ment administration, or carry out the tasks assigned to them by the Prime Minister.12
Pursuant to Article 34(1) of the Act on Government Administration Departments, a
Minister is obliged to initiate and prepare the policy of the Council of Ministers
relating to the department which is headed by the Minister, as well as to submit draft
laws and normative acts to the meetings of the Council of Ministers in this respect in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers. Within the
department headed, the Minister implements the policy of the Council of Ministers
and coordinates its implementation by the authorities, institutions, and
organisational units subsidiary to or supervised by the Minister.13 As part of their
powers, any Minister heading an administrative department may issue regulations
and orders. A regulation of a Minister, issued pursuant to Article 149(2) of the
Constitution, as well as regulations of the Council of Ministers and the Prime
Minister, is used as an act of management only in exceptional circumstances.
Much more often such a role is played by an order of a Minister issued pursuant
to Article 93(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The difference
between the orders of the Prime Minister and those of Ministers is that the binding
force of the orders of the Prime Minister is greater than that of a Minister’s, and that
the scope of the potential addressees of the orders of a Minister is much narrower. It
covers only those entities falling under the management of a given Minister, whereas
orders of the Prime Minister could concern the entire government administration.14
The fact that the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) is included in the
list of competent authorities indicated in the National Cybersecurity System Act
requires clarification. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Act on Financial Supervision,15 the
Polish Financial Supervision Authority is the supervisory authority responsible for
the capital market, and the market for financial instruments which are the subject of
10Act of 14 June 1960—the Code of Administrative Procedure, consolidated text, Polish Journal of
Laws of 2020, item 256, as amended.
11Wróbel (2020b).
12Zimmermann (2016), p. 242.
13More on the political position of a Minister heading a department of government administration—
Opaliński (2013), pp. 26–27.
14Góralczyk Jr (2016), pp. 126–132.
15Act of 29 July 2005 on Capital Market Supervision, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1400,
consolidated text.
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requests for admission to trading on the market.16 The Chair of the KNF manages the
operations of the KNF. There is no uniform view in the literature on the subject
assessing the legal status of the KNF. As noted by L. Góra, some of the authors rank
the KNF as a central-government administration authority, while others indicate that
the KNF does not have the status of a government administration authority.17 Also,
the case law of the administrative courts remains inconsistent. The view that the
Polish Financial Supervision Authority has the status of a state administration
authority prevails, although
the Act does not explicitly state that the Polish Financial Supervision Authority is a central
authority (headed by a Minister within the meaning of the provisions of the CAP), such a
conclusion should be drawn from a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of the Act on
Financial Supervision.
At the same time, the Supreme Administrative Court noted
no other state authority has been designated which would be responsible for matters falling
within the scope of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, and, in particular, no other
authority has been designated which would be a higher-instance authority, superior to the
Polish Financial Supervision Authority, with a power to decide on the validity of KNF’s
decisions.18
The legal assessment of the KNF in the literature has been significantly influenced
by the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, in which it stated that
the specific links with other state authorities resulting from the legal provisions which could
determine whether that authority is subject to the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers, the
Prime Minister, or a responsible Minister heading a department of government administra-
tion, are essential for determining the position of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority
within the structure of state authorities19.
According to the analysis made by the Tribunal as regards the statutory tasks of
the KNF, and of the legal forms of action the KNF may use, it can be concluded that
the authority is part of the executive. The Constitutional Tribunal noted
in the light of the provisions of the Constitution, the Act on Financial Market Supervision,
and other Acts, it should be stated that the Polish Financial Supervision Authority is a special
public state-administration authority, but located outside the government administration
structure.20
In the case of the KNF, with the existence of certain statutory links, the status of
the KNF is characterised by a considerable degree of autonomy and independence,
greater than that of the regulatory authorities defined by law as central-government
administration authorities.21 The argument by P. Wajda that the Polish Financial
16Article 3(1) of the Act on Capital Market Supervision.
17Góral (2012).
18The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 February 2012, II GSK 67/11.
19The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 15 June 2001, K 2/09, OTK-A 2011/5/42.
20The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 15 June 2001, K 2/09, OTK-A 2011/5/42.
21Góral (2012).
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Supervision Authority, due to its appointment to perform the tasks of public admin-
istration specified in legal acts, within its territorial responsibility covering the whole
country, should be included in a collective group of administrative entities, which
form the so-called central administration, may be accepted. Within this broad
category, the KNF, due to the fact that it has not been granted the position of
supreme authority, should be classified in a subcategory of central offices.22 It
should also be emphasised that to decisions by the Polish Financial Supervision
Authority on the basis of Article 11(6) of the Act on Financial Market Supervision,
Article 127§3 of the CAP should be applied accordingly, which results in the KNF’s
being considered a Minister within the meaning of Article 5§2(4) of the CAP, as
such a legal measure is available in respect of decisions by a Minister or a local
government appeal court issued in the first instance.23
In the Cybersecurity System Act, the legislators have created a list of tasks for
cybersecurity authorities.24 This fragmented list can be divided into several aspects
of the operation of the authorities.
The first of these concerns the situation in which a Minister, as a public admin-
istration authority, conducts administrative proceedings in accordance with the CAP,
and issues administrative decisions on recognising an entity as an operator of
essential services, or decisions stating that rulings on recognising entities as opera-
tors of essential services have expired.
The second group comprises the authorities’ powers to supervise and monitor the
activities of the operators of essential services.
The third group entails the authorities’ tasks regarding the formulation of con-
clusions and recommendations.
The next group of actions includes cooperation with EU bodies.
The last group comprises the powers to process information, including personal
data, concerning the provision of essential and digital services, and operators of
essential services or digital service providers.
While analysing the separate first group of tasks, it should be noted that each
designated authority may conduct administrative proceedings in the field of the
recognition of an entity as an operator of essential services. According to Article 1
(1) of the CAP, proceedings before public administration authorities in individual
cases falling within the responsibility of these bodies shall be settled by means of
administrative decisions, or settled tacitly. A legal definition of an administrative
authority classifies, in Article 5§2 of the CAP, a Minister as a public-administration
authority within the meaning of the CAP. Pursuant to the provisions of the National
Cybersecurity System Act, the authority carries out an ongoing analysis of entities in
a given sector or subsector, in terms of their recognition as an operator of essential
services, or failure to meet the conditions classifying an entity as an operator of
22Wajda (2009), p. 139.
23Chrościelewski (2015), p. 13.
24More on the public administration authorities responsible for cybersecurity in Chałubińska-
Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 360–375.
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essential services, and issues decisions on the recognition of an entity as an operator
of essential services, or decisions stating that the ruling on recognising an entity as an
operator of essential services has expired. Such an indication precludes tacit deci-
sions. The authority carrying out the aforementioned analysis conducts administra-
tive proceedings, as evidenced by the fact that the proceedings are terminated with
the issue of an administrative decision. When applying the CAP to the issue of this
decision, the operators of essential services become parties to the proceedings, using
all the statutory rights of such parties. AMinister as a public-administration authority
issues a decision, and, pursuant to Article 127§3 of the CAP, no appeal may be
brought against this decision.25 However, any party dissatisfied with the decision
may ask the authority to re-examine the case, and the regulations regarding appeals
against decisions apply in such a case. A request for re-examination of the case as
regards a first-instance decision issued by a Minister is treated in the literature on the
subject as a form of a standard appeal, although it serves as a final decision. A
request for the re-examination of a case differs from an appeal in that it does not have
a devolutive effect, i.e. it does not refer the case to a higher authority.26 It should be
noted that a request for the re-examination of a case will also be admissible when
specific provisions introduce the possibility of bringing an action before a court in
respect of a particular type of decision.27
Immediately after issuing a decision on recognising an operator of essential
services, or a ruling stating the expiry of a decision on recognising an operator of
essential services, the competent authority forwards requests to the Minister com-
petent for digital affairs for inclusion in the list of operators of essential services, or
removal from that list.28
It was further stated that authorities competent for cybersecurity should monitor
the application of the provisions of the Act by operators of essential services, and
digital service providers.29 The use of the verb “monitor” (“monitoruje”) by the
legislators creates some ambiguity in its interpretation. The use of this term results
from a direct translation of the terminology of the NIS Directive. It would be more
appropriate to use the term “nadzór” (“supervision”). This provision would then
correlate with the next task, namely that the competent authority, at the request of
CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, or CSIRT MON, calls on the operators of essential
services or digital service providers to remove, within a specified time frame, the
vulnerabilities which have led or could lead to a serious, significant, or critical
25According to B. Adamiak, an appeal against a decision is one of the legal remedies, which should
be understood as “procedural institutions standardize which authorised entities may request the
verification of administrative decisions with a view to their cassation or amendment”. Adamiak
(1996), p. 544. For more information on a request for re-examination of the case, cf. Piszczek and
Piszczek (2008), pp. 62–77.
26Wróbel (2020a). More on the devolutive effect of a request for the re-examination of the
Z. Kmieciak case, Kmieciak (2008), pp. 19–35.
27Przybysz (2019).
28Article 42(1) (3) of the NCSA.
29Article 42(1) (6) of the NCSA.
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incident.30 The literature indicates that supervision occurs in a centralised and
decentralised authority structure. The concept of supervision is connected with
subsidiarity, in which a supervisory authority has overseeing powers, and the
essence of supervision is the ability to draw consequences from the behaviour of a
subsidiary authority, observed by the supervisory authority from the point of view of
a specific, selected criterion.31 The literal use of the concept of supervision in this
form is justified in the later part of the list of tasks assigned to the authorities compe
for cybersecurity, in which the authorities submit requests for a change to the data in
the list of operators of essential services, no later than 6 months after the change of
such data, and monitor the application of the provisions of the Act by the operators of
essential services and digital service providers.32 In Chapter 11 of the Act, the Polish
legislators indicated the principles and manner of exercising supervision over the
operators of essential services and digital service providers.
The concept of supervision is connected with the notion of control. Control
should be understood as the examination of the compliance of the existing state
with the requested state, the determination of the scope and causes of discrepancies,
the communication of the results of this determination, and sometimes the resulting
instructions to both the controlled entity and the superior entity.33 Control is a basic
element of supervision, and also an element of management. According to
J. Zimmermann, supervision is, precisely, control carried out within the administra-
tive system, enhanced by an element of administrative power, which makes it
possible to derive consequences from the deficiencies in the activities of an admin-
istrative authority or other entity identified during the control. This means that
control occurs as a stage in the supervisory procedure, or as a stage in the manage-
ment procedure, and can occur as independent control.34 The legislators specified in
Article 42(1)(8) that the authorities carry out the control of the operators of essential
services and digital service providers. In accordance with Article 15(1) of the NIS
Directive, Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities have the
necessary powers and means to assess the compliance of the operators of essential
services with their obligations. Article 17(1) of the NIS Directive stipulates that
Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities take action, if necessary,
through ex post supervisory measures, when provided with evidence that a digital
service provider does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 16. Such
evidence may be submitted by a competent authority of another Member State in
30Article 42(1) (7) of the NCSA.
31Zimmermann (2016), p. 228. The most common supervision measures used include legality,
i.e. compliance with the law, expediency, cost-effectiveness, reliability, and validity. These are
repressive supervision measures. Preventive supervision, carried out before the supervised authority
takes action, i.e. agreement or opinion on an act. Zimmermann (2016), p. 228.
32Article 42(1) (4) of the NCSA.
33Boć (2003), p. 327.
34Zimmermann (2016), p. 229.
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which the service is being provided.35 The detailed scope of control is set out in
Chapter 11 of the National Cybersecurity System Act.
The competent authorities, using their powers, in cooperation with CSIRT
NASK, CSIRT GOV, CSIRT MON, and sectoral cybersecurity teams, prepare
recommendations for action to strengthen cybersecurity, including sector-specific
guidelines on incident reporting.36 Recommendations for action to strengthen cyber-
security, including sector-specific guidelines on incident reporting, referred to in
paragraph 1(5), are prepared, taking into account, in particular, Polish standards
transposing European standards, common technical specifications, understood as
ICT technical specifications defined in accordance with Articles 13 and 14 of the
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU).37
As part of their powers, the competent authorities may cooperate with the
authorities of the Member States of the European Union, and a Single Point of
Contact.38 As a general rule, cooperation between authorities should take place
through a single point of contact. However, it cannot be excluded that a Polish
competent authority might establish direct contact with its counterpart in another
Member State. A Single Point of Contact should, however, be informed of such
cooperation on a case-by-case basis, so that it is fully informed of the consultations
which are taking place, and which will facilitate the proper coordination of
activities.39
When a legal person or an organisational unit without legal personality providing
digital services does not have its registered office or management board on
the territory of the Republic of Poland, or has not appointed a representative on
the territory of the Republic of Poland, but its information systems are located on the
territory of the Republic of Poland and does not comply with the requirements set out
in Implementing Regulation 2018/151, the authority competent for cybersecurity for
digital service providers may transmit information and request action to the compe-
tent authority in another Member State of the European Union on the territory in
which it has its registered office or management board, or has appointed a
representative.40
The legislators have allowed the authorities competent for cybersecurity to
delegate their tasks. This means that the authority may entrust the performance, on
35Prusak-Górniak and Silicki (2019a).
36Article 42(1)(5) of the NCSA.
37Articles 13 and 14 of Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/
EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/
EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC, and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No. 1673/2006/EC of the European Parlia-
ment. and of the Council (OJ EU 2012 L 316/12). and the guidelines of the European Commission
and the European Network and the Information Security Agency (ENISA).
38Article 42(1)(9) of the NCSA.
39Prusak-Górniak and Silicki (2019b).
40Article 42(2) of the NCSA.
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its behalf, of certain tasks to entities which are subsidiary to, or supervised by, the
authority.41 Tasks are entrusted on the basis of an agreement between the competent
authority for cybersecurity and the entities. This agreement sets out the rules for the
exercise of control by the competent authority for cybersecurity over the proper
performance of the tasks entrusted. The communication on the conclusion of the
agreement is published in the official journal of the competent authority for cyber-
security. The Act specifies what information such a communication should
contain.42
Each competent authority processes information, including personal data
concerning the provision of key and digital services and digital service operators
or providers, to the extent necessary to carry out its statutory tasks. The right to
process information, including personal data, should be derived from provisions
indicating the specific tasks for which such processing is required. As noted by
K. Prusak-Górniak and K. Silicki, the processing of information may take place only
to the extent justified by the performance of a specific task, hence it seems excessive
to include provisions indicating the general right to process information, including
personal data.43
The legislators have provided the possibility of requesting information by creat-
ing a simplified procedure.44 As a result, the authority competent for cybersecurity
may, without initiating proceedings for recognising an entity as an operator of
essential services, request information to enable a preliminary assessment of whether
the entity meets the conditions to be recognised as an operator of essential services.45
The same applies to procedures to carry out an inspection. The competent authority
may, without initiating an inspection, request information from an operator of
essential services which will make it possible to determine the need for an inspec-
tion, and may, without initiating proceedings, request information from an operator
of essential services which will make it possible to make a preliminary assessment of
whether the entity no longer meets the conditions to be recognised as an operator of
essential services.46
The authority competent for cybersecurity, when making a request for informa-
tion to the appropriate entity or operator of essential services, indicates when the
information is to be provided. The deadline set may not be less than 14 days from the
date of the receipt of the request by the entity or the operator of essential services.47
The competent authority addresses the entity in the form of a simple letter containing
41Article 42(3) of the NCSA.
42Article 42(4)-(6) of the NCSA. The information refers to the address of the website on which the
agreement will be published, together with its integral annexes, and the date from which the
agreement will be effective.
43Prusak-Górniak and Silicki (2019a).
44Walczuk (2019), pp. 274–275.
45Article 43(1) of the NCSA.
46Article 43(2) of the NCSA.
47Article 43(3) of the NCSA.
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questions which will allow a preliminary assessment of the legitimacy of initiating a
formal procedure based on the provisions of the Code of Administrative Proce-
dure.48 The entity requested by the authorities may provide information on the
matter to which the request relates, or decline to provide information.49 A request
for information followed by the failure to provide information does not affect the
possibility of initiating administrative proceedings or inspections, but might consti-
tute evidence in administrative proceedings or inspections initiated. The failure to
provide information does not affect the procedural situation of the party or the
inspected entity, nor does it affect the administrative proceedings or inspection
initiated.50
The National Cybersecurity System Act also indicates the possibility of the
competent authority’s creating a sectoral cybersecurity team for specific sectors or
subsectors. Such a team is responsible, in particular, for receiving reports of serious
incidents and assisting in the handling of those incidents, supporting the operators of
essential services in carrying out their duties, analysing serious incidents, finding
links between incidents, preparing conclusions of incident handling, and cooperating
with the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV in coordinating
the handling of serious incidents.51 It should be noted, as did K. Walczuk, that the
tasks mentioned above do not form an exhaustive list; on the contrary—they rather
constitute a sample task list.52
A sectoral cybersecurity team may transmit to, and receive from, other states,
including Member States of the European Union, information on serious incidents,
including those involving two or more Member States of the European Union. A
sectoral cybersecurity team may receive reports of a serious incident from another
Member State of the European Union involving two or more Member States of the
European Union. A sectoral cybersecurity team forwards these reports to the appro-
priate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV, and a Single Point of Con-
tact.53 When a sectoral cybersecurity team is established, the authority competent for
cybersecurity informs the operators of essential services in the appropriate sector,
and CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV, of the establishment of that
team, and the scope of the tasks carried out.54 Sectoral cybersecurity teams may
operate in addition to CSIRTs which are mandatory at the national level.55
The legislators have defined the responsibility of the authorities in a fairly short
and general chapter, while at the same time providing the opportunity to extend this
responsibility in the other chapters discussed in this publication. The indicated list of
48Prusak-Górniak and Silicki (2019a).
49Article 43(4) of the NCSA.
50Article 43(6) of the NCSA.
51Article 44(1) of the NCSA.
52Walczuk (2019).
53Article 44(2) and (3) of the NCSA.
54Article 44(4) of the NCSA.
55Walczuk (2019).
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tasks of the authorities competent for cybersecurity is limited to mentioning the
individual tasks of these authorities. Public-administration authorities use their own
authoritative forms of action to perform their tasks. What is important is that in the
case of doubts as to the legitimacy of initiating proceedings, the competent author-
ities may use the measure provided for in Article 43 of the National Cybersecurity
System Act to request information, without the need to formally initiate the proce-
dure. It is also worth noting that the competent authorities, with regard to Article 8
(6) of the NIS Directive, consult and cooperate with the appropriate national law
enforcement authorities and national data protection authorities. However, it should
be stressed that the statutory assumptions will only be verified as time goes by. The
presentation of the activities of the authorities competent for cybersecurity as
outlined above follows from the recommendations set out in the NIS Directive,
and from political considerations and consultations. It is intended to provide for the
possibility of applying these provisions to the widest possible extent, but the period
which has elapsed since the adoption of the Act (2 years) does not yet enable a full
assessment of their application in practice. What remains is the practice of the
authorities, which might resolve a number of interpretation doubts.
References
Adamiak B (1996) Komentarz do Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego, Warsaw
Boć J (2003) Administracja publiczna, Wrocław
Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz K (2019) Cyberodpowiedzialność, Toruń
Chrościelewski W (2015) Postępowanie administracyjne – Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego –
wyłączenie od udziału w sprawie. Glosa to the Judgment of the Polish Supreme Administrative
Court (NSA) of 29 April 2014 r., II GSK 320/13 – a partly critical gloss
Czarny P (2019) Commentary on Article 149 Konstytucji RP. In: Tuleja P (ed) Konstytucja
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw, LEX/el
Góral L (2012) Commentary on Article 3 w: Ustawa o nadzorze nad rynkiem finansowym.
Komentarz, LEX/el
Góralczyk W Jr (2016) Kierownictwo w prawie administracyjnym, Warsaw
Kmieciak Z (2008) Wniosek o ponowne rozpatrzenie sprawy w KPA (Odwołanie czy
remonstracja?), Państwo i Prawo 3
Opaliński B (2013) Prawnoustrojowe uwarunkowania struktury Rady Ministrów, Przegląd
Legislacyjny 1
Piszczek K, Piszczek P (2008) Wniosek o ponowne rozpatrzenie sprawy – kontrowersje wokół jego
istoty. Prokuratura i Prawo 11
Prusak-Górniak K, Silicki K (2019a) Commentary on Article 42. In: Czaplicki K, Gryszczyńska A,
Szpor G (eds) Ustawa o Krajowym Systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa. Komentarz, Warsaw,
LEX/el
Prusak-Górniak K, Silicki K (2019b) Commentary on Article 26. In: Czaplicki K, Gryszczyńska A,
Szpor G (eds) Ustawa o Krajowym Systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa. Komentarz, Warsaw,
LEX/el
Przybysz P (2019) Commentary on Article 127. In: Przybysz P (ed) Komentarz do kodeksu
postępowania administracyjnego, Komentarz aktualizowany, LEX/el
Wajda P (2009) Pozycja prawnoustrojowa i skład Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego – kilka uwag
krytycznych, Przegląd Prawa Publicznego 7–8
220 A. Brzostek
Walczuk K (2019) Commentary on Article 43. In: Kitler W, Taczkowska-Olszewska J,
Radoniewicz F (eds) Ustawa o krajowym systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa. Komentarz, Warsaw
Wróbel A (2020a). Komentarz do art. 20 KPA. In: Jaśkowska M, Wilbrandt-Gotowicz M,Wróbel A
(eds) Komentarz zaktualizowany do Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego, Warsaw, LEX/el
Wróbel A (2020b). Komentarz do art. 127 KPA. In: Jaśkowska M, Wilbrandt-Gotowicz M,Wróbel
A (eds) Komentarz zaktualizowany do Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego, Warsaw,
LEX/el
Zimmermann J (2016) Prawo administracyjne, Warsaw
Agnieszka Brzostek PhD, adjunct at the Institute of Law of the War Studies Academy. She is a
lecturer of law and administrative procedure at studies in the field of law and administration.
Scientific interests focus on administrative law and administrative procedure, as well as on the
functioning of public administration, in particular on the activities of public administration bodies in
the field of security and cybersecurity. Scientific interests focus on administrative law and admin-
istrative proceedings, as well as on the operation of public administration, in particular on the
operation of public administration bodies in the field of security and cyber security. She is the author
or co-author of numerous chapters in monographs and scientific articles.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
The Authorities Competent for Cybersecurity 221
The Main Tasks of the Network
of Computer Security Incident Response
Teams in the Light of the Act
on the National Cybersecurity System
in Poland
Monika Nowikowska
Abstract Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) are specialised
entities established to handle network and information system security incidents and
cooperate with similar entities around the world, both in terms of operational, as well
as research and implementation activities. The main tasks of CSIRTs include:
recognition, prevention, recording and handling of events that breach network
security, active response in the event of direct threats, cooperation with other
CSIRT teams, and, finally, participation in national and international projects related
to information security and research activities on the scope of methods for detecting
security incidents. The article analyses the detailed tasks established on the basis of
the Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System of three CSIRTs
operating in Poland: CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK and CSIRT GOV.
Subsequent to the adoption on 6 July 2016 by the European Parliament and by the
Council of the European Union of Directive 2016/1148 concerning measures for a
high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union
(the NIS Directive) all Member States were required to adopt a national strategy for
the security of network and information systems, including the establishment of
networks of Computer Security Incident Response Teams, known as CSIRT net-
works. The Preamble to the NIS Directive indicates that network and information
systems and services play an important role in society. Their reliability and security
are essential for economic and social activities, in particular for the functioning of
the internal market.
The scale, frequency, and impact of security incidents are increasing, and con-
stitute a serious threat to the functioning of network and information systems. These
systems can also become the object of intentional harmful operations designed to
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damage or interrupt their performance. Such incidents can hamper business activi-
ties, cause significant financial losses, undermine user confidence and result in
serious damage to the Union’s economy.
In view of the differences between national management structures, the Member
States were authorised to designate responsible national authorities (more than one)
to be in charge of implementing tasks related to the security of network and
information systems belonging to operators of essential services and digital service
providers. Furthermore, for the purpose of facilitating cross-border cooperation and
communication, each Member State is required to designate a national single point
of contact responsible for coordinating issues relating to the security of network and
information systems and cross-border cooperation at the Union level. The NIS
Directive therefore provided the states with the flexibility to determine the number
of CSIRTs, with the reservation that operators of essential services and digital
service providers will have a designated CSIRT to which they will report. The
Polish legislators have designated three national-level CSIRTs: the CSIRT MON,
CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV.
In the National Cybersecurity System Act the legislators established the CSIRT
structure and the responsibilities of individual CSIRTs. The CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK, and CSIRT GOV are obliged to cooperate with each other, with the
authorities competent for cybersecurity matters, the Minister competent for
computerisation, and the Plenipotentiary, ensuring a cohesive and complete system
at the national level, performing tasks for counteracting cybersecurity threats of a
cross-sectoral and cross-border nature, as well as ensuring the coordination of
handling reported incidents. The entities have been obligated to jointly develop a
procedure for dealing with incidents, the coordination of which requires CSIRT
cooperation. Chapter 6 of the National Cybersecurity System Act implements
Articles 9 and 10 of the NIS Directive.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the NIS Directive, each Member State shall designate one
or more CSIRTs, which shall comply with the requirements set out in point (1) of
Annex I covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex II and the services referred
to in Annex III, responsible for risk and incident handling in accordance with a well-
defined process. CSIRTs may be established within a competent authority. The
Polish legislators adopted the second option, indicating three parallel CSIRTs.
CSIRTs, also known as CERTs, are computer emergency response teams which
comply with essential requirements to guarantee effective and compatible capabil-
ities to deal with incidents and risks, and to ensure efficient cooperation at the Union
level. The CSIRTs are expected to contribute to developing trust and confidence
between the Member States, and to promote prompt and effective operational
cooperation. The CSIRTs should be able to instruct the single point of contact to
forward incident reports to the single points of contact in other Member States
affected by the incident.
The states are required to ensure that the competent authorities and the single
points of contact are adequately equipped in terms of both technical and
organisational capabilities. It is intended to ensure the effective and efficient pre-
vention, detection, response, and mitigation of network and information system
incidents and risks.
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In Poland, a model based on three CSIRTs has been adopted: CSIRT GOV—a
Computer Security Incident Response Team operating at the national level, managed
by the Head of the Internal Security Agency, CSIRT MON—a Computer Security
Incident Response Team operating at the national level, managed by the Minister of
National Defence, and CSIRT NASK—a Computer Security Incident Response
Team operating at the national level, managed by the Research and Academic
Computer Network—the National Research Institute. These designated CSIRTs
cover all the sectors referred to in Annex II of the NIS Directive.
The three parallel CSIRTs represent the technical level of coordination of incident
handling, and demonstrate that the Polish legislators have adopted a de-centralised
system for the functioning of the CSIRTs. For the purpose of avoiding conflicts of
competence, the legislators have defined the briefs of computer incident response
teams. The tasks of CSIRTs take into consideration the responsibilities assigned to
each CSIRT for the management of the state’s cybersecurity, and include directories
of the entities supported forming the national cybersecurity system. The competence
scope is of a subjective and objective nature.
Among the tasks of the CSIRT MON is the coordination of handling incidents
reported by the entities subordinate to or supervised by the Minister of National
Defence, including those whose information and communication systems or net-
works are covered by the uniform list of facilities, installations, devices, and services
constituting the critical infrastructure, as drawn up by the Director of the Govern-
ment Centre for Security, pursuant to the Act on Crisis Management. The tasks of the
CSIRT MON also involve coordinating the handling of incidents reported by
enterprises of particular economic and defence significance, in relation to which
the Minister of National Defence is the authority organising and supervising the
performance of tasks for national defence, as well as in the field of incidents related
to events of a terrorist nature which undermine the security of the defence potential
of the state, the Polish Armed Forces, and the organisational units of the Ministry of
National Defence.
The CSIRT GOV operates within the structures of the Internal Security Agency.
The CSIRT GOV’s tasks encompass the coordination of incident handling in the
sphere of government administration and critical infrastructure.
The CSIRT NASK operates within the Research and Academic Computer Net-
work—the National Research Institute, supervised by the Minister competent for
computerisation. NASK operates in accordance with the Act of 30 April 2010 on
Research Institutes.1 The tasks of CSIRT NASK are a continuation of CERT Polska,
which was established in 1996 as the first incident response team in Poland.
The first set of tasks of CSIRTs is to cooperate with each other, with the
authorities competent for cybersecurity, the Minister competent for computerisation,
and the Plenipotentiary, ensuring a cohesive and complete risk-management system
at the national level.
1Act of 30 April 2010 on Research Institutes, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020,
item 1383, as amended.
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The second group of responsibilities is to implement measures to counteract
threats to cybersecurity. The CSIRTs operate to counter cybersecurity threats of a
cross-sectoral and cross-border nature. Cybersecurity hazards of a cross-sectoral
nature are those which go beyond a single sector listed in the Act. For the prevention
of threats of a cross-border nature, CSIRTs shall cooperate within the framework of
the CSIRT network, consisting of representatives of CSIRTs of the European Union
Member States. Under this cooperation, the Single Point of Contact provides
information on cross-border incidents.
The Single Point of Contact is required to submit summary reports to the
Cooperation Group, which should be anonymised in order to preserve the confiden-
tiality of the notifications and the identity of the operators of essential services and
digital service providers. It is indicated that information on the identity of the
notifying entities is not required for the exchange of best practices within the
Cooperation Group. The summary report should therefore include information on
the number of notifications received, as well as information on the nature of the
reported incidents, such as the types of security breaches, their seriousness, and their
duration. The Single Points of Contact should not receive any incident notifications
directly, unless they also function as a competent authority or a CSIRT.
CSIRTs are obligated to receive, analyse and coordinate incident notifications.
The CSIRT MON, CSIRT GOV, and CSIRT NASK obtain incident reports from
operators of essential services, digital service providers, and public entities,
according to their competence. Pursuant to Article 26(2) of the NCSA, CSIRTs, in
justified cases, are also obligated to provide incident-handling support at the request
of operators of essential services, digital service providers, public entities, sectoral
cybersecurity teams or owners, owner-like possessors, or holders bound by obliga-
tions towards owners, of facilities, installations, and equipment or services forming
part of the critical infrastructure. Therefore, the principle should be that the incident
must be handled by persons connected with the affected entity, or working for it. The
reliable handling of incidents requires knowledge of the specific system under
attack, and its functionality and design, which their administrators have. The oper-
ators of essential services should not expect the appropriate CSIRT team to provide
support in every case. The granting of support might depend on the scale of the
threat, the degree of impact, and other relevant factors. It should be emphasised that
the CSIRT support or its handling of serious incidents which have affected operators
of essential services and other entities can occur under two conditions: in justified
cases, and at the request of these entities.
The coordination of incidents is the primary task of the CSIRT teams. This is
essential for the proper performance of tasks, in particular when the incident is of a
cross-sectoral nature. Under this cooperation, the CSIRT teams exchange informa-
tion concerning threats. In Article 26(3) of the NCSA, the legislators defined the
responsibilities shared by all three national-level CSIRTs. The monitoring of cyber-
security threats and incidents at the national level is listed as the first task. Incident
management involves responding to a reported incident. Incident handling involves
verification and classification, collection of information, documentation, coordina-
tion, and, if incident management requires CSIRT cooperation, reporting or
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communication with the media. As part of incident management, the CSIRT clas-
sifies incidents, including those which are serious and significant, as critical inci-
dents, and coordinates the handling of critical situations, as well as reclassifies
serious and significant ones. Serious and significant incidents involving two or
more countries shall be forwarded to the Single Point of Contact for further trans-
mission to the relevant Member States.
The common responsibilities of CSIRTs include the assessment of the risks
associated with identified cybersecurity threats and incidents, including dynamic
risk analysis. The analysis of the incident is one of the crucial steps in dealing with
the occurrence. Its proper implementation can and should serve to draw conclusions
and tighten the security of systems. The proceedings during this stage should include
securing evidence and preparing documentation on the event, on the basis of which
further actual analysis of the incident will be performed.
CSIRTs have been obligated to report incidents and risks to the national cyber-
security system, and to issue communications about identified cybersecurity threats.
For cross-sectoral incidents, the legislators have ordered that technical informa-
tion concerning the incident, the coordination of which requires CSIRT cooperation,
must be transmitted to the appropriate CSIRT.
Where appropriate, CSIRTs have been required to conduct examinations of IT
devices or software in order to identify the vulnerabilities whose exploitation can
threaten, in particular, the integrity, confidentiality, accountability, authenticity, or
availability of the data processed, and which can affect public security or the
essential interests of national security; they must also submit proposals or recom-
mendations to the entities of the national cybersecurity system in respect of the use of
IT equipment or software, in particular with regard to the impact on public security
or essential interests of national security. The concept of accountability is understood
as ensuring that the actions of an entity can be unambiguously attributed only to that
entity. Data integrity means confirmation that the data transmitted, received, or
stored is complete and unaltered. Data confidentiality relates to the protection of
communications or stored data against interception and reading by unauthorised
persons. Furthermore, it should be noted that the legal regulations strictly define the
basic safety conditions to be met by IT devices and software.
The Polish legislators have obligated CSIRTs to provide, by 30 May each year, to
the Single Point of Contact, a list of serious incidents notified in the previous
calendar year by operators of essential services which have affected the continuity
of their essential services in the Republic of Poland and the continuity of their
provision of essential services in the Member States of the European Union, as
well as a summary of significant incidents notified by digital service providers in the
previous calendar year, including those involving two or more Member States of the
European Union. Moreover, the CSIRT teams must collectively prepare and submit
to the Minister competent for digital affairs the part of the report on national security
threats referred to in the Act on Crisis Management concerning cybersecurity.
National-level CSIRTs provide analytical and R&D facilities for the national
cybersecurity system. This involves conducting advanced malware and vulnerability
analyses, monitoring cyber threat indicators, developing tools and methods for
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detecting and combating cyber threats, conducting analyses and developing stan-
dards, recommendations, and good practices in the field of cybersecurity, supporting
entities of the national cybersecurity system in building cybersecurity capacities and
capabilities, and conducting awareness-building activities in the sphere of
cybersecurity.
The CSIRT tasks defined in the NCSA are compliant with the requirements for
Computer Security Incident Response Teams as defined in Annex I to the NIS
Directive. The EU legislature has included among these tasks monitoring incidents
at the national level, providing early warnings to the relevant stakeholders, issuing
alerts, publishing announcements and disseminating information to the stakeholders
regarding risks and incidents, responding to incidents, providing dynamic risk and
incident analysis and situational awareness, participating in the CSIRT network, and
establishing cooperation with the private sector.
The Polish legislators, in Article 26(8) of the NCSA, also regulated the rules for
forwarding incident notifications by the inappropriate CSIRT according to compe-
tence. The CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV which has received an
incident notification, but is not responsible for coordinating its handling, shall
immediately forward this notification to the competent CSIRT, along with the
information received. These entities may also entrust each other with the perfor-
mance of tasks in respect of certain types of entity on the basis of an agreement.
Should such an agreement be made, the CSIRT shall inform the entity in respect of
which there has been a change of subsidiarity. Additionally, the announcement of the
conclusion of the agreement shall be published in the Official Journal of the Minister
of National Defence, the Minister for Digital Affairs, or the Internal Security
Agency, respectively, indicating the address of the website on which the content
of the agreement is published, and the date from which the agreement is binding.
Whenever it is determined that the incident, the handling of which is coordinated by
the responsible CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV, is related to an event
of a terrorist nature or to a terrorist act detrimental to the security of the state’s
defence capabilities, the Polish Armed Forces and the organisational units of the
Ministry of National Defence, the coordination of incident handling is assumed by
the responsible CSIRT MON or CSIRT GOV.
It is important to note that information regarding incidents is becoming increas-
ingly valuable to the general public and businesses. Therefore, it is important that
such information should not only be focused on incidents and events with a national
range, but must also be provided in an aggregated form at the Union level. This is
due to the fact that small and medium-sized enterprises in particular are increasingly
operating across borders and the citizens are using online services. The EU legisla-
tors encourage CSIRTs to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to be published
on websites, without including confidential or sensitive information. When infor-
mation is considered confidential according to national laws, it must be kept
confidential. At the same time, the authorities are obligated to devote due attention
to safeguarding informal and trusted channels of information-sharing. Decisions
concerning the provision of information to the public about incidents should be
taken with a reasonable balance between the public interest, according to which the
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public should be informed of the threats, and the risk of the reputational and
commercial damage to which the operators of essential services and digital service
providers reporting incidents are exposed. While fulfilling their incident-notification
obligations, the competent authorities and the CSIRTs should pay particular atten-
tion to the need to maintain strict confidentiality with regard to information relating
to product vulnerabilities until the appropriate security fixes are released.
In identifying the right CSIRT, priority shall be given to examining whether an
entity belongs to the category of entities for which the CSIRT MON is appropriate.
The NCSA identifies two entity categories. First, entities subordinate to or super-
vised by the Minister of National Defence, including those whose communication
and information systems or networks are covered by the uniform list of facilities,
installations, devices, and services included in the critical infrastructure, referred to
in Article 5b(7)(1) of the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management; Second, the
enterprises of special economic and defence importance in respect of which the
Ministry of National Defence is the authority organising and supervising the perfor-
mance of tasks for state defence within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Act of
23 August 2001 on the Organisation of Tasks for State Defence Performed by
Enterprises.2 If a given entity is part of one of these two groups, it is obligated to
report to, or liaise with, the CSIRT MON response team. The CSIRT MON is
exclusively responsible for implementing the tasks laid down in the NCSA in
relation to the entities listed below. The scope of the entities subordinate to or
supervised by the Minister of National Defence was defined in the Notice of the
Minister of National Defence of 16 January 2019.3 Furthermore, it should be
indicated that the CSIRT MON’s jurisdiction ratione personae extends to critical-
infrastructure entities which are also subsidiary to the Minister of National Defence.
Essentially, the CSIRT GOV will be the responsible entity for critical infrastructure.
The legislators have thus decided that, as far as critical infrastructure is concerned,
entities under the authority of the Minister of National Defence, and supervised by
him or her, would be covered by the CSIRT MON’s responsibility. The second
group of entities within the responsibility of the CSIRT MON includes enterprises
of particular economic and defence importance, in respect of which the Minister of
National Defence is the authority organising and supervising the performance of
tasks for state defence.
Within the scope of the CSIRT NASK’s responsibilities, the legislators have
adopted both a subjective and an objective scope. In addition to the category of
entities which are within the responsibility of the CSIRT NASK, two functions have
been identified, which remain within the exclusive ambit of the CSIRT NASK. In the
subjective aspect, the tasks of the CSIRT NASK include the coordination of
handling incidents reported by units subsidiary to or supervised by
2Act of 23 August 2001 on the Organisation of Tasks for State Defence Performed by Enterprises,
consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1669.
3Notice of the Minister of National Defence of 16 January 2019, The Official Gazette of the
Government of the Republic of Poland of 2019, item 48.
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government-administration authorities, except for units subsidiary to or supervised
by the Prime Minister, research institutes, the Office of Technical Inspection, the
Polish Air Navigation Services Agency, the Polish Centre for Accreditation, the
National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, and provincial
funds for environmental protection and water management, commercial law com-
panies performing public service tasks intended to meet, on an ongoing and contin-
uous basis, the collective needs of the population through the provision of open
services, natural persons, digital service providers, in so far as they are not critical
infrastructure operators, the operators of essential services, with the exception of
those operators which are assigned to the CSIRT MON and the CSIRT GOV, and
other entities which are outside the responsibility of the CSIRTMON and the CSIRT
GOV. Therefore, incidents may be reported to the CSIRT NASK by all entities not
classified in any of the above-mentioned categories of entity. This means that anyone
can report incidents to the CSIRT NASK.
Among the additionally indicated exclusive tasks of the CSIRT NASK are the
creation and provision of tools for voluntary cooperation, and the exchange of
information on cybersecurity threats and incidents. The EU legislators encourage
the creation by other organisations of their own informal cooperation mechanisms to
ensure the security of network and information systems, recognising the need for
cooperation between the public and the private sectors. The Cooperation Group
should invite relevant stakeholders for discussion. In order to effectively encourage
the sharing of information and best practices, it is necessary to ensure that operators
of essential services and digital service providers participating in such exchanges do
not bear the consequences arising from the mere fact of cooperating. Moreover, it
should be stressed that the CSIRT NASK’s activities are financed in the form of an
earmarked subsidy from the part of the state budget at the disposal of the Minister
competent for computerisation.
The second function of the CSIRT NASK is to provide a telephone or Internet
service for those who are active in reporting and analysing the distribution, dissem-
ination, or transmission of child pornography through information and communica-
tion technologies. This task is performed on the basis of Directive 2011/92/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.4
The categories of content covered by the CSIRT NASK response procedure
include child sexual abuse material, hard pornography, racism, and xenophobia,
but also other illegal content which does not relate to either of these categories. All
materials (photos and videos) displaying the sexual abuses of children are transferred
to the ICCAM database to identify the victims and perpetrators. ICCAM is an
integrated database for the exchange of information on CSAM (child sexual abuse
materials). The legislators, in the discussed provision, explicitly indicated that the
4Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ EU 2011 L 335/1.
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task of the CSIRT NASK was to undertake activities in the field of the analysis of
cases of the distribution, dissemination, or transmission of child pornography by
means of information and communication technologies. In order to fulfil this obli-
gation, employees are allowed to be in possession of pornographic content. It should
be stressed that the CSIRT NASK’s activities will be within the limits of its statutory
entitlements and obligations, and will not constitute a breach of Article 202 § 4a and
4b of the Penal Code. If the material featuring the sexual abuse of a child is on a
server located in Poland, the information is forwarded to the National Police
Headquarters. If the child sexual abuse material is located in a country covered by
the operations of INHOPE Association, the information is forwarded to the response
team of the country where the server is located, as well as to Interpol. If the child
sexual abuse material is out of the reach of INHOPE, the information is forwarded to
the National Police Headquarters and to Interpol.
This task is implemented by the CSIRT NASK through Dyżurnet.pl, a team of
CSIRT NASK experts. This team belongs to the International Association of Internet
Hotlines (INHOPE). More than 50 response teams from all over the world are
members of the Association. The operations of all response teams and the
law-enforcement agencies cooperating with them aim to identify the perpetrator
and victim of sexual abuse as quickly as possible. The notification by the user and
immediate action by the administrator facilitates a significant reduction in the
dissemination of the material and a reduction in secondary victimisation.
The Polish legislators have defined the categories of entities and specific, named,
entities for which the CSIRT GOV is competent. The tasks of the CSIRT GOV
include the coordination of handling incidents reported by selected public finance
sector entities: public authorities, including government-administration bodies, state
control and law protection institutions and courts and tribunals, the Social Insurance
Institution and funds managed by it, the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund and
funds managed by the President of the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund, and the
National Health Fund. Additionally, the CSIRT GOV is responsible for entities
subordinate to or supervised by the Prime Minister, the National Bank of Poland,
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, and other entities whose communication and infor-
mation systems or networks are covered by the uniform list of facilities, systems,
equipment, and services included in the critical infrastructure prepared by the
Director of the Government Centre for Security pursuant to the Act on Crisis
Management, with the exception of entities whose incident handling is performed
by the CSIRT MON.
The CSIRT GOV has jurisdiction over all critical infrastructures. The legislators
have indicated that the entities whose incident handling is coordinated by the CSIRT
NASK, if the incident involves information and communication systems or networks
covered by the uniform list of facilities, systems, equipment, or services which are
part of the critical infrastructure, prepared by the Director of the Government Centre
for Security under the Crisis Management Act, fall within the competence of the
CSIRT GOV. When determining the scope of the CSIRT GOV’s competence in
relation to critical infrastructure entities, it should be stressed that the principle is the
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CSIRT GOV’s competence, excluding entities subject to or supervised by the
Minister of National Defence.
The legislators have obligated CSIRT teams to respect the range of their compe-
tence. In the event that the CSIRTMON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV receives an
incident notification from an entity for which it does not have an assigned coordi-
nation capability, it shall immediately forward that notification to the appropriate
CSIRT, along with any information received. The notifier should also be informed of
the transmission of the notification by virtue of the obligations incumbent on them.
The National Cybersecurity System Act also provides for the possibility of the
CSIRTs’ entering into agreements under which the general responsibility of an
individual CSIRT can be modified. These entities may also entrust each other with
the performance of tasks in relation to certain entity types by agreement. When such
an agreement is made, the CSIRT shall inform the entity in respect of which there
has been a change of subordination. The notification should contain, in particular,
the parties to the agreement, a list of entities in relation to which the CSIRT has been
changed, and the effective date of the agreement, the obligation for the CSIRT to
inform the entities concerned that the agreement has been made, and the address of
the website on which the text of the agreement will be published.
Pursuant to Article 27 of the National Cybersecurity System Act, the CSIRT
GOV and CSIRT MON are exclusive in relation to incidents linked to terrorist acts.
The statement of reasons to the Act indicates that the purpose of introducing the
provision was to maintain the consistency of the provisions of the NCSA with the
provisions of the Act on Anti-Terrorism. Incidents associated with a terrorist act
have been treated in a unique way, due to the seriousness of the threat. The primary
objective of the regulation is to increase the effectiveness of the Polish cyberse-
curity system, and thus to increase the security of all Polish citizens, by
strengthening the mechanisms for coordinating actions, clarifying the tasks
and responsibilities of the various CSIRTs and the rules of cooperation between
them, and ensuring that effective action can be taken in the event of an incident
related to a terrorist act.
Whether a specific incident is related to terrorist activities might be difficult to
identify during the notification phase. Here it is important to analyse in detail the
causes of the incident and to exchange information between the CSIRT teams. In
fact, only the CSIRT to which the incident has been reported may conduct an
analysis of the incident, and it is the one which remains responsible for the correct
classification. The CSIRT GOV is competent for incidents related to terrorist
activities. The event of a terrorist nature is a situation which is suspected to have
arisen as a result of an offence as specified in Article 115(20) of the Act of 6 June
1997—the Penal Code.5 Pursuant to Article 115(20) of the Penal Code, a terrorist
offence is a prohibited act with the aim of seriously intimidating a large number of
people, to compel a public authority of the Republic of Poland or another state or an
5Act of 6 June 1997—the Penal Code, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1444,
as amended.
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authority of an international organisation to undertake or refrain from undertaking
any specific act, or to cause any serious disruption to the system or the economy of
the Republic of Poland or another state or international organisation, or threaten to
commit any such act.6 It is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at
least five years.
The CSIRT MON is competent for incidents related to events of a terrorist nature
which compromise the security of the state’s defence capabilities, the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Poland, and organisational units of the Ministry of National
Defence. Whenever an incident, the handling of which is coordinated by the
responsible CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV, is related to events of
a terrorist nature, the coordination of incident handling will be assumed by the
responsible CSIRT MON or CSIRT GOV, depending on the nature of the incident.
The Polish legislators have imposed an obligation on CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK, and CSIRT GOV teams to inform other European Union Member States
of incidents which affect them. This obligation relates to serious incidents reported
by the operators of essential services. The information is transmitted through the
Single Point of Contact, which is used for communication within the European
Union. The exchange of information between EU Member States contributes to the
objectives of the NIS Directive to achieve a high common level of security of
network and information systems in the EU. The Single Point of Contact shall
forward, at the request of the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT
GOV, notifications of a serious incident or an incident involving two or more
Member States of the European Union to Single Points of Contact in other Member
States of the European Union. It is also obligated to receive notifications of a serious
incident involving two or more Member States of the European Union from the
Single Points of Contact in other Member States of the European Union, followed by
the transmission of these notifications to the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT
GOV, or sectoral cybersecurity teams. A serious incident, reported by an operator of
essential services, will be one associated with a serious deterioration or disruption to
the provision of an essential service.
The appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV may request from
the Single Point of Contact that a report of a serious incident be forwarded to the
Single Points of Contact in the other Member States of the European Union affected
by such an incident. This obligation relates to serious incidents. The information is
transmitted through the Minister for Digital Affairs, who performs the tasks of the
Single Point of Contact.
Article 29 of the NCSA establishes the obligation for the responsible CSIRT to
inform other EU Member States of incidents involving two or more Member States.
This obligation has been imposed on all CSIRTs. Article 29 reflects the provisions
laid down in Article 16(6) of the NIS Directive. In accordance with this Article,
when a significant incident involves two or more Member States, the appropriate
authority or CSIRT shall inform the other affected Member States. In so doing, the
6Węglowski (2018).
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competent authorities, CSIRT, and Single Points of Contact shall protect the security
and commercial interests of the digital service provider, as well as the confidentiality
of the information transmitted. This obligation concerns significant incidents. A
significant incident is an incident which has a substantial impact on the provision
of a digital service. These are incidents which are reported by digital service pro-
viders. Digital service providers shall, without undue delay, report to the appropriate
CSIRT any incident having a significant impact on the provision of a service
afforded by those providers in the Union. These notifications must contain informa-
tion enabling the appropriate CSIRT to determine the significance of the cross-
border impact. The notification must not expose the notifying party to increased
liability.
Digital service providers should ensure a level of security commensurate with the
level of risk to which the security of their digital services is exposed, considering the
importance of those services for the activities of other businesses in the Union. This
article is applicable to digital service providers. The EU legislators have noted that
the degree of risk to the operators of essential services—which are often crucial for
maintaining critical societal and economic activities—is higher than for digital
service providers. The security requirements for digital service providers should
therefore be reduced. Digital service providers should be permitted to adopt mea-
sures they consider appropriate to manage the risks to which the security of their
network and information systems might be exposed. The CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK, or CSIRT GOV shall inform the other Member States of the European Union
about the incident via the Single Point of Contact.
The NCSA also defines the rules for incident notification to the CSIRT NASK by
entities other than operators of essential services and digital service providers,
including individuals. For the purpose of receiving voluntary incident notifications,
the CSIRT NASK is the responsible entity. Entities not identified as operators of
essential services and which are not digital service providers may, on a voluntary
basis, report incidents which have a significant impact on the continuity of the
services they provide. A voluntary notification may not result in the imposition of
any obligations on the notifying party to which they would not be subject if they had
not done this notification. The entity which voluntarily reports an incident to the
CSIRT NASK is required to provide its name, or details of the information system in
which the incident occurred. Secondly, it should describe the incident, which must
be an event which has an adverse effect on cybersecurity. The notification is made by
filling in the form available on incydent.cert.pl, and specifying the category. These
categories are grouped into (1) suspicious e-mails (suspicious attachments, phishing,
blackmail), (2) attempts at fraud (fake online shops and other attempts at imperson-
ation), (3) malware (virus samples or ransomware-encrypted files), (4) vulnerabilities
(errors in software or web applications), (5) illegal content (notifications intended for
the Dyżurnet.pl team), (6) and other (all incidents not matching the previous
categories).
The notification shall contain all the appropriate information on the incident. This
information should be useful for the CSIRT. As an example, the source from which
the applicant learned about the site, and the bank account number for transferring
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money may be mentioned. Information which is legally protected, including trade
secrets, should be clearly identified in the notification. The legislators, in Article 30
(2) of the NCSA, stipulated that the CSIRT NASK should deal with incident reports
from operators of essential services and digital service providers, i.e. mandatory
notifications as a priority over voluntary notifications. Voluntary notifications are
examined only if such an examination does not impose a disproportionate or
excessive burden on the Member States involved. In this context, it should be
recognised that anyone who is concerned about a specific cybersecurity incident
may report the incident to the CSIRT NASK.
The Polish legislators have granted individual CSIRTs the responsibility to
determine how notifications should be submitted. It should be noted that the
CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV have been responding to incidents
for several years, maintaining cybersecurity. The legislators have recognised that the
solutions developed by individual CSIRTs in the field of incident notification and
communication with their entities, taking into consideration the specificity of each
entity’s operations, may still be implemented. Pursuant to Article 31, it is possible to
determine the manner in which notifications are to be made and information pro-
vided in electronic form.
The independence of a CSIRT in respect of the entities for which it is responsible
concerns
(1) serious incidents which must be reported by the operators of essential services
(2) significant incidents which must be reported by digital service providers
(3) incidents in a public entity, to be reported by the public entities
(4) information from the operators of essential services, digital service providers,
and public entities on other serious incidents, cyber threats, risk estimation,
vulnerabilities and technologies used
(5) other than the above-mentioned incidents, which may be reported by entities not
covered by the obligation to notify of incidents, on a voluntary basis.
The legislators reserve within the ambit of the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and
CSIRT GOV the technical issues of notifications. These notifications may be
submitted by electronic means as well as by other communication media where it
is not possible to submit the notification or to transmit it by electronic means. The
manner of notification and communication should be specified in the communica-
tion. The notice is published on the website of the Public Information Bulletin of the
Minister of National Defence, Research and Academic Computer Network—the
National Research Institute, or the Internal Security Agency, respectively.
Electronic incident notification for the CSIRT MON is made by filling in the
Incident Notification Form. As regards the CSIRT NASK, the electronic incident
notification takes place using the form available on the incydent.cert.pl website. The
form is completed under one of these categories: (1) suspicious e-mails, (suspicious
attachments, phishing, blackmail), (2) attempts at fraud (fake online shops and other
attempts at impersonation), (3) malware (virus samples or ransomware-encrypted
files), (4) vulnerabilities (errors in software or web applications), (5) illegal content
(notifications intended for the Dyżurnet.pl team), (6) other (all incidents not falling
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into the previous categories). The electronic reporting of an incident in the case of
the CSIRT GOV is made via the form available on csirt.gov.pl.
The Polish legislators have introduced the principle that the CSIRTMON, CSIRT
NASK, or CSIRT GOV may conduct an inspection of an IT device or software to
identify vulnerabilities, the use of which might, in particular, jeopardise the integrity,
confidentiality, accountability, authenticity, or availability of the data processed, and
which may affect public security or vital national security interests. The subject of
the inspection may be an IT device or software. The purpose of the investigation is to
identify vulnerabilities which, in particular, can jeopardise the integrity, confidenti-
ality, accountability, authenticity, or availability of the data processed, where such
vulnerability might affect public security or a substantial national security interest.
Data integrity is the confirmation that the data sent, received, or stored are
complete and in an unaltered state, and that the resources of the information system
have not been unlawfully modified. Data confidentiality is a property which ensures
that information is not disclosed to unauthorised persons. It means protecting
communications or stored data against interception and reading by unauthorised
persons. Accountability means the property of a system which allows specific
activities to be assigned to a person or process and placed in time. Authenticity
refers to the feature that the data content or origin is as declared. The last feature, the
availability of the processed data, is the property determining that the data may be
used on request, within the assumed period of time, by an entity authorised to work
in a communication and information system.
The legislators have established in Article 33(2) of the NCSA an obligation to
declare the fact of undertaking an inspection of an IT device or software. If one of the
CSIRTs initiates an inspection of an IT device or software, it shall inform the other
CSIRTs. The information should indicate which specific IT device or software is
being tested. This solution is designed to prevent the duplication of activities by the
individual CSIRT teams. The CSIRTMON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV informs
the other CSIRTs of the results.
Following the testing of an IT device or software, the CSIRT should prepare a
report which includes its findings and conclusions. Where it is established that there
is a vulnerability whose use can have an impact on public security or a substantial
national security interest, the CSIRT shall request a recommendation for the use of a
given IT device or software. The request is addressed to the Plenipotentiary for
Cybersecurity.
Recommendations shall be issued by the Plenipotentiary after obtaining the
approval of the College for Cybersecurity. The Plenipotentiary is also entitled to
change and cancel the recommendation concerning the use of IT devices or software.
Both the amendment and the withdrawal of the recommendation require the approval
of the College. Recommendations are not administrative decisions. The statement of
reasons to the Act indicates that recommendations are a positive measure, which
means that they may recommend the software in question or consider it undesirable.
Recommendations should also be a voluntary measure, which means that they
cannot bind private entities. It is designed to raise user awareness, supporting the
safe use of hardware and software. Recommendations are of an abstract nature,
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which means that the Plenipotentiary should inform all entities of the national
cybersecurity system which might be affected by the vulnerability when the recom-
mendation is issued.
An entity of the national cybersecurity system may raise objections to the
Plenipotentiary’s recommendations concerning the use of IT devices or software,
on the grounds of their negative impact on the service provided, or the public task
being performed, no later than within 7 days of the receipt of the recommendation.
The Plenipotentiary should address the concerns received from the national cyber-
security system operator without delay, but no later than 14 days after receipt. As a
result of examining the objections, the Plenipotentiary may uphold the recommen-
dations concerning the use of IT equipment or software, or issue amended recom-
mendations. If the objections are deemed justified, the amended content of the
recommendation shall be subject to the approval of the College. If the recommen-
dations concerning the use of IT equipment or software are not taken into consid-
eration, the Plenipotentiary is entitled to apply to the authority supervising the entity
to which the recommendation relates for them to be disregarded. The supervisory
authority, within the scope of its responsibilities, may take supervisory measures.
The NCSA has established the principle of cooperation between the CSIRT
MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV and sectoral cybersecurity teams and service
providers, with law enforcement authorities, as well as with the justice and intelli-
gence services, in the performance of their statutory tasks. The legislators have thus
highlighted that the CSIRT teams play an extremely significant role in counteracting
cybercrime. This might arise from the fact that these entities have knowledge and
experience in incident analysis. The CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT
GOV, while coordinating incident handling, are obligated to determine whether an
incident involves personal data. If the incident is found to have resulted in a personal
data breach, the CSIRT is required to cooperate with the authority responsible for
personal data protection.
Operators of essential services, digital service providers, and public entities, in
the case of an incident resulting in a personal data breach, in addition to the
obligation to notify the appropriate CSIRT of the incident, pursuant to the GDPR
regulation, are also obligated to report such a violation to the President of the
Personal Data Protection Office.
According to Article 31 of the GDPR, the controller and processor shall cooperate
with the supervisory authority in the performance of their tasks. In the case of a
personal data breach, the controller shall, without undue delay, where possible not
later than 72 h after having established the breach, report it to the supervisory
authority, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk of jeopardising the rights
and freedoms of natural persons. Where the notification to the supervisory authority
is not made within 72 h, it shall be accompanied by reasons for the delay (Article 33
(1) of GDPR).
Under Article 35 of the NCSA, the legislators provided for a specific category of
incidents, i.e. critical incidents. These are incidents with the most significant impor-
tance, resulting in considerable damage to public safety or order, international
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interests, economic interests, the operation of public institutions, civil rights and
freedoms, or the lives and health of people. Each time an incident is classified as
critical by the CSIRT team, and the identification of such an incident by each CSIRT
is related to the requirement to inform the other CSIRTs about the incident and to
notify the Government Centre for Security. The information should include a
preliminary analysis of the potential effects of the incident. This analysis should
identify the number of users affected by the incident (especially if it disrupts the
provision of an essential service), the moment when the incident occurred and was
detected, and its duration, as well as the geographical coverage of the affected area.
The information should include a description of the incident, specifying its nature,
course, and technical characteristics.
The information may include a recommendation to establish a Government Crisis
Management Team. It is a consultative and advisory authority responsible for
initiating and coordinating crisis management activities, operating within the struc-
tures of the Council of Ministers. The team is composed of the Prime Minister, as the
Chairperson, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister competent for public
administration, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister Coordinator of
Special Services. The tasks of the Government Crisis Management Team include
preparing proposals for the use of the forces and resources necessary to manage a
crisis situation, and advising on the coordination of actions by government admin-
istration authorities, state institutions and services in crisis situations, as well as
providing opinions on the final reports on actions taken regarding crisis
management.
The Act also provides for the possibility of including in the information a request
to convene a Critical Incidents Team. Apparently, a critical incident event may be
qualified as a crisis situation as referred to in the Act on Crisis Management. A crisis
situation is defined as any situation which adversely affects the level of security of
individuals, property of substantial size, or the environment, causing significant
constraints on the operation of the responsible public authorities due to the inade-
quacy of the forces and the resources available. Immediate cooperation, together
with the exchange of information and the coordination of actions, are essential
elements in the event of a critical incident. The CSIRT which has classified an
incident as critical transfers information to the other CSIRT teams. All CSIRT teams
are authorised to inform each other in the event of intelligence on cybersecurity
threats. These are potential sources of incidents. Moreover, this appears to refer to
cybersecurity threats that might contribute to a critical incident. Therefore, it would
be inappropriate to communicate all the threats identified by individual CSIRTs.
The CSIRT may also inform the Government Centre for Security on these threats.
The Government Centre for Security is the state entity established under Article
10 of the Act on Crisis Management. It reports to the Prime Minister. One of the
tasks of the Government Centre for Security is to support the Critical
Incidents Team.
All CSIRTs have also been authorised to publish on the website of the Public
Information Bulletin of, respectively, the Minister of National Defence—the CSIRT
MON, the Research and Academic Computer Network—the National Research
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Institute—the CSIRT NASK, or the Internal Security Agency—the CSIRT GOV,
information, to the extent necessary, on vulnerabilities, critical incidents, and threats
to cybersecurity, provided that the provision of the information contributes to
increasing the cybersecurity of the information systems used by citizens and busi-
nesses, or to ensuring the safe use of those systems. The information disclosed may
not violate the regulations on the protection of classified information and other
legally protected secrets, or the regulations on personal data protection. The publi-
cation of information on vulnerabilities, critical incidents, and threats to cybersecu-
rity should contribute to increasing the security of systems and public awareness of
the hazards. Such publication may be accompanied by information relating to risk
prevention and advice.
The adoption by the Polish legislators of several entities responsible for
performing duties related to the security of networks and IT systems owned by
operators of essential services and digital service providers—three national level
CSIRTs: the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV—resulted in the
obligation to establish a team which would coordinate the activities undertaken by
the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, and the Government Centre for
Security. In the article discussed, the legislators appointed the Critical Incidents
Team, which coordinates the activities of the three CSIRTs, and exchanges infor-
mation in the event of a critical incident.
It is composed of representatives of the CSIRT MON, the CSIRT NASK, the
Head of the Internal Security Agency implementing the tasks of the CSIRT GOV,
and the Government Centre for Security. The Team’s work is managed by the
Director of the Government Centre for Security. The Centre also supports the
operations of the Team. According to the statement of reasons for the Act, this is
an auxiliary body which should provide organisational and technical assistance for
critical incidents. This Team is therefore not a decision-making unit. The work of the
Team is convened by the Director of the Government Centre for Security. The
Director is obligated to convene the Team on his or her own initiative after being
notified of the occurrence of a critical incident, at the request of a Team member, and
if the request to call the Team results from CSIRT information on the occurrence of
the said incident. The Director of the Government Centre for Security shall imme-
diately notify the members of the Team of the date and venue of the Team’s meeting.
Participation in the meeting of the Group may take place by electronic means of
communication. Electronic-communication means shall be understood not only as
technical solutions, but also as information and communication devices and associ-
ated software tools enabling individual communication at a distance using data
transmission between communication and information systems, in particular e-mail.
The actions taken by the Team at meetings include unanimously designating the
CSIRT coordinating critical incident handling, and defining the roles of the other
CSIRTs and the Government Centre for Security in dealing with the incident. The
designation of the leading entity enables all information to be gathered in one place.
The Team also determines the manner in which technical information on the critical
incident shall be exchanged between the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT
GOV. The Team’s responsibility also includes adopting decisions requiring the
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Director of the Government Centre for Security to submit a request to the Prime
Minister to convene the Government Crisis Management Team. The decision to call
the Government Crisis Management Team relates to situations in which such critical
incidents might result in crisis situations within the meaning of the Act on Crisis
Management. Where a critical incident might result in the threat of a terrorist act
involving the information and communication systems of public authorities, or
information and communication systems which form a critical infrastructure, the
Team prepares information and conclusions on such an incident for the Minister
competent for the Interior and the Head of the Internal Security Agency. According
to the information provided, CRP alert levels (alerts related to threats in the cyber-
space) may be announced.
CRP alert levels are introduced pursuant to Article 15(2) of the Act of 10 June
2016 on Anti-Terrorism. There are four CRP alert levels. Where there is a threat of a
terrorist incident involving information and communication systems of public
administrations, or information and communication systems which are part of the
critical infrastructure, or where such an event occurs, one of the four CRP alert levels
may be introduced.
(1) First CRP alert level (ALFA-CRP level);
(2) Second CRP alert level (BRAVO-CRP level);
(3) Third CRP alert level (CHARLIE-CRP level);
(4) Fourth CRP alert level (DELTA-CRP level).
The first alert level may be introduced when there is intelligence on the possibility
of a terrorist event, the type and extent of which is difficult to predict. The second
alert level may be introduced in the event of an increased and foreseeable threat of a
terrorist act, although the specific target of the attack has not been identified. The
third alert level may be introduced in the event of an occurrence of incidents
confirming the probable target of a terrorist attack which is detrimental to the
security or public order or safety of the Republic of Poland, or the security of another
state or international organisation, and poses a potential threat to the Republic of
Poland; or in the event of obtaining reliable and confirmed information about a
planned terrorist event on the territory of the Republic of Poland; or in the event of
obtaining reliable and confirmed evidence of a planned terrorist act, the conse-
quences of which might affect Polish citizens residing abroad or Polish institutions
or Polish infrastructure located outside the Republic of Poland. The fourth level may
be introduced in the event of the occurrence of any event of a terrorist nature which
causes a threat to public security or order, or to the security of the Republic of
Poland, or to the security of another country or international organisation, and poses
a threat to the Republic of Poland intelligence being obtained indicating an advanced
stage of preparation for a terrorist event on the territory of the Republic of Poland,
intelligence being obtained indicating an advanced stage of preparation for a terrorist
event which is to be targeted at Polish citizens residing abroad, or at Polish
institutions or Polish infrastructure located outside the borders of the Republic of
Poland, whereas the information obtained indicates the inevitability of such an event.
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The alert levels are introduced, modified, or cancelled by way of an Order—
depending on the type of threat posed by the terrorist event—by the Prime Minister,
following consultation with the Minister competent for internal affairs and the Head
of the Internal Security Agency, and, in urgent cases, by the Minister competent for
internal affairs after consulting the Head of the Internal Security Agency, informing
the Prime Minister promptly.
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Tasks of the Minister of National Defence
in the Field of Cybersecurity
Krzysztof Wąsowski
Abstract This article is an attempt to analyse the legal position of the Minister of
National Defence of the Republic of Poland in the sphere of the national cyberse-
curity system. The author distinguishes a large number of types of functions of this
public administration entity. On the other hand, the author conducts an analysis of
cybersecurity competence of the independent bodies responsible for the cyberspace
system security in Poland. The author demonstrates that the Minister of National
Defence plays a crucial role in the Polish cybersecurity system in the context of the
state’s external security.
1 The Notion of a Task Within the Domain of Public
Administration—The Responsibilities Associated
with the Activities of a Public-Administration Authority
The tasks involved in the activities carried out by a public administration authority
are described by administrative law commentators as the notion of competence
within which a given public administration authority should operate. In this sense,
a “task” is often identified with the so-called material competence of a public
administration authority.1 However, the issue of the material responsibility of a
public administration authority is worth analysing from a broader perspective. As
Z. Cieślak suggests,
(. . .) the notion of “competence” in this context goes beyond legal categories, because it
relates to the fundamentals of creating administrative structures (the organisational structure
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1Cf. Cieślak (2013), p. 81.
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of public administration reflects the structure of its administrative objectives, tasks, and
affairs) and the rules of their functioning (. . .).2
According to the author, “competence” in its broader perspective may be
characterised as “the sum, type, and content of affairs encompassed by the legally
non-indifferent activities of an entity.”3 On the other hand, from a strictly procedural
perspective, competence is interpreted as only a specific “range of matters” assigned
by Acts, which a given entity (a public administration authority or judicial authority)
should resolve within its statutory powers.4 Therefore, legal procedure experts
associate the powers and obligations (competence) of a specific authority with the
notion of the “legal capacity of authorities”, defining it as a “set of premises exerting
a decisive impact on the capacity to take procedural steps in administrative pro-
ceedings”, and these premises, in turn, are determined by the norms of procedural
law.5
Traditionally administrative law commentators generally linked the notion of the
“scope of the activities” (competence, or powers and obligations) of a specific
authority to the so-called “task norms” regulating the tasks which should be carried
out by a specific administrative authority. This approach was linked to the normative
system of a specific public administration authority.6 Task norms show the subjec-
tive correlation between the activities carried out by public administration authorities
and the legal forms of conduct attributed to such activities. Therefore, administrative
law norms combine a significance for the state political system with the obligations
of a substantive law nature. It should also be stressed that when the tasks in the
domain of public administration are carried out in specific matters, they are based on
“competence norms”.7 In the light of the constitutional principle of legality,
concerning the activities of public administration authorities (defined in Article
7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland8), the responsibility of a public
administration authority must arise from the provisions of generally applicable law.
Structural legal norms regulating competence—whether defined in a broader, polit-
ical-system-related, or strictly procedural context—should encompass the four basic
2Cieślak (2013), p. 81.
3Ibidem; The same author defines “competence” in the context of the administration theory
(as opposed to the legal approach) as the “notion describing the static-structural foundations of
conduct, the so-called who and what components”. Obviously, this definition is not sufficient within
the state-administration system, and must always be accompanied by a description of the functional-
dynamic components, because the ability to act (operational capacity) is never equal to the
performance (execution). These two actual aspects of conduct, complementing each other, are
reflected in the normative approach, and—strictly speaking—in the types of legal norms—see
Cieślak (1992), p. 28.
4Compare Adamiak (1998), pp. 119–120.
5Also, Adamiak (1998), p. 119.
6This issue is presented as such by, i.a. Dawidowicz (1974), p. 57 or Filipek (1974), p. 44.
7Similarly, Borkowski (1980), also Dawidowicz (1989), p. 18.
8Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland states “The bodies of public authority shall
function on the basis of, and within the limits of, the law.”
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components: time, place, subjective features, and the subject of the activities. The
essence of the time criterion in the reconstruction of competence (powers and
obligations) of the activities of a public administration authority is the basis for the
reconstruction of the “rules updating the capacity for action by an individualised
entity.9”
2 The Position of the Minister of National Defence
in the State System
The Minister of National Defence is the central public administration authority,
managing the activities carried out by the department of government administration
called “national defence”,10 and a monocratic component of the central collective
authority, namely, the Council of Ministers.11 In the light of the Constitution, the
Minister of National Defence acts as an intermediary in the authority of the President
of the Republic of Poland over the Polish Armed Forces in peacetime.12 In a
hierarchical structure, the role of the Minister of National Defence is threefold.
First of all, the Minister of National Defence is an independent authority of the
government administration with independent responsibilities and tasks (arising from
the Act on the Authority of the Minister of National Defence and the Act on the
Tasks of Government Administration13). Second, it acts as an entity, being part of a
collective authority that is the Council of Ministers subject to the authority of the
Prime Minister.14 Third, the Minister of National Defence is subject to a certain form
of command of the President of the Republic of Poland in terms of having power
9Similarly, Cieślak (1992), p. 56.
10See Article 1(1) of the Act of 14 December 1995 on the Authority of the Minister of National
Defence, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 196, as amended; (“the AAMND”).
11Cf. Article 1 of the Act of 8 August 1996 on the Council of Ministers, Polish Journal of Laws of
2019, item 1171, as amended; (“the ACM”).
12See Article 134(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and Article 1(1) of the
AAMND—it should also be noted that neither the Constitution of the Republic of Poland nor the
AAMND refer to the essence of the role of intermediation of the Minister of National Defence in the
command of the President of the Republic of Poland over the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Poland in peacetime, or to the forms and courses of the performance of this legal relation. The
authorisation to file applications to the President of the Republic of Poland for the conferring of a
military rank specified in the Act is the second constitutional duty—attributed strictly to the
Minister of National Defence.
13The Act on Government Administration Departments (the GAD Act), which uses both the terms
“Minister competent for matters of national defence” (Article 19(2) of the GAD Act) and “Minister
of National Defence” (Article 19(3) of the GAD Act).
14See Article 148(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 6(1) a contrario
the ACM.
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over the Polish Armed Forces in times of peace15 and conferring the military ranks.16
On the other hand, as regards the activities of an entity mentioned in the legal norms
defining the responsibilities of the Minister of National Defence (apart from the task
of “intermediation” in the authority of the President of the Republic of Poland over
the Polish Armed Forces in peacetime), its role is limited only to managing the
department of government administration called “National Defence”.17 According to
the GAD Act, the National Defence Department (limited in time—which is quite
unique in comparison to other departments of government administration—to the
“time of peace”) encompasses the following affairs: state defence, the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Poland, the security of the cyberspace in the military dimension,
the participation of the Republic of Poland in the military projects of international
organisations, and fulfilling the military tasks arising from international agreements
and offset agreements.18 The task norm—defining the scope of activities—entrusts
to the Minister of National Defence a wide scope of matters, from managing
(in peacetime) the entire operations of the Armed Forces through the operational,
executive, and personnel matters concerning the performance of state defence tasks,
by implementing the commitments arising from the military obligations undertaken
by the Council of Ministers, to the performance of tasks as statio fisci, a state or local
government organisational unit acting for and on behalf of the State Treasury.19
3 The National Cybersecurity System
Undoubtedly, globally noticeable technological advancements have taken place in
the recent decades, especially in the field of telecommunications and information
technologies, which have had an increasing (nearly decisive) impact, not only on the
economic life of societies, but also on matters of the security of citizens, including
national defence and security. Digital technologies provide not only huge opportu-
nities but also pose significant risks, as reflected in the growing number of what is
known as computer incidents.20 The situation has been addressed at the suprana-
tional level. In particular, in 2013, the European Commission and the High
15Article 134(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
16Article 134(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
17See Article 1(1) of the AAMND.
18See Article 19(1) of the GAD Act. The specific statutory proviso, making the attribution of this
jurisdiction to the Minister of National Defence conditional on the autonomous responsibilities of
the President of the Republic of Poland or other state authorities, forming, at the same time, a rule
concerning conflict if any doubts about interpretations arise in the case of so-called overlapping of
responsibilities of individual authorities, is worth noting.
19Cf. Article 2, (1)–(23) of the AAMND.
20The issue has been more extensively discussed in numerous studies and reports, i.e. The security
landscape of the Polish Internet 2016. The annual report on the activities of CERT Polska, NASK,
https://www.cert.pl/PDF/Raport_CP_2016.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2020.
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Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published the
Communication on a Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union—An Open,
Safe and Secure Cyberspace,21 accompanied by a legislative proposal for a Directive
concerning cybersecurity. Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and
of the Council concerning measures for a high common level of security of network
and information systems across the Union was adopted on 6 July 2016. It imposed
on all Member States the obligation to create a system capable of ensuring the
necessary level of cybersecurity in information systems in service sectors of key
importance for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities, such
as energy, transport, banking, financial institutions, health protection, water supply,
and digital infrastructure. The specified administrative system, encompassing
specialised public administration authorities and related administrative entities
(such as Computer Security Incident Response Teams22), acting in line with the
principle of a single point of contact responsible for the cybersecurity, is intended to
be the mechanism supporting and coordinating the functioning of the entire system.
The NIS Directive obliged the Member States of the European Union to implement
its provisions until 9 May 2018 (however, it is an example of so-called minimum
harmonisation, not preventing the Member States from extending the level of
cybersecurity required under the Directive). While implementing the obligations
imposed under the above-mentioned Directive, Poland began legislative action in
April 2017 when the Council of Ministers issued Resolution No. 52/2017 adopting a
strategic document on cyberspace in the form of the National Framework of Cyber-
security Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022. At that time, the Ministry
of Digital Affairs started work on the draft of the Act implementing the NIS
Directive. The process of inter-Ministry agreements and consultations,23 completed
with the decision of the Council of Ministers’ handing over the draft of the Act for
parliamentary debate, was started on 8 January 2018.24 The bill was submitted to the
Sejm on 30 April 2018,25 which adopted the National Cybersecurity System Act.
The main objective of the Act, in force as of 28 August 2018, was to organise and
define the functioning of the National Cybersecurity System.26 The statutory objec-
tive was reached in the form of a direct regulatory effect encompassing the named
21Join (2013) 1 Final, 07.02.2013.
22CSIRT—Eng. Computer Security Incident Response Teams.
23The detailed course of the process, and the documentation referring to it, are published on the
website of the Government Legislation Centre (Rządowe Centrum Legislacji)—https://legislacja.
rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12304650/katalog/12466714#12466714. Accessed 11 June 2020.
24See Memorandum of Understanding No. 17/2018 of the meeting of the Council of Ministers held
on 26 April 2018 (RM-000-17-18) https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/docs//2/12304650/12466740/
12466745/dokument341423.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2020.
25The Sejm document was given the number 2505. For the detailed course of the Parliamentary
work, see http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr¼2505. Accessed 11 June 2020.
26See the impact assessment of a legal Act concerning the draft of the National Cybersecurity
System Act—https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12304650/katalog/12466714#12466714.
Accessed 11 June 2020.
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sectors of the national economy, defining the criteria for the identification of the
operators of essential services, defining the minimum requirements for the informa-
tion and communications security of the information systems belonging to operators
of essential services and digital service providers, and stipulating the statutory
requirements and responsibilities of the Computer Security Incident Response
Teams in the field of cybersecurity. Undoubtedly, the test concerning the perfor-
mance of control and supervisory functions of the responsible public administration
authorities defined in the law, regardless of whether their status is of a systemic or
just functional nature, will be of key importance for the reliable functioning of the
system (administrative structure) from the praxeological point of view.
The systematics of the Act was established on the basis of a model entailing a link
between a specific state system hierarchy of various categories and functions of
public administration authorities and other administrative entities with tasks attrib-
uted to them, and correlated with the responsibilities of the administered entities,
defined in the law and characteristic for regulatory legal acts. Customarily, the
legislators have separated the control powers (slightly excessively combining them
with control responsibilities) of the authorised staff of broadly defined administrative
entities. The relatively modern penalty system in the form of financial administrative
penalties was additionally implemented, and this will undoubtedly strengthen the
importance and “effectiveness” of the control procedure. On the other hand, the
“penal-administrative” procedure will definitely be the basic instrument for the
implementation of the supervisory (ex-post) competences, and together with ex-ante
supervision instruments (especially, involving decisions on permits) should result in
a variety of regulating tools allowing the effective stimulation of the conduct of
entities functioning on relevant markets.
4 The Task Norms of the Minister of National Defence
Within the Framework of the National Cybersecurity
System
In the National Cybersecurity System Act, the Minister of National Defence is
mentioned in at least four basic state system dimensions. First of all, as the authority
competent for these matters and a component of the National Cybersecurity Sys-
tem.27 Second, as an independent coordination-control-management authority hav-
ing the separate tasks entrusted to it by the legislators.28 Third, as an authority
supervising29 the Computer Security Incident Response Team (the CSIRT MON)
functioning at the national level. Fourth, as a member of the collegial body (the
College for Cybersecurity), being an advisory and opinion-forming authority of the
27See Article 4(17) in conjunction with Article 41(6), (9) and (11) of the NCSA.
28Cf. Chapter 10 of the NCSA.
29This follows directly from Article 2(2) of the NCSA.
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Council of Ministers on cybersecurity.30 It should also be noted that the adoption of
the law on the National Cybersecurity System modified the Act on the Departments
of Government Administration31 to some extent, dividing a subdivision component
of “cyberspace security”, into a unit functioning within the “civil dimension”
(attributing this component to the department of “digitisation”)32 and one function-
ing in the “military dimension” (attributing this component to the department of
“national defence”).33
As mentioned earlier, the Minister of National Defence is a component of the
national security system due to being named in the law as the authority responsible
for the cybersecurity of the following sectors: (1).The health-protection sector—
encompassing entities subordinate to or supervised by the Minister of National
Defence, including entities whose information and communication systems and
networks are included in a uniform list of facilities, installations, equipment, and
services forming critical infrastructure,34 and encompassing enterprises of special
economic and defence importance and their performance of tasks in the field of the
national defence, as organised and supervised by the Minister of National Defence;35
(2) The digital infrastructure sector—for entities listed in the same way;36 (3) digital
service providers encompassing the same entities as defined above.37
Within the named sectors and in respect of the said digital service providers, due
to their status as “authorities competent for cybersecurity”, the legislators entrust to
the Minister of National Defence the authority of a superior (“imperial”) nature,
encompassing, in particular, (1) the competence to issue decisions on recognising a
specific entity as an operator of essential services;38 (2) the competence to issue
decisions on the annulment of decisions recognising an entity as an operator of
essential services;39 (3) the establishment of a cybersecurity team for a given sector
or subsector40 (however, in discharging this duty, the authority competent for
cybersecurity is obliged to provide information to the operators of essential services
in a given sector and to the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV);41
30See Article 64 in conjunction with Article 66(1)(4)(c) of the NCSA.
31See Article 78 of the NCSA.
32See Article 12a(1) (10) of the GAD Act.
33See Article 19(1) (1a) of the GAD Act.
34See Article 41(6) in conjunction with Article 26(5) of NCSA in conjunction with Article 5b
(7) (1) of the Act on Crisis Management.
35See Article 41(6) in conjunction with Article 26(5) of NCSA in conjunction with Article 5(3) of
the Act on Organisation of National Defence Tasks Performed by Entrepreneurs.
36See Article 41(9) in conjunction with Article 26(5) of NCSA.
37See Article 41(11) in conjunction with Article 26(5) of NCSA.
38See Article 5(1) in conjunction with Article 42(1)(2) of NCSA.
39See Article 5(6) in conjunction with Article 42(1)(2) of NCSA.
40See Article 44(1) of NCSA.
41See Article 44(4) of NCSA.
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(4) the competence to impose administrative financial penalties42 forming instru-
ments of supervision exercised in respect of operators of essential services and
digital service providers, and, under exceptional circumstances, also in respect of
the head of an operator of an essential service.43 In addition to the clearly defined
tasks performed in the capacity of a superior authority, the legislators have entrusted
to the Minister of National Defence, being the authority competent for cybersecurity,
an entire set of tasks to be carried out in a non-superior, substantive, and technical or
organisational capacity, arising from the control and information tasks.44
The legislators have entrusted a separate group of tasks to the Minister of
National Defence as a specialised, autonomous public administration authority
distinguished in the National Cybersecurity System Act.45 Within these tasks, the
Minister of National Defence was entrusted with various competences, within the
scope of the performance of these “superior”,46 legal forms of activity, and those of a
“non-superior”—control47 or strictly organisational48 or substantive and technical
42See Article 53(2)(2) in conjunction with Article 74(1) of NCSA.
43See Article 75 of the NCSA.
44Examples of such tasks-powers-responsibilities can be found in Article 42(1) of the NCSA, in
which the legislators included the possibility of “entrusting certain tasks to be carried out on its
behalf (. . .) to entities subordinate to or supervised by the authority” (Article 42(3) of the NCSA),
also including in the form of an “agreement”, (Article 42(4) of the NCSA), in which “the principles
for carrying out the supervision over the proper performance of entrusted tasks by the authority
responsible for cybersecurity” should be defined (Article 42(5) of the NCSA). To learn more about
the issue of the canonical-theoretical concept of an administrative agreement as the legal form of the
activities of public-administration authorities, see Cieślak (1982).
45See Chapter 10 of the NCSA—“The Tasks of the Minister of National Defence.”
46This pertains, inter alia, to the superior competence for managing activities concerning incidents
in times of a state of emergency (see Article 51(5) of the NCSA) or the operations of the National
Contact Point for cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (see Article 52 of
the NCSA).
47In particular, the procurement of tools for capacity-building for ensuring cybersecurity in the
Polish Armed Forces (see Article 51(4) of the NCSA), the assessment of the impact of incidents on
the state defence system (see Article 51(6) of the NCSA), the assessment of hazards to cybersecurity
in times of a state of emergency (see, in principio, Article 51(7) of the NCSA) or the development of
the systems for sharing information on cybersecurity in the sphere of national defence (see Article
52(4) of the NCSA).
48Inter alia, cooperation between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and the appropriate
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union, and international
organisations in the field of state defence in terms of cybersecurity (see Article 51(1) of the
NCSA); providing the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland with the capacities to carry out
military actions within the national, coalition, and allied systems, when there is a threat to
cybersecurity introducing the need to undertake defensive measures (see Article 51(2) of the
NCSA); developing the skills of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in ensuring cyberse-
curity by organising special training projects (see Article 51(3) of the NCSA); and developing tools
for capacity-building involving the assurance of cybersecurity in the Armed Forces of the Republic
of Poland (see Article 51(4) of the NCSA).
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character.49 The legislators entrusted the Minister of National Defence with respon-
sibilities involving tasks in the field of cybersecurity in a specific manner.
The legislators have specified the performance of tasks entrusted to the Minister
towards the newly established entity, namely, the CSIRT MON, in an extensive and
open manner. Apart from the task of “operating” the CSIRT MON (specified in an
extensive and open manner), the legislators do not regulate the mutual relations
between these two entities, which are critical for the reliability of the cybersecurity
system in the sphere of defence. The issue of the status of the CSIRT MON in the
state system goes beyond the framework of this study. It may be even said that a
specific kind of “discretion” by the Minister in the performance of this task has been
sanctioned, to some extent.
On the other hand, the fact that no other powers have been entrusted to the
Minister of National Defence as a member of the collegial body, namely, the College
for Cybersecurity, recognised as an opinion-forming and advisory authority of the
Council of Ministers, is not surprising, because this “gap” results from the essence of
the activities of the collegial authority within the framework of which separate
responsibilities are attributed only to the chairs of such authorities.50
5 Summary
It is hard to resist the impression that the diversity and multiplicity of tasks attributed
to the Minister of National Defence within the framework of the National Cyberse-
curity System can raise many doubts concerning interpretation within the activities
of this supreme (constitutional) public administration authority, which can have
unpredictable consequences, especially taking into account its undoubtedly highly
responsible function within the public-administration system (directly involving
state security). In the field of the cybersecurity of the state, special attention should
be drawn to building such legal relations that will be an efficient instrument for the
prompt making of correct key decisions. They should be characterised by the
maximum elimination of any doubts over interpretation, and the avoiding of any
overlapping individual tasks and responsibilities. In the field of cybersecurity, the
legislators have expressed a precise definition of the tasks entrusted to the Minister
of National Defence only in a limited scope, and have allocated to them a specific set
49For instance, participation in achieving the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in
the fields of cybersecurity and cryptology (see Article 52(5) of the NCSA) or submitting to the
competent authorities proposals concerning defensive measures (see in fine, Article 51(7) of
the NCSA).
50The Chair of the National Broadcasting Council who is the Chair of a collegial body, namely, the
National Broadcasting Council, and at the same time has separate, independent, and superior
responsibilities to issue concession decisions within the framework of the procedures carried out
in cooperation (under specific collaborations) with the National Council in corpore, is so far the
most characteristic example of such “functioning” within the framework of a collegial body.
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of legal instruments in the form of appropriate legal actions. Clearly, numerous
doubts concerning interpretation can be resolved and eliminated in the course of the
authority’s practical performance of activities.
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Role of the Minister Competent
for Computerisation in the Cybersecurity
System
Katarzyna Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
Abstract A public administration authority, as a functional unit of public adminis-
tration, is responsible for the implementation and quality of public services. The
areas of competence of administrative authorities often refer to a specific field. This
is also the case with computerisation. The processes it involves are closely related to
innovation, new technologies and science. Computerisation has formed the substan-
tive area of activities of various ministries. The minister competent for
computerisation performs a range of organisational and reporting tasks and is
responsible for the monitoring the implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of
the Republic of Poland and the performance of action plans for its implementation.
The minister prepares annual reports on significant incidents reported by operators of
essential services and substantial incidents reported by digital service providers,
being responsible for monitoring the strategic dimension of cybersecurity.
Military and civil security issues are central in the activities of public administration
authorities related to cybersecurity and the fulfilment of responsibilities in this field
involves both the public and the private sectors. It is the public administration
authority as a functional unit that is responsible for the delivery and quality of public
services. The spheres of responsibility of administrative authorities often involve a
specific sector. The same applies to computerisation. Computerisation processes are
closely related to innovation, new technologies, and science. Computerisation has
been one of the core objectives of various Ministries. Changes to this arrangement,
and consequently to the responsibility for this aspect of state and public-
administration functioning, have been commensurate with the transformation of
public administration itself, and the processes related to it. Therefore, the Regulation
of the Council of Ministers of 18 March 2003 on the establishing of the Ministry of
Science and Computerisation, and the abolition of the office of the Scientific
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Research Committee,1 introduced the concept of computerisation to the Ministry of
Science and Computerisation which was being formed at the time. From 2005,
public administration, computerisation, internal affairs, religious denominations,
and national and ethnic minorities were the domain of the Minister of Internal
Affairs and Administration.2 In accordance with the principle of the division of
responsibilities between the Ministries, the objectives related to computerisation
were assigned by law. Pursuant to the Act on Government Administration Depart-
ments, the legislators made distinctions by subject matter. The Minister competent
for digital affairs is responsible for matters of computerisation. In accordance with
Article 12a of the Act, the computerisation department deals with issues involving:
(1) the computerisation of public administration and entities performing
public tasks
(2) information and communication systems and networks of public administration
(3) support for computerisation projects
(4) the fulfilment of the international obligations of the Republic of Poland in the
fields of computerisation and telecommunications
(5) participation in developing the European Union’s computerisation policy
(6) the development of the information society, and counteracting digital exclusion
(7) the development of services provided by electronic means
(8) the development of state policy on personal data protection
(9) telecommunications
(10) the civil aspect of cyberspace security
(11) the PESEL register, Register of Identity Cards, Civil Registry, and the Central
Register of Issued and Cancelled Passport Documents
(12) the vehicle register, drivers’ register, and parking-card holders’ register
(13) the supervision over the provision of trust services within the meaning of trust-
services regulations
(13a) electronic identification.
The Prime Minister determines, by way of a regulation, the detailed scope of a
Minister’s activities, and designates a Ministry or other government administration
office to assist the Minister. The Prime Minister, in specifying the detailed scope of
the Minister’s activity (in the case of a Minister managing a specific department of
government administration), designates the department or departments which the
Minister manages, and defines the scope of the Minister’s rights as the administrator
of a separate part or separate parts of the state budget.
Pursuant to the Regulation of the Prime Minister of 22 September 2014 on the
detailed scope of activities of the Minister for Administration and Digital Affairs,
1Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18 March 2003 on the establishing of the Ministry of
Science and Computerisation, and the abolition of the office of the Scientific Research Committee,
Polish Journal of Laws of 2003 No. 51, item 443 (no longer in force).
2The Regulation of the Prime Minister of 31 October 2005 on the detailed scope of activities of the
Minister for Internal Affairs and Administration.
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Article 1 (1) stipulates that the scope of activities of the Minister for Administration
and Digital Affairs should include matters concerning public administration and
computerisation. Pursuant to Order No. 43 of the Prime Minister of 15 July 2014 on
granting a charter to the Ministry of Administration and Digital Affairs, a provision
was introduced which, pursuant to Article 39 (5) of the Act of 8 August 1996 on the
Council of Ministers, the Ministry for Administration and Digital Affairs was duly
assigned the charter, which was an annex to the Order, the aim being to support the
responsible Minister of Administration and Digital Affairs on the basis of the
Regulation of the Prime Minister of 22 September 2014 on the detailed scope of
activities of the Minister of Administration and Digital Affairs, which involved
public administration and computerisation.
Next, under the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 7 December 2015 on
the Establishment of the Ministry for Digital Affairs under Article 39 (1) of the Act
of 8 August 1996 on the Council of Ministers, the creation of the Ministry of Digital
Affairs was ordered by way of the reorganisation of the existing Ministry of
Administration and Digital Affairs. The reorganisation involved the exclusion
from the existing Ministry of Administration and Digital Affairs—responsible for
the departments of public administration, computerisation, communication, and
religious denominations, and national and ethnic minorities—the organisational
units supporting the departments of public administration, communication, and
religious denominations, as well as national and ethnic minorities and employees
working for those departments. In accordance with the Regulation of the Prime
Minister of 13 December 2017 on the detailed scope of activities of the Minister of
Digital Affairs, the Minister manages the department of Government Administra-
tion—computerisation.3 Consequently, he or she would be the administrator of part
27 of the State budget. The services for the Minister were to be provided by the
Ministry of Digital Affairs.
Currently the Minister for Digital Affairs does not have his own organizational
unit (ministry), but is supported by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.4
Article 45 of the National Cybersecurity System Act defines the competences of
the minister competent for computerisation, who is competent for:
(1) monitoring the implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of
Poland, and associated action plans;
(2) recommending the spheres of cooperation with the private sector in order to
increase the cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland;
(3) preparing annual reports regarding:
3Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 December 2017 on the detailed scope of activities of
the Minister of Digital Affairs, Polish Journal of Laws of 2017 item 2327.
4Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 October 2020 on the detailed scope of activities of the
Minister of Digital Affairs, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020 item 1716.
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(a) serious incidents notified by operators of essential services affecting the
continuity of their essential services in the Republic of Poland and in the
Member States of the European Union;
(b) significant incidents notified by digital service providers, including those
involving two or more European Union Member States;
(4) conducting informational activities on good practices, educational programmes,
campaigns, and training, to expand knowledge and build awareness of cyberse-
curity, including the safe use of the Internet by various categories of users
(5) collecting information on serious incidents which concerns, or has been pro-
vided by, another Member State of the European Union
(6) providing information and good practices related to the reporting of serious
incidents by operators of essential services, and significant incidents by digital
service providers, obtained from the Cooperation Group, including
(a) incident-management procedures
(b) risk-management procedures
(c) the classification of information, risks, and incidents
The Act imposes a range of organisational and reporting obligations on the
Minister competent for computerisation. The Minister competent for
computerisation is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Cyberse-
curity Strategy of the Republic of Poland and associated action plans, and preparing
annual reports on serious incidents notified by operators of essential services and
significant incidents notified by digital service providers, with responsibility for the
strategic monitoring cybersecurity at the national level. It is important to add that
these responsibilities, according to the division between government departments,
also include issues of cybersecurity in the civil dimension. Accordingly, the Minister
of National Defence is responsible for the security of cyberspace in the military
sphere, indicated as part of the national defence department.
The responsibilities provided for in the said provision relate to the following
obligations of the Member States as defined in the Directive:
(1) Monitoring the implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Repub-
lic of Poland, hereinafter referred to as “the Strategy”, and the delivery of
action plans for its introduction
This includes supervision over the implementation of Poland’s strategic cyberse-
curity objectives. The strategy builds on the actions undertaken previously by
government administration, aimed at increasing the level of security in the cyber-
space of the Republic of Poland. Following strategic assumptions, both national-
development strategies and those relating to the sphere of public order and national
security make their success conditional on the use of communication and informa-
tion systems. Not only is digitisation a source of development and innovation, but it
also creates risks associated with the growing number of online threats. Considering
these new threats, the extensive architecture of communication and information
systems, and the growing dependence of society and entrepreneurs on these systems,
it is necessary to expand the national cybersecurity system and ensure a coherent
256 K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
approach across the country. The main objective of the Strategy is to define a
framework of actions aimed at achieving a high level of resilience for national
communication and information systems, operators of essential services, critical
infrastructure operators, digital service providers, and public administration, to
incidents in cyberspace. Furthermore, the proposed strategic policies are also
expected to increase the effectiveness of law-enforcement agencies and the judiciary
in detecting and combating crimes and terrorist and spying activities in cyberspace.
The strategic objectives include specific goals, such as gaining the ability to coor-
dinate nationwide activities aimed at preventing, detecting, combating, and
minimising the effects of incidents which compromise the security of communica-
tion and information systems central to the functioning of the state, reinforcing the
ability to counteract cyber threats, improving national capabilities and expertise in
the field of cybersecurity, and developing a strong international position for Poland
in the field of cybersecurity.
Moreover, it is essential to achieve a capacity for nationally coordinated actions to
prevent, detect, combat, and minimise the effects of security incidents on commu-
nication and information systems central to the functioning of states, and to adapt the
legal environment to the requirements and challenges in the field of cybersecurity.
(2) Recommending areas of cooperation with the private sector in order to
improve the cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland.
The need for cross-sectoral cooperation was indicated by the European Union’s
Cybersecurity Strategy: an open, secure, and protected cyberspace enhances private-
sector readiness and engagement. This strategy stressed the fact that the vast majority
of network and information systems are independently owned and operated by
private entities, and that the deeper involvement of the private sector in the efforts
to enhance cybersecurity is essential. The private sector should develop its own
cyber resilience capabilities at the technical level, and ensure the exchange of best
practices between different industries. Equally, the public sector should benefit from
the instruments developed by the industry to respond to incidents, identify causes,
and conduct forensic analyses. The purpose of the discussed regulation is, therefore,
to create a situation in which entities operating in many critical areas (energy,
transport, banking, stock exchanges, and technologies facilitating the provision of
essential online services, as well as public-administration authorities) assess the
cybersecurity threats they are exposed to, ensure the reliability and resilience of
the network and information systems employing the appropriate risk-prevention
strategies, and exchange information with the competent network and information-
security authorities. The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience was
launched in accordance with document COM (2009) 149.5 This platform has
5Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions:
enhancing preparedness, security and resilience, COM (2009) 149.
Role of the Minister Competent for Computerisation in the Cybersecurity System 257
initiated activities by and increased cooperation between the public and private
sectors in identifying key resources, means, functions, and baseline requirements
for resilience, as well as the demand for cooperation and mechanisms for responding
to large-scale electronic-communications disruptions. Communication from the
Commission: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council—
Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,
Brussels, 13.9.2017. JOIN(2017) 450 final, emphasised that the effectiveness of
traditional law-enforcement mechanisms has been undermined by the characteristics
of the digital world, which consists mainly of privately owned infrastructures and
multiple entities operating within various jurisdictions. In consequence, cooperation
with the private sector, including industry and civil society, is fundamental to the
public authorities’ effective fight against crime. However, the role as defined above
is the implementation of the aforementioned guidelines at the level of government
administration.
(3) Preparing annual reports regarding:
(a) serious incidents reported by operators of essential services affecting the
continuity of their essential services in the Republic of Poland and the
continuity of their essential services in the Member States of the
European Union
(b) significant incidents notified by digital service providers, including incidents
involving two or more Member States of the European Union.
(4) conducting informational activities on good practices, educational
programmes, campaigns, and training, to increase knowledge and build
awareness of cybersecurity, including the safe use of the Internet by various
categories of users
(5) collecting information on serious incidents which involves or has been
provided by another Member State of the European Union
(6) providing information and good practices related to the reporting of serious
incidents by operators of essential services, and significant incidents by
digital service providers, obtained from the Cooperation Group, including
(a) incident-management procedures
(b) risk-management procedures
(c) the classification of information, risks, and incidents.
Strategic cooperation between Member States, and the exchange of information,
experience, and best practices concerning the security of network and information
systems are essential to respond effectively to the challenges posed by security
incidents and threats to those systems across the Union. These tasks also apply to
cross-sectoral information exchange, especially in the field of educational activities
and the application of good practices. These responsibilities are supported by
extensive reporting. This reporting includes issues related to the duties referred to
in recital 61 of the NIS Directive, according to which competent authorities should
have the necessary means to perform their duties, including the power to obtain
sufficient information to assess the security level of network and information
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systems. The NIS Directive defines such a concept as “an incident”, which means
any event which has a genuinely adverse impact on the security of network and
information systems; “incident handling”, which means all procedures for detecting,
analysing, containing, and responding to an incident; and “risk”, which means any
reasonably identifiable circumstance or event which has a potentially adverse
impact on the security of network and information systems. According to the
definitions provided in the Act: an “incident”—an event which has or might have an
adverse effect on cybersecurity; a “critical incident”—one which results in signifi-
cant damage to public security or order, international interests, economic interests,
the operation of public institutions, civil rights and the freedoms or the lives and
health of the people, as classified by the respective CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or
CSIRT GOV; a “serious incident”—an occurrence which causes or is likely to cause
a significant deterioration in or disruption to the provision of an essential service; and
a “significant incident”—an event which has a serious impact on the provision of a
digital service within the meaning of Article 4 of Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for application
of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as
regards further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital
service providers for managing the risks posed to the security of network and
information systems and of the parameters for determining whether an incident
has a substantial impact.6 Risk, in turn, means a combination of the probability of
an undesirable event and its consequences, and risk estimation means the overall
process of risk identification, analysis, and evaluation. Therefore, reporting includes
gathering information on the incidents themselves, as well as providing information
obtained from the Cooperation Group—within the scope of developed cybersecurity
procedures, as well as the measures applied and all kinds of regulations on preven-
tive actions related to the application of so-called good practices in incident
response. The second pillar of the NIS Directive primarily involves cooperation
between Member States. The NIS Directive introduces cooperation mechanisms on
two levels: technical, and political-strategic. Technical cooperation is to be provided
by the European CSIRT Network and the creation of mechanisms for the exchange
of information on cross-border incidents between CSIRTs designated for operators
of essential services and digital service providers. Cooperation at the political and
strategic levels is to be implemented through the creation of a Cooperation Group
which will work on the development of common strategic concepts and will receive,
among other things, annual reports from the appropriate authorities. In accordance
with recital 4 of the preamble to the Directive, a Cooperation Group composed of
representatives of Member States, the Commission and the European Union Agency
6Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for
application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for
managing the risks posed to the security of network and information systems and of the parameters
for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact, OJ EU 2018 L 26/48 (hereinafter
referred to as “Implementing Regulation 2018/151).
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for Network and Information Security (nowadays: the European Union Agency for
Cybersecurity; hereinafter referred to as “ENISA”) should be established to promote
and facilitate strategic cooperation between Member States on the security of
network and information systems. In order for this group to be effective and
accessible to all, it is essential that all Member States have at least the minimum
capabilities, and strategy, to ensure a high level of security of network and informa-
tion systems on their territory. Additionally, security and incident-reporting require-
ments should apply to operators of essential services and digital service providers for
the promotion of a risk-handling culture, and to ensure that the most serious
incidents are reported. Article 11 of the NIS Directive establishes a Cooperation
Group composed of representatives of the Member States, the Commission, and
ENISA. According to Article 11 of the NIS Directive, the Cooperation Group is to
perform its tasks on the basis of biennial work programmes. The responsibilities of
the Group include providing strategic guidance on the activities of the computer
security incident response teams network, exchanging information and best prac-
tices, and discussing Member States’ capabilities and preparedness. The Coopera-
tion Group is also obliged to submit, every year and a half, a report evaluating the
experience gained in its strategic cooperation. It is also responsible for discussing, at
the request of a Member State, specific draft national measures by that Member State
concerning the identification of operators of essential services in a particular sector.
According to Article 14(7) of the NIS Directive, competent authorities, acting jointly
within the framework of the Cooperation Group, may develop and adopt guidelines
on the circumstances in which operators of essential services are required to report
incidents, including guidelines on parameters to determine the significance of the
impact of an incident. The Cooperation Group should be presided over by a
representative of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the
European Union. The Chairperson should be assisted in the performance of his or her
duties by a representative of the Member State holding the previous Presidency of
the Council of the European Union, and a representative of the Member State which
will hold the next Presidency. The Chairperson may indicate the duties in respect of
which he or she will need such support. In the event that the Member State holding
the Presidency of the Council decides not to preside over the Group, a two-thirds
majority of the members of the group shall elect a replacement Chairperson.
The responsibilities of the Cooperation Group as defined in the Directive are:
(a) providing strategic guidance on the activities of the CSIRTs network;
(b) exchanging best practice on information exchange related to incident reporting
(c) exchanging best practice between Member States, and, in collaboration with
ENISA, assisting Member States in capacity building with a view to ensuring
the security of network and information systems
(d) discussing Member States’ capabilities and preparedness, and, on a voluntary
basis, assessing national strategies for network and information system security
and the effectiveness of CSIRT, and identifying best practice
(e) exchanging information and best practices on awareness raising and training
(f) exchanging information and best practices on research and development relat-
ing to the security of network and information systems
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(g) where relevant, exchanging experiences on matters relating to the security of
network and information systems with the relevant Union institutions, bodies,
offices, and agencies
(h) discussing the standards and specifications with representatives from the rele-
vant European standardisation organisations
(i) collecting information on best practice for risks and incidents
(j) examining the summary reports on an annual basis
(k) discussing the work undertaken with regard to exercises on network and
information-systems security, education programmes and training, including
the work performed by ENISA
(l) with the assistance of ENISA, exchanging best practice with regard to the
identification of the operators of essential services by the Member States,
including in relation to cross-border dependencies, regarding risks and incidents
(m) discussing the rules on incident reporting.
In performing his or her duties, the Chairperson should be guided by the princi-
ples of inclusiveness, commitment, respect for diversity, and the pursuit of consen-
sus. In accordance with Article 11(2) of the NIS Directive, the Cooperation Group
may, where appropriate, invite representatives of influential stakeholders to partic-
ipate in its meetings. In order to ensure that acceding countries meet the requirements
specified in the NIS Directive from the date of their accession, representatives of
these countries should be invited to participate in the meetings of the Cooperation
Group from the date of signing the Treaty of Accession to the EU. The decision to
invite representatives of important stakeholders or experts to participate in a meet-
ing, or part of a meeting, of the Group, should be taken by the Chairperson, unless a
simple majority of members oppose the participation in the meeting or part of it by
the representative or expert concerned. In order to facilitate its activities, the Coop-
eration Group should be able to create subgroups. The meetings of the Group are
convened by the Chairperson, either on his or her own initiative or at the request of a
simple majority of its members. The Chairperson shall present a provisional agenda
for meetings during his or her term of office, taking into consideration the work
programme of the Group. In general, the Group’s discussions should not be publicly
accessible, as making them open to the public could have a negative impact on
building mutual trust between members, since they often address public security
issues. However, after consultation with the Chairperson, the Group may decide to
make public its deliberations on specific issues, and to facilitate making appropriate
documentation publicly available. Requests to the Group for access to the documents
relating to its activities shall be considered by the Commission in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. The
Group’s discussions are not public. In consultation with the Chairperson, the Group
might decide to make public its deliberations on certain issues. Documents distrib-
uted to members of the Group, representatives of third parties, and experts, shall not
be made available to the public unless access is granted or otherwise provided for by
the Commission.
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Pursuant to Article 46 of the Act, the Minister competent for computerisation
shall ensure the development or maintenance of a communication and information
system to support:
(1) cooperation between entities within the national cybersecurity system
(2) the generating and presenting of recommendations for actions to increase the
level of cybersecurity
(3) the reporting and handling of incidents
(4) risk estimation at the national level
(5) alerts regarding cybersecurity threats.
According to the EU strategy, national NIS authorities should cooperate on and
exchange information with other regulatory authorities, in particular data-protection
authorities, and regularly publish on dedicated websites unclassified information on
current early warnings about incidents and threats and the coordinated responses.
Integrated computerisation involves a comprehensive, managerial, and
organisational approach to building the state’s information and communication
system by public administration, which is expected to lead to developing informa-
tion and communication governance in the state. The creation, development, and
maintenance of a state information and communication system supports all the
crucial procedures related to cybersecurity.
The establishment of the appropriate organisational areas at all levels, from
independent institutions to departmental and local government activities, and build-
ing, providing, and maintaining a basic set of electronic services facilitating incident
handling all require an effective combination of various public-administration activ-
ities. For administrative processes which involve different sectors, cross-sectoral
projects seem essential. This is important, considering the required functionality of
such a system, including aspects of information exchange, educational issues, real
threats, alerting actions, and risk estimation. A communication and information
system is one in which data is sent, received, stored, and processed by means of
telecommunications networks. A service provided by electronic means does not
include a transmission within the internal network of a given entrepreneur7—the
intranet. Pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic
Means, a communication and information system is a set of cooperating IT devices
and software, ensuring processing and storage, as well as sending and receiving data
through telecommunications networks by means of a terminal device appropriate for
a given type of telecommunications network within the meaning of the Act of
7Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for
application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for
managing the risks posed to the security of network and information systems and of the parameters
for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact, OJ EU 2018 L 26/189.
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16 July 2004—Telecommunications Law.8 The communication between IT devices
is based on the TCP/IP protocol used. The most important here is the IP protocol,
which is responsible for assigning a logical IP address to each computer which is
connected to the TCP/IP network.9 The construction of the state communication and
information system should be carried out in close cooperation with all the entities
which are part of the national cybersecurity system. The legislators have defined the
system’s functionalities, which include cooperation between entities within the
national cybersecurity system, the generation and transmission of recommendations
for actions to increase the level of cybersecurity, incident reporting and handling,
risk assessment at the national level, and warnings about cyber hazards.
The CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV, sectoral cybersecurity
teams, and the President of the Office of Electronic Communications may use the
communication and information system under an agreement concluded with the
Minister competent for computerisation.
The entities involved in the process of managing cybersecurity require enhanced
security of communication systems and IT support. The Government Communica-
tions Network (GCN) was established in order to ensure the protection of informa-
tion against unauthorised disclosure during telephone and video-conferencing
conversations and data transmission, in particular against the loss of confidentiality,
availability, and integrity.
However, the dynamic development of ICT networks, and their increasing use for
data transmission, as well as for command and management, naturally made it
necessary to guarantee security for the operation of the networks themselves, and
for the information transmitted therein.
Therefore, the above provision ensures cooperation between the President of the
Office of Electronic Communications (OEC) and other bodies—Computer Security
Incident Response Teams—whose main task is to ensure the implementation and
coordination of the processes of preventing, detecting, and responding to computer
incidents involving communication and information systems and networks, as well
as cooperation in the sphere of preventing cyber attacks. The CSIRT GOV Computer
Security Incident Response Team is managed by the Head of the Internal Security
Agency, and operates as a national-level CSIRT Team responsible for coordinating
the process of responding to computer incidents occurring in the fields indicated in
Article 26(7) of the Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System.
Among its fundamental tasks are recognising, preventing, and detecting threats
which are detrimental to security, and important from the point of view of the
continuous functioning of the state’s communication and information systems of
public administration authorities, and of the system of ICT networks covered by a
standard list of objects, installations, devices and services categorised as critical
infrastructure, as well as of the communication and information systems of owners
8Act of 16 July 2004—Telecommunications Law, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2019, item 2460, as amended.
9Gołaczyński (2009), p. 34.
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and the holders of facilities, installations, and devices of critical infrastructure
referred to in Article 5b(7)(1) of the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management.
CSIRT GOV and CSIRT MON, whose main task is to ensure the implementation
and coordination of the processes of preventing, detecting and responding to com-
puter incidents in the Ministry for National Defence’s communication and informa-
tion systems and networks, as well as CSIRT NASK, whose tasks include the
monitoring of cybersecurity threats and incidents at the national level, are permitted
to implement their tasks using the communication and information system operated
by the Ministry for Information Technology. This usage is based on an agreement.
The legislators have decided that the basic terms and conditions for the use of
communication and information systems to serve cybersecurity, and the scope of
such use, will be agreed between the parties to the agreement. It should be assumed
that there is also going to be an administrative agreement. The main goal of the
entities concluding the agreement is the implementation of designated public tasks
within the communication and information system, and the conditions and scope of
this use are defined in the agreement. This form of public-administration activity is
similar to civil-law contracts, which have the effect of administrative agreements
primarily concerning the sphere of public law. As a rule, the mandatory provisions of
this agreement have not been defined by the legislators. Nevertheless, taking into
consideration the essence and purpose of the agreement on the conditions and scope
of the use of the communication and information system, the agreement should
specify, in particular, the parties to the agreement, its duration, whether the agree-
ment has been concluded for a definite period of time, the subject matter of the
agreement, the provisions concerning supervision over the use of the system, and the
provisions concerning the form of amending or terminating the agreement.
In accordance with Article 47 of the Act on the National Cybersecurity System,
the Minister competent for computerisation may perform the tasks referred to in
Article 45(1) and Article 46(1) subject to the rules specified in separate provisions by
means of units responsible in this respect which are subordinated to or supervised by
the Minister competent for computerisation. A significant role in the implementation
of tasks related to digitalisation and computerisation processes is performed by the
advisory units of the Minister competent for computerisation. Such a unit is the
Council for Computerisation. Pursuant to Article 17 of the UIDP the Council for
Computerisation was established, whose name under the amendment of 10 January
201410 was changed to the Council for Computerisation. It is a consultative and
advisory authority of the Minister competent for computerisation. Opinions, minutes
of meetings, and other Council documents are published in a separate part of the
Public Information Bulletin on the website of the Minister competent for
computerisation. The Council shall present a report on its activities for each calendar
year to the Minister by 30 April of the following year. The responsibilities of the
Council include:
10Polish Journal of Laws of 2014, item 183.
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(1) suggesting and providing opinions on the draft positions of the Council of
Ministers on the documents of the European Commission and the European
Parliament concerning computerisation, communication, and the development
of the information society, at the request of the Minister competent for
computerisation, including issuing opinions on the draft of the Integrated State
Computerisation Programme and other government documents, including draft
development strategies and draft programmes within the meaning of the Act of
6 December 2006 on the Principles of Conducting the Development Policy
concerning matters of computerisation, communication or the development of
the information society;
(2) issuing opinions on draft regulations published pursuant to Article 18 of
the UIDP
(3) providing opinions on other draft legal Acts and other documents submitted by
the Minister competent for computerisation, communication, or information
society development
(4) providing opinions on reports and other studies on the computerisation of the
Minister competent for computerisation
(a) requirements and demands concerning the development of the information
society
(b) the principles of the functioning of public registers
(c) the principles of the implementation of communication and information
systems in public administration, and the status of their implementation
(d) the current technical solutions applicable to the computerisation of admin-
istration, network development, and broadband services
(e) Polish terminology in the fields of computer science and communications.
The Council is composed of fifteen to twenty members. Candidates for member-
ship of the Council may be recommended by:
(1) Ministers
(2) the General Director of the State Archives
(3) the President of the Polish Committee for Standardisation
(4) the co-Chairperson of the Joint Commission of Government and Local
Government
(5) scientific entities within the meaning of the Act of 30 April 2010 on the
principles of science financing (Polish Journal of Laws of 2010, No. 96, item
615, as amended), which, within the framework of their statutory activities,
conduct scientific research or development work in the fields of information
technology and communications
(6) Chambers of Commerce representing entrepreneurs conducting business activ-
ities in the fields of the electronic economy, communications, media, the
manufacturing of IT equipment, software, or providing IT services
(7) associations registered in the National Court Register whose statutory purpose is
to represent the IT environment or to support the applications of IT, the elec-
tronic economy, communications, or media.
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The Minister competent for computerisation appoints the members of the Council
for a biennial term of office from among the candidates recommended by the entities
indicated above.
The Minister competent for computerisation may appoint and dismiss the Chair-
person and Deputy Chairperson of the Council from among its members. The
Chairperson of the Council manages its work and represents the Council externally.
In the event of the Chairperson’s absence, the Deputy Chairperson shall replace him
or her. The Council is supported by the office serving the Minister competent for
computerisation. Other persons may be invited to meetings of the Council by the
Minister competent for computerisation or the Chairperson of the Council, if it is
advisable to do so in order to fulfil the tasks of the Council. The detailed procedure of
the Council shall be established by its regulations, determined at the request of the
Council by the Minister competent for computerisation. However, this institution
has an exclusively advisory and consultative nature. The legislators have defined
precisely which institutions are supervised by this authority.
Pursuant to the announcement of the Minister for Digital Affairs of 19 June 2018
on the list of organisational units subordinate to, or supervised by, the Minister for
Digital Affairs, issued pursuant to Article 33(1d) of the Act on the Council of
Ministers, a register of organisational units subordinate to, or supervised by, the
Minister for Digital Affairs was established, constituting an appendix to the
announcement. According to the announcement, the Digital Poland Projects Centre
is a subordinate unit, while the following units are supervised: the Central Computer
Science Centre; the Communications Institute—National Research Institute; and the
Institute of Innovative Technologies EMAG and Scientific and Academic Computer
Network—National Research Institute. Apparently, the scope of the delegation
includes the institutions defined above.
It should be added that by Order No. 13 of the Minister for Digital Affairs of
2 May 2016 on the appointment and responsibilities of the Plenipotentiary of the
Minister for Digital Affairs for International Cooperation, the Plenipotentiary of the
Minister for Digital Affairs for International Cooperation was appointed, who is
responsible for:
(1) representing and acting on behalf of the Minister for Digital Affairs in the
international and national arenas on international issues
(2) strategic advice to the Minister for Digital Affairs on international activities
(3) developing with the Minister for Digital Affairs of a directional policy and
international cooperation strategy of the Ministry
(4) monitoring the effective implementation of the Ministry’s foreign policy on
behalf of the Minister for Digital Affairs. Thus, the tasks of such a person
include activities beyond the European Union and the regulation of the directive.
Furthermore, Order No. 30 of the Minister for Digital Affairs of 22 October 2017
on the establishment of the Operating Centre of the Minister for Digital Affairs
established the Operating Centre of the Minister for Digital Affairs, which supports
the implementation of the tasks of the Minister for Digital Affairs in the field of
cybersecurity, as well as crisis management and defence, in particular on the security
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of the civil sphere of cyberspace of the Republic of Poland and the system for
responding to ICT incidents and civil planning. The Centre can serve as a separate
place of permanent duty and as an HNS point of contact within the meaning of
Article 1(2)(1) of Order No. 19 of the Minister for Digital Affairs of 15 June 2016 on
the Functioning of the HNS System in the computerisation department of govern-
ment administration for the purposes of tasks resulting from the duties of the host
country (The Official Gazette of the Ministry for Digital Affairs, item 21). The
Centre is deployed, if necessary, by recommendation of the Minister, a member of
the Management of the Ministry of Digital Affairs, or, depending on the nature of the
threat or event, at the request of the Head of the organisational unit nominated in the
Instruction of the Operations Centre, or by the appropriate Head of the organisational
unit for exercises in the fields of cybersecurity, crisis management, and defence. The
following are the main tasks of the Centre:
(1) Supporting the Minister in managing the National Cybersecurity Centre11
operating within the National Research Institute—the Scientific and Academic
Computer Network, a unit supervised by the Minister competent for
responding to ICT incidents.
(2) Ensuring close cooperation with other entities involved in responding to ICT
incidents, in particular with the Internal Security Agency, the Government
Security Centre, and the Police.
(3) Supervising and coordinating the activities of units subordinate to, or super-
vised by, the Minister in a crisis situation, or in circumstances of extraordinary
threats, if justified by the scale or effects of the situation.
(4) Forwarding to the appropriate organisational units of the Ministry proposals for
the development of draft decisions, positions, guidelines, and recommenda-
tions concerning cybersecurity, crisis management, and defence matters, for the
purposes of the Ministry’s management and the Crisis Management Team of
the Minister for Digital Affairs.
(5) Analysing the situation, coordinating and directing the activities of the Ministry
in the event of an emergency situation causing disruptions to the functioning of
IT systems, networks, or telecommunication services, or when such disruptions
affect the essential (basic) services provided to the public or public-
administration systems, registers, or publications.
(6) Monitoring the development of a crisis situation where justified by its extent or
consequences.
(7) Ensuring permanent communication with the Office of Electronic Communi-
cations and the NCSC in the event of a disruption to the functioning of IT
systems, networks or telecommunication services, or when such a disruption
affects essential services provided to the public or public-administration sys-
tems, registers, or publications.
11National Cybersecurity Centre, “the NCSC”.
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(8) Ensuring the circulation of information in a crisis situation for the management
of the Ministry and the Crisis Management Team of the Minister for Digital
Affairs.
(9) Providing a place to perform emergency duty in the event of an alert level, or
CRP alert level, for persons authorised to make decisions on the security of
communication and information systems—in accordance with the Act on Anti-
Terrorist Activities
(10) Ensuring the circulation of information for the purposes of tasks included in the
list of the undertakings and procedures of the crisis management system
(11) Coordinating designated support arising from the obligations of the host state
(HNS) in the Ministry, the Office of Electronic Communications, and entre-
preneurs with special economic and defensive importance within the meaning
of Article 6(1)(2) and Article 18(1) and (3) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on
the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland (Polish Journal of Laws
of 2017, item 430).
Units subordinate to, or supervised by, the Minister ensure that the Centre is
staffed on the basis of individual contracts and agreements. While on duty, the
Centre cooperates with the Ministry’s Press Officer on media monitoring and
information policy.
It should be emphasised that the Centre’s tasks are related to situations
concerning national and internal procedures instigated in a crisis situation, while
the procedures defined in the National Cybersecurity Act refer to the common
objective of the EU, i.e. to provide common procedures for responding to cyber
threats in the area of the EU Single Market. It can be observed that the tasks of
different institutions and entities in the private sector can overlap, but in both
systems, the Minister competent for computerisation remains the common
coordinator.
The roles entrusted to these units, including in cybersecurity, are financed in the
form of an earmarked subsidy from the part of the state budget which is administered
by the Minister competent for digital affairs. According to the Regulation of the
Prime Minister of ^ October 2020 on the detailed scope of activity of the Minister for
Digital Affairs, this Minister is the administrator of part 27 of the state budget.
Article 127 of the Public Finance Act12 delineates a list of tasks for which funds from
an earmarked subsidy may be used. The detailed regulations concerning particular
types of designated subsidy, the rules for their granting, and the settlement and legal
consequences related to irregularities in these processes, are specified in the Act.
Earmarked subsidies may be allocated for financing or subsidising statutorily
defined tasks, implemented by entities other than local government units. The
amount of each grant so planned, in accordance with Article 215(2) of the PFA,
should be additionally described, with the appropriate type of subsidy in question as
an earmarked subsidy. Such a subsidy may be used by the beneficiary in connection
12Act from Public Finance, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 869, as amended, hereinafter “the
PFA”.
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with a public task only after the conclusion of a subsidy agreement. From the very
nature of an earmarked subsidy, it follows that it may be utilised by the subsidy
beneficiary in connection with the implementation of a public task only for expen-
ditures incurred after the conclusion of the subsidy agreement. In addition, it follows
from Article 251(2) of the PFA that the use of the subsidy is made in particular
through payment for the tasks for which the subsidy was awarded, or, if separate
regulations provide for the method of awarding and settling the subsidy, the
utilisation of the subsidy is achieved through the implementation of the objectives
indicated in these regulations. Therefore, since the provision of the subsidy is made
on the basis of an agreement, use of the subsidy can only be made by paying for the
completed tasks resulting from the subsidy agreement, and thus performed after it
has been signed (the Resolution of the College of the Regional Chamber of Auditors
in Kraków of 14 August 2013. KI-411212/2013—the essence of an earmarked
subsidy NZS 2013/5/10).
The Minister competent for computerisation, as the single point of contact
(Articles 48–50), has the responsibility to receive and forward, at the request of
the appropriate CSIRT, reports of serious or significant incidents involving two or
more Member States of the European Union to ensure the representation of the
Republic of Poland within the Cooperation Group, to exchange information for the
benefit of the public authorities and for the competent authorities in Poland and
abroad, and the CSIRT, and to meet its reporting obligations to the Cooperation
Group and the European Commission. In recent years there has been a growing
interest in cybersecurity, which has resulted in an increasing number of units and
organisations’ dealing with this issue. Nevertheless, in order to perform public tasks
in this area more effectively, cooperation and exchange of information between
administrative, military, and civil areas are indispensable. The Cybersecurity Strat-
egy of the European Union proposes an open, secure and protected cyberspace,13
and a network of national cybersecurity authorities. According to the EU strategy,
national NIS authorities should cooperate and exchange information with other
regulatory authorities, in particular data-protection authorities, and regularly publish,
on a dedicated website, unclassified information on current early warnings about
incidents and threats, as well as about coordinated responses. According to the
European Commission, legal obligations should not replace or prevent informal or
voluntary cooperation, including between the public and private sectors, to increase
security and exchange information and best practices. An especially important and
useful platform at the EU level which needs to be developed is the European Public-
Private Partnership for Resilience.14 All these tasks are not the complete catalogue of
13COM (2013) from 7 February 2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final.
14The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience was initiated under document COM
(2009) 149. The platform launched activities and increased cooperation between the public and
private sectors in identifying critical resources, means, functions, and baseline requirements, for
resilience, as well as the need for cooperation and mechanisms for responding to large-scale
disruptions affecting electronic communications.
Role of the Minister Competent for Computerisation in the Cybersecurity System 269
requirements related to the protection of national security in the digital age. This is
because the process of threat emergence is ongoing; therefore, the list of needs is
constantly growing. These demands must be met by an appropriate, innovative
selection of regulatory instruments, and without questioning these traditional mea-
sures. Digital democracy is a form of government operation which requires public
authorities and public administration authorities to counteract all tendencies which
have a negative impact on national security. Government administration and local
government authorities are able to provide more efficient and more effective assis-
tance in crisis situations related to ICT infrastructure if they receive the professional
support of third-sector organisations. As the Strategy emphasises, the effectiveness
of governmental organisations (the Polish Armed Forces, the Police, Guards, and
Inspectorates) depends largely on proper specialist support from non-governmental
organisations, which can provide as much assistance in various areas of national
security as government administration units. In order for such cooperation to be real,
it is necessary to provide information on potential threats, incidents, and rules
adopted in individual Member States. This necessity is indicated in recital 43 of
the Directive, according to which, due to the global nature of the problems related to
the security of network and information systems, there is a need to strengthen
international cooperation in order to improve security standards and information
exchange, and also to promote a common holistic approach to security issues. For
the purposes of achieving the above goals, a system of so-called points of contact
was designed. According to Article 8 of the Directive, each Member State shall
designate a national single point of contact for the security of network and informa-
tion systems (known as “the single point of contact”). Member States may designate
an existing body for this purpose. In Poland, such an authority is the Minister
competent for digital affairs. Should a Member State designate only one competent
authority, that competent authority is also the single point of contact. Pursuant to
Article 8(2) of the Directive, the single point of contact shall have a connecting
function to ensure cross-border cooperation between Member States’ authorities and
with the appropriate authorities in other Member States, as well as with the Coop-
eration Group and the CSIRT network. Member States are obligated to provide the
competent authorities and single points of contact with sufficient resources to enable
them to accomplish their tasks effectively and efficiently with a view to achieving
the objectives of the Directive. Member States shall ensure that the designated
representatives in the Cooperation Group are working together effectively, effi-
ciently, and securely. The competent authorities and the single point of contact are
required to, where appropriate, and in accordance with national law, consult and
cooperate with the applicable national law-enforcement authorities and national
data-protection bodies. Member States are obliged to notify the European Commis-
sion, without delay, of the designation of the competent authority and the single
point of contact, their tasks, and any subsequent modifications thereto, and to make
public the designation of the competent authority and the single point of contact. The
European Commission shall publish the list of designated single points of contact.
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The main responsibilities of points of contact:
(1) Receiving from the single points of contact in other Member States of the
European Union reports of a major incident, or a significant incident, involving
two or more Member States of the European Union, and forwarding these reports
to CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, or sectoral cybersecurity teams,
i.e., obtaining and communicating information about an emergency situation
from other points of contact in the EU, if the situation there is more extensive,
i.e. involves more than one country; it should be noted that, according to recital
32 of the Directive, the competent authorities, or computer security incident
response teams, (CSIRT’s), should receive incident reports. The single points of
contact should not receive any incident reports directly, unless they also operate
as a competent authority or a CSIRT. However, the competent authority or
CSIRT should be able to instruct the single point of contact to forward incident
reports to single points of contact in other Member States affected by the
incident.
(2) providing to the single points of contact in other Member States of the European
Union, at the request of the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT
GOV, a report of a major incident or a significant incident involving two or more
Member States of the European Union—i.e. acquiring and sharing information
about such an incident with the other points of contact affected by the incident.
(3) Ensuring representation of the Republic of Poland in the Cooperation Group—
i.e. serving a representative function.
(4) Assuring cybersecurity cooperation with the European Commission—i.e.
implementing a policy of cooperation with the EU in the sphere of cybersecurity.
(5) Coordinating cooperation between the competent authorities for cybersecurity
and public authorities in the Republic of Poland and the appropriate authorities
in the Member States of the European Union—i.e. coordinating state coopera-
tion with other EU countries with regard to cybersecurity;
(6) Securing the exchange of information for the Cooperation Group and the CSIRT
Network—i.e., implementing the informational aspects of cooperation.
Under recital 35 of the Preamble of the NIS Directive, the Cooperation Group
should function as a tool for the exchange of best practices, for discussions on
Member States’ capabilities and preparedness, and, on a voluntary basis, for
assisting its members in evaluating national network and information system secu-
rity strategies, and capacity building. Furthermore, for the purposes of promoting
advanced network and information system security, the Cooperation Group should,
where appropriate, cooperate with the relevant EU institutions, authorities, offices,
and agencies to exchange knowledge and best practices, and also to advise on the
aspects of network and information system security which could affect their work,
while respecting the existing arrangements for the exchange of proprietary informa-
tion. When cooperating with law-enforcement authorities on issues concerning the
security of network and information systems which could affect its work, the
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Cooperation Group should take into consideration existing information channels and
established networks.
In order to carry out the tasks of the Cooperation Group, the single points of
contact must provide it with specific information. Information policy is fundamental
to the activities related to ensuring cybersecurity.
Another essential element at this stage of civilisational advancement is the right
of citizens to obtain, collect, modify, and make available critical information of a
public nature. It should be noted that access to information is becoming much easier.
Also relevant is the legislation which defines the scopes of available information and
separates information of an undisclosed nature.15 Nowadays, in administrative-law
research, information is understood as a new and distinctive element in the tasks of
the state, and a form of procedure in times of conflict.16 Information as a value can
also be protected in the context of content relevant for national security.
The Commission’s rules on security regarding the protection of EU classified
information, established in Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 (3) and
(EU, Euratom) 2015/444 (4), shall apply to any such information received or
processed by or from the Cooperation Group. Information processed by the Group
which is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy must be duly protected.
Members of the Group, as well as representatives of third parties and experts, are
bound by the confidentiality obligation referred to in this article. The Chairperson
shall ensure that third-party representatives and experts are informed of their confi-
dentiality requirements. However, the Polish legislators have decided that any data
which could become information related to national security or public order may not
be provided to the Cooperation Group.
The legislators did not make a direct reference to the Act on the Protection of
Classified Information (PCI).17 Its Article 5 describes the types of protected infor-
mation. In their classification, the legislators referred to the effects which the
disclosure of secret information could have on the Polish State. It has been indicated,
among other things, that classified information will constitute a message whose
disclosure could cause serious damage to the Republic of Poland by making it
difficult to conduct operational or exploratory activities being undertaken to ensure
state security, or for the prosecution of offenders by institutions or services
authorised to do so; or will cause damage to the Republic of Poland by making it
more difficult for the services or institutions responsible for the protection of the
security or the fundamental interests of the Republic of Poland to perform their tasks;
or will hinder the performance of tasks by the services or institutions, or the judicial
authorities, responsible for the protection of public order, for the security of citizens,
or for the prosecution of the perpetrators of crimes and fiscal offences,
15Gardocka (2008), p. 11.
16Szpor (1998), p. 24.
17Act of 5 August 2010 on the Protection of Classified Information, consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 742, as amended).
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The aforementioned classification of confidential information has therefore been
clarified by the legislators in a fairly broad manner, covering most cases which can
cause damage or serious harm to the state.
Currently, classified information is governed by the following legal Acts:
(1) The Act of 5 August 2010 on the Protection of Classified Information and the
secondary legislation adopted on its basis.
(2) Ratified bilateral international agreements on the mutual protection of classified
information concluded with Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Russia, Romania,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States;
(3) Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of
Information, done at Brussels on 6 March 1997,18 and the Agreement Between
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic
Information, done at Paris on 18 June 1964.19
The Act on the Protection of Classified Information paved the way for the
directional construction of a modern system of protection of classified information,
which significantly contributed to the creation of a legal framework within which
Poland’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance became possible. Over the years
the Act has been in force, enormous technological progress has been accomplished,
especially in the means of communication and communication and information
systems, which undoubtedly has had an impact on information security, and thus
on the relevance of the solutions provided in the Act and secondary legislation,
especially on those issues which manifest levels far below the current technological
state of the art, and are not adapted to the conditions and capabilities of modern
technology. This also applies to procedures related to ensuring cybersecurity.
Regarding the information covered by the said Regulation, it can be assumed that
the catalogue of information which will not be released extends beyond classified
information. Meanwhile, the content of the provision does not indicate who verifies
the information, and which authority makes the decision at the stage of this revision,
and thus is responsible for not passing it to the Cooperation Group.
Since Member States vary widely in their level of preparedness, leading to an
uneven level of consumer and business protection, and adversely affecting the
overall level of security of network and information systems within the EU, it has
become necessary to develop common informational procedures. Effective response
to the challenges of ensuring the security of network and information systems calls
for a holistic approach at the EU level, including requirements for building and
planning common minimum capacities, and the exchange of information at the
primary, i.e. national level. Information, which in this case is a preventive factor,
18Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information, done
at Brussels on 6 March 1997 Polish Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 64, item 740.
19Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic
Information, done at Paris on 18 June 1964 Polish Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 143, item 1594.
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is a means to apply this practice. Reporting to the European Commission is essential
for building a uniform, common, cybersecurity system in the EU. The Commission
shall itself periodically review the functioning of this Directive and report thereon to
the European Parliament and the Council. For this purpose, and with a view to
further developing strategic and operational cooperation, the Commission shall take
into consideration reports by the Cooperation Group and the CSIRT network on the
experience gained at the strategic and operational levels. The designation by a
Member State of the competent authorities, the single point of contact (their tasks
and any amendments thereto, as well as information on the provisions on fines,
which, in accordance with Article 21 of the Directive, should be effective, propor-
tionate, and dissuasive) is part of a common policy to build a single cybersecurity
system.
Recital 71 of the Preamble to the NIS Directive stipulates that the Commission
should periodically review the Directive, in consultation with stakeholders, in
particular to verify whether amendments are necessary in the light of changing
social, political, technological, or market conditions. In its review, the Commission
shall also assess the listings in Annexes II and III, and the consistency in the
identification of the operators of essential services and the services in the sectors
referred to in Annex II. The obligation to provide information contained in this
provision not only arises from the need to create a coherent cybersecurity system, but
is related to the provision of information by the European Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council in the form of reports which assess, among
other things, the consistency of the approach being taken by the Member State
concerned to identify the operators of essential services. Pursuant to recital 19 of the
Preamble to the Directive, in order to ensure that possible market developments are
being adequately reflected, Member States should maintain under regular review a
list of identified operators, and update it where necessary. Moreover, Member States
should provide the Commission with the information necessary to assess to what
extent this common methodology has allowed the consistent application of the
definitions by Member States. The purpose of providing information concerning
the tasks of CSIRTMON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT GOV, encompassing the main
elements of incident-handling procedures, is to build a common and uniform
cybersecurity system, including at the level of emergency-handling procedures, as
well as the tasks of entities.
The Minister competent for digital affairs is an entity synchronising the activities
of the institutions at the strategic level (at the operational level the importance of the
NC Cyber and the National CSIRT should be emphasised). It is the essential element
in the organisation of the cybersecurity system in Poland. It should be emphasised
that the decision to appoint a special Ministry within the administration to perform
cybersecurity tasks is not a permanent solution. The sphere of cybersecurity is
interdisciplinary, and requires the consolidation and coordination of different ele-
ments of the state’s functioning, and, within it, individual units.
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The Duties and Legal Status
of the Government Plenipotentiary
for Cybersecurity and the College
for Cybersecurity
Agnieszka Brzostek
Abstract The imposition of the NIS Directive results in the adoption of the NCSA.
A special role in this system is played by the Government Plenipotentiary for
Cybersecurity, whose primary task is to coordinate activities and implement the
government’s policy in the field of cybersecurity.
The Plenipotentiary supervises the risk management process of the national
cybersecurity system using aggregated data and indicators developed with the
participation of competent authorities for cybersecurity matters, CSIRT MON,
CSIRT NASK and CSIRT GOV. The Plenipotentiary’s tasks in this area also include
providing opinions on government documents, including draft legal acts that affect
the implementation of cybersecurity tasks.
The Government Plenipotentiary is also one of the members of the College at the
Council of Ministers, which acts as an advisory and consultative body on
cybersecurity.
The NCSA also indicates the scope of cooperation of the Government Plenipo-
tentiary with the competent authorities for cybersecurity, which concerns coopera-
tion in matters related to cybersecurity with other countries, organisations and
international institutions.
1 The Legal Status of the Government Plenipotentiary
for Cybersecurity
In the Polish legal system, the term “Government Plenipotentiary” appears in the Act
of 8 August 1996 on the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers may appoint
a Plenipotentiary for specific matters the assignment of which to Members of the
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Council of Ministers is not advisable.1 The authorisation of the Government Plen-
ipotentiary to pursue the matters provided for in this article is restricted by Acts
relating to the competences of other Ministers.2 This general principle constitutes the
basis for appointing a Government Plenipotentiary.3
Government Plenipotentiaries are appointed and dismissed by the Prime Minister;
the Council of Ministers, by way of an ordinance, specifies the scope of the powers
granted to the Plenipotentiary, the manner of supervising his or her activities, and the
procedure for providing the Plenipotentiary with substantive, legal, organisational,
technical, and administrative support.4 The key point is that the Government Plen-
ipotentiary may be either a secretary or an under-secretary of state. The Act on the
Council of Ministers mentions the Government Plenipotentiary in the Chapter on
Members of the Council of Ministers. At the same time, it does not refer to the
Plenipotentiary as a Member of the Council of Ministers. The legal status of the
Government Plenipotentiary has been of little to no interest to researchers. This post
is treated briefly in the literature, and only in relation to the provisions of the Act on
the Council of Ministers.5
In the explanatory Statement on the Act on the National Cybersecurity System,6
the promoter did not indicate the legal nature of the Plenipotentiary, describing only
his or her duties. This does not mean that the Act’s promoter treated this issue
differently from the way the others did. The indication that the Plenipotentiary is the
secretary or under-secretary of state in the Ministry in question places the Plenipo-
tentiary within a specific organisational structure, and at the same time ensures
technical and organisational security when fulfilling duties.
Pursuant to Article 37(1) of the Act on the Council of Ministers, the Minister
performs his or her duties with the assistance of the secretary and under-secretaries
of state, and the Minister’s political cabinet. There is no unified position within the
jurisprudence or doctrine which defines the status of a secretary of state or an under-
secretary of state. It is generally accepted that they serve the role of Deputy Minister.
However, the Resolution adopted by the full panel of the Supreme Court indicated
there can be no doubt that the Deputies of the Minister are neither secretaries nor under-
secretaries of state who are not Members of the Council of Ministers, and that they cannot be
included in government administration authorities. The professional literature describes
them as an element in the political (managerial) structure of the Ministry, or, more precisely,
1Article 10(1) of the Act on the Council of Ministers.
2The Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 May 2000, U 6/98, OTK 2000/4/108 (Statement
of Grounds 6/98, Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal 2000/4/108).
3As of 31 October 2019 there were 36 appointed government Government Plenipotentiaries for
specific matters; see https://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/bip-rady-ministrow/organy-pomocnicze/
pelnomocnicy-rzadu-i-pr. Accessed on 10.05.2020
4Article 10(3) of the Act of 8 August 1996 on the Council of Ministers, consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1171, as amended.
5E.g. Zimmermann (2016), p. 240.
6Explanatory statement for the Act on Court Fees in Civil-Law Matters, print 2505. https://www.
sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr¼2505 (accessed on 10 May 2020).
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as Ministerial assistants, helping to run the Ministry; they are the closest associates of the
Minister and the highest officials in the Ministry, but they cannot be assigned the functions
of state authorities, because they perform their duties on behalf of, and under the authority of,
the Minister.7
It should also be noted that the normative body included Article 37 of the Act on
the Council of Ministers in Chapter 6 on the “Scope and principles of Ministers’
activities”, which defines the legal position of a Minister as the supreme entity in
government administration, managing a specific department of that administration.
This gave rise to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the assistance and cooperation
of the secretary and under-secretaries of state are closely related only to those matters
which result from managing a designated department of government administration,
and thus remain in the sphere of public administration without going beyond its
capacity.8
In a gloss to the Supreme Court’s Resolution, B. Mik pointed out that the
statement which placed the secretary and under-secretary of state in the role of
mere assistants and associates of the Minister and top officials of the Ministry was
unfounded. One can only concede that
this particular provision, contrary to Article 37(5) of the Act on the Council of Ministers, in
comparison with Article 36 of the Act on the Council of Ministers, has been unusually amiss
in its wording.9
The indication that a literal interpretation is not sufficient to specify what it means
for a Minister to perform his or her duties “with the assistance of” the Secretary,
Under-Secretary, and the political cabinet, might also raise doubts. B. Mik rightly
remarks that the equating of these three functions in one sentence can be misleading,
because the purpose of each individual position is different. The Minister’s political
cabinet plays an advisory role, and has no means to influence other members of the
Ministry. Similarly inappropriate is applying a functional interpretation, classifying
all these positions as auxiliary roles. To that extent, the understanding of these
functions would be purely service-oriented.10 In specific regulations, the secretary
of state and under-secretary of state may represent the Council of Ministers at the
session of the Sejm and Senate,11 and whether they are obliged to resign along with
the resignation of the Prime Minister and the Government.12 Thus, it is unreasonable
7The Resolution of the full composition of the Supreme Court of 14 November 2007 BSA
(Administrative Court Office) -1410-5/07, pp. 12–13.
8The Resolution of the full composition . . . op. cit.-1410-5/07, pp. 25–26 http://www.sn.pl/sprawy/
SiteAssets/Lists/Zagadnienia_prawne/EditForm/2007.11.14.Uchwala.pelnego.skladu.SN.pdf,
accessed on 14. September 2020.
9Mik (2008), p. 166.
10Mik (2008), p. 166. It is interesting that B. Mik cites an example of the interpretation of Article
115 §13 of the PC when analysing the term public official – an employee of the Government
administration who performs a purely service function does not enjoy the status of a public official.
11Article 9(3)(1) of the Act on the Council of Ministers (the Office of the Council of Ministers).
12Article 38 of the Act on the Council of Ministers (the Office of the Council of Ministers). More
Mik (2008), pp. 166–167.
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to reduce these functions to an auxiliary role only. It is appropriate to recognise, as
the legislators intended, a secretary of state or an under-secretary of state as the
highest-ranking officials in a Ministry, and as a Deputy Minister, insofar as such a
replacement has been appointed.13
A separate issue is the position of the Government Plenipotentiary within the
structure of public administration. The Plenipotentiary acts as a coordinator of
cybersecurity activities. The legislators, in Article 4(19) of the NCSA, while detail-
ing a catalogue of entities covered by the national cybersecurity system, did not
include the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, but cited the position as a
separate entity within the structure of the cybersecurity system. The appointment of a
secretary of state or under-secretary of state as a Government Plenipotentiary does
not imply that the Plenipotentiary is a public-administration authority. This is
explicitly stipulated by specific laws,14 or by the Code of Administrative Procedure.
2 The Duties of the Government Plenipotentiary
for Cybersecurity
The duties which the legislators set out for the Plenipotentiary are related to the
concepts of the coordination and implementation of the government’s policy of
ensuring cybersecurity.15 The term coordination requires explanation here. Coordi-
nation is considered to be a legal situation, or a whole group of legal situations,
which aims or aim to organise the activities of many entities, or, more precisely, to
harmonise these activities.16 According to the literature, coordination should be
understood as the harmonisation of activities undertaken by organisational units of
administration in order to achieve the intended goal more easily and in a uniform
manner. Coordination involves actions already taken and eliminates discrepancies
between them, or it can entail planned actions, and thus prevent their repetition,
overlap, or competition between them.17 It is noted that there are two sides to
understanding the concept of coordination. First of all, it is about removing the
contradictions which exist or can exist in the present, and this is treated as the
negative side of coordination. The positive side consists of identifying and
13Mik (2008), pp. 166–167.
14The legislators defined differently e.g. the responsible bodies of the National Tax Administra-
tion—Article 11(1)(2) of the NCSA. indicated explicitly that the Head of the National Tax
Administration is the authority responsible for NTA matters. Article (13) (2) indicates that the
Head of NTA, who is the Secretary of State in the office supporting the Minister of Finance, is
appointed by the Prime Minister at the request of the Minister competent for public finance.
15Article 60 of the NCSA: the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18 March 2018 on the
appointment of a Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, Polish Journal of Laws of 2018,
item 587. Act repealed.
16Góralczyk (2016), pp. 36–40.
17Zimmermann (2016), p. 230.
280 A. Brzostek
recommending such actions which will contribute to better performance by all
entities involved in the coordinative situation in the future.18
Coordination mostly occurs in the decentralised model, but it can also occur in the
centralised model of hierarchical subordination, because it consists of unifying and
adjusting the activities of entities which might even be organisationally independent
of each other. The influence of the coordinator on the behaviour of the coordinated
body is indirect, and the coordinator does not assume responsibility from the
coordinated body for its actions. As J. Zimmermann points out, the coordination
responsibilities are not very formalised, and are fragmentarily defined in the regu-
lations, often with the use of unclear and ambiguous phrases.19
Cooperation between public-administration authorities is a kind of bond akin to
coordination, which can, of course, only occur in a decentralised system. The forms
of cooperation are very diverse. Their basic categorisation involves distinguishing
the forms resulting from constitutional law and those introduced by substantive
law.20 Such cooperation can involve taking concrete actions, as well as drawing
up legal acts. The actual process of cooperation can be, for example, the exchange of
information and making suggestions. Legal acts specific to this legal and adminis-
trative situation should include all bilateral (or multilateral) acts, such as agreements
and settlements. They can sometimes constitute the basis for the creation of separate,
permanent structures (entities) for the development of cooperation (companies,
unions, and associations).21
Pursuant to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 16 March 2018 on the
appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, the secretary of
state or the under-secretary of state was appointed the Plenipotentiary in the Ministry
of National Defence.22 The explanatory statement to the Act avoided specifying the
status of the Plenipotentiary, but it merely announced the appointment to the
position.
The duties set out in Article 62 of the Act specify in detail what the coordination
activities of the Plenipotentiary should involve. These comprise the following.
• Analysing and assessing the functioning of the national cybersecurity system on
the basis of aggregated data and indicators developed with the participation of
public-administrative agencies, and agencies competent for cybersecurity—
CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) MON (Ministry of
National Defence), CSIRT NASK (Research and Academic Computer Network),
and CSIRT GOV.
• Supervising the risk-management process of the national cybersecurity system
with the use of aggregated data, and indicators developed with the participation of
18Góralczyk (2016), pp. 36–40.
19Zimmermann (2016), pp. 230–231.
20Zimmermann (2016), p. 231 et seq.
21Góralczyk (2016), pp. 36–40.
22§1 (2) of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the appointment of a Government
Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity.
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authorities competent for cybersecurity—CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and
CSIRT GOV.
• Issuing opinions on government documents, including draft legal Acts affecting
the implementation of cybersecurity duties.
• Popularising new solutions and initiating cybersecurity activities at the domestic
level.
• Initiating national cybersecurity exercises.
• Issuing recommendations regarding the use of IT devices or software at the
request of the CSIRT.
This closed catalogue has been supplemented with separate duties which the
Plenipotentiary performs in consultation with the respective Ministers. These com-
prise the following:
• Cooperating with other countries, organisations and international institutions in
matters related to cybersecurity
• Undertaking activities aimed at supporting scientific research and the develop-
ment of cybersecurity technologies
• Undertaking activities aimed at increasing public awareness of threats to cyber-
security and the safe use of the Internet.23
The Plenipotentiary will also supervise the process of managing the risk of the
national cybersecurity system with the use of aggregated data and indicators devel-
oped with the participation of authorities competent for cybersecurity—CSIRT
MON, CSIRT NASK and CSIRT GOV. His or her responsibilities in this respect
will also include issuing opinions on government documents, including draft legal
Acts affecting the performance of cybersecurity duties.
In his or her activities, the Plenipotentiary should also popularise new solutions
and instigate cybersecurity activities at the national level, initiate national exercises
in cybersecurity, and issue recommendations regarding the use of IT devices and
software at the request of CSIRT.24 The Plenipotentiary prepares, and submits to the
Council of Ministers, by 31 March each year, a report for the previous calendar year
containing information on activities in the sphere of ensuring cybersecurity at the
national level.
The Act on the national cybersecurity system also indicates the scope of cooper-
ation of the Government Plenipotentiary with the authorities competent for cyber-
security,25 which involves cooperation in matters related to cybersecurity with other
23Article 62(2) NCSA.
24Article 61(1) NCSA.
25In Article 41 the Act provided the catalogue and scope of responsibilities of the authorised
entities. The entities responsible for cybersecurity are (1) for the energy sector—the Minister
competent for energy; (2) for the water-transport sector—the Minister competent for the maritime
economy and the Minister competent for inland navigation; (3) for the banking sector and the
financial market infrastructure—the Polish Financial Supervision Authority; (4) for the health
sector, with the exception of certain entities—the Minister competent for health; (5) for the
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countries, organisations, and international institutions, undertaking activities aimed
at supporting the scientific research and development of cybersecurity technologies,
and conducting educational activities aimed at raising public awareness of cyberse-
curity threats and the safe use of the Internet.26
One of the duties of the Plenipotentiary, as indicated in the Act on the National
Cybersecurity System, is cooperation with CSIRTMON, CSIRT NASK, and CSIRT
GOV in order to ensure a cohesive and complete risk management system at the
domestic level, the implementation of duties to counteract cross-sectoral and cross-
border cybersecurity threats, and ensuring coordination to handle reported inci-
dents.27 In accordance with the definition of risk management adopted in the Act,
this means the necessity to take coordinated actions related to cybersecurity man-
agement with regard to the estimated risk at the domestic level through the cooper-
ation of the above-mentioned entities.28 The Plenipotentiary may decide on the
scope of authority of the CSIRTs. Each CSIRT is obliged to account for its scope
of authority, as well as take an action to determine the appropriate addressee of the
incident report. Where there is disagreement between the CSIRTs on the determi-
nation of their scopes of authority in the event of a critical incident, the identification
of the CSIRT coordinating the incident handling should be made by the critical
incident team. Responsibility for ensuring incident coordination should be acknowl-
edged as the responsibility of the CSIRT which received the report, until possible
clarification with the CSIRT expressing doubts about the chosen scope of authority.
In a situation where the CSIRT does not clarify these doubts, it is possible to ask the
Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity to indicate the appropriate solution.29
Article 33(8) of the NCSA provides for authorisation for the Plenipotentiary to
contact the authority supervising the entity which the recommendation concerned if
such an entity does not follow the recommendation. In such a situation the Plenipo-
tentiary informs the person exercising supervision about the failure to follow the
recommendation. The supervisory body, within the scope of its powers, may apply
supervisory measures. A letter signed by the Plenipotentiary is a sufficient form of
contacting the competent authority.30
healthcare sector, including certain entities—the Minister of National Defence; (6) for the drinking
water supply and distribution sector—the Minister competent for water management; (7) for the
digital infrastructure sector—with the exception of certain entities—the Minister competent for
digital affairs; (8) for the Digital infrastructure sector—Minister of National Defence; (9) for digital
service providers, with the exception of certain entities, the Minister competent for digital affairs;
(10) for digital service providers, including other entities—the Minister of National Defence.
26Article 62(2) NCSA.
27Article 26 NCSA
28Prusak-Górnicka and Silicki (2019a).
29Prusak-Górnicka and Silicki (2019a).
30Prusak-Górnicka and Silicki (2019a).
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The Plenipotentiary is one of the entities31 which, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Act, process personal data obtained in connection with incidents and
threats to cybersecurity.32
3 Cooperation Between the Plenipotentiary & the College
for Cybersecurity
The Plenipotentiary is also one of the Members of the College of the Council of
Ministers who acts as an opinion-giving and advisory body on cybersecurity matters.
The scope of responsibility of the College for Cybersecurity is defined in Article
65 of the Act, and covers, in principle, the expressing of opinions on issues related to
the policies and plans for counteracting cybersecurity threats; the performance by
CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, the Head of the Internal Security Agency performing
duties under CSIRT GOV, sectoral cybersecurity teams and authorities competent
for cybersecurity of duties entrusted to them in accordance with the policies and
plans for counteracting cybersecurity threats; the expressing of opinions on cooper-
ation between the authorities managing or supervising CSIRT MON, CSIRT GOV,
and CSIRT NASK; cooperation between CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, the Head of
the Internal Security Agency, and the Minister—a Member of the Council of
Ministers responsible for coordinating the activities of secret services, sectoral
cybersecurity teams and authorities competent for cybersecurity; the organisation
of the exchange of information relevant to cybersecurity and the international
position of the Republic of Poland between government administration authorities
and on the proposals of the CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV regarding
recommendations on the use of IT devices or software. Apart from the Plenipoten-
tiary, the College comprises the Prime Minister, as the Chair, the Secretary of the
College, and the Members of the College.33
The Act also stipulated that the Prime Minister, in order to coordinate the
cybersecurity activities of the government administration, may, on the basis of the
College’s recommendations, issue binding directives on guaranteeing cybersecurity
31These bodies also include the Minister competent for digital affairs, the Director of the Govern-
ment Centre for Security, and the bodies responsible for digital affairs.
32Article 39(4) NCSA. For more on this topic—Taczkowska-Olszewska (2019), pp. 243–256.
33Article 66(1) of the Act on the National Cybersecurity System stipulates that the Members of the
College are the Minister competent for internal affairs, the Minister competent for digital affairs, the
Minister of National Defence, the Minister competent for foreign affairs, the Head of the Chancel-
lery of the Prime Minister, the Head of the National Security Bureau, if appointed by the President
of the Republic of Poland, the Minister—a Member of the Council of Ministers responsible for the
coordination of the activities of secret services or a person authorised by him or her with the rank of
a secretary of state or under-secretary of state, and if the Minister—a Member of the Council of
Ministers responsible for coordinating the activities of secret services has not been appointed—the
Head of the Internal Security Agency.
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at the domestic level and on the operation of the national cybersecurity system, and
also request information and opinions in this regard from Members of the
Government.34
The Plenipotentiary may, after securing the opinion of the College, issue, change
or revoke a recommendation to use IT devices or software, in particular with regard
to the impact on public security or an important interest of state security. The entity
within the national cybersecurity system may raise objections to the Plenipotentiary
regarding recommendations on the use of IT devices or software, if they are having a
negative impact on the service provided or the public task implemented, no later than
within 7 days from the date of receipt of the recommendation. It is crucial that in the
justification for the objection, the entity must indicate and substantiate the negative
impact of the recommendation on the service provided or the task implemented.
Objections to the recommendation may be made by any of the entities in the national
cybersecurity system, i.e. each of the entities listed in Article 4. The Plenipotentiary
shall address the doubts immediately, but not later than within 14 days from the date
of their receipt, and uphold the recommendations regarding the use of IT devices or
software, or issue revised recommendations. The entity in the national cybersecurity
system informs the Plenipotentiary, at his or her request, about the manner and scope
of taking into account the recommendations regarding the use of IT devices or
software. In the event that the recommendation regarding the use of IT devices or
software is not being taken into account, this would be the basis for the Plenipoten-
tiary to contact the authority supervising the entity to inform it about their failure to
do so.35
IT security testing of the hardware or software used may be performed by each of
the three national-level CSIRTs, i.e. CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV.
It is reasonable to assume that the testing may be started at the CSIRT's own
initiative, or at the request of the College for Cybersecurity or the Plenipotentiary
for Cybersecurity. The CSIRT is not bound by the submitted testing application, and
its initiation remains at the sole discretion of the CSIRT. The purpose of the study is
to identify the vulnerabilities which, when taken advantage of, might affect public
security or an important interest of state security.36
The Plenipotentiary issues a recommendation after securing the opinion of the
College for Cybersecurity on the basis of an application submitted by the appropriate
CSIRT regarding the use of IT devices or software. As a consequence, when a
vulnerability which may affect public safety, or an important national security
interest, is detected, the CSIRT which discovered the vulnerability is obligated to
request a recommendation. Therefore, it is unacceptable to issue a recommendation
without the College’s opinion. The Plenipotentiary also has the power to change or
revoke a recommendation, but the change to or revocation of a recommendation also
34Article 67(1) NCSA.
35Article 33(4-8) NCSA. More on the scope of the individual activities of CSIRT Nowikowska
(2019), pp. 191–210.
36Prusak-Górnicka and Silicki (2019a).
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requires the opinion of the College. The provisions of the Code of Administrative
Procedure do not apply to issuing recommendations, and the form in which they are
issued is not a form of administrative decision. Therefore, no complaint may be
lodged with the administrative court.37 Such recommendations are abstract in nature.
In the light of the regulations, it should be assumed that the Plenipotentiary should
inform all entities in the national cybersecurity system that can be affected by the
vulnerability of issuing the recommendation, using for that action the CSIRT
communication channels and the authorities competent for cybersecurity.38
As part of his or her competences, the Plenipotentiary may submit to the Council
of Ministers proposals and recommendations regarding actions which should be
taken by entities within the national cybersecurity system in order to ensure cyber-
security at the domestic level, and to counteract threats in this regard.39
The Plenipotentiary draws up and submits to the Council of Ministers, by
31 March each year, a report on the previous calendar year containing information
on activities which involve ensuring cybersecurity at the domestic level.
The College operates under the Council of Ministers, and its responsibilities are
prescribed by law. These comprise the following.
(1) Policies and plans for counteracting cybersecurity threats.
(2) The performance by CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, and the Head of the Internal
Security Agency of duties under CSIRT GOV, the sectoral cybersecurity teams,
and the authorities competent for cybersecurity of duties entrusted to them in
accordance with the policies and plans for counteracting cybersecurity threats.
(3) Cooperation between the managing or supervisory bodies of CSIRT MON,
CSIRT GOV, and CSIRT NASK.
(4) Cooperation between CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK entities, the Head of the
Internal Security Agency, and the Minister—a Member of the Council of
Ministers responsible for coordinating the activities of special services, sectoral
cybersecurity teams, and the authorities competent for cybersecurity.
37Ibidem. The lack of authority to lodge a complaint to the Provincial Administrative Court is
limited by Article 3 of the Law on proceedings before administrative courts, as well as by the fact
that the recommendation is abstract and does not decide about rights and obligations.
38Prusak-Górnicka and Silicki (2019b).
39Article 63 NCSA. The indicated Regulation of the Council of Ministers also includes the duties of
the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity. These comprise the following. (1) The analysis
and assessment of cybersecurity on the basis of aggregated data and the indicators developed with
the participation of the government administration authorities and computer security incident
response teams operating at the Ministry of National Defence, the Internal Security Agency, and
the Scientific and Academic Computer Network—the National Research Institute. (2) Developing
new solutions and initiating cybersecurity activities at the domestic level. (3) Issuing opinions on
draft legal acts and other government documents affecting the fulfilment of cybersecurity duties.
(4) Conducting and coordinating activities carried out by government administration authorities
aimed at increasing public awareness of the threats to cybersecurity and the safe use of the Internet.
(5) Initiating national cybersecurity exercises. See §2 (2) of the Regulation of the Council of
Ministers of 18 March 2018 on the appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for
Cybersecurity.
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(5) The organisation of the exchange of information pertaining to cybersecurity and
the international position of the Republic of Poland between government admin-
istration agencies.
(6) Proposals from CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV regarding rec-
ommendations on the use of IT devices or software.40
Along with the Prime Minister as the Chair, and the Plenipotentiary for Cyber-
security, the College comprises the Secretary of the College and the Members.
Under the Act the following Ministers are the Members: the Minister competent
for domestic affairs, the Minister competent for digital affairs, the Minister of
National Defence, and the Minister competent for foreign affairs, as well as the
Minister—a Member of the Council of Ministers responsible for coordinating the
activities of the secret services or a person authorised by them in the rank of secretary
of state or under-secretary of state, and if the Minister—a Member of the Council of
Ministers responsible for the coordination of the activities of the secret services—has
not been appointed—the Head of the Internal Security Agency. The Members may
also include the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the Head of the
National Security Bureau, if appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland.41
Depending on the needs and the subject of the sessions, the meetings of the College
are also attended by the Director of the Government Centre for Security, the Head of
the Internal Security Agency or his or her Deputy, the Head of the Military
Counterintelligence Service or his or her Deputy, the Director of the Scientific and
Academic Computer Network—the National Research Institute.
The responsibilities of the College include the development of recommendations
for the Council of Ministers regarding cybersecurity activities at the domestic level.
On the basis of these recommendations, the Prime Minister, in order to coordinate
the activities of the government administration, may issue binding guidelines on
ensuring cybersecurity at the domestic level, and the operation of the national
cybersecurity system, and also request information and opinions in this regard.
The Prime Minister issues binding guidelines for CSIRT MON, CSIRT GOV, and
CSIRT NASK related to handling critical incidents, including the designation of the
CSIRT responsible for handling a specific critical incident.42
4 Summary
Within the scope of his or her activities, a Plenipotentiary coordinates the activities
of entities and bodies with authority in cybersecurity. In a closed catalogue, the Act
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assessment of the process of the functioning of the national cybersecurity system,
and on issuing recommendations. The legislators did not provide the Plenipotentiary
with the responsibilities of a public-administrative authority, thus emphasising its
character as a coordinator—not a manager—of cybersecurity activities. It is also
related to the legal nature of actions taken by the Plenipotentiary, which do not
display the characteristics of an administrative decision, i.e. they exclude the appli-
cation of the Code of Administrative Procedure. The fact that the Plenipotentiary is
not designated as a public-administration authority is also related to the legal status
of the Government Plenipotentiary, which, under the Act on the Council of Minis-
ters, becomes a secretary or an under-secretary of state. The College, established as
an opinion-giving and advisory body, does not raise any doubts as to its legal status.
At present, it is still difficult to assess the activities of both the Plenipotentiary for
Cybersecurity and the College. The creation of the cybersecurity system, and the
implementation of solutions and recommendations, is ongoing, so it takes time to
make a substantive assessment of the activities of the discussed entities, as well as
the legal solutions.
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Part III
Obligations of Other Entities Included in
the National Cybersecurity System
(“Participants” of the National
Cybersecurity System)
Tasks of Operators of Essential Services
and Digital Service Providers
Katarzyna Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
Abstract Public tasks for cyberspace security occupy an important place in the
National Security System of the Republic of Poland. The responsibility for ensuring
cybersecurity lies with all network users, but public administration authorities play a
significant role, with one of the basic tasks being activities to ensure public security
and order. In the conditions of arrangements for the implementation of public tasks
for national security, with particular emphasis on the specification of public tasks in
the area of critical infrastructure protection, it is important to determine the catalogue
of entities performing public tasks in the field of cyberspace security. It should be
noted that these entities may be public entities performing public tasks, private
entities performing public tasks based on the privatisation of public task implemen-
tation, and private entities performing their own tasks that are of significant public
interest, or which were once carried out as public tasks but were subject to
privatisation.
The opportunities afforded by new technologies, and the resulting necessity to adapt
the administrative and legal system, are key issues concerning the development of
modern public management and ensuring the security of ICT networks. Public
authorities have become obligated to provide electronic services to citizens, covering
both the handling of citizens’ affairs and other areas of public administration
functioning, not excluding the decision-making process. The computerisation pro-
cesses in public administration are accompanied by changes associated with the
state-citizen relationship. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in the initial period of
the development of computerisation, digitalisation occurred mainly in organisational
units, which based their activities on processing significant amounts of data. The first
IT applications were implemented in the financial and accounting departments,
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where IT services for public institutions were provided.1 Modern electronic tech-
nology facilitated data processing by means of the automation of certain work in
public administration. Therefore, “information technology is becoming an essential
tool for the efficiency of the administrative apparatus”.2 Thus, it can be concluded
that the current development of administrative procedures in Poland is being signif-
icantly influenced by constant and advanced technical progress. The influence of
new technical measures which have emerged in public administration is necessitat-
ing modifications to basic administrative-legal relations (individual-citizen), but is
also significant for inter-sectoral cooperation in the implementation of public tasks.
Cyberspace is a new sphere of influence of these processes. As cyberspace develops,
the threats occurring in it evolve. Cyberspace is nowadays a symbol of progress, but
also of freedom and privacy, and every interference in its functioning is associated
with an attack on these values. For the countries involved in developing the
information society, cybersecurity is considered to be one of the most serious
challenges for the national security system. It involves the security of both the entire
state establishment and individual citizens. Therefore, public tasks in cybersecurity
occupy an important position in the Polish National Security System. The respon-
sibility for ensuring cybersecurity rests with all network users; however, a significant
role is played by public administration authorities, one of whose primary tasks is to
ensure security and public order. In terms of arrangements regarding the implemen-
tation of public tasks for national security, with particular emphasis on the definition
of public tasks in the sphere of critical infrastructure protection, it is important to
establish a directory of entities performing public tasks in the field of cyberspace
security. Furthermore, it should be noted that these entities may be public entities
performing public tasks, private entities undertaking public tasks on the basis of the
privatisation of public tasks, or private entities carrying out their own tasks, which
are significant for the public interest, or which used to be performed as public tasks,
but were subject to privatisation. Subsequently, the issue of intersectoral cooperation
is becoming increasingly important in the process of creating a uniform cybersecu-
rity system. The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience was launched
on the basis of the document COM (2009) 149. This platform has initiated activities
and increased cooperation between the public and private sectors in identifying key
resources, means, functions, and core requirements for resilience, as well as the need
for cooperation and mechanisms to respond to large-scale disruptions to electronic
communications. National network and information security authorities should
cooperate and exchange information with other regulatory authorities, in particular
data protection authorities. Responsible NIS authorities should also report major
incidents which might be criminal in nature to law-enforcement authorities. Com-
petent national authorities should also regularly publish, on a dedicated website,
non-classified information on current early warnings of incidents and threats, and
coordinated responses. Legal obligations should not replace or prevent informal or
1Pawłowski (2002), p. 85.
2Knosala et al. (1996), p. 126.
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voluntary cooperation, including between the public and private sectors, aimed at
increasing security and exchanging information and best practices. A particularly
important and useful platform at the EU level to be developed is the European
Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R15). Pursuant to recital 9 of the
Preamble to the Directive, certain sectors of the economy are already regulated, or
may in the future be regulated, by sector-specific Union legal acts which incorporate
provisions on NIS security.
The Act of 5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System under the pro-
visions of the NIS Directive, introduced the concept of an essential service, which
means a service which is crucial for maintaining critical social or economic activi-
ties, listed in the register of essential services. Additionally, the Act introduced the
concept of a digital service, which means a service provided electronically within the
meaning of the provisions of the Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by
Electronic Means,3 listed in Annex No. 2 to the Act. The Act on the Provision of
Services by Electronic Means assumes that such a service is characterised by the fact
that it is provided at a distance, without the simultaneous presence of the parties
(remotely), through the transmission of data, at the individual request of the recipient
of the service, transmitted and received by means of devices for electronic
processing, including digital compression, and the storage of data, which is entirely
transmitted or received by means of a telecommunications network within the
meaning of the Act of 16 July 2004—Telecommunications Law.4
With regard to the digital service, the Act also determines the entity providing the
digital service, which is the digital service provider, i.e. a legal person, or an
organisational unit without a legal personality, with its registered office or manage-
ment bodies in the Republic of Poland, or a representative with an organisational unit
in the Republic of Poland, providing the digital service, with the exception of micro
and small businesses, as referred to in Article 7(1)(1) and (2) of the Act of 6 March
2018—The Entrepreneurs Law.5
The types of digital services are defined in Annex No. 2 to the Act, including
Internet trading platform—a service which enables consumers or entrepreneurs to
conclude contracts electronically with entrepreneurs on the website of the trading
platform, or on the website of the entrepreneur who is using the services provided by
the Internet trading platform (e.g. Allegro, ING Usługi dla Biznesu S.A.—ALEO.
COM, B2B platform automicob2b.pl); Cloud-computing service—a service which
provides access to a scalable and flexible set of computing resources for shared use
by multiple users (e.g. Cloud for Business—ergonet.pl, Amazon Web Services,
3Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means, consolidated text, Polish Journal
of Laws of 2020, item 344, as amended.
4Act of 16 July 2004—Telecommunications Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2019,
item 2460, as amended.
5Act of 6 March 2018—The Entrepreneurs Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2019,
item 1292 hereinafter referred to as “EL”.
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Google Cloud Platform, Microsoft Azure, private and hybrid6); and Internet search
engine—a service which allows users to search all websites or web pages in a given
language by means of a query, by providing a key word, phrase, or other element,
referring to information related to the query providing access through a link.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying
down rules for application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament
and of the Council as regards further specification of the elements to be taken into
account by digital service providers for managing the risks posed to the security of
network and information systems and of the parameters for determining whether an
incident has a substantial impact, specifies the procedures and determines the
operating conditions for digital service providers. Pursuant to Article 4, an incident
is considered to have a significant impact if at least one of the following situations
has occurred: (a) the service delivered by the digital service provider has been
unavailable for more than 5,000,000 user-hours, whereby the term “user-hour” refers
to the number of affected users in the Union for sixty minutes; (b) the incident has
led to a loss of integrity, authenticity, or confidentiality of stored, transmitted, or
processed data, or related services presented or accessible via the digital service
provider’s network and information systems affecting more than 100,000 users in
the EU; (c) the incident has created a risk to public safety or a risk of fatalities; (d) the
incident has caused material damage to at least one user in the Union where the
damage caused to that user exceeds EUR 1,000,000.
6Colocation is the oldest and straightforward form of service in the cloud. It involves renting a
server room, with access to electricity, air conditioning, and the Internet. Other components—
hardware, security (firewalls), load management, operating systems, software and applications, are
paid for by the user company. Therefore, it is a fee for lending space in a server room.
IaaS—Infrastructure as a Service—a model consisting of providing the customer with an IT
infrastructure, i.e. hardware, software, and maintenance. For example, the customer purchases a
specific number of servers, disk space, or a specific amount of memory and computing power.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the hardware will be physically installed on the customer’s
premises. In this model, it happens that the customer is supplying the service provider with its own
software, to be installed on the rented hardware.
PaaS—Platform as a Service—the sale of a ready-made, often customised, set of applications.
There is no need to purchase hardware or install software. All the necessary programs are located on
the provider’s servers. The client gets access to the interface (usually in the form of a standardised
working environment) through a program, e.g. a web browser. In this model, services are usually
available to the user from any computer connected to the Internet.
SaaS—Software as a Service—The customer receives specific, selected software functions.
They use any software they need. For this reason, they are not interested in hardware or the working
environment. They only have access to specific, functional tools—not necessarily connected to each
other through a uniform interface. The programs run on the provider’s server. The customer is not
obliged to purchase a licence for them. He or she only pays for each use of them, and access to such
tools is granted on request.
CaaS—Communications as a Service—The service provider delivers a platform for a telecom-
munications work environment.
iPaaS—Integration Platform as a Service—A platform which provides integration between
different services in the Cloud.
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The tasks of a digital service provider include: (1) security of information systems
and facilities; (2) incident handling; (3) business continuity management of the
provider to provide a digital service; (4) monitoring, auditing, and testing; (5) the
latest state of the art, including compliance with international standards as referred to
in Implementing Regulation 2018/151.
1. Security of systems and facilities, as referred to in Article 16(1)(a) of the NIS
Directive, means the security of network and information systems and their
physical environment, and includes the following elements:
(a) The systematic management of network and information systems—mapping
information systems and establishing a set of appropriate policies for infor-
mation security management, including risk analysis, human resources, oper-
ational security, security architecture, data security, system lifecycle
management, and, where appropriate, encryption and management
(b) Physical and environmental security—the availability of a set of measures to
protect the security of digital service providers’ networks, and information
systems, against damage, using a holistic risk-based approach to threats,
which takes into account, for example, system failures, human errors, mali-
cious actions, and natural phenomena
(c) Security of supplies—establishing and maintaining the appropriate policies to
guarantee the availability, and, where appropriate, the traceability, of critical
supplies used to provide services
(d) Controls on access to network and information systems—the availability of a
set of measures intended to ensure that physical access and logical access to
network and information systems, including the administrative security of
network and information systems, are authorised and restricted based on
business and security requirements.
2. With regard to incident management, referred to in Article 16(1)(b) of the NIS
Directive, measures taken by the digital service provider shall include:
(a) maintaining and testing detection processes and procedures to ensure timely
and appropriate intelligence on unusual events; (b) processes and policies for
reporting incidents and identifying shortcomings and weaknesses in its IT sys-
tems; (c) reacting in accordance with established procedures and reporting on the
results of the measures taken; (d) assessing the significance of a given incident,
documenting the intelligence gained from incident analysis, and gathering rele-
vant information which can provide evidence and support the process of contin-
uous improvement.
3. Business continuity management, defined in Article 16(1)(c) of the NIS Direc-
tive—the ability of an organisation to maintain, or, where necessary, restore, its
services at predetermined acceptable levels after a disruption, which includes:
(a) establishing and applying contingency plans based on business impact ana-
lyses, to ensure the continuity of services delivered by digital service pro-
viders, which is assessed and tested at regular intervals, for example through
practice;
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(b) post-disaster recovery capabilities, which are evaluated and tested at regular
intervals, for example through practice.
4. Monitoring, auditing and testing referred to in Article 16(1)(d) of the NIS
Directive shall include the establishment and maintenance of policies involving:
(a) conducting planned sequences of observations or measurements to assess
whether network and information systems are operating as intended;
(b) inspections and verifications to determine whether a standard or a set of
guidelines is being applied, whether the records are accurate, and whether
efficiency and effectiveness targets are being fulfilled;
(c) a process aimed at revealing flaws in the security mechanisms of network and
information systems which serve to protect data and maintain functionality as
intended. This type of process includes technical processes and personnel
involved in the operation flow.
5. International standards pursuant to Article 16(1)(e) of the NIS Directive—stan-
dards adopted by the international standardisation body referred to in Article 2(1)
(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council. According to Article 19 of the NIS Directive, European or recognised
international standards and specifications relevant to the security of network and
information systems, including existing national standards, may also be
implemented.
6. Digital service providers shall ensure that the appropriate documentation is made
available to the competent authority for the purposes of verifying compliance
with the safeguards set out in 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
In the field of its responsibilities, the digital service provider:
(1) undertakes activities which allow the detection, recording, analysis, and classi-
fication of incidents;
(2) provides, to the extent necessary, access to information for the appropriate
CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV about incidents classified as
critical by the respective CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV;
(3) qualifies the incident as significant;
(4) reports a significant incident immediately, no later than 24 hours after detection,
to the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV;
(5) ensures the handling of a significant incident and critical incident in cooperation
with the respective CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV, furnishing
the necessary information, including personal data;
(6) removes vulnerabilities;
(7) communicates to the operator of essential services which supplies the essential
service through that digital service provider information about any incident
affecting the continuity of the essential service of that operator.
The NIS Directive introduces a definition of the concept of “operators of essential
services”, according to which it is a public or private entity, belonging to one of the
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types referred to in Annex II of the Directive, fulfilling the criteria stipulated in
Article 5(2) of the Directive, i.e.:
(a) the entity provides a service which is fundamental to maintaining critical social
or economic activity
(b) the provision of this service depends on network and information systems and
(c) the incident would have a significantly disruptive effect on the provision of this
service.
The concept of services is defined in Article 57 of the TFEU,7 and means
“benefits normally provided for remuneration, to the extent that they are not covered
by the provisions on the free movement of goods, capital and persons”. The
definition of services contained in primary law is negative. Services include, in
particular, (a) industrial activities; (b) commercial activities; (c) craftspersons’ activ-
ities; (d) performing independent professions.
The operator of an essential service is an entity referred to in Annex No. 1 to the
Act, which has an organisational unit on the territory of the Republic of Poland, in
respect to which the competent authority for cybersecurity issues has issued a
decision granting the status of an operator of essential services. Sectors, subsectors,
and types of entity are defined in Annex No. 1 to the Act. In these circumstances, the
so-called essential services have been assigned in the field relevant to cybersecurity.
According to recital 19 of the Directive, Member States should be responsible for
determining which entities meet the definition of an operator of essential services. To
ensure a coherent approach, the definition of the operator of essential services should
be applied consistently by all Member States. The NIS Directive provides for the
assessment of operators in specific sectors and subsectors; the preparation of an
inventory of essential services; the consideration of a common list of cross-sectoral
factors to determine whether a possible incident could have a significantly disruptive
effect; a consultation process involving the relevant Member States in the case of
operators providing services in more than one Member State; and support from the
cooperation group in the identification of operators. The operators of essential
services shall guarantee an increase in the level of security of the services provided
through the introduction of the effective management of the cybersecurity system,
and the protection of the entities providing services in the field of cybersecurity.
The concept of service should not include services to which the Treaty’s pro-
visions on the exchange of goods, and the movement of capital and persons, do not
apply. The service will therefore include all activities performed for remuneration
which serve or accompany the exchange of goods and the free movement of capital
and persons, including the services of so-called online intermediaries, which provide
Internet-access services as well as hosting services or services by providers of
platforms storing data from users and data-encryption services. The Polish regulation
indicates the necessity for the service provider to have a key organisational unit
7The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 26 October 2012, OJ EU 2012 L 326/47.
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located on the territory of Poland. The Civil Code8 indicates in Article 41, in relation
to legal persons, and correspondingly in Article 331 in relation to organisational units
without a legal personality to which the Act grants legal capacity, that the registered
office is the place where their governing body is located. Each Member State shall
establish a list of services, and, where an operator provides a service which is
essential for maintaining critical social or economic activities, in two or more
Member States, those Member States shall consult each other. This consultation
occurs before the identification decision is taken (Article 5(4) of the NIS Directive).
In accordance with recital 20 of the Preamble to the Directive, in the process of
identifying operators of essential services, Member States should assess, at least for
each subsector referred to in this Directive, which services must be considered
essential for the maintenance of critical social and economic activities, and whether
entities within sectors and subsectors, and the providers of those services, meet the
criteria for identifying operators. While evaluating whether an entity provides a
service which is critical to maintaining vital social or economic activity, it is
sufficient to examine whether the entity provides a service which is included in the
list of essential services. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated that the provision of
the essential service depends on network and information systems. Additionally,
when assessing whether an incident could have a significantly disruptive effect on
the provision of a service, Member States should take into consideration a number of
cross-sectoral, and, where appropriate, sectoral factors.
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Directive, Member States shall take into account at
least the following cross-sectoral factors when determining the significance of the
disruptive effect: (a) the number of users dependent on the service provided by the
entity; (b) the dependence of the other sectors specified in Annex II on the service
provided by the entity; (c) the impact which incidents—in terms of their scale and
duration—could have on economic and social activity or public security; (d) the
market share of this entity; (e) the geographical coverage related to the area which
could be affected by the incident; (f) the importance of the entity in maintaining a
sufficient level of service, taking into account the availability of alternative means of
providing this service. In order to determine whether an incident would have a
significantly disruptive effect, Member States are required to take into consideration
sectoral factors, where appropriate. These guidelines were taken into consideration
in the secondary legislation to the Act. In accordance with the Regulation of the
Council of Ministers of 31 October 2018 on serious incidents thresholds, the
parameters to be taken into account to determine whether the impact of the incident
is significant include the number of users affected by the disruption of the essential
service; the timing of the impact of the incident on the essential service provided; the
geographical coverage of the area affected by the incident, and other factors specific
to the subsector; also whether the incident caused at least one of the following
circumstances:
8The Civil Code, consolidated text of the Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1740, as amended,
hereinafter referred to as CC.
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(a) the death of a person,
(b) serious damage to health,
(c) other than serious damage to the health of more than one person, and
(d) financial losses exceeding PLN 250,000.
For the identification of operators of essential services, holding an organisational
unit in a Member State involves the need to operate efficiently and effectively
through stable structures. The legal form of such structures, whether a branch or a
subsidiary with legal personality, is not a determining factor in this respect
(recital 21).
The process for identifying operators of essential services is specified in Article
5 of the Directive. Member States were required to identify, for each sector and
subsector referred to in Annex II, by 9 November 2018 at the latest, the operators of
essential services with an organisational unit on its territory.
The Polish legislators follow the definition from the NIS Directive, and therefore
the operator of essential services is an entity which meets all the following
conditions:
(1) will be one of the entities listed in the Annex to the Act,
(2) will provide the essential service listed in the inventory of essential services,
(3) the provision of this service will depend on information systems,
(4) the incident would have a significantly disruptive effect on its performance.
Consequently, the operator of essential services is a party to the rights and
obligations under the Act, regardless of whether it has entrusted to another entity
activities related to the provision of the essential service. Therefore, all issues of
responsibility sharing between the various entities should be regulated internally by
these bodies. An important element in the decision, as evidence of the will of the
administrative authority, is the decisive resolution of the matter covered by the
motion initiating the proceedings. It should be explained that a case may only be
settled (within the meaning of Article 104(1) and (2) of the Code of Administrative
Procedure—CAP) by a public administration authority if the facts have been duly
established. For this reason, in Article 7 of CAP, the legislators assigned to the
necessity of establishing the objective truth the status of the principle of adminis-
trative proceedings. Therefore, it is the duty of the authority to conduct the submis-
sion of evidence in such a way as to result in the creation of actual grounds for
adopting the legal basis for the settlement. Undoubtedly, a defective establishment
(or failure to establish) of facts relevant to the case prevents the authority from
issuing an appropriate decision. Otherwise, an administrative decision—in accor-
dance with Article 104 of CAP—resolves the case on its merits within the limits of
the demand specified by the parties. The decision in administrative proceedings, on
the other hand, consists of applying the applicable law to the established facts of an
administrative case. Therefore, the public administration authority pursues the
objective of the administrative procedure, which is to implement the applicable
legal standard for administrative and legal relations, when these relations require
such a measure. According to this objective of the administrative procedure, also the
essence of the administrative decision can be distinguishing between the factual
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basis and the legal basis of the administrative decision. The factual basis is the
findings of facts made by a public administration authority, while the legal basis is
those legislative provisions which the authority has accepted as binding in a given
case, and applied in its ruling.9 Establishing the actual implementation of the
conditions indicated above enables an administrative decision to be made in the
context of establishing the status of the operator of essential services.
The status of the operator of essential services should be determined by means of
a decision. The legislators have not specified that it is this particular form; however,
it should be assumed that if the legal situation of a particular entity is determined, it is
an administrative decision. An administrative decision is considered to be a decla-
ration of will of an administrative body which has legal effects in the sphere of the
administrative-legal relationship (the formation, modification or expiry of that rela-
tionship).10 If a standard of substantive administrative law requires concretisation,
the form of administrative decision is considered to be the form of such
concretisation. This applies also in this case. For the operator to be recognised in
its field of operation, an administrative decision must be issued. Hence, the decision
is an act of authority, issued by an authorised body.11 Article 104(2) of CAP
provides that decisions shall resolve the case as to its substance in whole or in
part; or otherwise the case will be closed at a given level. This interpretation of the
form of operation of the public administration body derives from Article 2 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which states that the Republic of Poland is a
democratic legal state which follows the principles of social justice. According to the
court, “From the principle of a democratic state of law, the judicial doctrine and
jurisprudence derives two principles of paramount importance for the formation of
the rights of the individual in relation to public administration, and thus for the
interpretation of the law: the principle of the right to a trial and the principle of the
right to a court. The essence of the principle of the right to a trial is to grant an
individual the right to defend his or her legal interests in proceedings governed by
procedural law. The principle of the right to a trial is of fundamental importance for
the interpretation of the substantive law provisions on the form of settlement,
towards the adoption of the principle of settling an individual’s affairs in the form
of an administrative decision when the substantive administrative law provision does
not assume another form of settlement on an expressis verbis basis. The Code of
Administrative Procedure does not contain a legal definition of the term “adminis-
trative decision”. However, it is assumed by legal commentators and in judicial
decisions that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1(1) of the CAP, it
follows that an administrative decision is a sovereign manifestation of the will of a
9Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Katowice of 5 April 2013. File No. III APa 55/12 LEX
No. 1313277.
10Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 25 April 2012, File No. I OSK 654/11 LEX
No. 1264894.
11Cf. judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 April 2000, I CKN 582/98, LEX No. 50843, Borkowski
(1996), p. 439.
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public-administration authority, issued in proceedings pending before that authority
in an individual administrative case, and constitutes its decision. Administrative
decisions are the basic form of action of public administration authorities, and are
therefore the primary object of appeal in administrative court proceedings. A
complaint to the administrative court is available both against administrative deci-
sions issued under the Code of Administrative Procedure and against decisions
issued under another procedure regulating jurisdictional proceedings, i.e., against
decisions in cases in which, pursuant to Article 3 of CAP, jurisdictional proceedings
have been excluded from the scope of the Code of Administrative Procedure
(exclusions of applications of the Act). The situation of the adoption of the decision
in question for an administrative decision has an impact on the entity’s rights to take
appeal actions, which can hinder the process of determining the list of operators of
essential services.
Furthermore, it shall be possible for operators in the sectors and subsectors
referred to in this Directive to provide both essential and non-essential services.
For the purposes of identifying operators, Member States should therefore establish a
list of services which they consider to be essential (such a list is specified in Annex
No. 1 to the Act).
According to Article 41 of the Act, the authorities competent for cybersecurity
matters are:
(1) for the energy sector—the Minister competent for energy issues
(2) for the transport sector, excluding the water transport subsector—the Minister
competent for transport
(3) for the water-transport subsector—the Minister competent for the maritime
economy and the Minister competent for inland navigation
(4) for the banking sector and infrastructure of financial markets—the Polish
Financial-Supervision Authority
(5) for the healthcare sector, excluding the entities mentioned in Article 26(5)—the
Minister competent for health matters
(6) for the healthcare sector covering the entities mentioned in Article 26(5)—the
Minister of National Defence
(7) for the drinking water supply and distribution sector—the Minister competent
for water management
(8) for the digital infrastructure sector, excluding the entities referred to in Article
26(5)—the Minister competent for digital affairs.
(9) for the digital infrastructure sector including the entities referred to in Article 26
(5)—the Minister of National Defence
(10) for digital service providers, excluding the entities mentioned in Article 26
(5)—the Minister competent for digital affairs.
(11) for digital service providers including the entities mentioned in Article 26(5)—
the Minister of National Defence.
(12) for entites subordinated to the Minister of National Defence or supervised by
him, including those whose communication and information systems or net-
works are covered by a uniform list of objects, installations, devices, and
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services included in the critical infrastructure referred to in Article 5b(7)(1) of
the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management; and
(13) Entrepreneurs of particular economic and defensive importance, in respect of
whom the Minister of National Defence is the authority organising and super-
vising the performance of tasks for the benefit of state defence, within the
meaning of Article 5(3) of the Act of 23 August 2001 on the on the Organisa-
tion of Tasks for State Defence Performed by Enterprises.
It should be emphasised that, according to recital 45 of the preamble, the
Directive applies only to those public administrations which have been identified
as operators of essential services. However, Member States remain responsible for
ensuring the security of the network and information systems of public administra-
tions outside the scope of the NIS Directive.
Where an entity provides an essential service in other Member States of the
European Union, the authority competent for cybersecurity matters shall, in the
course of the administrative proceedings, consult with those states through the
Single Points of Contact to determine whether the entity is recognised as an operator
of an essential service in those states. In accordance with Article 5(4) of the
Directive, where an operator provides a service referred to in 2(a) in two or more
Member States, those Member States shall consult each other. Such consultation
shall take place before a decision on classification is taken. This provision is
equivalent to the procedure for identifying an operator of essential services as
stipulated in the Directive. For the purposes of the identification process, where an
entity provides an essential service in two or more Member States, these states
should engage in bilateral or multilateral discussions among themselves.
In relation to an entity which no longer meets the conditions, the competent
authority for cybersecurity shall issue a judgment stating that the decision to consider
an operator of essential services has expired.
The content of the provision of Article 162(1) of CAP states
a public-administration authority is obliged to determine the expiry of a decision if the
following conditions are jointly met:
(a) the decision became pointless,
(b) the decision shall be declared void by a provision of law or the declaration of voidness is
in the public interest or in the interests of a party.
An administrative decision which establishes the status of an operator of essential
services is not indefinite. When the operator no longer meets the conditions, the
authority issues a new decision, this time determining the expiry of the previous one.
Similarly as the decision determining the status of an operator of essential services,
the decision determining its expiry is subject to all CAP regulations. There is no
doubt that in the event of a legal provision’s ordering the decision to expire, a public
administration authority is obliged to examine whether the conditions listed in this
provision are being met. A ruling to grant the status of an essential service, or a
decision to rescind such a decision, is immediately enforceable. The requirement of
immediate enforceability is regulated in Article 108(1) and (2) of CAP. The essence
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of the immediate enforceability of administrative decisions is that the decision
becomes enforceable, and constitutes an enforcement order, although it is not
final. According to the above-mentioned standard, the rigour of immediate enforce-
ability can be imposed ex-officio, or at the request of a party, only for a decision
against which an appeal is being lodged, i.e. against a non-conclusive decision. The
enforcement of a non-conclusive decision is exceptional; therefore the prerequisites
for making the decision immediately enforceable must not be interpreted in a
broadening but in a narrowing way. In the case of a regulation concerning the
administrative decision determining the status of an operator of essential services,
its immediate enforceability was established by law. This solution results from the
special status of the regulation of services which are important for security.
Article 7 of the National Cybersecurity System Act obliges the Minister compe-
tent for digital affairs to maintain a list of operators of essential services. This list is
created taking into consideration the division into sectors, subsectors, and types of
entities introduced by the Act. The entry into or removal from the list is declaratory
in nature, and will be a material and technical activity, implemented on the basis of
administrative decisions by the competent authorities, in terms of identifying oper-
ators of essential services in the relevant sectors. This provision also defines
the procedure for access to the information and the directory of entities in which
the information from the list will be made available. Recital 25 of the Preamble to the
Directive indicates the obligation to establish a list containing all operators of
essential services, or by adopting national measures containing objective quantita-
tive criteria, such as the end result of the operator’s activities or the number of users,
which make it possible to determine which entities are covered by obligations
relating to network and information system security.
The public register is an institution through which a registry authority with the
characteristics of a public body manages an official dataset, controls the reported
information, may modify it on its own, or request specific changes, and holds the
power to refuse to publish certain information with regard to its content.12 In the
traditional definition, maintaining the register and publishing the data included in it
can have certain legal effects, and this occurs when the public notification and
publication of the indicated data determines the effectiveness of a legal action.13
The information contained in the register is received, recorded, and made available
by means of a decision, which is an act of law, resulting in the registration.14 Such an
approach is primarily related to the nature of the register as a regulatory instrument in
the sphere of organising public administration activities. The registration system is
based on the state’s determination of the conditions. The registration procedure
involves the possibility of verifying whether the market-share requirements imposed
by law on interested parties are being fulfilled.
12Ganczar (2009), p. 99.
13Ganczar (2009), p. 100.
14Ganczar (2009), p. 632.
Tasks of Operators of Essential Services and Digital Service Providers 305
The regulatory model adopted in the Act assumes that the responsibilities of
sectoral institutions in the field of cybersecurity will be extended, instead of
establishing a single national entity for cybersecurity at the central level. Adminis-
trative, regulatory, and control responsibilities have been assigned to the Ministers
responsible for the sectors listed in the NIS Directive, namely energy, transport,
banking and financial institutions, healthcare, water supply, digital infrastructure,
and digital service providers (Article 41). Regarding the healthcare sector, digital
infrastructure, and digital service providers, the separate entities subordinated to or
supervised by the Minister of National Defence were taken into consideration.
Article 42 of the Act stipulated a schedule of tasks to be performed by the competent
authorities. These tasks include conducting analyses, issuing administrative deci-
sions granting the status of an operator of essential services, rescinding the status of
an operator of essential services, and monitoring the application of the Act by
operators of essential services, as well as digital service providers in their respective
sectors.
Data from the list of operators of essential services, to the extent necessary to
implement their statutory tasks, shall be made available by the Minister competent
for digital affairs, on request. The data are retained by units such as the police,
the courts, prosecutor’s offices, or other services for preventive purposes, for the
detection of criminal activities. The following authorities are entitled to use the data
under this provision: competent authorities in the field of cybersecurity, the courts,
prosecutor’s offices, the police, the Border Guard, the Military Police, the Military
Counter-Intelligence Service, the Internal Security Agency, the Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau the National Revenue Administration, the Government Security
Centre and the State Protection Service. Such data should be used primarily as a
source of information and evidence in criminal cases. Nonetheless, the institutions
listed here have the right to use the data in the performance of their statutory tasks,
also for preventive purposes. Public institutions very often benefit from such legal
possibilities. Within the activities of the institutions indicated here, so-called oper-
ational and investigative activities can be distinguished.
Operational and investigative activities are non-contentious. This limits judicial
control over their course—“the practice of the investigating service has been shaped
as complementary or executive activities in relation to procedural activities and the
tasks of preparatory proceedings”.15
The tasks of operators of essential services include the systematic assessment and
management of the risk of an incident.
Conducting systematic assessment and the management of incident risk. The first
obligation of the operator of essential services concerns the creation and implemen-
tation of a security management system in the information (ICT) system, and follows
from Article 14 of the Directive, according to which Member States shall ensure that
operators of essential services undertake appropriate and proportionate technical and
organisational measures to manage the risks to which their network and information
15See Szaff (1957), p. 38.
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systems are exposed. Taking into consideration the state of the art, these measures
must ensure a level of security of network and information systems commensurate
with the existing risks. Member States shall ensure that operators of essential
services adopt the appropriate measures to prevent and minimise the impact of
security incidents on the network and information systems used to provide such
essential services, with a view to ensuring the continuity of those services.
According to Article 4(9) of the NIS Directive, ‘risk’ means any reasonably identi-
fiable circumstance or event which has a potentially adverse impact on the security
of network and information systems. Management is primarily involved in
organising safety (defining safety requirements and the range of responsibilities,
and assigning organisational functions). Information- and communication-security
management is intended to ensure the security of information systems—here the
information system (i.e. the information and communication system referred to in
Article 3(3) of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations
of Entities Performing Public Tasks together with the data processed in electronic
form) of the data contained therein in a situation of many difficulties and adversities.
Among numerous conditions which hinder this protection, it can be mentioned that
communication and information systems are difficult to manage because they are
highly complex, fast, and extremely diverse in terms of technology; communication
and information systems and their environments are constantly changing; threats to
the environment are difficult to fully identify; the management processes are highly
diverse, interdisciplinary—there are often interrelationships which are not fully
understood; multiple issues are difficult to identify, and, due to the human factor
present here, also unpredictable. Risk assessment and the analysis of threats involves
the identification of threats, the vulnerability analysis of systems, and the develop-
ment and implementation of a comprehensive security plan (security policy). There-
fore, in order to ensure the security of the data, and the information systems in which
this information is processed, due to the complexity of these systems and processes,
and their interdependence and variability over time, conscious and coordinated
actions are required on the basis of the objectives set, i.e. to conduct a certain policy,
referred to as the security policy in this document. Resource protection involves
limiting the vulnerability of the system, and shielding it from threats by using
protective measures. On the other hand, the monitoring and detection of threats
involve all activities (e.g. notification) related to ensuring proper operations (includ-
ing protections). The reaction to an incident is any action related to the response to
the incident (security breach). Consequently, it must be assumed that the term
“information system security” means a level of reasonable confidence that the
potential losses resulting from the unauthorised (accidental or deliberate) disclosure,
modification, destruction, or rendering inoperable the processing of information
stored and transmitted through information and communication systems, will not
be incurred. Information and communication security must be considered in their
organisational, technical, and legal aspects. Thus, security is not a single act of
introducing protections, but a continuous, dynamic, and very complex process which
requires constant supervision and adaptation to fluctuating environmental condi-
tions. Under such conditions it seems necessary to manage the information-security
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system. The principles of risk management in the context of telecommunications
security can be discussed with reference to International Standards. The general
concepts of this management are specified in ISO/IEC 27001, which was developed
to support the effective implementation of a risk-management approach to security.
Understanding the concepts, models, processes, and terminology outlined in
ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 is crucial for understanding PN-ISO/IEC
27005:2014 Information Technology—Security Techniques—Risk Management
in Information Security. The International Standard is applicable to all types of
organisations (e.g., companies, governmental institutions, non-profit organisations)
which intend to manage the risks which can cause information-security breaches in
these organisations. Polish Standard PN-ISO/IEC 27005:2014 Information Technol-
ogy—Security Techniques—Risk Management in Information Security defines the
principles and methodology of risk management in security management systems
within the so-called essential services—in the sphere of threats from cyberspace.
Risk management should be understood as activities consisting of risk estimation,
risk handling, risk acceptance, risk monitoring, and risk communication. Where ISO
standards are applied, Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending
Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC,
95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC, and 2009/
105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Decision 87/95/EEC, and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council, text with EEA relevance, must be taken into consideration.16
Risk assessment—a comprehensive process of risk identification, analysis, and
assessment—is the task of a person or a team appointed by the operator of essential
services. Risk analysis includes the following steps: estimating the consequences,
assessing the probability of the incident, and determining the risk level. Conse-
quence estimation consists of considering what effects on information resources or
communication and information systems could be brought about by the
materialisation of threats, taking into account the vulnerability of resources or
systems. Incident risk assessment is to determine the frequency with which specific
incidents might occur. Statistics on similar events should also be taken into consid-
eration. This risk assessment, on the other hand, compares the designated risk levels
with predefined risk-acceptance criteria, and facilitates the determination of priorities
in risk management. Initial identification, i.e. risk diagnosis, is performed by the
person responsible for a given resource, and who passes the identification results to
the person responsible for performing the risk analysis. The whole process is
coordinated by the plenipotentiary for cybersecurity of the institution. If a
16Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and
Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/
EC, and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Decision 87/95/EEC, and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council, text with EEA relevance, OJ EU 2012 L 316/12.
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plenipotentiary is not appointed, the process is coordinated by the person designated
by the operator of essential services. The list of threats and vulnerabilities may be
extended as required by the operator of essential services, where the identification of
risks is conducted. Such risk identification shall be carried out periodically or on an
ad-hoc basis. Ad-hoc identification is performed when a threat to a system is
observed, where the horizon of materialisation is shorter than the periodic identifi-
cation of risks, and when a delay in identification would be significant for the system.
Ad-hoc identification is also undertaken in the event of an ICT incident’s resulting in
a catastrophic loss of information security. Specifically, risk identification is carried
out before the system is handed over for operation. Risk assessment is the process of
comparing risk values with specific criteria in order to determine the significance of
risk. Risk management is the coordinated management of cybersecurity in relation to
the estimated risk, which includes activities leading to a change in the level of risk
through applying protections, risk avoidance, risk transfer, and acceptance of risk
even if its level exceeds that of residual risk. The method of risk management is to
reduce the level of risk by means of a risk-control measure in the form of protections,
selected commensurately with the nature of such risk. Regarding the implementation
of public tasks, which is the subject of operators of essential services’ activities, risk
avoidance, as a rule, does not apply; neither does risk transfer. Nonetheless, the
transfer of risk may be justified in the form of the insurance of the assets of the
system. According to the standard, in situations in which the final risk level is less
than or equal to 20% of the maximum level (Rk  9.6) they are subject to automatic
acceptance, but remain under the supervision of the risk owner for monitoring
purposes. Risks for which the level is in the range of 9.6 < Rk  38.4 are subject
to acceptance according to the rules established in the entity, or are re-analysed.
Risks for which the level exceeds 80% of the maximum level (Rk > 38.4) are
submitted to the entity’s management for approval. Pursuant to recital 46 of the
Directive, risk-management measures include actions to identify, prevent, detect,
and deal with all risks of incidents and to mitigate their impact. The security of
network and information systems includes the security of stored, transmitted, and
processed data.
Another significant task is to implement technical and organisational measures
appropriate and proportional to the estimated risk, taking into account the latest state
of the art, including
(a) the maintenance and safe operation of the information system
(b) physical and environmental security, including access control
(c) the security and continuity of service delivery on which the provision of the
essential service depends
(d) implementing, documenting and maintaining action plans which facilitate the
continuous and uninterrupted provision of the essential service, and ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of information
(e) covering the information system employed to provide the essential service with a
continuous monitoring system.
According to recital 53 of the preamble to the Directive, in order to avoid
imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on the operators
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of essential services and digital service providers, the requirements should be
proportionate to the risks associated with the network and information system
concerned and should take into account the state of the art of such measures. An
essential task in ensuring the protection of systems is the application of the appro-
priate safeguards, proportional to the needs and objectives, i.e. also non-excessive
safeguards against the loss of security of the provision of essential services. These
protections take the form of technical and organisational measures. The legislators
have defined in general terms the actions to be taken by the operator of essential
services. Ensuring the continuity of service provision is the principal duty. This is
achieved by maintaining, documenting, and implementing plans to ensure the
provision of the essential service, and the confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and authenticity of information; the maintenance and secure operation of the infor-
mation system; physical and environmental security, including access control,
security and continuity of service delivery on which the provision of the essential
service depends; and the inclusion of the information system used to provide the
essential service under a continuous monitoring system. Consequently, the reduction
of the risk level is performed in the process of dealing with the risk. The basic
method of dealing with risk in the case of operators of essential services is to apply
safeguards in the form of continuous monitoring, i.e. in the 24/7 system. The
application of a security feature must take into account its impact on the other
security attributes and may in itself be a risk factor. For example, the application
of security measures to limit the risk of losing the confidentiality of information can
increase the risk of loss of availability. Especially in the process of risk management,
it is of particular importance to determine the category of safeguards. According to
the security characteristics, the goal of a secure information and communication
system is achieved through (1) covering the communication and information system
with the process of risk management for the security of essential services provided in
the communication and information system; (2) the limitation of reliability,
consisting of treating other communication and information systems as potential
sources of threats, and implementing safeguards in the communication and infor-
mation system to control the exchange of services with these communication and
information systems; (3) the introduction of multi-level protection of the communi-
cation and information system, consisting of the application of protections on as
many different levels of organisation of the communication and information system
protection as possible, in order to limit the occurrence of cases in which breaking a
single protection results in a breach.17 Another responsibility of operators of
17Examples of protections against threats to the communication and information system resulting
from cyberspace include:
Hazard category: Malicious code penetration from WAN
Building the network topology with consideration of safe and demilitarised zones (DMZ)
Network address translation
Firewalls configured according to the principle “everything is forbidden except what is allowed”
AV-class software at the interconnection of WAN and LAN
IDS/IPS-class systems
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essential services is to collect information about cybersecurity threats. In accordance
with the methodology of cyberspace risk management in government information
PROXY servers (including maintaining a blacklist of URLs and IP addresses)
Spam detection and blocking
Procedures for the maintenance of the protections listed in items 3–6
Procedures for responding to detected incidents
Hazard category: Malicious code entry from LAN
AV-class software on workstations
Blocking USB ports on workstations
Supervision over unused LAN terminations
DHCP server access authorisation
Disabling software installation by users
Verifying installed software on workstations
Software upgrade procedures (patch installation)
Hazard category: DDoS or DoS attack
Network-traffic monitoring
Using content delivery networks (CDN)
Switching to static versions of the service after detecting a DDoS/DoS attack
Agreements with Internet-access providers containing clauses transferring obligations relating to
actions against an attack on the provider
Blocking network traffic from specific IP addresses
Procedures in the event of detecting a DDoS/DoS attack
Hazard category: Unauthorised access to information
Procedures for granting and withdrawing privileges in the system
Procedures for reviewing authorisations in systems
Applying the need-to-know principle
Distribution of authorisation (the “eight-eyes” principle)
Hazard category: Inappropriate use of the system by the user
Initial training for new employees
Periodic training for employees currently working in the company
Implementation of applications verifying the quality of entered data
Hazard category: Breaching access security inside the system
Blocking the possibility for the user to install software
Hardening of workstations (elimination of unnecessary operating-system functions and
applications)
Blocking the possibility of starting an operating system from a removable drive
Verification whether only acceptable software is available on the workstation
Periodic reviews of workstation logs by administrators
Procedures for handling detected anomalies and ways of documenting such handling
Hazard category: Data eavesdropping, data interception
Application of zoning
Application of equipment with reduced compromising emanations
Room shielding
Network cabling in closed channels, supervision of patch panels
Using fibre-optic cables instead of galvanic connections
Supervision over unused LAN terminations (disconnection of unused terminations on patch panels)
Hazard category: System of operators of essential services as a source of interference in cyberspace
Outgoing-traffic supervision
Procedures for responding to botnet detection in an entity’s network
Procedures for responding to spamming attempts
Detection of illegal activities by internal users of the system
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security management systems and ISO standards, the following categories of inci-
dents in interactions between communication and information systems and cyber-
space are distinguished, along with examples of vulnerabilities causing the
materialisation of hazards to affect the information resource or communication and
information system:18 Incident management, on the other hand, involves incident
18Hazard category: Malicious code penetration from WAN
absence or wrong placement in the system, or lack of AV software updates
absence of or incorrect placement in network topology or incorrect firewall configuration
absence of or incorrect placement in the network topology or improper configuration of IPS/IDS
software and its sensors
incorrect configuration of security mechanisms in WAN networks
absence of server load monitoring
susceptibility of users to social engineering methods in order to obtain information or enter
malicious code
Hazard category: Malicious code entry from LAN
absence or wrong placement in the system, or failure to update AV software
absence of or incorrect placement in network topology or wrong firewall configuration
absence of or incorrect placement in the network topology or wrong configuration of IPS/IDS
software and its sensors
incorrect configuration of security mechanisms in LANs
Hazard category: DDoS or DoS attack
absence of or incorrect placement in network topology or wrong firewall configuration
absence of or incorrect placement in the network topology or wrong configuration of IPS/IDS
software and its sensors
absence of network traffic supervision (QoS)
absence of server load monitoring
software error
loss of access to WAN services (including Internet) as a result of an attack on WAN components
Hazard category: Unauthorised access to information
absence of supervision over users’ rights, entitlements inadequate to tasks
too slow implementation of changes in user authorisations
absence of physical access control to system components
Hazard category: Inappropriate use of the system by the user
absence of proper user training in the use of the system
absence of quality control of data entered into the system
recovery of information from end-of-life media
users’ susceptibility to social engineering methods to obtain information or enter malicious code
Hazard category: Breaching of access security inside the system
absence of supervision over user authorisations, entitlements inadequate to the tasks (e.g. possibility
of installing programs, including those used to break security)
too slow implementation of changes in user authorisations
absence of supervision over users’ activities in the system
absence of or wrong placement in the system, or no AV-software update
absence or incorrect placement in network topology, or wrong firewall configuration
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handling, searching for links between incidents, removing the causes of incidents,
and developing conclusions resulting from incident handling. Unlike risk manage-
ment, incident management will cover actual situations where a security breach has
occurred.
Another responsibility of operators of essential services is to collect information
about cybersecurity threats. According to the methodology of cyber risk manage-
ment in government information security management systems and ISO standards,
the following categories of incidents: in interaction between the communication and
information system and cyberspace are distinguished, as well as examples of vul-
nerabilities causing the materialisation of the threat to affect the information resource
or communication and information system. On the other hand, monitoring and
detecting hazards are any activities (e.g. notification) related to ensuring proper
operations (including protections). The reaction to an incident means all actions
related to the response to the incident (security breach).
Therefore, it should be assumed that the term “information and communication
security” means the level of reasonable confidence that potential losses resulting
from unwanted (accidental or deliberate) disclosure, modification, destruction, or
disabling of the service provided through information and communication systems
will not be incurred. Information and communication security must be considered in
their organisational, technical, and legal aspects. Therefore, security is not a single
absence of or incorrect placement in the network topology or wrong configuration of IPS/IDS
software and its sensors
Hazard category: Data eavesdropping, data interception
absence of network-traffic supervision (QoS)
compromising emanation
absence of encryption in WAN links
eavesdropping on information in the internal network (LAN)
retrieving information from end-of-life media
Hazard category: Breaking into a communication and information system from an external WAN
(security breach)
absence of system software update
absence of or incorrect placement in network topology, or wrong firewall configuration
absence of or incorrect placement in the network topology or wrong configuration of IPS/IDS
software and its sensors
absence of network traffic supervision (QoS)
absence of server load monitoring
susceptibility of users to social engineering methods in order to obtain information or enter
malicious code
Hazard category: Entity (office) system as a source of interference in cyberspace
absence of network traffic supervision (QoS)
absence of or wrong placement in the system, or no AV software update
absence of or incorrect placement in network topology or wrong firewall configuration
absence of or incorrect placement in the network topology or wrong configuration of IPS/IDS
software and its sensors.
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act of introducing protections, but a continuous, dynamic, and at the same time
highly complex process, requiring constant supervision and adaptation to changing
environmental conditions.
When analysing issues of telecommunications security in the context of the
security of essential services, attention should be paid to the transmission of data
and information through electronic media and ICT networks. Information security
law is concerned with the legal protection of telecommunications systems, which
incorporates certain data enabling the provision of services, the protection of the
electronic services as such, and the related content and databases, as well as the
network through which such services are provided. It must therefore be assumed that
information security is closely linked with the concept of telecommunications
security, and more specifically to information and communication technology secu-
rity, which means the protection of information processed, stored, and transmitted by
means of information and communication systems against unwanted (accidental or
deliberate) disclosure, modification, destruction, or prevention of its processing.
Computer technology and networks (ICT—Information and Communication Tech-
nologies) have become an important part of the everyday life of people, so most of
the legal regulations related to telecommunications security relate to the security of
communications as such, ICT security, which represents an element of telecommu-
nications security. The obligation of the operator of essential services, which con-
cerns the generally defined “application of measures to prevent and mitigate the
impact of incidents on the security of the information system used to provide the
essential service”, with particular reference to:
(a) the application of mechanisms ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, availabil-
ity, and authenticity of data processed in the information system,
(b) ensuring that the software is updated,
(c) protection against unauthorised modification of the information system,
(d) immediate action when vulnerabilities or hazards of cybersecurity are identified
in respect of information and communication security issues.
The term “network and information system” is defined in NIS Directive as
(a) an electronic communications network within the meaning of Article 2(a) of
Directive 2002/21/EC19;
(b) any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which,
pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data; or
19
“Electronic communications network” means transmission systems and, where applicable,
switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by
wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed
(circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable
systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for
radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of
information conveyed.
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(c) digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by elements covered under
points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and
maintenance;
In light of the same act “security of network and information systems’ means the
ability of network and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence,
any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality
of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by, or
accessible via, those network and information systems;
The communication and information system in the Polish legal system was
defined in the Act of 17 February 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations
of Entities Performing Public Tasks,20 and according to this definition (in Article 3
(3)) it is
a set of cooperating IT devices and software, ensuring processing and storage, as well as
sending and receiving, data through telecommunication networks by means of a terminal
device appropriate for a given type of telecommunication network within the meaning of the
Telecommunications Law—(the same definition is in Article 2(3) of the PSEMA).
In accordance with Article 175d of the Telecommunications Law, the Minister
competent for communications may determine by way of a regulation the minimum
technical and organisational measures and methods for preventing the threats
referred to in Article 175a(1) and Article 175c(1), which telecommunications under-
takings are obliged to apply in order to ensure the security or integrity of networks or
services, taking into consideration the guidelines of the European Commission and
the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity in this respect. In the Polish legal
system, the issues of information and communication security in the field of elec-
tronic communication security in relation to telecommunications and ICT networks
are defined in Telecommunications Law. Pursuant to Article 3(1) of this Act, the
provisions of Telecommunications Law, unless ratified international agreements
binding on the Republic of Poland provide otherwise, relate to the issues of network
security. It should be noted that the NCSA does not apply to the telecommunications
undertakings referred to in Telecommunications Law, as far as security requirements
and incident reporting are concerned, as they are subject to the above-mentioned
regulations on telecommunications security. Consequently, these obligations do not
overlap.
With regard to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authentic-
ity of data processed in the information system, several definitions should be
considered. Reference is made to the definition of ‘availability’ in Regulation
(EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March
2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency. This
document not only defines the concepts which constitute the definition of
20Consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 346, as amended.
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information security, but also defines ‘availability’,21 which means that data are
available and services are fully operational.
While “data integrity” means the confirmation that data transmitted, received, or
stored are complete and unchanged, “data confidentiality” means the protection of
communications or stored data against interception and reading by unauthorised
persons. It should be emphasised that the legal regulations strictly define the basic
security conditions which a communication and information system should meet.
First and foremost, it should ensure the confidentiality of data and information (data
become information under certain conditions), but not limit its availability and
integrity with other subsystems or documents.
The authenticity of data is a term indicating, above all, the importance of ensuring
the reliability of data in terms of its origin and source, authorship, or possibly the
ownership of databases.
Ensuring whether the integrity of systems is maintained—protection against
unauthorised modification—means that the data in the system, and also the system
itself will not be modified in an unauthorised manner. The application of software
updates refers to the software which operates a given system, with the software being
overall information in the form of a set of instructions, implemented interfaces, and
integrated data designed to achieve the set objectives.
Entities providing essential services using information systems, including in the
field of communication, introduce technologies and procedures for security man-
agement. However, in addition to individual solutions, systematic cross-border
cooperation on ICT network security between sectors (the public-private sector),
and between EU Member States, is becoming significant. Such a need arises from
the fact that the problems of network security and the services it provides are of a
global nature, which is determined by the features of the ICT network itself, and the
ease of information transfer, especially after its digital-conversion process. Risk
assessment and the analysis of threats, i.e. the identification of incidents,
system-vulnerability analysis, and the development and implementation of a com-
prehensive security plan (security policy), are the basic responsibilities of the
operator of essential services. Therefore, in order to ensure the security of the ICT
services and systems in which these services are processed, due to the complexity of
these systems and processes, and their interdependence and variability over time, it is
required to conduct conscious and coordinated actions on the basis of the objectives
set, i.e. to conduct a certain information policy, also referred to in this document as
security policy. Security policy includes the obligation to communicate properly
within the National Cybersecurity System.
21Access, within the meaning of Directive 19/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks
and associated facilities (AD), did not mean access provided to end-users/customers, but the
provision of facilities and/or services to another undertaking, under defined conditions, for the
purpose of providing electronic communications services, including access to virtual network
services.
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The information obligations of an operator of essential services involve the
identification of the person responsible for contacts with entities forming the
National Cybersecurity System, i.e.:
(1) other operators of essential services;




(6) sectoral cybersecurity teams
(7) public-finance-sector entities specified in Article 9(1)-(6), (8), (9), (11) and
(12) of the Act of 27 August 2009 on Public Finance
(8) research institutes
(9) National Bank of Poland
(10) Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego
(11) Office of Technical Inspection
(12) Polish Air Navigation Services Agency
(13) Polish Centre for Accreditation
(14) National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, and
provincial funds for environmental protection and water management
(15) companies and partnerships performing public-utility tasks within the meaning
of Article 1(2) of the Act of 20 December 1996 on Municipal Management
(16) entities providing cybersecurity services
(17) authorities providing services in the area of cybersecurity
(18) The Single Point of Contact for cybersecurity issues,22
(19) Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity Affairs,23
(20) The College on Cybersecurity,24
The appointment of such a person is an element in security information policy,
which refers to the exchange of data, and incident information in the context of a
coherent and coordinated system of mutual communication. To some extent, this
person acts as a spokesperson for the coordinator of cooperation with entities
operating in the system.
Furthermore, providing the user of the essential service with access to the
knowledge to understand cybersecurity threats, and applying effective ways of
protecting against them to the extent that the essential service is provided, in
particular by publishing information about them on its website, is also part of
security information policy. One of the essential principles is the exchange or
sharing of risk information between system stakeholders, in this case the users—
recipients—of the essential service. The legislator has indicated the form of infor-
mation, e.g. a message on a website. It would be good practice to prepare for the
22Hereinafter referred to as the “Single Point of Contact”.
23Hereinafter referred to as the “Plenipotentiary”.
24Hereinafter referred to as the “College”.
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service recipient a security policy for the essential service, and special alerts,
operating on the basis of information on threats to the essential service, provided
directly to the service recipient. This provision does not form a basis for such
notifications to be made directly, but the openness of the directory of ways to access
knowledge about cyber threats, and the application of effective means of protection
against those threats to the extent of the essential service delivered, provides the
opportunity to communicate such unsolicited information, which justifies the need to
ensure security and act in the public interest. However, pursuant to Article 38 of the
Act on the National Cybersecurity System, information processed under the Act
shall not be made available if its disclosure would violate the protection of the public
interest in relation to public security or order, and would adversely affect the
conducting of preparatory proceedings for criminal offences, and their detection
and prosecution.
It should be stressed, however, that the activities of the exchanging of information
in accordance with recital 8 of the Preamble to the Directive should be without
prejudice to the possibility for each Member State to take the measures necessary to
ensure the protection of the essential interests of its security, to safeguard public
policy and public security, and to facilitate the investigation, detection, and prose-
cution of criminal offences. According to Article 346 of TFEU, no Member State is
required to supply information whose disclosure it considers contrary to the essential
interests of its security. Therefore, Council Decision 2013/488/EU (5), and
non-disclosure agreements or informal non-disclosure agreements, such as the
TLP25 confidentiality rules, apply in this context.
The operator of essential services shall also inform the authority competent for
cybersecurity of the Member States of the European Union in which Member States
of the European Union the entity is recognised as the operator of essential services
and the date on which the provision of the essential service is terminated within
3 months of the change. The information is intended to reach the competent authority
due to the nature of the service. The authorities competent for cybersecurity matters
are:
(1) for the energy sector—the Minister competent for energy issues
(2) for the transport sector, excluding the water transport subsector—the Minister
competent for transport issues
(3) for the water transport subsector—the Minister competent for the maritime
economy and the Minister competent for inland navigation
(4) for the banking sector and the financial-market infrastructure—the Financial
Supervision Authority
(5) for the healthcare sector, excluding the entities mentioned in Article 26(5)—the
Minister competent for health
(6) for the healthcare sector including the entities mentioned in Article 26(5)—the
Minister of National Defence
25TLP—Traffic Light Protocol.
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(7) for the drinking water supply and distribution sector—the Minister competent
for water management
(8) for the digital infrastructure sector, excluding the entities referred to in Article 26
(5)—the Minister competent for digital affairs
(9) for the digital infrastructure sector including the entities referred to in Article 26
(5)—the Minister of National Defence
The operator of essential services shall transmit to the authority competent for
cybersecurity, the relevant CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV, and the
sectoral cybersecurity team, the data on the person referred to in paragraph 1(1),
including the name, surname, telephone number, and e-mail address, within 14 days
from the date of their designation, as well as information on changes to these data—
within 14 days from the date of their alteration. The purpose of this provision is to
identify the data of the person designated to communicate with the authorities; the
authority competent for cybersecurity, CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, CSIRT GOV,
and the sectoral cybersecurity team. The 14-day deadline appears to be relatively
long, given the dynamics of the processes taking place in communication and
information systems, especially in crisis situations, related to incidents threatening
cybersecurity, mainly due to the obligation to maintain monitoring on a continuous
basis.
The notion of Security Operations Centres (SOC) has been introduced into the
national cybersecurity system under the government bill on amending the National
Cybersecurity System Act and the Public Procurement Law (published in the Public
Information Bulletin on the Government Legislation Centre’s website on
7 September 2020). SOCs are to replace the existing structures responsible for the
cybersecurity of operators of essential services. SOCs have an established market
position as structures performing all functions related to cybersecurity surveillance
and management, both within the internal organisational structure, and as part of
services provided to other entities. The operators of essential services will establish
SOC structures within their internal organisational units, or enter into contracts with
third-party providers of SOC services. SOCs will perform risk assessment, and
detect and respond to incidents. The minister competent for computerisation will
maintain the list of Security Operations Centres. The assessment of risk profiles of
hardware or software providers will be performed by the Board at the request of its
members. The entities within the national cybersecurity system, while managing
risks in their information systems, will be obligated to take into account the results of
risk assessment of hardware and software providers. The entities within the national
cybersecurity system will not be able to put in operation any hardware, software or
services which pose a substantial threat, and will have to withdraw such hardware,
software and services indicated in the assessment of a given hardware or software
provider no later than within 5 years of the date of the assessment notice. The
Plenipotentiary will be obliged to announce risk assessment results by means of a
notice published in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Republic of
Poland. With a view to preventing critical incidents, and improving the effectiveness
of critical incident response, it has been recommended that new articles (Article
67a-67c) be introduced to specify the new competencies of the Plenipotentiary,
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including the power to issue warnings and injunction orders. The bill introduces
amendments to the provisions of the so called new Public Procurement Law. These
amendments result from the introduction of risk assessment for hardware and
software providers.
As intended by the legislators, electronic communications undertakings are due to
become part of the “national cybersecurity system.” They will receive support in
incident response. A new category of incidents, i.e. telecommunications incidents,
will be introduced. Notifications of telecommunications incidents will raise the
situational awareness of national-level CSIRTs and improve the coordination of
incident response. A separate CSIRT Telco is to be established to provide assistance
to electronic communications undertakings, and its tasks will be analogous to those
of other sector-specific CSIRTs. CSIRT Telco will be managed by the minister
competent for computerisation. It should be noted that the bill is to introduce
regulations concerning the obligations of telecommunications operators and trust
service providers in respect of ensuring cybersecurity, which is in conflict with the
provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security
of network and information systems across the Union (Official Journal EU 2016 L
194/1). Under Article 1 of the Directive, the security and notification requirements
shall not apply to undertakings which are subject to the requirements of Articles 13a
and 13b of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications
networks and services (Official Journal EU 2002 L 108/33, hereinafter “Framework
Directive”), or to trust service providers who are subject to the requirements of
Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic
transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (Official
Journal EU 2014 L 257/73).
The bill sets out the obligations of electronic communications undertakings in
respect of the application, following risk assessment, of appropriate and proportion-
ate technical and organisational measures to accurately manage the risks, which
implements the provisions set out in Article 40(1) of the EECC 26. The mandatory
elements of the measures, arising from Recital 94 of the EECC, have been laid down.
Similarly to the provisions of the Telecommunications Law currently in force, the
minister competent for computerisation will have the authority to define the mini-
mum scope of technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to
the security of networks and services. Each undertaking will be obliged to document
risk analysis and the application of the above-mentioned security measures. Article
20b defines the information obligation of an electronic communications undertaking
following the detection of a security incident. Such undertaking is responsible for
incident handling, and for its classification as a telecommunications incident in line
with the telecommunications incident thresholds. The undertaking concerned is
obliged to notify of the incident a relevant national-level CSIRT, and to cooperate
with the CSIRT. This provision implements the first sentence of Article 40(2) of the
EECC. In addition, such notification should be communicated to CSIRT Telco, with
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which the undertaking also cooperates on the handling of telecommunications and
critical incidents. Article 20c sets out the principles of incident notification applica-
ble to undertakings preparing action plans for particular threats. They will be
obligated to send a security incident notification no later than within 24 hours of
incident occurrence, based on the information held at the time. This information
should be updated in the course of security incident handling. The thresholds of
telecommunications incidents will be defined by means of a regulation of the
minister competent for computerisation, and the notification obligation will be
imposed on the basis of meeting the criteria for reaching the thresholds. Article
20d sets out the details concerning the contents of a telecommunications incident
notification. Article 20e regulates the information obligations imposed on electronic
communications undertakings operating on the retail market. In the event of a
particular and significant threat of a security incident, such undertaking shall inform
the users potentially affected by such a threat about any possible protective measures
or remedies which can be taken by the users, including their costs, which is the
implementation of the first sentence of Article 40(3) of the EECC. Furthermore, such
undertaking will be obligated to inform the users of the security incident itself and its
impact on the availability of the services provided, [26 European Electronic Com-
munication Code, EECC - Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic
Communications Code, replacing Directives 2002/19/WE, 2002/20/WE, 2002/21/
WE, 2002/22/WE], if, in its opinion, the impact of the security incident is significant,
which is the implementation of the provisions laid down in the second sentence of
Article 40(3) of the EECC. Article 20f concerns the obligation of an electronic
communications undertaking to block communication, and limit or interrupt the
provision of electronic communications services at the network termination point
from where such communication is sent. Such measures are possible if a threat to the
security of networks or services is identified, and can only be taken to the extent
necessary to prevent the threat, and only for as long as the cause of such a threat
persists. The amendment to Article 32 will make it possible for the CSIRT Telco to
inform the entities within the national cybersecurity system about any vulnerabilities
and any measures for removing them, if such information was obtained from the
entities within the system. Pursuant to the new wording of Article 34, CSIRT Telco
and sector-specific CSIRTs may cooperate with law enforcement and judicial
authorities, as well as with special forces in fulfilling their statutory tasks. The
newly introduced Article 34a concerns the issue of cooperation between national-
level CSIRTs and the President of the Office of Electronic Communications during
telecommunications incidents. These provisions implement Article 41 (4) and (5) of
the EECC. The proposed amendments to Article 39 allow the CSIRT Telco to
process personal data in the course of fulfilling its statutory tasks. The amendment
to Article 39(3)(2) is a technical modification which results from repealing the
existing Telecommunications Law. Due to adding Article 39(4)(4), the minister
competent for computerisation, the Director of the Government Centre for Security,
the Plenipotentiary and competent authorities for cybersecurity will be entitled to
process personal data obtained from electronic communications undertakings in the
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course of fulfilling their statutory duties in relation to cybersecurity threats and
incidents.
The current position of telecommunications undertakings in the cybersecurity
system is based on national laws, but the basic solutions in this respect are a
consequence of the solutions adopted in the European Union law. Any differences
concerning telecommunications undertakings refer both to counteracting and com-
bating cybersecurity threats, and to providing information about the occurrence of
such threats. Thanks to entrusting relevant tasks to the President of the Office of
Electronic Communications (UKE), a possibility was provided to transfer informa-
tion about incidents in the telecommunications sector to competent entities within
the national cybersecurity system. The structure of sector-specific regulations in
respect of cybersecurity in telecommunications corresponds to the structure of
obligations imposed on operators of essential services, as provided for in general
cybersecurity regulations.
The “NIS 2 Directive” aims to reform the provisions on the security of network
and information systems. It is to help build a high level of cybersecurity in critical
public and private sectors, such as health care and its facilities (e.g. hospitals,
medical laboratories), energy networks, railways, public administration, as well as
infrastructure and their services, thus significantly expanding the group of entities
covered by it in relation to the so-called “NIS Directives”. The general direction of
regulating key sectors, in particular the telecommunications sector and the public
administration sector, in the common framework of the NIS 2 Directive, will allow
for the creation of a coherent cybersecurity system, both at the EU level and at the
national level. Including telecommunications, or more broadly the electronic com-
munications sector, into a uniform legal system throughout the EU is important for
several key reasons: 1. Such a solution is in line with the general market develop-
ment tendency resulting from the increasing use of IT technologies in telecommu-
nications (the effect of technological convergence). Today it is telecommunications
that is the provider of the Internet, which is the basis for the provision of many
strategic network services, such as cloud computing. The role of software in the
construction of telecommunications services and systems is also growing. Media
penetration is an everyday reality. It is therefore unjustified to separate the service
layer from the regulation of the telecommunications infrastructure on which these
services are “embedded”. The strategy of defense against cyber attacks must be
comprehensive and rely on the protection of both networks and IT systems, up to end
devices. The current legal status, both in the NIS Directive and in its implementation
in the Polish Act on the National Cybersecurity System, caused a state of uncer-
tainty. The NIS Directive exempted telecommunications undertakings pursuant to
Article 1 para. 2 point 1 in terms of security and incident reporting requirements, and
the EU legal system provided for a separate regulation for network security and
integrity. This is a paradoxical situation, because in fact the NIS Directive concerned
“security”, and without the security of the network layer, the security of the service is
in many cases impossible to implement. This impotence of precise delimitation
shows that it is impossible to create a coherent cybersecurity system without the
participation of the telecommunications sector and the sector of Internet access
service providers.
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Annex No. 1, Sectors and subsectors and types of entities,
defines the areas to be regulated
Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
Energy Mineral extraction Entities conducting business activities in the
field of natural gas extraction, on the basis of a
concession referred to in Article 22(1) of the Act
of 9 June 2011—Geological and Mining Law.a
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of crude oil mining, on the basis of a
concession referred to in Article 22(1) of the Act
of 9 June 2011—Geological and Mining Law.
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of lignite mining, on the basis of a con-
cession referred to in Article 22(1) of the Act of
9 June 2011—Geological and Mining Law.
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of hard coal mining, on the basis of a
concession referred to in Article 22(1) of the Act
of 9 June 2011—Geological and Mining Law.
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of mining of other minerals, on the basis of
a concession referred to in Article 22(1) of the
Act of 9 June 2011—Geological and Mining
Law.
Electricity An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law
(Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 833, as
amendedb), holding a licence to conduct busi-
ness activities in the field of electricity
generation.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(24) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of electricity transmission.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(25) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of electricity distribution.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of electricity trading.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
conducting business activities in the field of
electricity processing or storage.
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of system, quality, and energy infrastruc-
ture management services.
(continued)
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Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
Heat An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of heat generation.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of heat trading.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of heat transmission.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to perform business activ-
ities in the field of heat distribution.
Crude oil An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession for the performance of
business activities in the field of the production
of liquid fuels, mentioned in Article 32(1) of the
Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law.
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of crude-oil transmission.
An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession for conducting business
activities in the field of liquid-fuels transmission
through a pipeline network, mentioned in Arti-
cle 32(1) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy
Law.
An entity conducting business activities in the
field of crude oil storage, including the tankless
underground storage of crude oil, referred to in
Article 22(1) of the Act of 9 June 2011—Geo-
logical and Mining Law.
Entities engaged in the business of crude oil
transhipment.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
conducting business activities in the field of
liquid fuels storage, referred to in Article 32
(1) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
and an entity conducting activities in the field of
the tankless underground storage of liquid fuels,
referred to in Article 22(1) of the Act of 9 June
2011—Geological and Mining Law.
An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
performing business activities in the field of the
transhipment of liquid fuels, mentioned in
(continued)
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Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
Article 32(1) of the Act of 10 April 1997—
Energy Law.
An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
performing business activities in the field of
liquid fuel trading, or in the field of liquid fuel
trading with foreign countries, mentioned in
Article 32(1) of the Act of 10 April 1997—
Energy Law.
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of synthetic fuel production.
Gas An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
conducting activities in the field of gaseous fuel
generation, referred to in Article 3(45) of Act of
10 April 1997—Energy Law.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of gaseous fuel transmission.
An energy company referred to in Article 3
(12) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
holding a concession to conduct business activ-
ities in the field of natural gas trading with
foreign countries, or to conduct business activi-
ties in the field of trade in gaseous fuels.
An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(24) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
being a gas transmission-system operator
appointed by the President of the Energy Regu-
latory Office.
An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(25) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
being a gas distribution system operator
appointed by the President of the Energy Regu-
latory Office.
An energy company mentioned in Article 3
(26) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
being a gaseous fuel storage system operator
appointed by the President of the Energy Regu-
latory Office.
An energy company, mentioned in Article 3
(27) of the Act of 10 April 1997—Energy Law,
being a natural gas liquefaction system operator
appointed by the President of the Energy Regu-
latory Office.
Supply and services
for the energy sector
Entities conducting business activities in the
field of the supply of systems, machines, equip-
ment, materials, raw materials, and services for
the energy sector.
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Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
Supervised and sub-
ordinated units
Organisational units subordinated to or super-
vised by the Minister competent for energy.
Organisational units subordinated to or super-
vised by the Minister competent for mineral
resources management.
Transportation Air transport An air carrier referred to in Article 3(4) of Reg-
ulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on
common rules in the field of civil aviation
security and repealing Regulation (EC) No
2320/2002.c
An airport manager referred to in Article 2(7) of
the Act of 3 July 2002—Aviation Law.d
An entrepreneur referred to in Article 177(2) of
the Act of 3 July 2002—Aviation Law,
performing for air carriers and other aircraft
users one or more categories of services referred
to in Article 176 of that Act, and an entrepreneur
referred to in Article 186b(1)(2) of the Act of
3 July 2002—Aviation Law, performing tasks
related to security control for air carriers.
An air navigation service provider referred to in
Article 127(1) of the Act of 3 July 2002—Avi-
ation Law.
Rail transport A railway-infrastructure administrator, within
the meaning of Article 4(7) of the Act of
28 March 2003 on Rail Transporte excluding the
administrators of only the inactive infrastructure
referred to in Article 4(1b) of this Act, and the
private infrastructure, referred to in Article 4
(1c), and the narrow-gauge railway infrastruc-
ture referred to in Article 4(1d) of this Act.
A railway undertaking referred to in Article 4
(9) of the Act of 28 March 2003 on Rail Trans-
port, whose activities are subject to licensing,
and an operator of a service facility referred to in
Article 4(52) of the Act of 28 March 2003 on
Rail Transport, if the entrepreneur performing
the function of an operator is also a railway
undertaking.
Water transport A shipowner in the maritime transport of pas-
sengers and goods, according to the definition of
maritime transport in Annex I to Regulation
(EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
enhancing ship and port facility securityf with




Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
A shipowner referred to in Article 5(1) (2) of the
Act of 21 December 2000 on Inland
Navigation.g
An entity managing the port referred to in Arti-
cle 2(6) of the Act of 20 December 1996 on
Ports and Sea Harbours.h
A manager of a port facility referred to in Article
2(11) of Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 of the
European Parliament, and of the Council, of
31 March 2004, on enhancing ship and port
facility security.i
Entities conducting activities at ports supporting
maritime transport.
The VTS (Vessel Traffic Service)—an auxiliary
apparatus of the Director of the Maritime Office
established in order to monitor ship traffic and
transfer information, constituting a component
of the National SafeSeaNet System referred to in
Article 91 of the Act of 18 August 2011 on
Maritime Safety.j
Road transport Authorities referred to in Article 19(2), (5) and
(5a) of the Act of 21 March 1985 on Public
Roads.k
Entities referred to in Article 43a(1) of the Act of
21 March 1985 on Public Roads.
Banking and financial-
markets infrastructure
A credit institution referred to in Article 4
(1) (17) of the Act of 29 August 1997—Banking
Law.l
The National Bank referred to in Article 4(1)
(1) of the Act of 29 August 1997—Banking
Law.
A branch of a foreign bank referred to in Article
4(1)(20) of the Act of 29 August 1997—Bank-
ing Law.
A branch of a credit institution referred to in
Article 4(1)(18) of the Act of 29 August 1997—
Banking Law.
Cooperative savings and credit unions within
the meaning of the Act of 5 November 2009 on
Cooperative Savings and Credit Unions.m
An entity operating the regulated market
referred to in Article 14(1) of the Act of 29 July
2005 on Trading Financial Instruments.n
An entity referred to in Article 3(49) of the Act
of 29 July 2005 on Trading Financial
Instruments
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Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
An entity referred to in Article 48(7) of the Act
of 29 July 2005 on Trading Financial
Instruments.
Healthcare A healthcare entity referred to in Article 4(1) of
the Act of 15 April 2011 on Healthcare Activi-
ties (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 160, 138,
650, 1128, 1375 and 1532).
A unit subordinated to the Minister competent
for health, responsible for healthcare-
information systems.
National Health Fund.
A healthcare entity within which the hospital
pharmacy department operates, within the
meaning of the Act of 6 September 2001—
Pharmaceutical Lawo
A healthcare entity within which a hospital
pharmacy operates, within the meaning of the
Act of 6 September 2001—Pharmaceutical Law.
An entrepreneur conducting the activities of a
pharmaceutical wholesaler, within the meaning
of the Act of 6 September 2001—Pharmaceuti-
cal Law.
An entrepreneur or an entity conducting busi-
ness activities in a Member State of the
European Union or a Member State of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—a
party to the agreement on the European Eco-
nomic Area which has obtained marketing
authorisation for a medicinal product.
An importer of a medicinal product/active sub-
stance within the meaning of the Act of
6 September 2001—Pharmaceutical Law.
A manufacturer of a medicinal product/active
substance within the meaning of the Act of
6 September 2001—Pharmaceutical Law.
A parallel importer within the meaning of the
Act of 6 September 2001—Pharmaceutical Law.
A distributor of active substances within the
meaning of the Act of 6 September 2001—
Pharmaceutical Law.
An entrepreneur operating as a commercial
pharmacy within the meaning of the Act of
6 September 2001—Pharmaceutical Law.
The supply and distri-
bution of drinking
water
A water supply and sewage company referred to
in Article 2(4) of the Act of 7 June 2001 on




Sector Subsector (if any) Type of entity
Digital infrastructure An entity which provides DNS services.
An entity operating an Internet Exchange Point
(IXP), which is a network facility which allows
interconnection between more than two inde-
pendent autonomous systems, mainly for the
purpose of facilitating Internet traffic exchange.
An entity managing the registration of Internet
domain names within a top-level domain (TLD).
aAct of 9 June 2011—Geological and Mining Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of
2020, item 1064
bAct of 10 April 1997—Energy Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 833, as
amended
cRegulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on
common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002,
OJ EU 2008 L 97/72
dAct of 3 July 2002—Aviation Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1970,
as amended
eAct of 28 March 2003 on Rail Transport, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020
No. 20, item 1043, as amended
fRegulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
enhancing ship and port facility security, OJ EU 2004 L 129/6
gAct of 21 December 2000 on Inland Navigation, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020,
item 1863, as amended
hAct of 20 December 1996 on Ports and Sea Harbours, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of
2020, item 998, as amended
iRegulation (EC) No. 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004,
on enhancing ship and port facility security, OJ EU 2004 L 129/6
jAct of 18 August 2011 onMaritime Safety, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, items
680, as amended
kAct of 21 March 1985 on Public Roads, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item
470, as amended
lAct of 29 August 1997—Banking Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item
1896, as amended
mAct of 5 November 2009 on Cooperative Savings and Credit Unions, consolidated text Polish
Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1643, as amended
nAct of 29 July 2005 on Trading Financial Instruments, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of
2020, item 89, as amended
oAct of 6 September 2001—Pharmaceutical Law, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020,
item 944, as amended)
pAct of 7 June 2001 on Collective Water Supply and Collective Sewage Disposal, consolidated text
Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 2028
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Abstract The author presents the structure and principles which the Polish legis-
lature imposes on public entities in the field of cybersecurity. The analysed
regulations cover government authorities, state control authorities, law enforce-
ment authorities, courts (both common and special), local government units and
their associations (including metropolitan unions), budgetary units and Budget
establishments, executive agencies, budgetary institutions, the Social Insurance
Institution (ZUS) and managed funds, the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund
(KRUS) and the funds managed by its President, the National Health Found,
public universities, and the Polish Academy of Sciences. In addition to these
public finance entities, special cybersecurity obligations have been imposed on
research institutes, the National Bank of Poland, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego
(BGK), Office of Technical Inspection (UDT), the Polish Air Navigation Services
Agency (PENSA), Polish Centre for Accreditation (PCA), the National Fund for
Environmental Protection and Water Management (NFEP&WM) and the provin-
cial funds, as well as municipal companies. Despite differences in the form of
activity (including possession or absence of legal personality), it is commonly
agreed that the analysed regulations treat public entities as public administration
authorities, at least in the functional sense, as evidenced by the indication that
the obligations of public entities should be carried out within the framework of
public tasks.
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1 Range of Public Entities Subject to Cyber Security
Obligations
The National Cybersecurity System attempts to cover comprehensively and com-
plementarily all entities which use IT tools in the spheres of both public and private
activities (under private law) and are significant for state security. In addition to a
number of obligations exacted on entities which are not systemically linked to the
public sector (such as digital service providers and operators of essential services),
the legislators also impose independent, or autonomous, obligations on public
entities. It should be noted that the understanding of the term “public entity”
significantly exceeds the confines of the term “public administration authority” as
used by legal commentators. The legislators have outlined the range of these public
institutions very broadly. The provisions contained in Chapter 5 of the National
Cybersecurity System Act designate not only government administration authorities,
state control authorities, and legal protection authorities, but also the courts (both
common and special), local government units and their associations (including
metropolitan associations), budget units and local government budget enterprises,
executive agencies, budget economy institutions, the Social Insurance Institution
and the funds managed by it, the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (Kasa
Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego) and the funds managed by its President,
the National Health Fund, public universities, and the Polish Academy of Sciences,
as well as the organisational units created by it. Apart from these public finance
sector entities, special cybersecurity obligations have been imposed on research
institutes, the National Bank of Poland, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, the Office
of Technical Inspection, the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency, the Polish
Centre for Accreditation, the National Fund for Environmental Protection and
Water Management, and Voivodeship Water Management Funds. Finally, the leg-
islators included so-called municipal companies among public entities.1
Despite differences in the form of activity (resulting, i.a., in having or not having
legal personality), there is no doubt that the analysed regulations treat public entities
as public administration authorities, at least in the functional sense,2 by indicating
that the duties of public entities should be performed while performing “public
tasks”.3 The functions of public tasks may be performed by any entity to which
the legislators assign relevant responsibilities in a normative Act. This is because this
entity does not necessarily have to be systemically linked to the structure of public
administration authorities, nor does it have to be a state legal person,4 and it may
1Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz et al. (2021) passim.
2See more Dawidowicz (1965), pp. 5–7.
3Por. Biernat (1994), pp. 4–11.
4See more—Dybowski (1990); Szachułowicz (2000), p. 18.
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operate, for example, within the structures provided for in the Code of Commercial
Companies and Partnerships5 for private commercial entities.
Government administration authorities in the political system are subject, respec-
tively by hierarchy, to the Council of Ministers, which conducts the internal and
external policies of the Republic of Poland,6 and governs all matters of state policy
not reserved for other state and local government authorities.7 The Council of
Ministers has also been given a clear mandate to lead the government
administration.8
In addition, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland includes the following
state authorities as state control and legal protection authorities: the Supreme Audit
Office,9 the Ombudsman,10 and the National Broadcasting Council.11 These are
autonomous state authorities, with their independence from both the executive and
the legislative authorities already guaranteed at system level. The cybersecurity
system has also been extended to the courts and tribunals,12 whose autonomy from
other state authorities derives from the principles of tri-partition and the balance of
power.13
Local government is an emanation of the de-centralised state system,14 and
performs all public tasks not reserved for others by the legislators.15 Local govern-
ment units also have the constitutional right to associate16 and establish municipal
associations.
Budgetary units are organisational entities in the public finance sector, with no
legal personality, and whose expenditures are financed directly from the budget,
while they transfer the collected revenues to the account of the state budget revenue,
or the budget of a local government unit, respectively.17 A local government budget
entity, in turn, is a separate, autonomous, unit within the structure of a specific
territorial government unit, and within its activities in the field of broadly understood
municipal management, performing tasks of a public-utility type.18 The cyber
5The Commercial Companies Code of 15 September 2000, consolidated text of 2019, item 505, as
amended.
6See Article 146 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
7See Article 146 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
8See Article 146 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
9See Articles 202–207 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
10See Articles 208–212 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
11See Articles 214–215 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
12See Articles 173–201 See Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
13See Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
14See Article 15 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
15See Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
16See Article 172 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
17According to the requirements of Article 11 (1) of the Act on Public Finances of 27 August 2009,
consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 869, as amended.
18See more—Banasiński and Jaroszyński (2017), p. 28.
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security system also includes executive agencies, which are referred to as new public
management institutions,19 the aim of which is to implement the transition from the
bureaucratic model of public management to the so-called managerial model.20
Cybersecurity obligations are also imposed on budgetary-economy institutions,
i.e. the public finance sector units created in order to perform public tasks, with
their typical features including the implementation of the public tasks entrusted to
them for remuneration, and covering their operational costs and liabilities from the
revenues obtained.21
The Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych—ZUS) is a
state organisational unit with legal personality. The scope, tasks, and responsibilities
of ZUS are defined by law.22 ZUS is managed by its President, who performs his or
her functions with the help of the management board—a collegial authority. The
control function is performed by the Supervisory Board, appointed by the Prime
Minister, with the reservation that individual members of the Board should be
appointed by the appropriate public administration authorities and organisations of
employers, employees and pensioners.23 The legislators have differentiated the Head
Office from the field organisational units within the structure of ZUS. The main task
of this public undertaking is to implement the social security regulations.24 As part of
its public tasks, ZUS is also obligated to maintain a contact point for the exchange of
data within the System for Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information.25
The Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia
Społecznego—KRUS) is a state organisational unit, with a status not clearly defined
by law. The legislators have given KRUS the basic task of administering social
insurance for farmers.26 The fund is managed by its President, who has the status of a




21See Article 23 (1) of the Act on Public Finances of 27 August 2009.
22See Chapter 7 of the Social Insurance System Act of 13 October 1998, consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 300, as amended.
23See Article 75 of the Social Insurance System Act.
24See Article 68 (1) (1) of the Social Insurance System Act.
25See Article 68a(1) of the Social Security System Act, in conjunction with Regulation (EC) No
987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 on the coordination of social security
systems (OJ EU 2009 L 284/1, as amended).
26See Article 2 (1) of the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund of 20 December 1990, consolidated
text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 299, as amended.
27See Article 2 (2) of the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund.
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The National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia—NFZ) is a state
organisational unit with legal personality.28 A National Contact Point for cross-
border healthcare has also been established at the Headquarters of the Fund.29
Public universities which were established by a state authority are also covered by
the regulations in respect of the cybersecurity system.30 Research institutes have also
been included in this system. They are defined in the Act as state development units,
independent in legal, organisational, economic, and financial terms, which conduct
research and development work aimed at the implementation and practical applica-
tion of its results.31 The Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk—
PAN), in turn, is a “state scientific institution”,32 with legal personality.33
The National Bank of Poland (NBP) is the central bank of the country, which has
the exclusive right to issue money, and to establish and implement monetary
policy.34 This entity has legal personality.35 In contrast, Bank Gospodarstwa
Krajowego is the state bank,36 which means that it is not a state enterprise, nor is
it a state organisational unit or a public finance sector entity, nor is it subject to
registration in the National Court Register. The basic objective of BGK is to support
the economic policy of the Council of Ministers, governmental social and economic
programmes, including guarantee and suretyship programmes, and local government
and regional development programmes.37
The Office of Technical Inspection (Urząd Dozoru Technicznego—UDT) is a
state entity with legal personality, which is not responsible for the liabilities of the
Treasury, and the Treasury is not responsible for the obligations of UDT. The Polish
Air Navigation Services Agency is a state entity with legal personality,38 and its
statutory tasks include ensuring safe, continuous, smooth-running, and effective air
28See Article 96(1) of the Act on Health Care Services Financed from Public Funds of 27 August
2004, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1373, as amended.
29See Article 97a of the Act on Public Health Care Services.
30See Article 14 of the Higher Education and Science Law of 20 July 2018, Polish Journal of Laws
of 2018, item 1668, as amended.
31See Article 1 (1) of the Act on Research Institutes of 30 April 2010, consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1350, as amended.
32See Article 1(1) of the Act on the Polish Academy of Sciences of 30 April 2010, consolidated text,
Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1183, as amended.
33See Article 3 (1) of the Act on the Polish Academy of Sciences.
34See Article 227 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
35See Article 2 (2) of the Act on the National Bank of Poland of 29 August 1997, consolidated text,
Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1810, as amended.
36Within the meaning of Article 14 et seq. of Banking Law of 29 August 1997, consolidated text,
Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 2187, as amended.
37See Article 4 of the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego Act of 14 March 2003, consolidated text,
Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1543, as amended.
38See Article 1 (2) of the Act on the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency of 8 December 2006,
consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1967, as amended.
The Obligations of Public Entities 335
navigation in Polish airspace.39 The Polish Accreditation Centre is a national
accreditation authority which is a state legal entity.40 The National Fund for Envi-
ronmental Protection and Water Management, and the provincial funds for environ-
mental protection and water management, are environmental protection
institutions.41 The National Fund is a state institution with legal personality,42
while voivodeship funds have the status of local government units with legal
personalities,43 but they are not local government organisational units.44
This general review of the legal status of individual entities charged with taking
certain actions within the framework of the functioning of the cybersecurity system
shows that their systemic nature is quite diverse. The principle of the functional
approach to public entities is clearly apparent, and is closely related to the public
tasks implemented by these entities.
2 Obligation to Report and Handle an Incident in a Public
Entity
An obligation placed on a public entity becomes enforceable only when the task
imposed on that entity is carried out using an information system. The concept of an
information system has been legally defined by reference to the concept of an
information and communication system,45 supplemented by the fact that it also
involves processing data in an electronic form in that system. If a certain public
entity does not perform public tasks at all, it will not be subject to this obligation.
Such a situation is difficult to imagine in the current legal regime, and would require
the intervention of the legislators, who would prohibit a public entity indicated in
this provision from the fulfilment of public tasks in general, or would order such an
entity not to fulfil its tasks using the information system, which nowadays seems
unlikely.46 Ensuring “incident management” includes, at the same time, an obliga-
tion to ensure access to know-how, and a procedure to inform certain entities of the
39See Article 3 (1) of the Act on the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency.
40See Article 38 (2) of the Act on Conformity Assessment and Market Supervision of 13 April
2016, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 544, as amended.
41See Article 386 (3) of the Environmental Protection Law of 27 April 2001, consolidated text of
2019, item 1396, as amended.
42See Article 400 (1) of the Environmental Protection Law.
43See Article 400 (2) of the Environmental Protection Law.
44See Article 400 (3) of the Environmental Protection Law.
45Within the meaning of Article 3 point 3 of the Act on the Computerisation of the Activities of
Entities Performing Public Tasks of 17 February 2005, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2019, item 700, as amended.
46Por. Wąsowski (2019), pp. 188–189.
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designation of the responsible person. It is worth pointing out that the catalogue of
these duties is of closed nature (numerus clausus).
Incident management as a term is understood by the legislators not only as
“dealing with” such incidents, but also detecting links between them, removing
their causes, and developing the appropriate proposals addressed at, inter alia,
detecting them more effectively, and taking action to prevent such events in the
future. An obligation characterised in this way provides a legal basis for any action,
both managerial and organisational-technical, which it should carry out, not only
within its “own” capacities, but also with “external” assistance—of a public entity in
this respect.
Notwithstanding the obligation to undertake incident management, a public entity
must immediately report a detected “in-house” incident to the competent Computer
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT). The determination of competence is
reduced to the scope of subject-matter competence based on a catalogue of incident
types (also in terms of the sector in which the incident has been detected). In this
case, the legislators did not specify any exact rules for the observance of competence
ex-officio by the applicable CSIRT. The rules for the assessment and observance of
competence as laid down in the Code of Administrative Procedure do not apply. A
notification to the competent CSIRT should be made without undue (culpable)
delay, no later than 24 hours after the detection of such an incident. It is worth
noting that the legislators have not specified in detail the technology of such an
electronic form. It will be reasonable to assume that the notification should be made
by e-mail, while the public authority is obliged to provide the e-mail address of the
competent CSIRT.47 Where it is not possible to communicate the information by
electronic means, any other way of passing on the notification is acceptable. How-
ever, it is worth assuming that in each of the possible ways chosen by the informant
there should be a guarantee that the information (notification) reaches the addressee.
Only then will it be possible to consider the act of notification as having been
carried out.
The handling of an incident and a critical occurrence in a public entity has been
entrusted to a public entity cooperating with the competent CSIRT. The entity
obliged to provide a service has been indicated as a public entity, and the cooperating
entity as the competent CSIRT, which should support the public entity in carrying
out such an obligation. The legislators have also included an obligation imposed on a
public entity, carried out during incident handling, to provide essential data, includ-
ing personal details. All data (other than personal) which might be (even indirectly)
related to the detection and response to incidents should be treated as essential.
Public entities are also responsible for the implementation of the material and
technical task of providing the beneficiaries of public tasks with access to know-how
and useful information on cybersecurity. This obligation is manifestly described in
more detail when the necessary information on cybersecurity is published. Similarly
47See Article 22 (5) of the National Cybersecurity System Act of 5 July 2018, Polish Journal of
Laws of 2018, item 1560, as amended.
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to other cybersecurity tasks imposed on public entities, the legislators have not
provided for direct legal sanctions.48
3 Formal Requirements for Reporting an Incident
in a Public Entity
The reporting of incidents is conditional on numerous formal and informational
requirements. The informational obligations involve the transfer of data of a subjec-
tive nature (data on the public entity, the reporting person, and the person authorised
to provide explanations) and of an objective nature (containing information on what
caused the incident, its essential features, the effects it had or might have had, and
about the preventive actions taken or planned).
The obligation to include data on the public entity in the notification is defined at
the basic level (name, number in the relevant register, registered office, and address).
It is worth pointing out that in situations in which a public entity is not subject to the
obligation of registration (e.g. public administration authorities), it will not be able to
indicate the register number.
The person submitting the notification should, in principle, be the responsible
person designated by the public entity. However, the legislators do not grant such a
person specific exclusivity to undertake such duties. When reporting an incident, the
time and speed with which the competent CSIRT is informed of such an event is of
crucial importance. Therefore, the obligation to make a report in emergency situa-
tions may be fulfilled by persons other than the one responsible. Also, the informant
should indicate his or her name, telephone number, and e-mail address.
A person entitled to submit explanations is another party whose data should be
disclosed in the notification. The scope of the disclosure of the information about
such a person is the same as that of the person submitting the notification. The mere
mention of such a person in the notification means that he or she has given a specific
authorisation to clarify the submitted information. No additional document is
required to confirm such an authorisation. Nor is there any formal limitation on
the person who reports to be shown as entitled to submit explanations at the
same time.
Details of the public task should be included in the description of the incident,
which should be linked to an indication of the legal basis for carrying out such a task.
The estimate of the number of people affected by the incident need not be clearly
defined. In a situation in which it would be impossible to determine a precise figure,
an estimate of the number of people who were affected by such an incident should be
given. Correct timing is important and should be presented in the most precise way
possible. In a virtual reality, the requirement to define the geographical area affected
might concern the entire region, although, where possible, a precisely defined area
48Wąsowski (2019), pp. 190–192.
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should be identified. The most important element in the description, by general
consent, is the identification of the causes of the incident, its course, and the effects
of its impact on the information systems of the public entity. This description should
indicate all the relevant facts which had a direct and indirect impact on the occur-
rence, course, and consequences of the incident. The cause and source of the incident
are important, so the standard-setter acknowledges such an obligation, both as part of
the description of the impact of the incident on the public task being carried out and
as a stand-alone criterion in the incident report.
It is also important to describe any preventive measures which were taken after
the incident had occurred, in order to prevent the recurrence of such an event. The
description of such activities should be disclosed in the most transparent way
possible. The notification shall also include a listing and description of all corrective
actions taken after the incident occurred. Notwithstanding the required factual
information, the notification shall include any information which might contribute
to the identification of the incident, its assessment, and the taking of corrective and
preventive action. The legislators have also introduced an obligation to supplement
the information in the notification as an ongoing and permanent duty. The addendum
shall be communicated without delay, at the same time, and in the same way, as the
original notification.
Any restrictions on the transmission of information contained in the notification
would involve information classified as legally protected secrets. In particular, a
company secret has the status of such a clause. It is worth mentioning at this point
that in addition to company secrets, current legislation regulates almost 70 types of
legally protected secrets.49 Such limitations may only be ignored if the disclosure is
necessary to carry out the tasks of the competent CRSIT MON, CSIRT NASK, or
CSIRT GOV, and, in addition, if the scope of the information disclosed is incom-
plete or limited to what is essential. Such legally protected information may also be
disclosed at the request of the competent CSIRT, and its disclosure shall be subject to
the same restrictions as if it had been transmitted by a public entity on its own
initiative. In the notification, the protected legal information disclosed shall be
classified, and shall be separated and secured in such a way that it cannot be
disclosed to unauthorised persons.
4 Obligation to Designate a Person Responsible
for Contacts with National Cyber Security System
Operators
The general norm requires the public entities listed in the Act to appoint a person
responsible for maintaining contact with the entities in the national cyber security
system. The concept of “responsible person” has not been clarified by the legislators.
49For more information on this subject, see Polok (2006), pp. 23–25.
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It can be speculated on—particularly in the light of what is known as a logical-
linguistic interpretation—that this could be both a natural person and a legal person.
However, it is more difficult to indicate at this level of interpretation that the term
“responsible person” may also be used to describe an organisational unit without
legal personality. In the light of a systemic interpretation, it appears that the
legislators aimed at referring to a specific natural person, since it distinguishes the
concept of a “person” from that of an “entity” (or “entities”), which has a much
broader scope of meaning.50
An obligation imposed on the indicated public entity should be implemented by
way of “appointing” a responsible person. Legal commentators in administrative law
tend to avoid defining “appointing” as a legal form of administration. It is more often
determined as a result of the application of some legal form of administrative
authority (e.g. an administrative act or an internal management act). It can therefore
be assumed that the concept of “appointing” a specific responsible person is intended
to signify an effect achieved by a public entity through the use of an indeterminate
form of administrative action. On the other hand, the legal form of such appointment,
although not explicitly indicated in the Act, should first relate to internal forms of
administrative activity, due to the context of the provision suggesting the designation
of a person who is organisationally related to a public entity, and, second, take the
form of a specific declaration of will by the entity. The question remains of how to
express this will. At first glance, it seems that the appointment should be made
unilaterally, either in an individualised form, resembling a type of official order, or in
a normative form, assigning the duties of the appointed person to a function, which
may be carried out in the form of regulations, guidelines, or internal orders. It seems,
however, that this “appointment” may also be done in a bilateral, even contractual,
format—especially if the allocated person is not an employee of a public entity. The
term “person” itself, and not, e.g., “employee”, shows that the legislators do not limit
the circle of appointed persons to those who are organisationally related to the public
entity.
The “appointed person” of the entity will, in turn, be required to “maintain contact
with the entities in the national cybersecurity system.” The legislators are not setting
out here the framework for such an obligation. The appointed person will have to be
disclosed to the competent CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK, or CSIRT GOV in the
manner specified therein, without regulating the procedure for the other entities
forming the national cybersecurity system, as a kind of “contact point” for those
entities.51 With this wording it is difficult to prove any “exclusivity” for such an
appointed person to maintain these contacts. In the practice of a public entity, other
persons (formally “non-appointed”) performing specific tasks within the entity may
also maintain contact with entities in the national cybersecurity system. Regardless
of the formula for “appointing” a contact person, it is worthwhile setting out in such
an “appointment act”, or in a kind of “appointment agreement”, the rules (even
50Zob. Wąsowski (2019), pp. 185–192.
51See Article 22(1)(5) of the NCSA.
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procedures) for implementing the obligation of the designated person to maintain
contact with the entities in the national cybersecurity system.
Nor do the legislators specify what the responsibilities of the designated person
will be. The issue of a possible transfer of responsibility from a public authority to
the designated person has also not been resolved. In this respect, the lack of a clear
directive by the legislators should be taken as an indication that the designation of
the person responsible by a public entity does not in any way supersede the
responsibility of the public entity in question for efficiently maintaining contact
with all the “elements” in the national cybersecurity system. It is puzzling that there
are no sanctions (in particular of a criminal-administrative nature) for failure to
comply with a public entity’s obligation by not appointing an appropriate contact
person with the entities in the national cybersecurity system, while for operators of
essential services for failure to comply with a similar duty52 there are imposed
specific sanctions of an administrative nature.53
The use of wording referring to appointing the “competent person” (using the
singular instead of the plural) suggests that a public entity has the right to appoint
only one person, instead of, for example, a team of responsible persons. Such a literal
interpretation does not seem to be conclusive, however, as the legislators clearly
limit the “circle” of designated responsible persons to “one”. Thus, it should be
recognised that more than one individual can be a “responsible person”. Even if a
strictly literal interpretation is considered binding, it should be pointed out that the
provisions of this regulation do not restrict public entities to indicating a specific
sequence in the assuming of the obligation to maintain contacts by the deputies
(in the event of an even temporary inability to perform their duties) of the designated
responsible person.
As public entities, public administration authorities are treated specially in terms
of appointing the responsible person. First, they may only appoint “one” responsible
person. Second, that person will be required to cooperate (“maintain contact”) with
the entities in the national cyber-security system to a specific extent, namely with
regard to “public tasks dependent on information systems”. In today’s complexity of
individual public tasks (understood as tasks imposed by the standards of the univer-
sally applicable law, aimed at the realisation of the common good), it is difficult to
imagine a total separation between the operation of a public administration authority
and the use of even the least-complicated information systems. It is clear, therefore,
that it should be recognised that, within the practice of public administration
authorities, all public tasks performed by these authorities will be related to the
use of information systems and, in this sense, will depend on their use.
It appears that the specificity of a “single responsible person” does not involve the
performance of public tasks dependent on information systems, but the appointment
of a common responsible person for a given public administration authority and the
units subordinate to or supervised by it. At the same time it could be assumed that the
52See Article 73 (1) of the NCSA.
53See Article 9 (1) of the NCSA.
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wording presented by the legislators was not so much about one (in the literal
sense—the only) person for the public administration authority and its related
entities, but about the possibility of appointing even several persons (similarly to
other public entities), with these persons, within the scope of their responsibilities,
also having entities related by ties of subordination or supervision to the given public
administration authority. The relations of supremacy—subordination and supervi-
sion—have been described quite extensively in the literature on the subject.54 The
essence of superiority lies in the competence of a public administration authority
vis-à-vis a subordinate entity which authorises the superior to have a binding
influence on the activities undertaken by the subordinate entity, and on the personnel
of such an entity. Speaking in simple terms, supervision means the authority
(resulting from the provisions of generally applicable law) which allows the super-
visor to control the supervised entity, and, in the modes specified by law, to influence
the decisions of the supervised entity.
A similar system of appointing “one” person, as in the case of public adminis-
tration authorities, has been applied to local government units. Local government
units currently include communes, districts, and self-government voivodships.
These units have been given legal personality by the legislators, which is certainly
different from the situation with public administration authorities, which in principle
do not have such a personality. The problem is that acting on behalf of local
government units are their bodies (both constituting and executive), which also
perform the function of public administration authorities (this group, sometimes
also referred to as “state” authorities, is divided into government administration
authorities, and, i.a., local government administration authorities, including local
government authorities). In this context, the introduction of the differentiation of
responsibilities in the analysed provision between public administration authorities
(paragraph 2) and local government units (paragraph 3) loses its significance.
Within the framework of the cooperation of public entities with the competent
CSIRT, the legislators have also introduced a specific informational procedure for
transferring the data of the responsible person appointed on the basis of the National
Cybersecurity System Act. Formal requirements shall include the name of the
responsible person, his or her telephone number, and e-mail address. Failure to
indicate one of the three formal elements results in failure to comply with this
requirement. The legislators do not, however, attribute clear consequences in the
form of statutory sanctions for such deficiencies. The obligation to provide the basic
data of the responsible person shall be fulfilled within 14 days of the appointment of
that person. The same applies to the time limit for the passing on of information on
changes to such data. With today’s technological progress and the need to quickly
(in principle immediately) respond to incidents, such an extensive time frame seems
to be too wide.
54See more—Cieślak (2014), pp. 75–85.
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5 Obligation to Provide Information
to the Competent CSIRT
This provision sets the legal basis for allowing public entities carrying out public
tasks, which depend on information systems, to communicate to the competent
CSIRT information about other incidents, cyber-security threats relating to risk
assessment, vulnerabilities, and the technologies used. This possibility has also
been attributed to the operators of essential services. This task is complementary
to the informational obligations imposed on public entities in the field of cyberse-
curity; it aims at the broadest possible prevention involving early detection and
analysis of any phenomena which might affect the functioning of the cybersecurity
system.
The information procedure has not been formalised in principle. It is sufficient for
such information to be provided in an electronic form (in the simplest way, by
e-mail). In the event that the electronic transmission of such information is impos-
sible or excessively difficult, the communication of information (as is the case with
the notification) should take place by any available means. Written (paper) corre-
spondence may therefore be delivered by conventional means. The legislators have
also not stipulated any time limits—unlike in the case of the notification—on the
information to be provided under a kind of early warning system. However, the
essence of the National Cybersecurity System is that this information should also be
provided immediately. The Act provides for the possibility of obtaining the status of
an operator of essential services by a public entity under general principles after
obtaining an appropriate administrative decision. There are no special restrictions or
privileges for public entities in the procedure for becoming operators of essential
services.
The legislators have limited the performance of related obligations by a public
entity with the status of an operator of essential services to specific essential services
which relate to the exercising of the function of an operator of that service. In
activities not directly related to the essential service, the public entity is not obliged
to fulfil any obligations imposed by law on the operator of essential services.55
6 Summary
Within the framework of the regulation contained in the National Cybersecurity
System Act, the inclusion of such a large number of public entities under the regime
of this regulation results from the desire to build a comprehensive and systemic
approach to the national cybersecurity system,56 rather than the implementation of
55See Wąsowski (2019), pp. 192–193.
56See Czaplicki (2019).
The Obligations of Public Entities 343
the NIS Directive itself.57 The directive applies to operators of essential services and
digital service providers, and the National Cybersecurity System Act goes beyond
the implementation of the NIS Directive, and also defines other elements which
influence national cybersecurity policy. Some public entities may be recognised as
operators of essential services, and will then have obligations similar to other such
entities. The NIS Directive allows each Member State to take the necessary measures
to ensure the protection of the essential interests of its security, public order, and
public safety. Such a directive certainly includes a broad (and not closed) definition
of the circle of public entities, and assigning them legal obligations of an informa-
tional nature. It is also an attempt at a procedural and organisational response to the
dangers of cyberspace.
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The System of Control and Supervision
of Operators of Essential Services, Digital
Service Providers and Entities Providing
Cybersecurity Services
Monika Nowikowska
Abstract Cyberspace has become a new security environment. Technological
progress added a new type of threat to the so-called “physical” threats—“ICT
threats”. This entails the need to make numerous changes, both in legal and
organisational terms. The considerations undertaken at work are aimed at defining
the control and supervision system in the cyberspace environment. The issue of the
system of control and supervision of operators of essential services, digital service
providers and entities providing services in the field of cybersecurity is an important
research issue. The Polish legislators have introduced the principle of supervision
over the functioning of the national cybersecurity system, which is exercised by the
minister competent for computerisation and competent authorities for cybersecurity.
The article discusses the principles of supervision and control adopted in the Act of
5 July 2018 on the National Cybersecurity System in Poland.
The issue of the system of control and supervision of operators of essential services,
digital service providers, and entities providing cybersecurity services, is a current
and important research problem. The Polish legislators regulated the issue of super-
vision and control in the National Cybersecurity System Act of 5 July 2018 (the
NCSA). The provisions of Article 53 of the NCSA introduce the principle of
supervision over the functioning of the national cybersecurity system which is
exercised by the Minister competent for computerisation and the authorities account-
able for matters of cybersecurity.
It should be stressed that the National Cybersecurity System Act regulates both
control and supervision. It is worth noting that in the Polish legal system, the terms
“control” (kontrola) and “supervision” (nadzór) are often perceived as synonymous
and applied interchangeably. Therefore, it seems appropriate to attempt to define the
notion and essence of “control” within the present theoretical framework, and in
compliance with the requirements of the existing practice, and to analyse the term
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“control” as opposed to “supervision”. The deliberations presented below are an
attempt to clarify the meaning of these coexisting terms. Finding, confronting, and
commenting on the analogies and differences between them might be helpful in the
context of legal terminology. Accuracy in nomenclature is as vital in the domain of
control as in any other field. The proper interpretation of the increasingly complex
reality would be difficult without a correct hierarchy and classification, and it would
be even more difficult to modify it in the desired direction.
The term “kontrola” has been in use for a long time, and the scope of the
discussed notion has evolved over the centuries as the volume of sample material
has increased. The dispute over the origin of the word in the Polish language still
continues. French and British origins are considered. While the French etymology of
the word “le contrôle” suggests an association with documenting taxes collected
from taxpayers,1 and indirectly emphasises the function of document authentica-
tion,2 the Anglo-Saxon etymology of “control” points to the concept of power,
i.e. the analogy between control and exercising public authority.3 In this case,
“control” means “exercising political authority” (administration).4
In the Polish language, “kontrola” combines both traditions. It generally means
verifying, assessing something, reviewing an activity. On the other hand, the term
also expresses the essence of having an impact, influence on someone. The phrase
“someone controls something” is associated with power, having an influence on
something.
Two different approaches to the definition of control are distinguished in the
literature:5 (a) general (control in the managerial sense) and (b) specific (control in
the functional sense).
In the case of the general approach, control is defined as an approved manage-
ment system (procedures, instructions, principles, mechanisms) for obtaining the
rational certainty that the objectives of management will be achieved; the process by
which specific actions are managed.
The specific approach, concerning “the functional dimension of control”, empha-
sises the process of verification and assessment. Academic textbooks and scientific
studies provide definitions referring to a sequence of actions identified in this
manner.6
J. Płoskonka stresses that control in the functional aspect relates to observations
and review (of a case or result), assessment (based on a specific pattern), diagnosis
1Filipek (2001), p. 215.
2Kiczka (2018), p. 37.
3Jagielski (2012), p. 14; Jagielski (2004), pp. 13–30.
4Kałużny (2008), pp. 16 and 20.
5For more information, see Jagielski (2012), pp. 13–22; Płoskonka (2006), p. 8; Nitkowski (2013),
p. 19; Bogacz-Miętka (2018), p. 18; Celarek (2015), p. 33.
6K. Nitkowski notes that institutional control “is a component of a complex control system applied
in an organisation.” This approach enables the institutional control to be properly placed within the
system. See Nitkowski (2013), p. 19.
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formulated if any irregularities are found, and reaching conclusions.7 The process of
comparing the existing and desired state of affairs encompasses the sequence of
consecutive actions: review—identification—assessment—diagnosis—conclusions.
Clearly, control is one of the functions of management defined as a comparison
between what has been implemented and what is desired, as the identification of
discrepancies and explanations for their reasons.8 The definition formulated by
J. Jagielski, describing control as a function encompassing four phases, is worth
distinguishing from among the definitions provided by legal commentators. The first
phase involves the monitoring and reviewing of activities; the second relates to the
assessment of such activities by confronting the actual picture with the respective
initial assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to determine regularities or
irregularities in specific actions. The diagnosis concerning the potential reasons for
irregularities is enumerated by the author as the third phase, and conclusions on the
future of such actions are mentioned as the fourth phase. “The discussed aspects of
control show that control is not limited only to a single action, but rather that it
assumes a certain process.9”Accordingly, E. Chojna-Duch points out that “control is
interpreted as a process (activity) involving a comparison between the regulated
condition (postulated, defined) and the factual one (implemented, real). Therefore, to
control is to ensure coherence between the required and the actual condition.10” In
the opinion of B. R. Kuc, “control is a phase (an intrinsic component), a cycle, of an
organised action. In general, conclusions drawn from it are the starting point for the
next action.”11 K. Winiarska presents the opinion that “control is about continuously
ensuring that the result of an action is consistent with its objectives, and that all
activities and measures applied in the process of control are effective.12”
In defining control, J. Gnoiński13 and M. Zembaty emphasise its correlation with
human activities. “Control is integral in organising and directing human activities.
Its function is to compare the specific and actual condition with the objectives, and to
identify any potential irregularities in the actual condition as compared to the
assumed framework of reference.14” No activities may be carried out in an organised
and reliable manner without proper control. W. Kieżun additionally emphasises that,
as a rule, “man is not keen on working, so he must be forced to work and
permanently controlled”. Therefore, control is also an element of pressure generating
a sense of threat, and thus, motivating a human being to work.15
7Płoskonka (2006), p. 8.
8Winiarska (2003), p. 157; Owczarek (1990), p. 1; Jemioła (1987), p. 48.
9Jagielski (2012), p. 157.
10Chojna-Duch (2003), p. 13.
11Kuc (1983), p. 14.
12Winiarska (2003), p. 163.
13Gnoiński (1972b), p. 24; Gnoiński (1972a), p. 40; Gnoiński (1974), p. 5.
14Zembaty (1988), p. 58.
15Kieżun (1972), p. 34.
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S. Kałużny states that the following actions are the components of the notion of
control: determining the existing condition (the objectives); determining the actual
condition (the performance); comparing the performance and objectives in order to
identify regularities or irregularities within them; and explaining the reasons for the
regularities or irregularities found in the performance and objectives. The author
points out that the two basic elements of human activities—objectives and perfor-
mance—are the starting point for defining the notion of “control”.16 Special attention
should be paid to the problem of setting objectives. It should be noted that the setting
of objectives is not part of control activities, and that it goes beyond the notion of
control. However, control may be used for analysing and identifying the objectives
which are not adjusted to the actual reality, and hamper or obstruct the achievement
of the defined objectives.17 As K. Wierzbicki rightly notes, control assessments may
not be based on the imagination and intuition of the controller, i.e. on subjective
premises. Control does not exist if it is not accompanied by the specific objectives
accepted as the basis of comparison.
J. Płoskonka presents a new approach to the notion of control by contrasting the
“contemporary” and “traditional” approaches. According to the author, the tradi-
tional method focuses on inspection, responding to the violation of the applicable
law. Control actions interpreted in this way are of horizontal and corrective nature.
The contemporary method concentrates on the assessment of the achieved results,
where compliance with the law is the necessary, but incomplete, condition.18
The deliberations presented above suggest that the term “control” can be
interpreted in different ways: as functional (specific); as an extensive process of
reviewing and assessing (a sequence of the consecutive actions: identification—
assessment—diagnosis—conclusions); and managerial (general) as a management
support system applied in an organisation. Therefore, the notion of control has a
broad meaning. A specific definition should be applied for the purpose of deliber-
ations on the control exercised over the operators of essential services, digital service
providers, and entities providing cybersecurity services. In this sense, control serves
as a tool for comparing the actual condition with the postulated one.
In Article 53 of the NCSA, the term “control” is accompanied by the term
“supervision” (“nadzór”). These notions are closely interrelated, but markedly
different despite their many common features. In the Polish language, “nadzór” is
a concept broader than “kontrola”. It encompasses not only the verification, but also
the components, of management. In the case of supervision, there is primacy
(domination and subordination), i.e. the attributes missing in the notion of control.
It means that, as well as controlling an entity’s activities, a supervisory authority may
also issue binding instructions to such an entity. Supervision is not limited to
monitoring, but it is linked with management through directives.19 In this case,
16Kałużny (2008), p. 21.
17Gnoiński (1974), pp. 7–8.
18Płoskonka (2006), p. 7; Płoskonka (2005), pp. 138–165.
19Kałużny (2008), p. 25.
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control activities are carried out by a permanent control department at the request of
the supervising authority. If the control is carried out by the control department,
binding decisions are issued by the supervisory authority, not by the control
department. J. Starościak notes “where there is the right to give and observe
instructions, there is supervision.20” Accordingly, supervision is not limited to
monitoring, but it is linked with an aspect of management.21 Control does not
provide the right to issue follow-up recommendations based on the results of control
and aimed at regulating specific matters. The powers of control are limited only to
the issuance of recommendations and conclusions. These powers encompass only
the right to recommend the observance of something which was regulated but
remains neglected. Such recommendations, however, do not relate to administration
or management, which are associated with supervision.
J. Gnoiński defines supervision as “the permanent, active monitoring of the
activities of a given entity, and, consequently, associated with acts of intervention
(the issuance of decisions). Therefore, it is a combination of control activities and
management.22”
There is one more significant difference between control and supervision,
i.e. supervisors are responsible for the substantive activities of the supervised
entities, whereas the control authorities monitor the proper course of control.
Additionally, J. Jagielski suggests that, in general, supervision is a legal category
not defined by the norms, which appears in various domains of legal regulations.23
Supervision has a meaning broader than control. Supervision always encom-
passes control with the option of giving imperative instructions. To be more precise,
supervision is permanent and concurrent control over the activities of dependent or
subordinated entities, exercised by the authorities or organisational units having the
right to issue the relevant decisions aimed to improve, order, guide or advance the
activities of the above category of authorities or organisational units.24
Supervision can take three forms: preventive, successive, and repressive. In the
case of the preventive form of supervision, a lower executive is obliged to consult on
his or her decision with a supervisor before such a decision is made, or to submit the
draft decision to the higher executive for approval. Supervision in the successive
form consists of entrusting the higher executive with the right to annul the decision
which is made at any stage. When supervision takes the repressive form, the
supervisory authority has the right to impose disciplinary sanctions on the super-
vised personnel. These aspects are absent in the process of control.
The above analysis shows the basic differences between the notions of control
and supervision. It seems that supervision is similar to overseeing, the essence of
which is based on the simple protection of the matters exercised directly by the
20Starościak (1971), p. 356; Starościak (1975), p. 346.
21See Longchamps de Berier (1964), p. 4; Lang (1963), p. 40.
22Gnoiński (1972a), p. 43; Gnoiński (1974), p. 10.
23Jagielski (2012), p. 30.
24Antoniak (2012), p. 16.
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overseeing authority. The organisational, hierarchical, relations between the super-
visor and the supervised entity are key components of supervision. As O. Bogacz-
Miętka rightly notes, supervision is broader than control, “as it consists of not only
control powers, but also the authority to issue guidelines and recommendations to
the supervised entity.25” On the other hand, individuals exercising control who are
not superiors (supervisors) might give their instructions only with regard to the
matters concerning control. Other authorisations than the issuance of binding
instructions are missing in the case of control. Control only entails a reliable observer
obliged to present the so-called “control snapshot”. However, he or she is not
involved in management, and is not responsible for the circumstances existing in
the controlled entity, but only for the reliability of the control as such.26
The Polish legislators have appointed the Minister competent for computerisation
as the supervisory authority. The Minister verifies whether the internal structures or
entities providing cybersecurity services, appointed by the operator of an essential
service, are observing
(1) the requirement to satisfy the organisational and technical conditions ensuring
the cybersecurity of the supported operator of an essential service
(2) the requirement to have the premises facilitating the provision of the services
with regard to incident-handling, protected against physical and
environmental risks
(3) the requirement to apply protections aimed at ensuring the confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and authenticity of the processed information involved,
including the safety of people, operations, and system architecture.
Therefore, the authorities in charge of cybersecurity matters verify whether the
operators of essential services are fulfilling the obligations arising from the Act
concerning counteracting cybersecurity risks, and reporting major incidents, and
whether digital service providers are satisfying the requirements concerning the
safety of the digital services provided by them, defined in Implementing Regulation
2018/151, and whether they are meeting the obligations arising from the Act
concerning the reporting of major incidents.
The Polish legislators have rightly noted that supervision is limited to control and
the authority to impose fines on the operators of essential services and digital service
providers. It means that control is one of the mechanisms of supervision.
The provisions of the NCSA define the material and subjective scopes of control.
The material scope encompasses the activities of internal structures appointed by the
operators of essential services, or the entities providing cybersecurity services. On
the other hand, the subjective scope relates to the requirement to satisfy the
organisational and technical conditions ensuring the cybersecurity of the supported
operator of an essential service; the requirement to have the premises facilitating the
provision of services in the field of incident-handling protected against physical and
25Bogacz-Miętka (2018), p. 18; also: Nitkowski (2013), p. 20.
26Popławski (1965), p. 7.
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environmental risks; and the requirement to apply protections aimed at ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of the processed information,
including the safety of people, operations, and system architecture. The NCSA also
defines the additional components of the control procedure, especially the resulting
powers and obligations of the supervisory authority and the controlled entity. In this
ambit, the discussed regulation leads to a large number of various legal solutions
with regard to control procedures.
The provisions of Chapter 5 of the Entrepreneurs Law should be applied to the
control proceedings instigated by the Minister competent for computerisation, aimed
at verifying whether the statutory requirements are satisfied by the internal structures
or entities providing services in the field of cybersecurity, which were appointed by
the operator of an essential service.27 In general, control needs to be exercised under
the rules defined in the Act on Entrepreneurs, and the provisions of the specific Acts
should be applied to control which exceeds the scope regulated under the
above-mentioned law. Control authorities have an absolute obligation to apply the
provisions of Chapter 5, which defines specific control standards, and then the
provisions of the specific Acts. The latter may be applied in a scope not regulated
by the provisions of the Entrepreneurs Law.
The control exercised under the Entrepreneurs Law needs to be carried out in
accordance with the following principles: the principle of legality, proportionality,
and the selection of a legal measure applicable to a specific situation; the principle of
minimising the burden of the control procedure; the principle of balancing the public
interest and the legitimate interests of the controlled entities; the principle of
objectivity; and the principle of the right of the controlled entrepreneur to informa-
tion concerning the control procedure.28
It should be noted that where the authorities responsible for matters of cyberse-
curity are carrying out controls to verify whether the operators of essential services
are fulfilling the obligations arising from the Act involving counteracting the threats
to cybersecurity and reporting major incidents, and whether digital service providers,
being entrepreneurs, are satisfying the requirements of the security of the services
provided by them specified in Implementing Regulation No. 2018/151; and whether
they are implementing the obligations arising from the Act concerning the reporting
of major incidents, such authorities should apply the provisions of Chapter 5 of the
Act of Entrepreneurs. The provisions of the Act of 15 July 2011 on Control in State
Administration should also be applied to the above-mentioned entities which are not
entrepreneurs.29
In Article 55 of the NCSA, the legislators defined the rights of individuals
controlling entities who are entrepreneurs. This provision introduces an extensive
27Act of 6 March 2018 on Entrepreneurs, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item
1292, as amended.
28Blicharz (2013), pp. 103–108.
29Act of 15 July 2011 on Control in State Administration, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws
of 2020, item 224, as amended.
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catalogue of powers entrusted to the controller, the implementation of which is
intended to ensure an efficient control process. This control cannot be carried out
without free access to the documents and materials encompassed by the scope of
control. The right to review documents, file applications for the preparation of
copies, duplicates, or extracts from the documents and estimates needed to exercise
control, is also important. An employee requested by the controller to prepare such
documents, or to make them available, may not reject this request. According to
Article 55 of the NCSA, controllers have the right of free access and movement
around the controlled entity without a pass. However, the controller is obliged to
observe the principles of conduct concerning the access-control systems
implemented in the controlled entity. The controller should observe the control
procedures implemented in certain controlled entities, e.g. concerning luggage
control.30
Special attention should be paid to Article 55(4) on the processing of personal
data in the scope needed to achieve the purpose of the control. The Head of
the controlled entity may not refuse the controller access to personal data solely on
the basis of the lack of the relevant authorisation to process personal data issued by
the controlled entity, or the failure to show such authorisation issued by the control-
ling entity.31 The controller needs to process this personal data for the purpose of the
control, and to exercise the powers and obligations entrusted to the controlling entity
under the NCSA.
Under Article 55(5) and (6), the legislators established the principle under which
evidence assessment may be freely applied. The controller may request the submis-
sion of oral or written explanations on the matters concerning the scope of control,
and visually inspect the informational equipment, carriers, and systems. The princi-
ple of the free assessment of evidence is the main basis of evidentiary proceedings.
The acceptance of the concept that the evidentiary proceedings should be based on
the principle of the free assessment of evidence is justified by the fact that an
authority establishing the facts on the basis of the evidence should not be restricted
by any provisions as far as the value of individual types of evidence is concerned,
and it should be able to freely establish the state of facts in a given case, based on the
assessment of the result of the evidentiary proceedings (preliminary investigation),
i.e. according to its sole discretion. The free assessment of evidence needs to be
made in accordance with the standards of procedural law and the observance of the
specific rules on assessment. These rules are as follows: relying on evidence
collected by such an authority, making assessments on the basis of all the evidence,
establishing the importance and value of the evidence, and reasoning in accordance
with the rules of logic.
The provisions of Article 55 of the NCSA are consistent with the provisions
concerning the obligations of the controlled entities who are entrepreneurs as defined
in Article 56 of the Act. The controlled entity is obliged to ensure the conditions
30Bolek and Dobruk (2018), pp. 140–141.
31Ninard (2017), p. 105.
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needed to carry out the control in a reliable manner. The obligation of reliable
cooperation with controllers, especially in the form of the submission of documen-
tation and written and oral explanations in line with the best knowledge, is imposed
on the employees of the controlled entity. This provision expresses the principle of
the efficiency of the procedure. The legislators have imposed on the Head of the
controlled entity specific obligations to provide controllers with the genuine facility
to carry out the control in accordance with the directives arising from the principle of
minimising the burden of control activities. The controlled entity is obliged to afford
the controllers conditions allowing the reliable course of control, by
(1) immediately submitting the requested documents
(2) providing timely oral and written explanations on the controlled matters
(3) making available the necessary technical means
(4) preparing, at its own cost, duplicates or printouts of documents and information
stored on information carriers, equipment, and systems.
It should be noted that the Polish legislators have imposed on the controlled
entrepreneur the obligation to ensure reliable cooperation with the controllers. The
regulation provided in Article 56 of the NCSA confirms the reliable and correct
course of the control procedure. The obligations imposed on the controlled entity
under the Act do not supersede the solutions commonly applied within this scope,
and concerning other control procedures. The appointment of an employee respon-
sible for cooperation with controllers on behalf of the entrepreneur, and for the
implementation of the obligations imposed on the controlled entity under the Act, is
the solution often applied in the practice of control.
The main obligation of the controlled entity is to ensure the immediate submis-
sion of the requested documents. The term “document” is not uniformly interpreted
in the field of control. This notion is used with regard to the so-called “carrier of
information” which can be meaningful in the control procedure, i.e. the source of
evidence in a written form. Under the NCSA, a broad interpretation of a document
may be applied. The following are the important components of a document serving
as evidence in the control procedure: the written form i.e., its graphical aspect, the
content of a document, i.e., the information contained therein, and the author of the
document, i.e. the entity expressing an opinion in the document.32 To be considered
as a document, an item needs to be prepared in writing. It should be produced with
the use of graphic characters—writing (handwriting, print, typewriting). It seems
that plans, sketches, and designs may also be considered documents, because they
are graphical representations expressing particular content, replacing verbal descrip-
tion, or placed next to it. Second, the document should express human thought in the
form of a statement of will or knowledge, so it should encompass a certain intellec-
tual content. Due to the content’s being information for the controlling authority, a
document becomes the source of evidence for a particular control fact. The issue of
the authorship of a document is associated with the person who prepared it. A
32Nowikowska and Walczuk (2018), p. 96.
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document provides evidence in the form of intellectual content, i.e. the thought
content. Then, evidence from a document is collected by rewriting its content in the
control report.
The controlled entity is obliged to certify that the submitted documents are
consistent with their originals. If confirmation of consistency with the originals is
refused, the documents should be authenticated by the person carrying out the
control activities, and the fact of such authentication should be mentioned in the
control report. The controlled entity is also obliged to provide written and oral
explanations on the controlled matters on time. Information on the established
facts may be provided to the controller by a present or former employee.
Pursuant to Article 57 of the NCSA, the person carrying out control activities
with respect of entities who are entrepreneurs establishes the facts on the basis of
evidence collected in the course of the control, especially documents, items, and
visual controls, as well as oral or written explanations and statements. That Article
reflects one of the basic principles of the control procedure—the principle of
objective truth. According to this principle, control findings should illustrate the
true picture of the controlled activities. The principle of the objective truth applied in
the control takes the form of the objective and honest establishment or presentation
of the control findings, based on reliably collected evidence.
Evidentiary proceedings are one of the most important stages in the control
procedure. Under the control procedure, the controller establishes the actual state
and the control facts based on the collected evidence. The actual state must corre-
spond to the reality, i.e. it needs to be proved. The interpretation of the provision set
out in Article 57 allows us to state that the issue of the selection of evidence is
entrusted to the controller. In an attempt to establish the actual state of the facts, the
controller selects evidence at his or her sole discretion.33 It should be noted that the
Polish legislators have pointed out that evidence encompasses, in particular, docu-
ments, items, visual controls, and oral or written explanations or statements. The
provisions of the NCSA do not provide a hierarchy of evidence. Each piece of
evidence with an impact on the establishment of the actual state needs to be
considered.34
In the context of Article 57 of the NCSA, an analysis of the notion of evidence
leads to the conclusion that treating a document, statement, or item as evidence is
only a mental shortcut. A clear distinction among the following notions—evidence,
element of proof, and source of evidence—is particularly important for the proper
understanding of the discussed issue. A control fact, which is provided to the
controller in the course of the control procedure by, e.g., the content of the docu-
ment, is the subject of reasoning. The content of the document does not form the
evidence, but it is rather an element of proof used by the controller to establish the
33Cz (1968), p. 62.
34See Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Kraków of 09.05.2017, III S.A./Kr
384/16, Lex No. 2286959; Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29.03.2017, II
OSK 1936/15, Lex No. 2283181.
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control fact. On the other hand, the document itself is the source of evidence. The
evidence source contains potential evidence which is only revealed to the control-
ler.35 An analysis of Article 57 of the NCSA shows that, while defining the control
evidence, the legislators used the three meanings of evidence—as a source of
evidence: a document or an item; an element of proof: oral explanations or state-
ments; and also as a method of collecting evidence—inspection. It seems that the
discussed structure forms a kind of mental shortcut.
The NCSA enumerates the following types of evidence: (1) documents,
(2) objects, (3) visual inspection, (4) oral or written explanations or statements.
The enumerated evidence does not form a complete catalogue. The phrase “in
particular” used by the legislators suggests that this catalogue is open, and it
means that the controller may accept other evidence not enumerated in the Act,
but should also define the manner of the evidence-taking by the proper application of
the provisions concerning the pieces of evidence defined in the Act. As a result, these
are unnamed pieces of evidence. In the Judgment of 20 July 2017, the Court of
Appeal in Poznań noted that, in addition to documents, expert opinions and visual
inspections, photographs found on the Internet, may also be considered evidence.36
In control practice, physical evidence is not used as often as documentary
evidence. However, physical evidence is worth considering due to the quality of
the provided information. As far as physical evidence is concerned, the pieces of
evidence obtained from it are not easily distorted in terms of the manner in which
they are perceived, remembered, and restored. In particular, any object with features
which can provide the controller with information may form physical evidence.
When the items are examined, the controller establishes the findings by analysing the
external features of such objects. Visual inspection is the method of accepting
physical evidence.37
Visual inspections of objects are made in order to establish their external or
internal properties. Their perceived features need to be confirmed in the visual
inspection report. The purpose of visual inspection is to establish the state of the
objects and their properties. The need for deriving evidence from the items is each
time decided by the controller. The control practice shows that the most common
mistakes made in formulating findings from visual inspections are (a) the provision
of data which cannot be established under visual inspection, but which arise from
other documents, (b) subjective opinions and assessments, and (c) explanations and
statements given by individuals participating in the visual inspection.
Explanations and statements are yet another type of evidence providing the
controller with information from personal sources.
35Warchoł (2013), p. 565; Ponikowski (2012), p. 266.
36See Judgment of the Administrative Court in Poznań of 20.07.2017, IV SA/Po 167/17, Lex
No. 2341989; Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Kraków of 19.12.2017, II SA/Kr
1203/17, Lex No. 2425316; Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Kraków of
15.12.2017, I SA/Kr 233/17, Lex No. 2442272.
37Jarkiewicz (1972), p. 21.
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Each employee, including the head of the controlled entity, may be requested to
provide explanations. In general, the circumstances accompanying disclosed irreg-
ularities are usually the subject of provided explanations. The procedure for
documenting explanations can take two forms: written—when the person giving
explanations prepares the explanations individually and submits them to the con-
troller, and oral—when the controller writes down the explanations in the form of a
report and signs it along with the person giving the explanations.
While taking evidence in the form of explanations, the controller is obliged to
make sure that the explanations are comprehensive. The controller has the right to
request explanations, and may exercise this right at his or her sole discretion. In
practical terms, it is necessary to obtain explanations from persons named as being
responsible for the disclosed irregularities. Irregularities in control findings
presented in follow-up opinions and obtained explanations are inadmissible. If this
happens, the disclosed irregularities need to be justified by the collected evidence
defining the part of the explanations incompatible with the truth, and providing the
reasoning behind such irregularities.
As far as statements are concerned, a current or former employee of the controlled
entity, as well as any other person providing the controller with information covered
by the control, may be a source of evidence. Therefore, the subjective catalogue is
broader, and it can also include persons from outside the controlled entity. The
source of the initiative is the basic difference between evidence from explanations
and statements. In the case of explanations, the controller is always the originator,
and in the second case, it is the person giving the statement.38 It should be stressed
that if statements are taken, the controller’s conduct depends on the type of infor-
mation given in the statement. If the information lies within the scope of the control,
and its value is significant, it may be used in the control process as evidence. If it
deviates from the subject of the control, it may be used as a starting point for further
actions, such as broadening the control subject or disregarding it without
consideration.
In Article 58 of the NCSA, the legislators assumed the principle according to
which a report of the controlled activities carried out with reference to entities who
are entrepreneurs needs to be drawn up. According to the implemented solutions, the
findings made in the course of the control should be documented in the control
format to which the appeal procedure may be applied. This format encompasses the
mandatory elements defined under the Act, including the trade name or the name and
surname and address of the controlled entity; the name and surname of the person
representing the controlled entity; the name of the authority representing the entity;
the name, surname, function, and authorisation number of the controller; the start
and completion dates of the control activities; the identification of the subject and
scope of the control; a description of the actual state established in the course of the
control; and other information of significant importance for the carried-out control,
including the scope of, reasons for, and results of the disclosed irregularities, and a
38Kowalski (1971), p. 27.
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list of appendices. The legislators do not impose any limitations concerning the
volume of the document, but it should be remembered that conciseness is one of the
features of a properly prepared follow-up document.
The report includes the trade name or the name and surname and address of the
controlled entity. Generally, there should be no doubt about the interpretation of this
provision. Sometimes, however, the fact that the entity is based in various locations,
or its address changes during the course of the control, can raise some difficulties.
The report includes the name, surname, and official position and authorisation
number of the controller. All persons carrying out the control need to be named,
whether the control is carried out by a single person or a group of controllers.
In Article 58(2)(4) of the NCSA, the legislators stated that the report should
include the date of the start and completion of the control activities. This is technical
information. Generally, the date of the start of a control is the same as the date given
in the authorisation. On the other hand, the date when the controller or a control team
finishes their work in the controlled entity is assumed as the date of the completion of
the control activities. It should be stressed that all breaks taken in the course of the
control may be recorded in the control report.
The schedule also includes the subject and scope of the control. The subject of the
control relates to the issues which need to be verified, and the scope relates to the
timeline when these issues will be verified.
The control report should also include a description of the actual state established
in the course of the control, and other information of significant importance for the
control being carried out, including the scope of, reasons for, and results of any
irregularities. This is the most important element in the follow-up document—the
essence of the control procedure. The ability to establish the actual state of facts
should be the basic feature of the controller’s skills. It should be stressed that the
purpose of a control carried out in accordance with the provisions of the NCSA is to
establish the actual situation, and any potential irregularities. These are the basics of
the controller’s work, because a control consists of an examination or review, the
purpose of which is to establish the actual state of the facts, to compare it with the
desired state of the facts, and to make an assessment of them. Here it should be noted
that in the findings the controller should discuss any irregularities, and also the
examined elements which should be considered as positive.
If any irregularities are found, their scope, reasons, and results should be
discussed. These elements form the so-called control facts. The concept of the
control facts on which the description of the actual state of facts is based, encom-
passes the following components: the applicable legal standard, any action or neglect
departing from the rule, the reasons for and results of any derogation from the rule,
and the identification of responsible persons.39 The control fact may not be merely
an allegation—it has to correspond to reality, i.e. it needs to be proved. The scope of,
reasons for, and results of irregularities have to arise directly from the evidence
collected under the control procedure. The basic tasks of the controller include
39Wiechowski (1969), p. 58.
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establishing the scope of the irregularities (what happened), the reasons (why it
happened) and the effects of the disclosed irregularities (what the results were).
The control report is handed over to the person representing the controlled entity.
It needs to be signed by the controller—the person carrying out the control activi-
ties—and the person representing the controlled entity. The controller is responsible
for the document as its author. The controller’s signature on the document means
that its content has been accepted by the controller. If the control is carried out by a
group of controllers, the document needs to be signed by all the persons carrying out
the control activities. The signing of the control report by the expert delivering the
opinion on the control subject does not seem to be appropriate. The expert is not the
controller.
The analysis of Article 58 of the NCSA shows that the control report does not
include any instructions addressed to the person representing the controlled entity
concerning the right to submit a statement of objections to the report. The controlled
entity may submit the statement of objections before the report is signed, 7 days from
the date when it is presented to the controlled entity for signing. The person
representing the controlled entity has the right to report any objections before
the document is signed. The person needs to do so within 7 days from the day
when the report is submitted for signing. This is a relatively short period of time. The
objections should be expressed in writing, and reasoned, i.e. their justification should
be presented. The objections should point out the part of the document prompting the
objections, what is being questioned by the objecting party, and why. Moreover, the
objections should include supporting evidence, and, potentially, the suggested new
content of the document.
The procedure assumed by the legislators in this situation ensures the observance
of the adversarial principle for the benefit of the controlled entity, and it also
provides an opportunity for collecting the complete evidence which is the basis for
the actual state of the facts. Apart from the adversarial principle, the discussed
provisions relate to the principle of using the written form. The objections expressed
by the controlled entity should be submitted in writing. The submitted objections
should indicate the new facts, and present specific information or documents. If
possible, any additional documents should be attached to the objections in the form
of appendices. If objections are reported, the person carrying out the control activ-
ities analyses them, and, as necessary, carries out additional control activities, and if
the objections are found to be justified, the person modifies or complements the
relevant part of the document in the form of an annex to the report. Article 58(4) and
(6) may be interpreted as a certain whole. They define the right to file objections, the
manner and procedure concerning the consideration of objections to the control
report and any potential modification to the content of the document if the submitted
objections are found justified. Article 58 of the NCSA combines several methods
relating to the consideration of the submitted objections, and not only by the persons
carrying out the control activities. Article 58(4) refers to the rights of the person
representing the controlled entity, (5) facilitates carrying out additional control
activities, and (6) refers to the method in which objections should be handled. The
person carrying out the control activities modifies or complements the relevant part
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of the document in the form of an annex to the report, if this person considers the
objections justified. If the objections are not considered in full or in part, the person
carrying out the control activities informs the controlled entity about it in writing.
These provisions form a logical and integral whole.
The procedure involving the consideration of objections to the control report
needs to be performed by the person carrying out the control activities. This person
should decide on the manner of considering the objections. The objections are
analysed in formal and substantive terms. According to Article 58(5) and (6), the
controller has, de facto, four options. The first one is the dismissal of the submitted
objections. This is the case when the objections are filed after the expiry of the 7-day
period. Consequently, written information on the above sent to the objecting party is
sufficient. If possible, the controllers should be flexible in handling the formal
aspects concerning the submitted objections. Any potential doubts about the formal
aspects of filing an objection should be considered for the benefit of the controlled
entity to enable the substantive consideration of the objections. The second option
relates to the positive consideration of objections—the assessment of their validity.
This is the case when the controllers consider the objections as substantially justified.
The third and fourth options concern the dismissal of the objections in full or in part.
This is the case when the person carrying out the control activities does not consider
the arguments arising from the objections as convincing. It should be noted that
passing on information only if the objections are dismissed in full or in part forms a
statutory requirement. Therefore, there is no requirement to inform about objections.
The controlled entity will obtain such information while reading the control report.
The delivered opinion should satisfy specific criteria: it should be signed by the
person carrying out the control activities, and should provide justification of how
individual objections will be handled. The arguments given in justifications to the
individual objections should be addressed, and own arguments should be presented.
According to the provisions of Article 58(6) of the NCSA, the person carrying out
the control activities reviews the objections and informs the controlled entity about
the decision in writing. The Act does not provide any further appeal procedure, e.g. a
complaint lodged with an administrative court. This phase of the control procedure is
thus completed. The legislators have provided the opportunity for refusing to sign
the report by the person representing the controlled entity. In such a case, the person
carrying out the control activities records this in the report with the date. The
schedule in paper form is produced in two counterparts, one of which should be
handed over to the controlled entity and the other to the controller.
If the controlled entity confirms in the document the probability of a violation of
the provisions of the NCSA, according to Article 59 the authority responsible for
matters of cybersecurity or the Minister competent for computerisation hands over
the follow-up recommendations concerning the removal of the irregularity. Recom-
mendations are the essential feature of the control procedure. The recommendations
should be formulated objectively, and should be based on the findings made in the
course of the control, supported with evidence. The recommendations need to be
based on facts, and not on opinions or experiences (impartiality). Bias is defined as a
non-objective approach to problem solving, in the form of an attempt to confirm the
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individual assumptions to the detriment of the main control objectives. Distortion of
information under the control procedure, bias in the presented opinions, and dis-
closing only the negative aspects of the activities carried out by the controlled entity,
are examples of the violation of impartiality in the control procedure.
The NCSA includes definitions of follow-up recommendations. An analysis of
Article 59(1) shows that the recommendations should involve the elimination of
irregularities. There is no appeal procedure concerning follow-up recommendations,
which means that they are binding.40 It should be assumed that this phase of the
control is completed, and the document will not be analysed by any administrative
court.41 It means that the follow-up recommendations may not be compared with an
administrative decision, i.e. a unilateral, superior act issued by an administrative
authority solving an individual case of a specific addressee.42 In Article 59(3), the
legislators provided the opportunity for obtaining information if the controlled entity
implements the follow-up recommendations. It should be noted that this is the
purpose of handing over to the controlled entity the results of the control, including
the established state of the facts and recommendations to the controlled entity. Based
on this knowledge, the controlled entity should take the proper managerial measures
to remedy the disclosed irregularities. Only in the results of these activities is a given
area really changed, because these actions form the actual meeting of the expecta-
tions of the authority competent for cybersecurity matters or the Minister competent
for computerisation. Moreover, the solution provided under the Act facilitates
assessments concerning the accuracy of the findings. The controlled entity is obliged
to state how the irregularities should be removed within the prescribed period. The
legislators do not make a precise reference to the period in which the appropriate
authority should be informed. According to the legislators, this period may be freely
defined. On each occasion, the period will be dependent on the circumstances
accompanying the given control procedure and the nature of the disclosed
irregularities.
The deliberations presented in this paper relate also to the presentation of the issue
of the functionality of control and supervision of the operators of essential services,
digital service providers, and entities providing cybersecurity services, based on the
NCSA. It is the institutional system having a broad subjective spectrum and a
precisely defined objective range of impact. In the subjective and objective scopes,
the system is complete, which means that it features no significant gaps.
To sum up the presented discussion, it may be stated that the control objectives
should be defined from the perspective of the functioning of the entire cybersecurity
system. An effective control system should promote the proper course of the
implementation processes and the achievement of the best possible results in any
type of activity. The efficiency of controls comprises two main elements. The proper
40Nowikowska and Cieślak (2015), p. 187.
41Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw of 22.11.2010, V S.A./Wa 2517/10,
Lex No. 781401.
42Jarzęcka-Siwik and Skwarka (2013), p. 29 et al.
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selection of the control subject is the first one. So-called control proficiency is the
second. It should be understood as the proper training of controllers in substantive
and ethical terms. It should be noted that the good aspects are promoted only by the
hard work of controllers, their achievements, and tradition, as well as constant
improvements in the control procedure.
References
Antoniak M (2012) Kontrola rządowa w administracji publicznej. Poradnik dla kontrolujących i
kontrolowanych, Warsaw
Blicharz R (2013) In: Blicharz R (ed) Kontrola przedsiębiorcy, Warsaw
Bogacz-Miętka O (2018) Kompendium wiedzy o nadzorze i kontroli nad przedsiębiorstwem,
Warsaw
Bolek T, Dobruk M (2018) Ustawa o kontroli w administracji rządowej. Komentarz z wzorami
dokumentów, Warsaw
Celarek K (2015) Prawne i praktyczne aspekty kontroli i nadzoru nad działalnością samorządu
terytorialnego, Warsaw
Chojna-Duch E (2003) Kontrola finansowa i audyt – ustawowe implikacje. In: Kontrola i audyt
w administracji publicznej, Stan i perspektywy, 1st Conference, Warsaw
Cz B (1968) Dowód z dokumentu w postępowaniu kontrolnym, Kontrola Państwowa 2
Filipek J (2001) Prawo administracyjne. Instytucje ogólne, part II, Kraków
Gnoiński J (1972a) Formy działania kontrolnego i odpowiadająca im terminologia, Kontrola
Państwowa 3
Gnoiński J (1972b) Próba określenia pojęcia i istoty kontroli, Kontrola Państwowa 2
Gnoiński J (1974) Niektóre zagadnienia teorii działania kontrolnego, Kontrola Państwowa 7
Jagielski J (2004) Współczesna funkcja kontroli administracji publicznej (kilka refleksji
teoretycznych). Kontrola Państwowa 1
Jagielski J (2012) Kontrola administracji publicznej, Warsaw
Jarkiewicz Z (1972) Rola oględzin w procesie kontrolnym, Kontrola Państwowa 1
Jarzęcka-Siwik E, Skwarka B (2013) Dopuszczalność zaskarżania wyników kontroli – możliwość
weryfikacji ustaleń pokontrolnych, Kontrola Państwowa 4
Jemioła S (1987) O zaktywizowanie i wzmocnienie kontroli wewnętrznej, Kontrola Państwowa 1
Kałużny S (2008) Kontrola wewnętrzna. Teoria i praktyka, Warsaw
Kiczka K (2018) Pozycja kontroli w publicznym prawie gospodarczym. In: Kokocińska K
(ed) Kontrola działań administracji publicznej w sferze gospodarki, Poznań
Kieżun W (1972) Problemy kontroli w systemach zarządzania, Kontrola Państwowa 3
Kowalski A (1971) Wyjaśnienia i oświadczenia jako środki dowodowe w procesie kontroli,
Kontrola Państwowa 4
Kuc BR (1983) Kontrola w systemie zarządzania, Warsaw
Lang W (1963) Struktura kontroli prawnej organów państwowych Polskiej, Kraków
Longchamps de Berier F (1964) Rzut oka na system kontroli nad administracją, Kontrola
Państwowa 3
Ninard G (2017) Udzielenie upoważnienia do przetwarzania danych osobowych a udostępnienie
akt podmiotowi kontrolującemu, Nowe Zeszyty Samorządowe 6
Nitkowski K (2013) Kontrola wewnętrzna instytucjonalna w systemie kontroli w przedsiębiorstwie,
Warsaw
Nowikowska M, Cieślak J (2015) O potrzebie zmian w ustawie o kontroli w administracji
rządowej – uwagi de lege ferenda, Kontrola Państwowa 4
Nowikowska M, Walczuk K (2018) Dowody w postępowaniu kontrolnym (w trybie ustawy o
kontroli w administracji rządowej) i możliwość ich wykorzystania w postępowaniu karnym. In:
The System of Control and Supervision of Operators of Essential Services,. . . 363
Paszkowski M, Daniluk D, Rzewuska M (eds) Teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty postępowania
dowodowego, KPP Monographs, Olsztyn
Owczarek T (1990) Kontrola – integralna funkcja zarządzania, Kontrola Państwowa 1
Płoskonka J (2005) Zmiany w stosowanych przez polską administrację publiczną metodach i
narzędziach. Kontrola Państwowa 1
Płoskonka J (2006) Pojęcie kontroli w ujęciu zarządczym. Kontrola Państwowa 2
Ponikowski R (2012) Dowody – zagadnienia podstawowe i systemowe. In: Skorupka J
(ed) Postępowanie karne. Część ogólna, Warsaw
Popławski H (1965) Obowiązki kierownika przedsiębiorstwa w zakresie kontroli i nadzoru.
Kontrola Państwowa 2
Starościak J (1971) Zarys nauki administracji, Warsaw
Starościak J (1975) Prawo administracyjne, Warsaw
Warchoł M (2013) Dowody. In: Hofmański P (ed) System Prawa Karnego Procesowego v. II,
Proces karny. Rozwiązania modelowe w ujęciu prawno porównawczym, Warsaw
Wiechowski Z (1969) Fakt kontrolny – teoria a praktyka, Kontrola Państwowa 6
Winiarska K (2003) Definicja i klasyfikacja kontroli. In: Kontrola i audyt w administracji
publicznej, Stan i perspektywy, 1st Conference, Warsaw 2003
Zembaty M (1988) Z rozważań nad teorią kontroli, Kontrola Państwowa 4
Monika Nowikowska PhD, adjunct at the Department of Cybersecurity Law and New Technol-
ogies of the Institute of Law of the War Studies University. Author of several dozen scientific
publications in the field of intellectual property law and the media. He also specializes in issues
related to security, such as audit, protection of classified information and personal data. Internal
auditor, legal advisor.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
364 M. Nowikowska
Monetary Penalties in the National
Cybersecurity System Act
Filip Radoniewicz
Abstract This chapter presents the provisions of Chapter 14 (“Provisions regarding
monetary penalties”) of NCSA containing provisions directed at implementing the
provisions of Art. 21 of the NIS which obliging Member States to lay down
sanctions applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant
to the NIS Directive and to take all necessary measures to ensure their
implementation.
Pursuant to the above provision of the NIS Directive, the Polish legislator adopted
an appropriate provisions providing for administrative liability for three groups of
entities: operators of essential services, digital service providers and (additionally)
managers of operators of essential services.
To the penalties imposed on the basis of the NCSA, the provisions of the Code of
Administrative Procedure apply, which results directly from the content of art. 189a
Code of Administrative Procedure.
In this case, provisions of NCSA are ‘lex specialis’ and take precedence over
codex regulations. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to consider the statutory
regulation as complete (in Chapter 14, in principle, only provisions regulating the
types of violations and the amount of administrative penalties are provided), hence
the need to apply the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure.
1 Introductory Remarks
The provisions of Chapter 14 of the NCSA (“Provisions regarding monetary penal-
ties”) reflect the provisions of Article 21 of the NIS Directive, under which Member
States are obligated to penalise infringements of the national provisions adopted
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pursuant to this Directive, and to take all measures necessary to ensure that they are
implemented.
In line with the said NIS Directive provision, the Polish legislator adopted an
appropriate regulation to govern the administrative liability of three groups of
entities:
(1) operators of essential services, entities whose organisational units are located
within the territory of the Republic of Poland, which have been recognised by
the authority competent for cybersecurity as operators of essential services
(operators of services, which are essential for the maintenance of critical societal
and economic activities included in the list of essential services). These include
banks, energy-sector companies and healthcare entities. It is reasonable to
assume that in addition to legal persons and organizational units not being
legal persons which have been granted the legal capacity by virtue of statutory
law (such as commercial partnerships); such operators might also be natural-
person entrepreneurs;1
(2) digital-service providers, legal persons or organizational units not being legal
persons which have been granted the legal capacity by virtue of statutory law
(art, 331 of the CC) which have their head office or management office within the
territory of Poland, or whose representative has an organisational unit in Poland,
which provides digital services, i.e. services provided by electronic means as
defined by the Act on the Provision of Services by Electronic Means (PSEMA),
listed in Annex 2 to the NCSA, an online marketplace, cloud computing or
online search services;
and more:
(3) managers of operators of essential services.
Article 21 of the NIS Directive requires Member States to impose effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties for infringements of national provisions
adopted pursuant to this Directive, and to take all measures necessary to ensure
that they are implemented.
By using the word “penalties”, the EU legislator refrained from specifying their
nature, thus, they may include criminal, civil, as well as administrative sanctions, as
in the case of Poland. Effective penalties should be understood as sanctions designed
to enforce an objective enshrined in EU laws, which has not been met due to the
infringement of the national provisions. Hence, the underlying purpose of adminis-
trative penalties is to enforce compliance with the law. Penalties should be propor-
tionate to the type, nature and circumstances of the infringement. In other words,
they should be strictly necessary (essential) for the achievement of the objectives
enshrined in law. In this sense the principle of proportionality safeguards the rights
of individuals. Dissuasive penalties are sanctions, which deter infringement and
enforce future compliance.2
1Radoniewicz (2019), p. 343.
2Cf. Fajgielski (2018); Łacny (2011), pp. 477–489.
366 F. Radoniewicz
Notably, administrative liability is not based upon the principle of guilt. Instead, it
has an objective nature. Accordingly, administrative penalties are adjudged regard-
less of the possible fault, since the very fact of infringement provides a basis for their
imposition. This is confirmed by the rulings of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal.
For example, in its rationale to the judgement of the 25th of March 2010 in case P
9/08 (Legalis) the Tribunal found that monetary penalties represent measures to
mobilise entities to comply with their obligations towards the State in a timely and
appropriate manner, and that they are used automatically, and legally, and serve
preventive functions. By warning against the negative consequences of the infringe-
ment of the obligations set forth in law or administrative decision, they encourage
statutory compliance. However, it is the objective infringement of the law, which
alone provides the basis for imposing a monetary penalty. Not surprisingly, the same
stance may be found in the rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC).3
Indeed, the monetary penalties imposed under the are governed by the provisions
of the Code of Administrative Procedure4 (CAP), as explicitly stipulated by Article
189a of the CAP, which requires the provisions of Section IVa of the CAP to be
applied in cases involving the imposition or determination of administrative mone-
tary penalties, or the granting of relief in their enforcement, subject to § 2 and §
3, which provide for partial or full derogations from the application of the provisions
of this section. The first derogation applies to cases, in which a particular Act
governs specific subject matters (preconditions for the determination of administra-
tive monetary penalties, abstaining from the imposition of such penalties, prescrip-
tion periods for their imposition or enforcement, interest on overdue administrative
monetary penalties, and granting relief from their enforcement), thus constituting a
lex specialis. The other derogation explicitly excludes the application of the CAP in
cases involving the imposition or determination of penalties by public administration
authorities based on the provisions governing petty offences, disciplinary liability
and employees’ liability for maintenance of order, and liability for public-finance
discipline.
Here, NCSA provisions represent a lex specialis and take precedence over CAP
regulations. On the other hand, it is difficult to consider the statutory regulation as
complete (Chapter 14 essentially governs only the types of infringements and the
amounts of administrative penalties). Hence the need to apply CAP provisions (not
only those mentioned in Section IVa).
In accordance with Article 189b CAP, an administrative monetary penalty is a
statutorily defined financial penalty imposed through an administrative decision
issued by a public administration authority for an infringement of the law involving
non-compliance or infringement by a natural person, legal person or organizational
units not being legal persons which have been granted the legal capacity by virtue of
statutory law.
3See e.g. SAC Judgement of 27 January 2016, II GSK, 694/14, Legalis.
4Act of 14 June 1960—the Code of Administrative Procedure, consolidated text, Polish Journal of
Laws of 2020, item 256, as amended.
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The straightforward expressions used by the legislator in the provisions of Article
73 (1) (“a monetary penalty shall be imposed on operators of essential services”) and
Article 73 (2) (“a monetary penalty shall be imposed on digital-service providers”)
of the NCSA make it clear that the penalties provided for operators of essential
services and digital-service providers (in contrast to natural persons, managers of
operators of essential services, on whom “may be imposed a monetary penalty” by
the authorities competent for cybersecurity, see below) are mandatory in nature,
resulting in the competent authority being obliged to determine a financial penalty
where it has found an infringement of the said provision (unless Article 189f CAP
applies). However, the authority has the freedom to decide on the amount of the
penalty, as such, the penalty is relative. In one instance the legislator provided for an
absolute penalty, the infringement defined in Article 73 (1) (10) of the NCSA, which
involves the neglect of a duty, as referred to in Article 14 (1) of the NCSA
(i.e. failure to establish internal structures responsible for cybersecurity, or, alterna-
tively, to enter into an appropriate agreement with a provider of cybersecurity
services), is subject to a fixed monetary penalty of 100,000 PLN. As a side note, it
is worth pointing out that the legislator was “careless” in setting the fixed amount of
the penalty while also stipulating that such an amount may not be lower than 15,000
PLN (Article 73 (4) (3) of the NCSA).
2 Administrative Penalties Provided for in the NCSA
In addition to serving the retributive function (as particularly shown by the regula-
tions of Article 73 (5) of the NCSA), administrative monetary penalties are intended
primarily as preventive and admonitory measures, both generally (especially with
regard to the negative aspect, by dissuading the addressees of the Act from infringing
its provisions) and specifically (acting as a deterrent for the penalised operator).
Moreover, they are usually designed to force the penalised operator to comply with
the obligation set forth in the provisions of the said Act.5 As mentioned above,
almost all monetary penalties defined in the Act are relative. The Act sets the upper
limit of the amount of the penalty, which may be determined for an infringement, as
well as, for operators of essential services, its lower limit. The legislator has not
defined the lower limit of the penalties imposed on digital-service providers. This
might pose problems with their determination. In the existing situation this limit
should be 1PLN.6
In its comments on the draft of NCSA, the Polish Entrepreneurs’ Association
noted that financial penalties would be imposed on institutions and not on the natural
persons who serve managerial functions at them, postulating the introduction of
5Cf. Banasiński and Nowak (2018), pp. 170–171.
6Radoniewicz (2019), p. 346.
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criminal penalties “which would provide the motivation to comply with the Act”. In
their opinion the PEA proposed the following types of prohibited acts:
(1) failing to ensure adequate data security, especially by operators of essential
services, or putting data processed in information systems at risk of being
disclosed or lost;
(2) intentionally (on purpose or through gross negligence) disclosing data processed
in information systems.
The Council of Digital Affairs issued an opinion proposing that criminal liability
be introduced, applicable only to managers of local government units, with the
possible penalty being limited to 100,000 PLN per infringement. However, the
legislator did not go so far as to introduce criminal liability for members of
governing bodies at entities, which commit infringements, instead providing only
for the possibility of imposing monetary penalties on managers of operators of
essential services (Article 75 of the NCSA).
Ultimately, the legislator provided only for financial penalties in relation to
operators of essential services and digital-service providers (the Polish Bank Asso-
ciation criticised this in its opinion), and they have increased them compared to the
ones provided in the draft Act, although not going beyond setting the rates. I believe
that the comments to the draft NCSA were right to note the need to introduce rates
with the amount determined as a percentage of the revenue of the infringing entity. It
seems worth considering other measures, which are equally harsh or even harsher
than financial penalties, the same as those provided in the Act on the liability of
collective entities7 (LCEA), under which the catalogue of available penalties against
collective entities (i.e. legal persons or organizational units not being legal persons
which have been granted the legal capacity by virtue of statutory law (excluding the
State Treasury, local government units and their associations), commercial compa-
nies with a State Treasury holding, local government units or their associations,
companies under formation, entities in liquidation, entrepreneurs, who are not
natural persons, foreign organisational units (Article 2 (1) and (2) of the LCEA)
includes such measures as the prohibition of promotion and advertising, using
grants, subsidies or other forms of public financial support, and the prohibition of
entering public procurement procedures).
3 Catalogue of Penalties
Almost all infringements penalised under the NCSA involve non-performance or
improper performance (failure to notify the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK or CSIRT GOV about a serious incident within twenty four hours from its
7The Act of 28 October 2002 on Liability of Collective Entities for Prohibited Acts Punishable by
Sanction, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020 item 358, as amended.
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identification; hence, an untimely notification might represent an infringement) by
operators of essential services of their obligations imposed under the NCSA. The
other two instances relate to infringements of procedural rules provided for in the
NCSA and involve obstructing inspection and failure to comply with post-inspection
recommendations.8 Provided below are infringements defined in Article 73 (1) the
NCSA, including the penalties to which, operators of essential services are subject
for such infringements:
(1) failure to perform incident risk assessment on a regular basis or to manage
incident risk (negligence of the duty defined in Article 8 (1) of the NCSA) is
subject to a monetary penalty of up to 150,000 PLN, but not less than
5000 PLN;
(2) monetary penalties of up to 100,000 PLN (but not less than 5000 PLN) may be
imposed for failure to implement technical and organisational measures, which
are appropriate for, and proportionate to, the assessed risk, taking into account
the requirements referred to in Article 8 (2) (a–e), such as in particular:
(a) the maintenance and safe operation of the information system;
(b) physical and environmental security, including access control;
(c) the security and continuity of services essential for the provision of critical
services;
(d) implementing, documenting, and maintaining action plans to enable the
continued and uninterrupted provision of critical services, and to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of information;
(e) establishing a system for the continuous monitoring of the information
system used to provide an essential service;
(3) monetary penalties of up to 50,000 PLN (but not less than 5000 PLN) may be
imposed for failing to implement the measures referred to in Article 8 (5) (a–d)
of the NCSA, i.e. measures to prevent and mitigate the impact of incidents on
the security of the information system used to provide an essential service,
including the following measures:
(a) using mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and
authenticity of data processed in the information system;
(b) keeping software up-to-date
(c) providing protection against unauthorised modifications in the information
system;
(d) responding promptly to any identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities or
threats;
(4) failure to appoint a contact person to communicate with entities within the
national cybersecurity system (Article 9 (1) (1) of the NCSA) is subject to a
monetary penalty of up to 15,000 PLN, but not less than 1000 PLN;
(5) failure to perform the duties referred to in Article 10 (1) of the NCSA,
i.e. failure to draft documentation on the cybersecurity of the information
8Banasiński and Nowak (2018), pp. 170–171.
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system used to provide an essential service, or failing to apply or update such
documentation despite its being in place is subject to a monetary penalty of
50,000 PLN;
(6) failure to perform the duty referred to in Article 11 (1) (1) of the NCSA,
i.e. failure to handle an incident, is subject to a monetary penalty of up to
15,000 PLN (but not less than 5000 PLN) for each identified negligence of such
a duty;
(7) failure to perform the duty referred to in Article 11 (1) (4) of the NCSA,
i.e. failure to notify the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT
GOV about a serious incident within twenty four hours from its identification
(under this provision the monetary penalty is also imposed when the operator of
essential services reported the incident after twenty four hours from its identi-
fication; this should be taken into account when determining the amount of the
monetary penalty) is subject to a monetary penalty of 20,000 PLN (but not less
than 5000 PLN) for each identified failure to notify an incident;
(8) failure to perform the duty referred to in Article 11 (1) (5) of the NCSA,
i.e. failure to provide CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV with the
data necessary to handle a serious incident, or personal data, is subject to a
monetary penalty of 5000 PLN to 20,000 PLN;
(9) a monetary penalty of up to 20,000 PLN (but not less than 5000 PLN) is
imposed for failure to resolve in a timely manner the vulnerabilities referred to
in Article 32 (2) of the NCSA, i.e. ones, which have caused or could cause a
serious, significant or critical incident, and the resolution of which has been
demanded by the competent authority at the request of CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK or CSIRT GOV, which coordinate the handling of such an incident;
(10) negligence of the duty referred to in Article 14 (1) of the NCSA, which
involves establishing internal structures responsible for cybersecurity, or, alter-
natively, entering into an agreement with a provider of cybersecurity services,
is subject to a monetary penalty of PLN 100,000 (but not less than PLN
15,000);
(11) failure to have an audit is subject to a monetary penalty of PLN 200,000 (but
not less than PLN 15,000);
(12) monetary penalties of up to PLN 50,000 (but not less than PLN 5000) are
imposed for obstructing inspections by the authority competent for cybersecu-
rity or the minister competent for computerization, as defined in Article
53 (2) (1) of the NCSA, i.e.
(a) for the minister competent for computerization, inspections on compliance
by the internal structures responsible for cybersecurity and the cybersecu-
rity service providers referred to in Article 14 (2) of the NCSA with the
requirements referred to in Article 14 (2) of the NCSA, i.e.:
– meeting the organisational and technical requirements to ensure cyber-
security for the operator of essential services;
– the availability of incident-response rooms protected against physical and
environmental threats; having safeguards in place to ensure the
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confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of processed infor-
mation, taking into account personal safety and the operation and archi-
tecture of the systems;
(b) for the authority competent for cybersecurity:
– the fulfilment by operators of essential services of their statutory obliga-
tions related to counteracting cybersecurity threats and reporting serious
incidents;
– the fulfilment by digital-service providers of the safety requirements
related to the digital services provided by them, as laid down by
Implementing Regulation 2018/151, and their statutory obligations
related to reporting significant incidents;
(13) failure to comply with post-inspection recommendations on resolving irregu-
larities, as referred to in Article 59 (1) of the NCSA (i.e. possible irregularities
found by the authority competent for cybersecurity or the minister competent
for computerisation based on the information contained in the inspection
report) is subject to a monetary penalty of up to 200,000 PLN, but not lower
than 15,000 PLN.
As emphasised in the rationale to the draft Act, in accordance with the NIS
Directive digital-service providers may be subject to sanctions in the form of
monetary penalties only when such providers have infringed the national provisions,
which implement the NIS Directive. It is not an option to impose monetary penalties
for the infringement of the provisions of the EU legislation, which supplements the
NIS Directive (including provisions governing the protection of the information
systems designed to provide digital services, as defined in Implementing Regulation
2018/151).
Of course, the catalogue of infringements for which digital-service providers are
subject to monetary penalties is much smaller than that applicable to operators of
essential services, since they have fewer duties under the Act. Accordingly, mone-
tary penalties apply only to matters associated with the reporting and handling of
significant incidents, resolving vulnerabilities, which have or could have led to
significant incidents, or which have or could have harmed national defence and
state security, public order or the safety, health and lives of people. Digital-service
providers are liable for failure to promptly (i.e. within twenty hours from identifica-
tion) notify a significant incident to the appropriate CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or
CSIRT GOV (the obligation referred to in Article 18 (1) (4) of the NCSA). Such
providers are subject to monetary penalties of up to 20,000 PLN for each failure to
report such an incident. Digital-service providers, who fail to provide the appropriate
CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV with the necessary data, including
personal data, when handling a significant or critical incident, are subject to a
monetary penalty of up to 20,000 PLN. Providers who have failed to resolve the
vulnerabilities referred to in Article 32 (2) of the NCSA (i.e. vulnerabilities that have
or could have caused a serious, significant or critical incident) despite being ordered
to do so by the authority competent for cybersecurity at the request of CSIRT MON,
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CSIRT NASK or CSIRT GOV, depending on which one is handling the given
incident, may be imposed a monetary penalty of up to 20,000 PLN by such an
authority.
4 Penalty Increase
Article 73 (5) of the NCSA provides the authority competent for cybersecurity with
the option of imposing an increased monetary penalty of up to 1,000,000 PLN
(as already mentioned, the amount was 200,000 PLN in the initial version of the
draft), should an inspection find that the operator of essential services or digital-
service provider repeatedly infringes the NCSA, causing the consequences listed in
the said provision, i.e.:
(1) a direct and serious cybersecurity threat to national defence and state security,
public order and the safety, health and lives of people;
(2) the threat of serious damage to property, or serious essential-service disruptions.
Marked by many ambiguous expressions, this provision affords considerable
freedom to the authority competent for cybersecurity. In order for the penalty to be
imposed, two objective preconditions must be met, the provisions of the Act have
been infringed (“repeatedly” suggests that there must be more than one infringe-
ment) and such infringements have caused a threat (as stipulated in Article
73 (5) (1) or (2) of the NCSA). However, it is at the discretion of the authority
competent for cybersecurity to decide whether the infringements have been com-
mitted repeatedly, and also whether their consequences meet the preconditions
specified in the said provision (i.e. whether the cybersecurity threat for national
defence, state security, public order and the safety, health and lives of people caused
by such infringements has been “direct and serious”, or whether the potential
property damage as a result of such infringements may be described as serious, or
whether essential-service disruptions caused by such infringements were serious in
nature), and whether to impose a monetary penalty, accordingly.
The administrative penalties referred to in Article 73 of the NCSA are imposed by
the authority competent for cybersecurity (i.e. respective ministers, depending on the
sector in which the given operator of essential services or digital-service provider
operates, as defined in Annex I to the NCSA to ministers competent for energy,
transport, maritime economy, inland navigation, health, national defence,
computerisation and the Financial Supervision Authority, see Article 41 (4)) by an
administrative decision.
Since the administrative penalties set forth in the said provision are subject to
administrative discretion (being obligatory but falling within a specified bracket of
amounts), and since the legislator has not defined the factors, which should guide the
authority’s determination of the penalty, the decisions in this regard are governed by
the degree-of-penalty directives (“general requirements for the determination of
administrative penalties) defined in Article 189d CAP, namely:
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(1) the gravity and circumstances of the infringement, including in particular with
regard to the protection of life or health, the protection of assets of substantial
value, or the safeguarding of an important public interest, or a particularly
important interest of a party, and the duration of such an infringement;
(2) past recurring events of non-compliance or infringements of the same type as
that which is subject to the penalty;
(3) a record of penalties imposed for the same behaviour, offence, fiscal offence,
petty offence and fiscal petty offence;
(4) the degree to which the party to be penalised has contributed to the infringement
of the law;
(5) the actions taken voluntarily by the party to be penalised to avoid the conse-
quences of the infringement of the law;
(6) the size of the benefit gained, or the loss avoided, by the party to be penalised;
this will be taken into consideration only when the determination alone of the
infringement is contingent upon whether the party to be penalised has gained a
benefit or avoided a loss through that infringement;
(7) in the case of a natural person, the personal circumstances of the party to be
penalised.
In the case of digital-service providers, as legal persons and organizational units
not being legal persons which have been granted the legal capacity by virtue of
statutory law, it is clear that the last precondition mentioned in the said provision
shall not apply, as opposed to operators of essential services, who (at least theoret-
ically) may be natural persons, and their managers. An analogous situation applies to
the precondition described in item 4 (it is difficult to accuse a legal person or
organisational unit of “contributing” to an infringement of the law).
Since the competent authorities are either supreme authorities (ministers) or
central authorities (the Financial Supervision Authority), administrative procedures
concerning the imposition of monetary penalties pursuant to provisions of the NCSA
are single-instance procedures (i.e. the decisions may not be appealed against).
Accordingly, under Article 127 § 3 of the CAP the penalised entity may (in the
case of a decision issued by the Financial Supervision Authority, under Article 127 §
3 of the CAP in conjunction with Article 11 (5) of the Financial-Market Supervision
Act) lodge a motion for reconsideration. This motion may, however, be relinquished
in accordance with Article 127a § 1 of the CAP, resulting in the decision becoming
final and irrevocable as of the date on which the public administration authority is
served the declaration on the relinquishment of the right to appeal made by the last
party to the proceedings.
Since, as already mentioned, under Article 127 § 3 of the CAP motions for
reconsideration are governed by the provisions on appeals, under Article 128 CAP
there is no requirement to substantiate such motions. It is sufficient that the motion
expresses the party’s discontent with the decision; unless specific provisions lay
down other requirements as to the contents of such motions (no such provisions exist
in this case). The time limit for lodging the motion is fourteen days from the service
of the decision, and if the decision has been announced orally, from the date of such
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an announcement. The decision may not be enforced before this time limit has
lapsed, and the lodging of the motion suspends the enforcement of the decision,
unless an order of immediate enforceability has been issued by a court (Article
108 of the CAP), or the decision is immediately enforceable by statute (Article 130 §
1, 2 and 3 of the CAP). If the decision satisfies the demands of all the parties, or if all
the parties have relinquished their right to appeal (Article 130 § 4 of the CAP), the
decision becomes enforceable before the said time limit expires.
A complaint may be filed with the appropriate administrative court against the
decision issued after the examination of the motion for reconsideration, in which
case general rules for such complaints apply (Article 3 § 2 (1) of the Law on
proceedings before administrative courts9 [LPACA]).
Due to the nature of the operations conducted by operators of essential services
and digital-service providers, involving personal-data processing and cross-border
ICT networks, a considerable role is played by Article 189f § 1 of the CAP, which
provides public administration authorities with the option to refrain, through a
decision, from imposing a monetary penalty, and instead only issue a warning.
This is the case where the gravity of the infringement is negligible and the party
has remedied such an infringement, or where an administrative penalty has been
previously imposed by an appropriate public administration authority under a final
and irrevocable decision for the same infringement, or where the party has been
penalised under a final and irrevocable decision for a petty offence or fiscal petty
offence, or where the party has been sentenced under a final and irrevocable
judgement for a fiscal offence and the previous penalty serves the purpose underly-
ing the possible administrative penalty. This provision makes it possible to avoid a
double penalty for the same infringement as a result of the concurrence of legal rules
prescribed in the NCSA, such as with GDPR or cybersecurity regulations applicable
in other EU Member States, as might be the case with cross-border incidents.
Article 189f § 2 and 3 of the CAP provides for the possibility of waiving the
penalty in cases other than those described in Article 189f § 1 of the CAP, should this
serve the purposes of the possible administrative penalty. In this situation a public
administration authority may issue a decision to set a time limit for the party to
furnish evidence that the infringement of the law has been remedied, or that the
appropriate entities have been notified of the infringement, prescribing the time limit
for, and manner of, such a notification (Article 189f §2 of the CAP). Where the entity
has furnished evidence that the requirements of the decision have been met, the
public administration authority shall refrain from imposing an administrative penalty
and instead only issues a warning to that entity. Adjudication with regard to
refraining from imposing an administrative penalty, as a determination of the merits
of the case (i.e. a subject-matter determination), should take the form of an admin-
istrative decision.10
9Act of 30 August 2002—the Law on proceedings before administrative courts, consolidated text,
Polish Journal of Laws of 2019, item 2325, as amended.
10Stankiewicz (2020).
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Article 76 of the NCSA (“the penalty referred to in Article 73 may also be
imposed where the entity has remedied the infringement or the damage caused by
such an infringement, provided that the authority competent for cybersecurity finds
that this is justified due to the duration, scope and consequences of the infringe-
ment”) seems to suggest a contrario that the administrative penalty prescribed in
Article 73 may not be imposed where the entity concerned has remedied the
infringement or damage caused by such an infringement, unless the authority
competent for cybersecurity finds that this is justified due to the duration, scope or
consequences of the infringement.11 However, it seems that in reality this provision
is somewhat amiss, modifying the general regulation applicable to refraining from a
penalty, as stipulated by Article 189f § 2 and 3 of the CAP. Indeed, it enables the
competent authority to impose a monetary penalty even in the circumstances
described in Article 189f § 3 of the CAP (Article 189f § 3 of the CAP do not
provide for options other than refraining from the penalty). Notably, the legislator
has afforded the authority competent for cybersecurity considerable freedom in its
decision-making. Hence, the exercise of the right to impose a monetary penalty is
contingent here on the authority’s finding that such a monetary penalty is justified by
the vaguely described statutory preconditions, i.e. the duration, scope or conse-
quences of the infringement.
The original version of the draft of NCSA (discussed as part of public consulta-
tions held before it being submitted for further Parliamentary processing) expected
that before instigating penalty proceedings the authority competent for cybersecurity
could request the operator of essential services (the original draft did not provide for
digital-service provider’s liability) to remedy the infringement within a specified
time limit, provided that this is justified due to the nature of the infringement (Article
58 (2) of the original bill). This provision, however, was eventually removed from
the final version of the Act. Possibly, it was considered redundant, since similar
solutions are provided by the above-discussed provisions of Article 189f § 2 and 3 of
the CAP. I believe this supports the above-presented interpretation.
An adjudication made pursuant to Article 76 of the NCSA should take the form of
an administrative decision.
Since the NCSA does not address the prescription period for the ruling and the
enforcement of the penalty, CAP provisions apply, stipulating that an administrative
penalty may not be imposed once five years have lapsed after the infringement date
or the date on which the consequences of the infringement occurred, unless separate
laws prescribe a time limit after which administrative-penalty or infringement pro-
ceedings, involving a potential monetary penalty, may not be instigated. Such a
penalty may not be enforced once five years have lapsed from the date on which the
penalty should have been enforced. The prescription period for, as well as the
enforcement of, the administrative penalty cease upon the declaration of bankruptcy
by the party concerned (Article 189h and 189j CAP).
11Banasiński and Nowak (2018), pp. 170–171.
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In accordance with Article 189 of the CAP, where justified due to an important
public interest or an important interest of the party concerned, the public adminis-
tration authority, which has imposed an administrative penalty at the request of the
party may grant relief in the enforcement of the administrative penalty by:
(1) postponing the date by which the administrative penalty is to be enforced, or
dividing the monetary penalty into instalments;
(2) postponing the date by which the outstanding administrative penalty is to be
enforced, or dividing the monetary penalty into instalments;
(3) forgiving the administrative penalty in full or in part (where an outstanding
administrative penalty is forgiven, this also includes late-payment interest in full
or in part, to the extent that such an outstanding administrative penalty has been
forgiven);
(4) forgiving, fully or partly, late-payment interest.
In proceedings concerning relief in an administrative-penalty enforcement a party
to which is a business entity, the authority has the obligation to determine whether
such a relief represents state aid as defined by EU law. No such relief may be granted
where it represents de minimis aid or de minimis aid in agriculture or fisheries. Where
the relief is found to be state aid other than de minimis aid, it may be granted,
provided that:
(1) its purpose would be to redress/remedy any damages caused by natural disasters
or other force majeure;
(2) it would help to address serious economic disturbances;
(3) it would be compatible with the internal EU market rules, and that it has been
considered admissible by the appropriate EU authorities for purposes other than
those mentioned in items (a) and (b) above.12
Pursuant to Article 189e CAP where the infringement was due to force majeure,
operators of essential services and their managers, and digital-service providers are
not subject to penalty (Article 189e of the CAP). A force majeure is an external event
beyond the control of the affected entity, which has no influence on the occurrence
and consequences of that event. Three categories of force majeure are distinguished:
natural disasters, legislative and executive acts, and serious public disorders.13 As
noted by A. Wróbel, Article 189e of the CAP applies to situations where the affected
entity failed to meet its obligation (through an infringement or non-compliance) as a
result of a force majeure.14
The exclusion of penalty is a construct derived from criminal law. The Penal
Code (PC) provides for such a solution where the perpetrator abandons the
prohibited act or prevented its consequence (Article 15 § 1 of the PC), or where
the co-perpetrator voluntarily prevents the prohibited act (Article 23 of the PC), or in
12For more on the subject, see Wróbel (2019a).
13Warkałło (1949), pp. 100–102.
14Wróbel (2019b).
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the event that the limits of necessary defence have been exceeded due to fright or
emotional distress, as justified by the circumstances of the attack.15 It is a prerequi-
site for criminal proceedings, as defined in Article 17 § 4 of the CAP, representing a
circumstance on which the admissibility of criminal proceedings is contingent (i.e. a
circumstance which, if found to exist, result in the refusal to instigate proceedings or
to discontinue pending proceedings), and which is substantive (meaning that it
derives from, and causes consequences in, the substantive-law sphere), absolute
(irresolvable), common (applicable always, regardless of the procedure) and nega-
tive (meaning that its occurrence shall preclude the instigation of the proceedings).16
In the context of administrative proceedings, this means that an infringement of the
law due to force majeure shall not result in the instigation of proceedings to impose a
monetary penalty, and if the circumstance was found to exist in the course of the
proceedings, such proceedings are discontinued.17
5 The Liability of Managers of Operators of Essential
Services
The Act uses the term “managers of operators of essential services” (no liability is
provided for “managers of digital-service providers”) without providing any defini-
tion (e.g., in the “glossary” in Article 2) of what it means. Clearly, no such position
exists in the organisational structures of organisational units, which operate, for
instance, under the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies, and since
operators of essential services (as well as digital-service providers) are usually
entrepreneurs (see Annex 1 to the NCSA) within the meaning of Article 4 (1) and
(2) in conjunction with Article 3 of the Entrepreneurs Law Act18 (LEA) (i.e. natural
persons, legal persons or organizational units not being legal persons which have
been granted the legal capacity by virtue of statutory law which conduct business
activities, i.e. organised for-profit activities carried out continuously and in their own
name, and also partners in civil-law partnerships to the extent of their business
activities), in legal transactions they usually operate as commercial entities,
i.e. partnerships and, above all, companies. A similar problem is encountered in
the Act on the protection of classified information19 (PCIA), in which the term
“manager” is used in relation to the so-called industrial-security proceedings
(i.e. proceedings conducted by the Internal Security Agency or the Military
15Cf. Wróbel (2019b).
16Grzegorczyk (2014), pp. 108–109.
17Cf. Krawczyk (2018).
18Act of 6 March 2018—the Entrepreneurs Law, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019
item 1292, as amended.
19Act of 5 August 2010 on the Protection of Classified Information, consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 742, as amended.
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Counterintelligence Service to establish whether an entrepreneur seeking, or plan-
ning to seek, to enter contracts associated with access to classified information, or an
entrepreneur already bound by such contracts, or fulfilling statutory responsibilities
associated with access to classified information provides the conditions required to
protect classified information). However, the PCIA defines the term “entrepreneur’s
manager” as the sole Management Board member, or the member of a different
single-member governing body, and if the governing body comprises multiple
members, the entire body or the member or members of such a body appointed at
least under a Management Board resolution to serve in the capacity of entrepreneur’s
manager, excluding any proxies appointed by such a body or unit; in the case of
general partnerships and civil-law partnerships, entrepreneur’s managers are the
partners in charge of the partnership’s affairs, and in the case of professional
partnerships, the partners in charge of the partnership’s affairs or the Management
Board, and in relation to limited partnerships and limited joint-stock companies, the
general partners in charge of the partnership’s or company’s affairs; in the case of
natural-person entrepreneurs the entrepreneur’s manager is the natural person
concerned; liquidators, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers are also considered to
be entrepreneur’s managers; an entrepreneur’s manager is an organisational-unit
manager within the meaning of the Act (Article 2 (14) of the PCIA). The term
manager, or unit manager, more specifically, is also used in the Accounting Act. For
the purposes of this Act, Article 3 (1) (6) thereof stipulates that an organisational-unit
manager is a member of the Management Board or other governing body, and if that
body comprises multiple members, the members of that body, excluding any proxies
appointed by the unit. In the case of general partnerships and civil-law partnerships,
the role of unit manager is ascribed to the partners in charge of the partnership’s
affairs, and in the case of professional partnerships, the partners in charge of the
partnership’s affairs or the Management Board, and in relation to limited partner-
ships and limited joint-stock companies, the general partners in charge of the
partnership’s or company’s affairs. In the case of natural-person entrepreneurs,
unit managers are the natural persons concerned; and the same provision applies to
individuals practising liberal professions, accordingly. Unit managers are also liq-
uidators, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers appointed in reorganisation proceed-
ings, as well as succession administrators, as referred to in the Act on succession
administration (ASA), or the individuals referred to in Article 14 of the said Act, who
performed the filing referred to in Article 12 (1c) of the Act on the registration and
identification of taxpayers and taxable persons. The Accounting Act also provides
the definition of the term “governing-body member” as a natural person serving in
the capacity of member of the Management Board or other governing body, member
of the Supervisory Board or other supervisory body, as well as member of other
administrative body of the unit, appointed in accordance with the Articles of
Association, Partnership Agreement or other laws applicable to the unit (Article
3 (1) (5a) of the Accounting Act). It seems that the definition provided in the
Accounting Act is more appropriate for the purposes of interpreting the term
“manager of an operator of essential services”.
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The liability of managers of operators of essential services is limited to cases
involving failure by such managers to exercise due care to fulfil the obligations laid
down in the said provision, i.e. to perform incident risk assessment on a regular basis
and to manage incident risk (Article 8 (1) of the NCSA), appoint a contact person to
communicate with entities within the national cybersecurity system (Article
9 (1) (1) of the NCSA), and to have, at least every two years, a security audit of
the information system used to provide the essential service (Article 15 (1) of the
NCSA). Monetary penalties on managers of operators of essential services are
optional (as opposed to operators of essential services and digital-service operators,
where such monetary penalties are mandatory).
As already mentioned, during the public consultations on the NCSA a suggestion
was put forward (in the comments made by the Polish Entrepreneurs’ Association
with regard to the draft of NCSA) to introduce criminal liability for individuals in
managerial positions, the rationale being that ensuring cybersecurity was of consid-
erable significance. However, the legislator chose not to implement this solution.
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The Liability of Entities Providing Services
by Electronic Means for Digital Content
Paweł Zając
Abstract As a result of computerisation, digitisation and informatisation of human
activities, cyber responsibility became a key and indispensable issue related to
human functioning in cyberspace. One of its aspects is the liability of service
providers for digital content shared in network and information systems. This
issue is increasingly important as the Internet has become a medium of exchange
for ideas, views and content, and thus, a potential place of abuse, both from service
providers and end users.
This article aims to show the legal regulations regarding the scope of liability of
entities providing electronic services for digital content provided under Polish
legislation, with particular emphasis on the obligations incumbent on service pro-
viders and indication of limitations of liability in the case of mere conduit, caching
and hosting services, upon fulfilling certain regulatory requirements. This article also
deals with the issue of protecting the copyrights to works unlawfully made available
on the web by users and the scope of responsibility of service providers for the above
activities.
1 General Remarks
The overall picture of our society has been transformed as a result of technological
and technical progress. New forms of communication and new social habits have
become engrained in society’s DNA. We have become an information society for
which creating, collecting and sharing information are crucial, and computers, the
Internet, and digital technologies in general, are becoming some of the most impor-
tant aspects of life.1 Thanks to the web, every user has become a potential author of
content, and information has become a commodity. That is why the digital
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1Golka (2005), p. 254. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz and Karpiuk (2015), Part I, Chapter 2, point 3.
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revolution has had an impact on law. The creation of legal regulations on the
economic use of the Internet is of key importance in the information society in
harmonising activities related to e-services. One aspect of the regulations is the
definition of legal responsibility for content posted on the Internet, and, more
specifically, of who is responsible, and under what conditions, for the infringement
of third-party rights caused by posting content on the Internet. Until the adoption of
the Directive on electronic commerce2 by the European Union, the issue of business
activities on the Internet, and, consequently, the liability of entities providing
services by electronic means, had remained the prerogative of individual states,
which did not know exactly how they should classify legal infringements on the
Internet. The situations described below should serve as clear examples.
On 6 May 1996, the Paris police arrived on the premises of World-NET and
FranceNet, two French companies providing Internet services in France, with a
search warrant for all their premises and equipment.3 As a result, the head of
World-NET and the CEO of FranceNet were charged under Articles 227-23 of the
French penal code4 for the dissemination, recording, and transmission of child
pornography. The reason for the arrest and detention was that companies provided
access to Internet groups and forums on which paedophilic content was posted and
exchanged. During the court hearing, the adjudicating authority concluded that the
service provider could not be held liable, because it did not have the authority to filter
the content posted on the Internet by other users, as this was contrary to French
constitutional law.5 The case for paedophilia was dropped.
In 1998, an action for disseminating a naked image of a model on the Internet was
brought against Valentin Lacambre, one of the French owners of a server—a device
on which websites are stored in the computer’s memory and which provides access
to the network.6 The photo had previously appeared in a French magazine, and was
then uploaded onto the server by one of the network users who used the hosting
service of the server’s owner. In the first instance, the referring judge, Jean-Jacques
Gomez, stated “It is necessary to specify that the hosting provider is obliged to
guarantee the moral standing of those it hosts and that these parties respect the
statutory rights of third parties”. The judge adjudicated against Valentin Lacambre,
imposing a penalty of 100,000 Francs, and prohibited any dissemination of the
image of the model in the photo.7 An appeal was lodged against this ruling. Judge
2Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market, OJ EC 2000 L 178/1 [hereinafter the e-Commerce Directive].
3Une contre-histoire de l’Internet, realisation S. Bergere, France 2013.
4 C o d e p e n a l e , h t t p s : / / w w w . l e g i f r a n c e . g o u v . f r / a f fi c h C o d e . d o ?
cidTexte¼LEGITEXT000006070719 [Accessed 10 April 2020].
5See World-Net and FranceNet blanchis par la justice, https://www.itespresso.fr/world-net-et-
francenet-blanchis-par-la-justice-3594.html [Accessed on 20 December 2020].
6Une contre-histoire de l’Internet, realisation S. Bergere, France 2013.
7Responsabilités des fournisseurs d’accès et d’hébergements: une première, https://www.legalis.
net/actualite/responsabilites-des-fournisseurs-dacces-et-dhebergements-une-premiere/ [accessed on
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Marais, hearing the case in the second instance, ruled that, in so far as the defendant
allowed Internet users to express themselves online, he “has clearly exceeded the
role of a mere conduit of information” and must therefore be responsible for the
content of the sites he hosted. The defendant was ordered to pay 300,000 Francs
compensation and 100,000 Francs penalty per day.8
What do these two cases have in common? They are both related to the activities
of entities providing services by electronic means, and involve data produced and
delivered in digital form, and also raise the issue of liability for such activities.
Furthermore, they initiated a public debate on the obligations and powers of Internet
service providers, and specifically whether electronic-service providers are respon-
sible for the content posted by network users.
The issue of defining the scope of responsibility of entities providing services by
electronic means also become a subject of public debate in Poland. It resulted in the
enactment of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means by the Sejm of the
Republic of Poland on 18 July 2002.9 This Act contained regulations implementing
the Directive on electronic commerce, despite the fact that Poland was not yet
formally a Member of the European Union.
2 What Is Digital Content?
Under Polish law, for the first time, the definition of “digital content” was included
by the legislators in Article 2 of the Act on Consumer Rights of 30 May 2014,10
according to which digital content should be understood as data produced and
supplied in digital form. This definition, taken from Article 2(11) of Directive
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011
on consumer rights11 (and subsequently repeated in the Digital Content Directive12),
20 December 2020]. The same logical argument was used in other judgments. See Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Nanterre 08 décembre 1999 – Affaire Lynda L. c/ Sté Multimania, Sté France
Cybermédia, Sté SPPI, Sté Esterel.
8La décision: Cour d’appel de Paris, 14ème chambre, 10 février 1999E. Hallyday contre
V. Lacambre, https://www.alain-bensoussan.com/wp-content/uploads/5446189.pdf. Accessed on
20.12.2020.
9Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means, consolidated text Polish Journal
of Laws of 2020, item 344, as amended (PSEMA).
10Act of 30 May 2014 on Consumer Rights, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item
287, as amended.
11Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance, OJ EU 2011 L
304/64.
12Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain
aspects concerning contracts for the provision of digital content and digital services, OJ EU 2019 L
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is very vague, and, therefore, includes a broad and open catalogue of the possible
scope of digital content. Recital 19 of the abovementioned Directive, which specifies
“Digital content means data produced and supplied in digital form, such as computer
programs, applications, games, music, videos or texts, irrespective of whether they
are accessed through downloading or streaming, from a tangible medium or through
any other means”, is helpful in interpreting this provision.13
It appears that the meaning of digital content as suggested by the legislators is
justified. The digital revolution is characterised by rapid technological and technical
development, and, thanks to such a universal, general, and technologically neutral
approach to the definition of digital content, this definition does not become
outdated.14
The definition covers data produced and supplied in digital form “irrespective of
whether they are accessed through downloading or streaming, from a tangible
medium or through any other means”. Therefore, the category of digital content
will also include data in other forms, which will then be digitised and delivered in
digital form.15
Seemingly, the Polish legislators approached the issue of digital content in a
slightly different way in Article 2(29a) of the Act on Payment Services of 19 August
2011,16 stipulating that this term should be understood as “goods or services
produced and supplied or rendered in digital form, which may be used or enjoyed
exclusively by means of a technical device, excluding the use and consumption of
physical goods or services”. The legislators have thus explicitly described the scope
of digital content as including goods and services. However, the discrepancies in
terminology which arise from the interpretation of the concept of digital content
136/1. The proposal for the directive originally contained a different definition, according to which
digital content was considered to be: “(a) data produced and supplied in digital form (e.g. video,
audio, application, digital games, other software; (b) a service allowing the creation, processing or
storage in digital form of data provided by the consumer; (c) a service allowing the sharing of data
and interaction with data in digital form, if those data are provided by other users of the service”,
COM(2015) 634 final.
13A slightly different definition of digital content is formulated in the Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law. “Digital content
means data which are produced and supplied in digital form, whether or not according to the buyer’s
specifications, including video, audio, picture or written digital content, digital games, software and
digital content which makes it possible to personalise existing hardware or software; it excludes:
(i) financial services, including online banking services; (ii) legal or financial advice provided in
electronic form; (iii) electronic healthcare services; (iv) electronic communications services and
networks, and associated facilities and services; (v) gambling; (vi) the creation of new digital
content and the amendment of existing digital content by consumers or any other interaction with
the creations of other users;”, COM (2011) 635: Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
procedure/PL/2011_284. Accessed 12 December 2020.
14See Kaczmarek-Templin (2015), p. 96.
15Macierzyńska-Franaszczyk (2018), p. 133.
16Act of 19 August 2011 on Payment Services, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020,
item 794, as amended. There is no obligation to filter content. . . or is there?
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contained in the Act on Consumer Rights and the Act on Payment Services do not
concern the very essence of digital content, but affect the nature of a contract the
subject of which is digital content.17
Digital content is data produced and delivered in digital form. The term “data”
usually means everything which is or can be processed, either mentally or by a
computer, and is transmitted to the recipient’s consciousness in the form of a
message.18 We use specific means to obtain information from data. In the case of
digital content, information is obtained through the use of appropriate hardware and
software, examples of which include material in the form of music files, photo-
graphs, videos, e-books, or apps.19 In general, data must meet two conditions in
order to be referred to as digital content—it must be produced and delivered in
digital form, but the production does not have to mean original production—and the
original form may be analog which has been digitised.20 As far as supply is
concerned, the term should be understood as “transmission by electronic means –
either wired or wireless, and reception by means of devices facilitating their
processing, storage, and reproduction”.21
On the basis of recital 19 of the E-Commerce Directive, two types of digital
content can be distinguished, i.e. data received on a tangible medium, or received
through any other means. This distinction is pertinent for determining the legal
nature of contracts for the supply of digital content, since, according to recital
12 of the Digital Content Directive, “This Directive should also not determine the
legal nature of contracts for the supply of digital content or a digital service, and the
question of whether such contracts constitute, for instance, a sales, service, rental or
sui generis contract, should be left to national law”. More importantly, however, the
provisions of the Digital Content Directive will apply, notwithstanding the medium
used to transmit or make available a digital content or service. This means that where
digital content is received on a tangible medium used exclusively for the supply of
digital content, the provisions of the Directive apply to both the medium, provided
that it functions only for the supply of digital content, and the content recorded on it
(Article 3(3). Digital content contained in goods or interconnected with them is
excluded from the scope of the Directive. Here, the EU legislators have introduced a
category of “goods with digital elements”, such as smart phones, which contain
pre-installed applications, and included them in the ambit of Directive 2019/771.22
The legal definition of a tangible medium is contained in Article 2(4) of the Act
on Consumer Rights. On the basis of Article 2(4) of the Act on Consumer Rights,
17For more details see Macierzyńska-Franaszczyk (2018), pp. 133–134.
18See Grabowski and Zając (2009), p. 111.
19Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), p. 148.
20Dziomdziora (2014), p. 33.
21Dziomdziora (2014), p. 33.
22Directive 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 concerning
contracts for the sale of goods, amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC,
and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC, OJ EU 2019 L 136/28.
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Any material or tool which enables a consumer or trader to store information addressed
personally to him or her in a way which allows future access to the information for a period
of time adequate for the purposes for which the information is intended, and which allows
the unchanged reproduction of the information stored, should be regarded as a tangible
medium.
A similar definition exists under the Digital Content Directive, except that instead
of “material or tool”, the EU legislators have used the term “instrument”. (Article 2
(13)). However, in the Digital Content Directive itself, the EU legislators introduced
yet another term, namely “durable medium”, which causes some conceptual confu-
sion. The question therefore arises whether “durable medium” and “tangible
medium” are identical expressions. When interpreting recital 20 of the Digital
Content Directive23and recital 23 of the Consumer Rights Directive,24 it becomes
clear that both concepts describe similar categories of media. However, as
K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz points out, “A tangible medium does not include
information stored in broadly defined electronic mail or in cloud tools”.25 Therefore,
we cannot consider these concepts to be identical.26
Receiving digital content through any other means can include, inter alia,
downloading from the network, streaming in the form of access to digital content
stored in the cloud, and accessing social media.
When considering matters relating to digital content, the issue described in recital
42 of the Digital Content Directive also requires considering. It stipulates that digital
content should be characterised by security, functionality, compatibility, and inter-
operability. We can find an explanation of the different qualities of digital content in
the directive itself, which states in recital 43
The notion of functionality should be understood to refer to the ways in which digital content
or a digital service can be used. For instance, the absence or presence of any technical
restrictions such as protection via Digital Rights Management or region coding could have
an impact on the ability of the digital content or digital service to perform all its functions
having regard to its purpose. The notion of interoperability relates to whether and to what
extent digital content or a digital service is able to function with hardware or software that is
different from those with which digital content or digital services of the same type are
normally used. Successful functioning could include, for instance, the ability of the digital
content or digital service to exchange information with such other software or hardware and
to use the information exchanged.
In addition, Article 2(10) includes a definition of compatibility, which should be
understood to mean the ability to interact with devices and software with which
digital content is normally used, without having to be transformed.
23
“. . . on a tangible medium such as DVDs, CDs, USB flash drives, and memory cards. . .”
24
“Such media should include, in particular, paper, USB sticks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, memory cards,
or computer hard disks, as well as electronic mail”.
25Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), p. 157.
26For more details see Kaczmarek-Templin (2014).
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3 Entities Providing Services by Electronic Means
In order to decode the notion of an entity providing services by electronical means,
the two statutory concepts contained in Article 2(4) and (6), of the PSEMA should be
interpreted—electronically supplied services, and the service provider. Such a pro-
cess will make it possible to identify the subject and the issue in question.
According to the legislators’ intent, providing services by electronic means
involves the performance of services which must meet all the following conditions:
the service must be performed without the parties’ being present at the same time,
i.e. remotely; the service must be performed by transmitting data at the individual
request of the service recipient; the data must be sent and received by means of
electronic-processing devices, including digital compression and data storage; and
the data must be transmitted, received, or transmitted by means of a telecommuni-
cations network within the meaning of the Telecommunications Law of 16 July
2004. It follows from the above that the legislators did not introduce a definition of a
service provided by electronic means, but defined it by indicating the elements of the
method of its provision.27
The lack of the simultaneous presence of both parties means that there is no
physical or direct contact between the provider and the recipient in the same location
in the performance of the service, which is sent and received by means of electronic
devices designed to store or process the data transmitted. As emphasised by legal
commentators,
It is significant that the moment of performance of the service decides, and not the moment
of ordering the service (the conclusion of the contract), as in the case of distance contracts
within the meaning of Article 6 of the Act on the Protection of Certain Consumer Rights and
Liability for Damage Caused by a Dangerous Product of 2 March 2000.28,29
An individual request means the provision of a service “at the request” of the
recipient, namely at a place and at a time individually chosen by the recipient.30
Examples include VOD (video-on-demand) services, web browsing, and sending
text and image messages. However, this category does not include services
consisting of the transmission of data received by an unlimited number of people,
such as radio and television broadcasts, because the recipient of the service does not
have the possibility to choose the time of providing the service—he or she can only
join it.31
The legislators did not include a definition of a “device for the electronic
processing and storage of data”, which can give rise to some interpretation problems
27Świerczyński (2009a).
28Act of 2 March 2000 on the Protection of Certain Consumer Rights and Liability for Damage
Caused by a Dangerous Product, Polish Journal of Laws No. 22, item 271, as amended. No longer
in force.
29Lubasz and Chomiczewski (2011).
30Konarski (2004), p. 69.
31Świerczyński (2009a).
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in practice. In the literature, we might encounter opinions that this term should be
understood as
part of a communication and information system in the form of a telecommunications
terminal device within the meaning of the Telecommunications Law. Sending, receiving,
processing, and storing data, from a technical point of view, will be effected by means of
such a device. This premise is connected with an important feature of a service provided by
electronic means, i.e. the absence of a material substrate.32
According to Article 2(46) in conjunction with (48) of the Telecommunications
Law,33 telecommunications equipment is any electric or electronic device intended
to provide telecommunications, i.e. to transmit signals on a telecommunications
network. However, not every use of such equipment will be equivalent to the
provision of electronic services, such as ATMs, motorway toll collecting devices,
or medical consultations by telephone.34
The final requirement is the transmission, receiving, or transmitting data over a
telecommunications network, meaning “transmission systems, and switching or
routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are not
active, which permit the transmission, reception, or transmission of signals by wire,
by radio, by optical or other means using electromagnetic energy, regardless of their
type”. (Article 2(36) of the Telecommunications Law).
Bearing in mind that the provisions of the PSEMA are a transposition of the
regulations contained in the E-Commerce Directive, it is worthwhile at this point to
refer to the solutions adopted by the European Union. The EU legislators do not use
the term included in the Polish legal order. Instead, they introduce the concept of
“Information Society services”, which, in accordance with Directive 98/34/EC,35
should be understood to mean any service normally provided for remuneration, at a
distance, by electronic means, and at the individual request of a recipient of services.
It can be noted that the PSEMA does not refer to the gainful nature of services, which
is present in the case of “Information Society services”. However, this does not mean
that the PSEMA applies to a category of services wider than Directive 2000/31/EC.
This gap is filled by Article 2(6) of the PSEMA, which provides a legal definition of
a service provider. According to this definition, a service provider may be a natural
person, a legal person, or an organisational entity without a legal personality, which
provides services electronically, even if it is performing as an incidental, gainful, or
professional activity. Legal commentators therefore assume that the term
32Lubasz and Chomiczewski (2011).
33Act of 16 July 2004 Telecommunications Law, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2019,
item 2460, as amended.
34Kot (2001), pp. 47–49.
35Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending
Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of
technical standards and regulations, OJ EC 1998 L 217/8.
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“Information Society services” is synonymous with “services provided by electronic
means”.36
An entity does not have to provide a service in an organised and continuous
manner to be recognised as a service provider, as described in Article 3 of the
Entrepreneurs’ Law. Such a solution is supported by the use of the phrase “even if
only incidentally”, which also makes it possible to classify as a service provider
those entities which only incidentally provide services by electronic means.37
As M. Świerczewski rightly points out,
The provision of Article 2(6) of the PSEMA is modelled on Article 2(b) of Directive 2000/
31/EC. The term ‘usługodawca’ is equivalent to the term service provider used in the
Directive. In Directive 2000/31/EC, in addition to the concept of service provider, there is
also the concept of ‘ustanowiony usługodawca’ (established provider). The introduction of
this category of service providers is important mainly depending on the country-of-origin
principle.38
Legal commentators distinguish between providers of electronic services. J. Barta
and R. Markiewicz differentiate the following categories of entities: administrators/
operators of a telecommunications network—telecommunications companies;
access providers—entities providing a service to facilitate access to a network
without any influence on the content transmitted in the network; original-content
providers in the network; content providers—entities whose activities consist of
introducing “own” content into the network, which allows downstream users to use
this material; and service providers.39 M. Zieliński distinguishes three categories of
service providers: access providers, network providers and intermediary service
providers, who transmit, store and make information available on the Internet. It
also identifies content providers.40 The introduction of the categorisation of entities
is of great importance in the issue of determining liability for a breach of law in the
network, because liability is determined on the basis of the type of activity of entities
providing services by electronic means. Furthermore, in some cases there is a
convergence of services provided by the same entity, which makes it difficult to
assert the rights of third parties.
When interpreting the individual provisions contained in the PSEMA, we can
notice that the Polish legislators have also introduced a categorisation of entities
which should be understood as entities providing services by electronic means. This
list has been included in Articles 12–14 of the PSEMA, on the basis of which we can
point to mere conduit service providers; hosting service administrators (host pro-
viders), and entities providing caching services. It should be remembered, however,
that this is not an exhaustive list, and these are not all the entities which fall under the
36Konarski (2004), p. 65; Zieliński (2013).
37Świerczyński (2009a).
38Świerczyński (2009a).
39Barta and Markiewicz (1998), pp. 213–215. See more.: Gęsicka (2014), pp. 40–49.
40Zieliński (2013), p. 38. A similar distinction is made by P. Litwiński, see Litwiński (2004),
pp. 176–178.
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definition. The criterion used by the legislators to distinguish the above categories is
the possibility to exclude liability in connection with the provision of specific
electronic services.
4 The Liability of the Providers of Services by
Electronic Means
The type and extent of the liability borne by the providers of services by electronic
means is diverse. In the Polish legal system, content providers are fully and directly
liable for the infringement of third-party rights on general terms.41 This is due to the
fact that they are the “authors” of the content they post, which will ensure that “in
terms of liability, their legal situation does not differ in any way from the status of
other legal entities responsible for their own actions”.42 Thus, depending on the
nature of the infringement they commit, they will be held criminally, civilly, or
administratively liable under the rules of a particular domain of law.
In contrast, the issue of liability has been regulated with regard to so-called
intermediary service providers, with which we can include services of: mere conduit,
data storage for accelerating data transmission (catching) and data storage for
sharing (hosting). In these cases, the liability of the intermediary for the transmitted
digital content may be waived if the statutory requirements of the PSEMA are met.
The drawing up of the exclusions has been implemented from the E-Commerce
Directive, where it is of a horizontal nature, thus eliminating any liability for a breach
of law—whether on criminal, civil, or administrative grounds.
5 Mere Conduit
An entity providing services by electronic means, including the transmission in a
telecommunications network of data transferred to the recipient of the service, or the
provision of access to a telecommunications network, having fulfilled the conditions
of Article 12(1) of the PSEMA, is not liable for the digital content transmitted in this
manner, or the activities related to it.43 The transmission in question is a service
involving mere conduit of information, i.e. passive participation in data transmission
(without involvement in its content, structure, or circle of addressees).
To benefit from the exemption, the provider of a mere conduit service may not
initiate the transfer, may not select the recipient of the data, and may not delete or
41Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (2019), pp. 176–178.
42Zieliński (2013), p. 38.
43Frań-Adamek (2002).
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modify the data subject to the transfer.44 These conditions must be cumulative. Such
a construct is modelled on the exclusion of the courier’s responsibility for the
content of the letters and parcels he or she delivers. In addition, the Polish legislators,
in Article 12(2) of the PSEMA, have also extended the exclusion of liability to the
automatic and short-term indirect storage of transmitted data, if this action is
exclusively aimed at carrying out the transmission, and the data are not stored longer
than it is normally necessary to carry out the transmission.
A mere conduit service should be neutral, consisting of a purely technical
delivery (with no knowledge of the information being transmitted or stored) and a
lack of cooperation with the recipient which would have involved transmitting
illegal content.45
The Polish legislators have not implemented the solution resulting from Article
12(3) of the E-Commerce Directive, which allows for the possibility of imposing an
obligation on the provider of mere conduit services, by courts or administrative
authorities, to stop or prevent an infringement. However, literature sources state that
the absence of an appropriate provision does not eliminate the exclusion of prohib-
itive claims against service providers.46
As a result of technological progress, the providers of mere conduit services have
begun to use deep packet inspection technology, which provides greater security for
data transmission. It also gives the opportunity to monitor data traffic, as well as to
personalise advertisements and profile consumers. Polański notes
The use of DPI technology for marketing purposes by providers of a simple message service
may be the basis for waiving the exclusion of liability under Article 12 (. . .) For in order to
be able to attach advertising messages to the content downloaded by the recipient of the
service, intermediaries must temporarily change the direction of data transmission, i.e. the
recipient of data.47
Furthermore, service providers using DPI modify the information contained in
the message by attaching an advertising message, which affects its integrity. There-
fore, it is not possible to justify such an action with a technical service process in
order to improve the effectiveness of the message.
Under copyright law, there is a particular form of evasion of liability for infring-
ing digital content by mere conduit service providers. Article 231 of the Copyright
Law48 provides the author’s consent is not required for a temporary reproduction,
transient or incidental in nature, that has no independent economic significance and
44Recital 47 of the E-Commerce Directive allows for the possibility of modifying the content which
is the subject of a simple communication service, where the modification involves “manipulations
of a technical nature which take place in the course of the transmission as they do not alter the
integrity of the information contained in the transmission.”
45See Polański (2020), p. 25.
46Lubasz (2013).
47Polański (2020), p. 28. See also: Litwiński (2002), p. 12.
48Act of 4 February 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights, consolidated text Polish Journal of
Laws of 2019, item 1231, as amended.
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is an integral and essential part of a technological process whose sole purpose is to
facilitate: 1) the transmission of a work in an information and communication system
between third parties by an intermediary, or 2) the lawful use of the work.
This provision has been transposed from Directive 2001/29/EC. Accordingly, the
possibility of transmitting content infringing copyright and related rights under the
mere conduit service is permitted if all the following conditions are met: the act is
temporary; it is transient or incidental; it is not economically significant; it is an
integral and essential part of a technological process; the purpose of the process is to
transmit content through an intermediary between third parties or to allow the lawful
use of the work. Legal commentators assume that Article 231 of the Copyright Law
is a special provision of Article 12 of the PSEMA, and is therefore the only basis for
evading liability.49
6 Caching
The essence of caching is to “automatically and briefly store on an intermediary
server someone else’s data, by creating a copy of them, in order for the end user to
download it more quickly in the future” (buffering), which reduces the intensity of
packet traffic transmitted within the network, which in turn increases network
efficiency.50
A distinction must be made here between a mere conduit service and a caching
service. Mere conduit, like the caching service, is the automatic and short-term
indirect storage of transmitted data. It would therefore appear that we are dealing
with the same service. The difference is, however, apparent in the purpose of storing
data. In the case of caching, it will be to accelerate access to data. In the case of mere
conduit, however, the aim is to facilitate data transmission. The difference is also the
duration of data storage, which will be shorter in the mere conduit service. The
question arises, therefore, as to the temporal scope of the data storage in the caching
service. Legal commentators take the position that “no strictly defined storage period
for caching data should be introduced and defined by the caching function. In other
words, as long as the storage of the data is to facilitate their faster downloading in the
future, it must be regarded as caching”.51 The specification of the time of data
storage has a significant impact, because a service aimed at storing information for
a longer period of time, e.g. a mirror-caching service (storing the content of entire
websites for a longer period of time), will not be exempted from liability.52
49Polański (2020), p. 34.
50Chomiczewski (2013), Accessed: 18.12.2020.
51Ibid. See also Konarski (2004), p. 135; Chomiczewski (2011).
52Świerczyński (2009b); cf. Julia-Barcelo (2000), p. 14.
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In Article 13(1) of the PSEMA, the legislators state
No entity transmitting data and providing automatic and short-term indirect storage of such
data in order to expedite their retrieval at the request of another party shall be liable for the
data stored if 1) it does not modify the data; 2) it uses recognised and customary information
technology for the technical parameters for accessing and updating the data, and 3) it does
not interfere with the use of recognised and customary information technology for the
collection of information on the use of the collected data.
In addition, (2) lays down an obligation for the service provider to delete the data,
or to prevent access to the stored data, without delay, when it becomes aware that the
data have been deleted from the initial source of transmission, or access to the data
has been prevented, or when a court or other competent authority has ordered for the
data to be deleted or access to them prevented. The fulfilment of these conditions
cumulatively allows the service provider to avoid liability.
The caching service provider should not modify the stored data, as this can affect
their integrity.53 In practice this means that a copy of the data stored on the servers
should be consistent with the content of the data on the input server.54 The legislators
also require the service provider to use recognised and customary information
technology for this type of activity, specifying the technical parameters for accessing
the data. As legal commentators indicate, “The purpose of this provision is to ensure
that a website copied and stored on a proxy server is accessible to users on the same
terms and to the same extent as the same website on the input server”.55
An important reason for excluding liability is to remove or prevent access to
content where the service provider becomes aware that it has been blocked or
removed from the input server. or where an order has been received from a court
or administrative authority. The question arises as to what is to be understood by the
notion of obtaining information. and whether the service provider is obliged to keep
track of the original content which is subject to the caching service. From the content
of the provision it seems that any information which reaches the service provider is a
message. Furthermore, the interpretation used by the legislators leads to the assump-
tion that an entity providing a caching service has an active obligation to monitor the
content which is subject to its service.56
7 Hosting
Hosting is one of the most popular services provided in the network. Its essence
consists of making the resources of an information and communication system (the
virtual memory on the server) available by the service provider to another entity in
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order to keep the data stored by it in those resources.57 Legal commentators
distinguish between classic and virtual hosting. The former relates to the storage
of websites on a remote server of the service provider in order to make them
available to network users. Virtual hosting, on the other hand, consists of making
available to the users of a given service the disk space of the provider of a classic
hosting service.58
In accordance with Article 14(1) of the PSEMA,
Anyone who, while making available the resources of an information and communication
system for the storage of data by a recipient of a service, is not aware of the unlawful nature
of the data, or of any activity relating to them, shall not be liable for the data stored, and shall
immediately prevent access to the data if he or she receives official notification, or if he or
she obtains reliable information on the unlawful nature of the data, or of any activity relating
to them.
The legislators have thus limited the liability of the hosting provider to a situation
in which the provider had no knowledge of the unlawfulness of the content stored, or
of the activities related to it; in other words, as long as it is not aware that users are
publishing illegal content through the provider, it cannot be held liable for possible
legal liability (civil, criminal, or administrative). This provision corresponds to the
general principle contained in Article 15 of the PSEMA, according to which the
service provider is not obliged to filter the data transmitted, stored, or made available
by it. However, where it acquires knowledge as a result of an official notice or actual
knowledge of the illegality of digital content stored on its servers, this disclaimer of
liability shall be removed unless it blocks access to it. Official notification is to be
understood here as information provided by an authorised official (court, public
prosecutor’s office, police, public administration authority), in an appropriate (offi-
cial) form, and with due process. It seems problematic to obtain knowledge about the
illegality of data from a source such as “actual knowledge”. Legal commentators
assume that such information can be obtained by the service provider from third
parties or by itself, but in this case it has to check its veracity.59 To this end,
appropriate notification procedures should be developed, in particular as regards
the indication of the minimum data necessary for the verification of the notification,
not specified in the PSEMA, with the obligation to create them being passed on to
the service providers themselves.60 In its judgment of 18 April 2017 the Court of
Appeal in Warsaw ruled
57Błaszyk (2018), p. 291.
58Polański (2020), pp. 53–54.
59See Siwicki (2011). According to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw (Case No. VI
ACa 1910/16) “Knowledge of the hosting service provider about the illegal nature of Internet users’
entries does not necessarily have to come from the persons affected by the incriminated comments.
The source of reliable information is legally neutral here, to the extent that such information can also
be the result of the own observations of employees or representatives of the web-portal adminis-
trator, and the technical means used by him or her”.
60Gienas (2008), pkt. 2.3.
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The purposive interpretation of Article 14 of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic
Means of 2002 indicates that a host provider is not obliged to conduct a detailed investiga-
tion to verify whether the information about the unlawful nature of data or activities related
to them is reliable. Therefore, a person requesting the prevention of access to the data should
supply the host provider with such information on the basis of which the unlawful nature of
the data or activities related to it becomes apparent, and leads it to conclude that it has
knowledge of the unlawful nature of the data within the meaning of Article 14(1) of the
PSEMA.61
Such an interpretation was also confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Lublin in the
judgment of 18 January 2011, which stated
The service provider is not obliged to monitor the network; furthermore, it is not obliged to
take steps to implement monitoring software. The only situation which undoubtedly leads to
the liability of the service provider is its being aware of the infringement, or of the unlawful
nature of the infringement.62
The notification procedure indicated in Article 14(1) of the PSEMA could be
included in the procedure for blocking content referred to as Notice-and-Takedown,
adopted in US legislation, where the service provider, on becoming aware of the
illegality of the content, must immediately block access to it,63 but only in respect of
the case in which the service provider has become aware of the illegality of the
content on the basis of an official notification, as provided for in Article 14(2) of the
PSEMA. In addition, in such a situation, the service provider shall not be liable for
any failure to perform or for the inadequate performance of an obligation between it
and the content provider.64 However, the Polish legislators have gone beyond the
American model by introducing, in a parallel manner, the Stay-and-Stay procedure,
the essence of which is contained in Article 14(3) of the PSEMA, according to which
the service provider is obliged to immediately notify the recipient of the service of its
intention to prevent access to illegal content posted by it.65 Fulfilling this obligation
removes its liability towards the recipient of the service for damage resulting from
preventing access to the data.
The exclusions of liability in Article 14(1) to (3) of the PSEMA do not apply if the
provider has taken control of the recipient of the service, that is to say, if the provider
of the illegal content acts under the authorisation or supervision of the provider.
When an entity providing services by electronic means cannot invoke the exclu-
sions set out in the PSEMA, the general principles of liability contained in particular
domains of law shall apply to it. In the case of civil law, as noted by M. Zieliński,
“The liability of intermediary service providers is possible on the basis of many tort
regulations, based on both the fault and the risk principles”. In view of the subsidiary
nature of ISP activity, however, with regard to the storage or transmission of
61Case file No. I ACa 55/16, LEX No. 2317742.
62Case file No. I ACa 544/10, LEX No. 736495.
63See Digital Milllennium Copyright Act, section 512 (C).
64Janowski (2008).
65Cf. Polański (2020), p. 81.
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information on behalf of users of their services, their liability as direct perpetrators
should always be excluded, on the basis of Article 415 of the Civil Code. Particular
importance in this context should be attached to the interpretation of the liability for
aiding within the meaning of Article 422 of the Civil Code.66 In the case of the
infringement of personal rights by statements by anonymous internet users placed on
Internet portals, the liability of the administrator (service provider) should be
considered on the basis of Article 24 § 1 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to the judgment
of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 29 November 2018,
The provision of Article 24 § 1 of the Civil Code does not limit its application to direct
infringers of personal rights, but covers all the actions of a specific entity which in any way
cause or contribute to the infringement of the injured party’s personal rights, or to the
aggravation of the infringement of those rights, previously committed by other entities.67
As far as the liability of service providers under copyright law is concerned, the
Court of Appeal in Kraków ruled on this on 18 September 2017. In accordance with
the operative part of the judgment,
An entity participating in the implementation of transfers infringing property copyrights is a
co-perpetrator, and co-infringer of other persons’ rights to the works. Thus, the position
stating that the manner in which the entity operates makes it unable to be treated as an entity
subject to Article 14 of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means, but it is simply
an entity which also illegally distributes works protected by copyright, is fully justified. If so,
the entity cannot invoke Articles 14 and 15 of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic
Means, and Article 79 of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means should be
applied to accept its responsibility.68,69
8 There Is No Obligation to Filter Content. . . Or Is There?
The legislators, in Article 15 of the PSEMA, did not impose a general obligation on
the providers of mere conduit, caching or hosting services to check the data
transmitted, stored, or made available by them. As the Court of Appeal in Warsaw
emphasised in one of its rulings,
This excludes the possibility of imposing general data monitoring obligations on these
service providers. The assessment that the standard of behaviour and professionalism
requires the controller to filter and remove any statements which violate the law, or which
might violate the law in an objective manner, without prior notice, cannot be accepted.70
Thus, the Polish Act lacks the full implementation of the provision contained in
Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, which additionally provides for the lack
of a general obligation to actively seek the facts and circumstances indicating an
66Zieliński (2013).
67Case file No. I ACa 974/17, LEX No. 2691182.
68Case file No. I ACa 1494/15, LEX No. 2354397.
69Copyright and Related Rights Act.
70Case file No. I ACa 1247/15, LEX No. 2138249.
398 P. Zając
illegal activity. However, the literature stresses that, despite the lack of the above
obligation, the understanding of the provision of Article 15 of the PSEMA should be
read in the spirit of the Directive.71
However, this does not mean a total ban on filtering content, as recital 47 of the
directive provides for the possibility of making it compulsory for service providers to
filter certain types of content. The possibility of doing so is left to individual Member
States to consider. The Polish legislators did not provide for such a possibility in the
PSEMA.
In spite of the fact that the E-Commerce Directive, and thus the PSEMA, did not
impose a general obligation on service providers to check content, the European
Union tried to push through the filtering obligation in the Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the digital single market.72 Article
13 of the Directive provided for this.
Information society service providers that store and provide to the public access to large
amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users shall, in cooperation with
rightholders, take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with
rightholders for the use of their works or other subject-matter or to prevent the availability
on their services of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the
cooperation with the service providers. Those measures, such as the use of effective content
recognition technologies, shall be appropriate and proportionate. The service providers shall
provide rightholders with adequate information on the functioning and the deployment of the
measures, as well as, when relevant, adequate reporting on the recognition and use of the
works and other subject-matter.
As a result of protests by electronic-service providers and the public, the
European Parliament did not adopt the Directive as proposed. However, this did
not mean that work on the regulation of a general obligation to filter content in terms
of copyright was stopped. Such an obligation was adopted indirectly in Article 17 of
the Directive on copyright and related rights in the digital single market.73 Service
providers who produce a large number of works protected by copyright available for
profit have been obliged to conclude licence agreements with copyright holders.
Under the provisions of the Directive, they are legally liable if they make available
content published by users for which they have not paid the authors, unless they
show that they have made every effort to obtain authorisation; that they have made
efforts to block access to unlawful content; and that they have acted promptly on
receipt of the notification. Here, the legislators have introduced an economic crite-
rion for service providers and restrictions on their liability. New providers of online
content services whose services have been available to the public in the Union for
less than three years. and whose annual turnover does not exceed EUR 10 million,
71Gęsicka (2014).
72Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital
Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final 2016/0280 (COD).
73Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright
and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC
OJ EU 2019 L 130/92.
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may waive their liability if they have made every effort to obtain authorisation and
have acted promptly after receiving a relevant reasoned objection in order to block
access to the protected works and subject matter covered by the objection, or to
remove those works and subject matter from their websites (Article 17(6)).
The EU legislators also imposed an obligation on Member States to enact
legislation stipulating
online content-sharing service providers put in place an effective and expeditious complaint
and redress mechanism that is available to users of their services in the event of disputes over
the disabling of access to, or the removal of, works or other subject matter uploaded by them.
As legal commentators emphasise,
Although the Directive as such does not impose a general obligation of supervision on the
owner of the platform in question, it is currently still difficult to determine how they will be
able to discharge their responsibility without implementing such a control-and-supervision
system, based on intelligent technology for identifying and recognising content.74
The directive also provides for exemptions from the service provider’s liability
for user-generated content in online content services. The restrictions concern
quotations, criticism, review, and the use of illegal content for the purposes of
caricature, parody, or pastiche (Article 17(7)).
Poland has not yet implemented the Directive’s provisions in its national legal
system.75
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Combating Cybercrime as a Special Task in




Abstract The aim of the paper is to analyze the provisions criminalizing the
phenomenon of “computer crimes” (“cybercrimes”) in the strict sense, i.e. acts in
which a computer or network is the target of a crime (“a victim”). The paper consists
of two parts—the main part in which analysis of articles 267-269c of the Penal Code
of 1997 (Chapter XXXIII, entitled “Offenses against the protection of informa-
tion”)—in which the Polish legislator defined these offenses—is carried out. The
second part refers to the “cyberterrorist offense” which is an “ordinary” computer
crime carried out with a “terrorist purpose”.
1 Computer Crimes in the Penal Code of 1997
The Polish regulation of prohibited acts set out in Directive 2013/40 is included in
Chapter XXXIII of the Penal Code titled “Crimes Against the Protection of Infor-
mation”, in the provisions of Articles 267-269c. It owes its present form to three
amendments: the first one, introduced by way of the Act of the 18th of March 2004
Amending the following Acts: the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, and
the Code of Minor Offences,1 intended to adapt Polish regulations to the provisions
of the aforesaid Convention on Cybercrime;2 the second one, introduced by way of
the Act of the 24th of October 2008 Amending the Penal Code and Certain Other
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2Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe of 23 November 2001. Polish Journal of
Laws of 2015, item 728.
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Acts,3 intended to implement Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against
information systems;4 and the third one, introduced by way of the Act of the 23rd of
March 2017 Amending the Penal Code and Certain Other Acts,5 the main purpose of
which was to implement Directive 2014/42/EU of the 3rd of April 2014 on the
freezing and confiscation of instruments and proceeds of crime in the European
Union6 and, “partially” (as formulated in the Act), Directive 2013/40 on attacks
against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/
JHA.7
Article 267(1) of the PC provides for penal responsibility of the offender for
gaining unauthorised access to information8 not intended for him/her. It penalises
three acts, which constitute attacks on the security of information systems and the
data processed in those systems.
First, connecting to a telecommunications network9 or, in other words, the
offender’s obtaining physical access to that network, e.g. by connecting to the server
3Act of 24 October 2008 Amending the Penal Code and Certain Other Acts Polish Journal of Laws
No. 214, item. 1344.
4Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information
systems, OJ EU 2005 L 69/67.
5Act of 23 March 2017 Amending the Penal Code and Certain Other Acts Polish Journal of Laws of
2017, item 768.
6Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the
freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union, OJ EU
2014 L 127/39.
7Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks
against information systems and replacing Council Framework Dec22/222/JHA, OJ EU 2013 L
218/8.
8From the very beginning, it is necessary to take note of the fact that the instruments of international
and EU law concerned with the security of computer networks, in order to specify the object of
protection, use the term “computer data”, and not “information”. The Polish legislator, in principle,
identifies the concept of information with the concept of data despite the obvious differences
between these two. In the light of Article 2(b) of Directive 2014/30, “computer data” is to be
understood as “a representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in
an information system, including a programme suitable for causing an information system to
perform a function”. The Convention on Cybercrime adopted a similar definition. With regard to
the above, computer data is a carrier (medium) of information, facts and concepts, which, only after
they are converted to the form of computer data, are readable by a computer (or information)
system. Computer programs fall within the scope of that concept as well. The distinction between
“computer data” and “information” is important from a legal standpoint, for one may take
possession of computer data; however, he/she may not be able to make of use of the information
contained in it, not knowing the algorithm used to encode it, for example. The destruction of data
does not always mean the destruction of information and, conversely, the seizure of data does not
have to mean theft of information. Cf. Adamski (2000), p. 37 et seq.
9According to the definition formulated in Article 2(35) of the Act of Telecommunications Law a
telecommunications network means “transmission systems, and commutation or redirecting
devices, as well as other resources, such as inactive network elements, enabling the sending,
reception or transmission of signals through wires, radio waves, optical waves or other means
using electromagnetic energy, regardless of their kind”. These are, for instance, satellite networks,
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via the network and obtaining access to the data stored in that server (actions
including the interception of data during transmission are penalised by Article 267
(3) of the PC).
Second, obtaining access to information by breaking electronic, magnetic, com-
puter or any other special protection. It follows that only the information, which is
stored in computer systems, and which has been protected against unauthorised
access by its holder, is protected. Electronic, magnetic or computer protection is to
be understood as “any forms of hindering access to information, the breaking of
which requires expert knowledge or a special device or code”,10 whereas “other
special protection” is a complementary category, which includes means that cannot
be classified with any of the kinds provided for in the applicable regulation, and the
removal of which causes difficulties for the offender no lesser than the breaking of
electronic, magnetic or computer protection.11 Computer data can be protected either
directly, e.g. by encoding or securing access with a password, or indirectly, as part of
the overall protection of a computer system itself, by means of firewalls, break
detection systems or authentication procedures. “Security breach” is the direct
interference of the offender with the protection mechanism, which leads to the loss
of its protective function and does not have to involve its removal.12 In the doctrine,
it is indicated that it must be actual and active at the time of committing the act.
Otherwise, the statutory criteria of a crime are not met.13
Third, omitting the above-mentioned protection and gaining access to informa-
tion due to that omission. One should bear in mind that the breaching of protection is
merely one of the many techniques (and not the most popular one) used by hackers to
penetrate computer systems. The other techniques are omitting protection, and they
consist of misleading people (the so-called social engineering, which are, for
instance, wheedling passwords out of people), misleading a system (e.g. the
so-called IP spoofing, i.e. the creation of false addresses, directed at manipulating
the source from which the data comes), or taking advantage of gaps (errors) in, or
permanent networks relying on the commutation of connections (circuit switching, in other words,
commutation of channels or circuits, consists in establishing, on demand, a “permanent” dedicated
connection between two or more network points for their exclusive use for the duration of the
communication session) and the commutation of packets (packet switching—a method of data
transmission which consists in grouping data into packets, each of which may reach its destination
via a different route; the process of transferring packets is called routing and takes place between
several network nodes—routers), cable television networks or power networks which enable the
transmission of signals. Commutation devices are devices used for circuit switching
(e.g. switchboards), whereas redirecting devices are devices used for packet switching (mainly
routers). Commutation or redirection devices are not always required for signal transmission. There
are networks that do not contain them. Cf. Krasuski (2015), Commentary on Art. 2(35); Piątek
(2019), Commentary on Art. 2(35); Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 278–282.
10Wróbel and Zając (2017) Commentary on Art. 267 PC.
11Kardas (2000), p. 71.
12Kardas (2000), pp. 71–72; Kozłowska-Kalisz (2020) Commentary on Art. 267 PC; Wróbel and
Zając (2017) Commentary on Art. 267 PC.
13Cf. Bukowski (2006), pp. 142–143; Kardas (2000), p. 64.
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vulnerabilities of, operating systems, applications or protocols (sets of rules, which
specify the communication processes responsible for identifying computers in a
network, among other things), using programmes called exploits.14
In Article 267(2) of the PC, the legislator penalises unauthorised access to the
whole or part of an information system.15 The authors of the 2008 amendment,
which introduced the provision, pointed out rightly, in the justification, that the
purpose of obtaining unauthorised access to a system may be not only obtaining
access to information contained in such computer data, but may also serve, to some
extent, as a first step to other activities such as, using the example taken from the
justification, installing on a computer a programme enabling one to take control over
the computer, in order to create a botnet16 by means of which the offender intends to
launch a dDoS attack.17 That provision is applied when the offender’s purpose, as he
14See more Radoniewicz (2021).
15The interpretation of the concept, basically from the very moment it appeared in the Penal Code,
created problems (cf. Radoniewicz 2016, pp. 275–278; Siwicki 2013), which intensified after
Poland ratified the Convention on Cybercrime. Since Article 267(2) of the PC was added by way
of the 2008 amendment, connected with the implementation of Framework Decision 2005/222, it
would be advisable to construe the term according to the definition set out in the Act and in
Directive 2013/40, which replaces it, namely, both as a single device that processes computer data
and a set of such devices, in other words, a network (see earlier observations). A lot of errors were
made in the translation of the Convention on Cybercrime. One of them was translating the term
“computer system” as “system informatyczny” [information system]. As mentioned earlier, the
substantive scope of the concept of a computer system, as defined in the Convention, is narrower
than the one of an “information system” as applied in Directive 2013/40. That calls into question the
scope of the concept of the information system in view of the Penal Code. It is important to stress
that, although the Convention on Cybercrime, upon its ratification, became part of the legal order,
the definition of an “information system” (computer system) may not be applied directly, owing to
the problems discussed. The existing confusion is intensified by the fact that, in the translation of the
definition of computer data in Article 2(b) of the Convention (computer data translated as “dane
informatyczne” [information data]), the translator used the concept of a computer system (“com-
puter data means a representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing
in a computer system, including a programme suitable for causing an information system to perform
a function”). In addition, the term “computer system” was used in the translation of the Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and
xenophobic nature committed through computer systems of 28 January 2003 (Polish Journal of
Laws of 2015, item 2015, item 730). Cf. Radoniewicz (2019a), pp. 42–47; Radoniewicz (2016),
pp. 244–249, 275–285.
16Botnets, which are networks of computers on which the offender (without the users’ knowledge)
installed special programmes—the so-called zombies (hence the infected computers are called
“zombie computers”), which are booted up under remote direction at a certain moment, e.g. in
order to launch a dDoS attack. Since it is possible to use a tremendous number of computers (even
several thousand, spread all over the world), the actual source of the attack remains unknown. At
present, in the Internet, one may obtain both programmes designed to launch DoS attacks and
“ready-to-use” botnets to launch dDoS attacks. In addition, botnets can be used, among other things,
to send spam (unwanted e-mail messages). Cf. Adamski (2013), pp. 68–69.
17DoS attacks (denial-of-service attacks) usually aim at impairing the operation of a network (and
blocking the network). In principle, one can assume that they consist in generating huge network
traffic leading to the hung-up of a server, or to an overload of a router or network devices. They may
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has gained unauthorised access, is to commit a “common” crime (the offender’s
conduct may involve, for instance, accessing another user’s account on an Internet
auction site in order to commit fraud) or when he/she was guided by some other
motives such as verifying his/her own skills or earning respect in the “hacker
circles”. Therefore, the objective, which the offender was to achieve or the motive
by which he/she was guided are irrelevant to the essence of the crime defined in
Article 267(2) of the PC.18
Access to the whole or part of an information system should be understood as
having an opportunity to use its resources, which basically means the data processed
by it. This, however, is not tantamount to access to information since the data may
be, for instance, either encoded or entirely incomprehensible to the offender.
Within the meaning of this provision, unauthorised access should be understood
as access without an authorisation or access, which exceeds the limits of such an
authorisation.
The solution adopted by the legislator in Article 267(2) of the PC received
justified criticism for three basic reasons. First of all, it was a word-for-word copy
of Article 2 of Framework Decision 2005/222 (“Each Member State shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the intentional access without right to the whole or
any part of an information system is punishable as a criminal offence, at least for
cases which are not minor”). It should be stressed that framework decisions were
aimed to harmonise legal provisions of Member States. They set out objectives to be
achieved, whereas Member States were free to choose the forms and methods to
achieve them. Therefore, the provisions formulated in the objectives are very
general. The framework decisions, which harmonise substantive criminal law, are
not suitable for literal transposition. Second, Article 267(2) of the PC is extremely
laden with content. The statutory criteria of the act defined in the article are met by
the offender who “obtains unlawful access” to data because that is what obtaining
access to a system in principle means, and in order to be held criminally responsible,
he/she does not have to breach protection. The sole condition is access that is
unauthorised. It should be assumed that the provision set out in Article 267(2) of
the PC is applicable to cases, in which the main element of the offender’s act was
gaining access to an information system, and not obtaining access to information.
This is the case, for instance, when one breaks into a computer in order to insert a
bot. Because of the broad subjective scope of Article 267(2) of the PC, also some of
the acts penalised by Article 267(3) of the PC, defined as computer eavesdropping,
may be potentially qualified also under Article 267(2) of the PC. Obtaining
unauthorised access to a network is tantamount to gaining access to the data that is
transferred over that network; the offender, therefore, meets the statutory criteria of a
prohibited act under Article 267(3) of the PC.
be also targeted at specific computers, disabling their communication with the server. Their
“enhanced” versions are dDoS attacks (distributed denial-of-service attacks), which make use of
botnets.
18See more Radoniewicz (2021).
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Third, the only condition to be met in order to press charges against the offender
for breaching Article 267(2) of the PC is the offender’s gaining access without an
authorisation. The issue of access rights to the resources of an information system is,
in most cases, regulated by “soft law”, the internal rules and regulations of a
network. The granting of access rights for users and the scope of such rights are
within the discretion of the system administrator. Such reference to non-legal norms
is dangerous and difficult to reconcile with the principle of the specificity of a
crime.19
The last amendment added provision 269c, pursuant to which one is not subject to
punishment for the crime set out Article 267(2) or Article 269a, for acting exclu-
sively for the purpose of protecting an information system, an ICT system or an ICT
network, or for developing a method for such protection, and has immediately
informed the holder of that system or network of the revealed threats, and his/her
actions did not violate public or private interests, or did not do any damage.
The tool for combating the so-called computer eavesdropping20 is the already
mentioned Article 267(3) of the PC, which penalises the installation or use of, in
order to obtain information,21 a listening, visual or other device or software.
It should be stressed that it penalises only the interception of computer data
during its transmission. If the offender obtains data stored, for instance, on a server
or private computer, this act should be qualified under Article 267(1) or Article 267
(2) of the PC. The unlawfulness of the offender’s conduct is obviously derogated if
the conduct that meets the statutory criteria of a crime is connected with lawful
operations of law enforcement authorities (i.e. it follows from the relevant legal
provisions22).23
Article 268(2) of the PC penalises any unauthorised interference with computer
data that consists in destroying, damaging, deleting or altering significant
19Cf. Adamski (2007), pp. 7–8; Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 301–303.
20Computer eavesdropping is a colloquial term for the surveillance of information systems. It is
often called, not entirely correctly, sniffing which is only one of its techniques. There are two types
of computer eavesdropping: the passive one, when the offender only reads the information being
accessed, and the active one, when the offender modifies the data that is transmitted, e.g. by
redirecting the transmission to somewhere else in the network.
21It is worth noting that Directive 2013/40 does not stipulate that the offender committing an act of
illegal interception of data must satisfy any other premises in order for penal responsibility to be
imposed—e.g. “dishonest” intent or acting for a specific purpose (“Member States shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that intercepting, by technical means, non-public transmissions of
computer data to, from or within an information system, including electromagnetic emissions from
an information system carrying such computer data, intentionally and without right, is punishable as
a criminal offence, at least for cases which are not minor”—Article 6 of Directive 2013/40).
22First of all, one should indicate the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Act of 6 April
1990 on the Police Service (Consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020 item 360, as
amended), the Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence
Agency (Consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020 item 27, as amended).
23See more Radoniewicz (2017a), pp. 181–196.
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information on a computer data carrier,24 and in limiting its accessibility for an
authorised person25 by foiling or hindering, in any other manner, the familiarisation
with such information recorded on such a computer data carrier.
The information that is the object of the offender’s act must be “significant”,
especially in the objective sense (because of its content, weight and significance26),
taking into consideration the interests of an authorised person to familiarise him or
herself with that information27 for the purpose that was intended or supposed to have
been intended.28
As the protection concerns “information recorded on an electronic data carrier”,
Article 268(2) of the PC is not applicable to any cases where the familiarisation with
such information is hindered by disturbances in the network functioning (in this
case, the offender’s conduct should be qualified under Article 268a (1) or (2), or
Article 269a of the PC).
In this case, the aggravated crime corresponds to the act described in Article 268
(2) of the PC, with substantial property damage caused by the offender being
considered an element of that offence.
The first part of Article 268a (1) of the PC penalises acts such as destruction,
modification of data, and hindering access to it. The second part, in turn, penalises
acts such as disturbing (in other words, hindering the operation of an information
system) or preventing the processing, storing or transferring of computer data. The
statement refers to any acts which impinge on these processes, and which lead to any
irregularities in, or slowdown of, these processes, as well as the distortion or
modification of the computer data that is processed, transferred or stored.29
In this case, the aggravated crime corresponds to the act described in Article 268a
(2) of the PC, with the substantial property damage caused by the offender being
considered an element of that offence.
The essence of the so-called computer sabotage defined in Article 269 (1) of the
PC is the impairment, damaging or alteration of computer data of special signifi-
cance to the State’s defence, communications security, the operation of the public
administration, other public authorities or institutions, or a local government body,
or disrupting or hindering the automatic processing, storage or transfer of such data.
Pursuant to Article 269 (2) of the PC, computer sabotage may also include damaging
24In the light of Article 3(1) of the Act on the Computerisation of the Operations of Entities
Performing Public Tasks, hereinafter: the Act on Computerisation, it is a “material or device
designed to save, store and read data in digital form”, which encompasses all data carriers such
as: floppy disks, which are rare at present, hard drives (magnetic data carriers), CDs and DVDs
(optical carriers), semiconductor memory (RAM—Random Access Memory, ROM—Read Only
Memory, in-built memory e.g. in printers, to name a few), flash memory etc.
25Cf. Adamski (2000), pp. 64–65.
26Kardas (2000), p. 88.
27Ibid. Cf. Kozłowska-Kalisz (2020), Commentary on Art. 268 PC; Wróbel and Zając (2017),
Commentary on Art. 268 PC.
28Górniok (2005), pp. 363–364; Kalitowski (2012), p. 1209.
29Wróbel and Zając (2017) Commentary on Art. 268a PC. See more Radoniewicz (2020),
pp. 241–250.
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or replacing a data carrier, or damaging or impairing a device designed to automat-
ically process, store or transfer protected computer data. It is punishable by impris-
onment from six months to eight years, which is a heavy sentence.30
In view of the much greater significance of the information protected under
Article 269 (1) of the PC, in comparison with the information subject to protection
under Article 268 (2) of the PC, and the identicality of the remaining statutory
criteria of prohibited acts penalised under those provisions, the crime described in
269 (1) of the PC is considered an aggravated crime in relation to the crime defined
in Article 268 (2) of the PC.31 For these reasons, such a statement appears justified
also in the case of the relationship between the crimes defined in Article 268a of the
PC, or 269a and 269 (1) of the PC.
Article 269a of the PC provides for penal responsibility of the person who,
without an authorisation, to a large extent disrupts the operation of an information
system, an ICT system32 or an ICT network,33 through actions of a logical character
such as the transmission, destruction, impairment or alteration of computer data. The
protection applies to the secure operation of a computer system and, in consequence,
to accessibility of the computer data processed in that system.
An attack on the operation of an information system, an ICT system and an ICT
network is a logical, rather than a physical attack. Disruption is to be caused by the
transmission, destruction, impairment or alteration of computer data. These will
include, for instance, DoS attacks.
As pointed out by Andrzej Adamski34 and Włodzimierz Wróbel and Dominik
Zając,35 the provisions set out in Articles 268a and 269a of the PC overlap. The
definitions “to a large extent disrupts or hinders the automatic processing, storing or
transferring of data” and “to a large extent disrupts the operation of an information
30See more Radoniewicz (2019b), pp. 199–209.
31Kardas (2000), p. 96. Cf. Adamski (2000), p. 77; Kalitowski (2012), p. 1211.
32Pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Act on Computerisation, this corresponds to a set of compatible
hardware and software which together ensure the processing and storage, as well as sending and
receiving data via telecommunication networks, by means of the appropriate end-point device,
within the meaning of the Telecommunication Law; the same definition can be found in the Act of
18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means (Consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws
of 2017, item 1030 as amended). It is assumed that an information system serves the purpose of
processing data, while a telecommunication system is used for sending such data. Hence, the ICT
system is an information system (in which computer data is processed) connected to a telecommu-
nications network, via which it can send and receive data. Cf. Konarski (2004), pp. 62–64;
Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 282–284.
33At present, the concept is not defined in any legal instrument. An ICT network is a set of ICT
systems, in other words, information systems in which data is processed, interconnected telecom-
munications networks by means of which data is transferred between those systems. It is an
extensive structure, created as a result of the convergence of information technology and telecom-
munications. Cf. Konarski (2004), pp. 62–64; Radoniewicz (2016), p. 284; Świerczyński (2009),
p. 39; Urbanek (1999), pp. 4–5.
34Adamski (2005), pp. 58–59.
35Wróbel and Zając (2017), Commentary on Art. 269a PC.
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system, an ICT system and an ICT network” are essentially identical. The operation
of the said systems and the ICT network consists in the processing, storing and
transferring of data. As further proposed by Andrzej Adamski, Article 268a of the
PC could be treated as a tool to prosecute the offenders, whose conduct does not
meet the criteria of the perpetrator defined in Article 269a of the PC,36 while
Włodzimierz Wróbel and Dominik Zając claimed that the said article should be
applied when the operation of an information system or an ICT network has been
disturbed.37 The offence under Article 269(1) of the PC should be considered as
aggravated type to the offence described in Article 269a of the PC.38
As in the case of the act described in Article 267 (2) of the PC, the provision of
Article 269c of the PC may apply here.
Article 269b of the PC penalises prohibited acts committed with the use of
“hacking tools”. Article 269b (1) of the PC, which is the equivalent of Article 7 of
Directive 2013/40, penalises the creation, acquisition, sales or making available: 1)
hardware or software adapted to committing the crime defined in Article
165 (1) (4) of the PC (causing danger to the life or health of many people, or
resulting in large-scale damage to property), and in Article 267 (3), Article 268a
(1) or 268a (2), in connection with 268a (1), art. 269 (1) or 269 (2), or Article 269a of
the PC; 2) computer passwords, access codes or other data which enable
unauthorised access to the information stored in an information system, an ICT
system or an ICT network.
The solutions adopted in Article 269b (1) of the PC, from the moment of its
inclusion in the Penal Code by way of the 2004 amendment, were widely criticised.
For the most part, the critics pointed out that there was no provision excluding the
penal responsibility of administrators and persons in charge of the security of
information systems, who use such software in the process of developing and testing
protection for systems, or authors of antivirus software.39 In order to eliminate the
shortcomings, section 1a was added to Article 269b, reading as follows: “Anyone
who acts solely with the purpose of securing an information system, an ICT system
or an ICT network against the crimes listed herein, or with the purpose of developing
such a security method, shall not be considered as committing the crime referred to
in section 1”. The primary aim of the amendment was, however, to increase the
upper limit of the statutory penalty for the crime to five years of imprisonment,
which was justified solely by indicating the necessity to make it possible for one to
subject the offender to the so-called extended forfeit, as provided for in Article
36Adamski (2005), p. 58.
37Wróbel and Zając (2017), Commentary on Art. 269a PC.
38Radoniewicz (2020), pp. 252–255.
39Gienas (2005), p. 82; Radoniewicz (2016), p. 336. Cf. Wróbel and Zając (2017), Commentary on
Art. 269b PC.
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45 (2) of the PC.40 This also met with fair criticism.41 No matter what the intentions
of the authors of the amendment were, one should take note of the fact that,
essentially from the moment of the inclusion of Article 269b (1) to the Penal Code
(by way of the 2004 amendment), emphasis was on the sanctions (the power to
impose a penalty of up to three years of imprisonment). The provision actually
penalises the acts or actions performed by a criminal offender in order to prepare to
commit the crimes set out in the provision, some of which are punishable by the
same or lesser sanctions.42 As for other “shortcomings” of the provision, one should
give attention, in the first place, to the fact that Article 269b of the PC does not
include hacking, whether in the form of unauthorised access to information under
Article 267 (1) of the PC or unauthorised access to an information system under
Article 267 (2) of the PC, in the list of crimes (for the commission of which the
creation, acquisition, sales and sharing of hardware and software are penalised).43
As far as other shortcomings of Article 269b (1) of the PC are concerned,
the provision mainly refers to software “adapted” to commit the crimes specified
therein. A problem, therefore, arises in connection with qualifying the actions of
creators of software serving several functions (the so-called dual-nature software),44
which is then used by third parties for criminal purposes, contrary to the creator’
intent.45 With the aim of complying with the ratio legis of that provision and
avoiding excessive criminalisation, Włodzimierz Wróbel proposed that it be
interpreted in line with the definition of punishable preparatory activities under
Article 16 (1) of the PC, which requires that the offender creating or acquiring the
tools listed therein acts with direct intent (or, as regards selling and providing access,
with indirect intent).46 As it seems, however, most representatives of the doctrine
(except for Włodzimierz Wróbel and Dominik Zając, Joanna Piórkowska-Flieger,
Barbara Kunicka-Michalska47 and Andrzej Marek48 are of the opinion that, in order
40The justification to the government’s bill amending the Penal Code and Certain Other Acts, form
No. 1186, section 4.6.
41On (the lack of) penal responsibility for identifying gaps in information systems and networks—a
legal opinion of the Foundation of Frank Bold and the Cracow Institute of Criminal Law, http://
blog.frankbold.pl/bug-bounty/. Accessed on 1.12.2020.
42As regards problems that arise from this fact, cf. Radoniewicz (2016), pp. 347–349.
43The fact that the crime under Article 268(2) of the PC is not included in the list appears less
problematic—the same programmes will serve one to commit the crime set out therein as in the case
of acts under Article 268a(1) and 268a(2) of the PC and Article 165(1)(4) of the PC (viruses).
44By way of example, network monitors, also referred to as protocol analysers, which allow
administrators to analyse network traffic, may be used by hackers as sniffers.
45Cf. Adamski (2005), p. 60.
46Wróbel and Zając (2017) Commentary to Article 269b. Cf. Piórkowska-Flieger (2012), p. 713.
47B. Kunicka-Michalska thinks that it is difficult to imagine creation, acquisition or selling without
the offender’s direct intent; see Kunicka-Michalska (2010), p. 748.
48According to A. Marek, the causative acts listed in Article 269b (1) of the PC may be committed
with direct intent only, while indirect intent may apply solely to the intended purpose of devices,
programmes, passwords, access codes and other data; see Marek (2010), p. 576. J. W. Giezek, by
critically referring to the viewpoint that creation and acquisition can only be done with direct intent,
stresses that it seems more probable that the crime is committed with indirect intent, when the
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for guilt to be attributed to the offender, it suffices that he/she has acted with indirect
intent.49
The Polish legislation on computer crimes undoubtedly needs change. First of all,
the conceptual framework should be standardised. At present, in the light of
the ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime, it is not necessary to define the
concept of information (computer) data as the definition offered by it has the
character of a self-executing norm and may be applied directly. In view of the
broadly discussed doubts about the scope of the concepts of an “information
system”, those should be defined. The same applies to the term “ICT network”.
I believe that limiting the scope of criminalisation under Article 267(1) of the PC
to the cases of violation of the secrecy of correspondence should be considered,
along with assigning the principal role in combating hacking (i.e. obtaining
unauthorised access to an information system) to Article 267(2) of the PC, by adding
the requirement that the offender mitigates or omits the magnetic, electronic, com-
puter or other security feature (which would also conform to the content of Article
3 of Directive 2013/40 recommending such a solution50).
It is also necessary to modify the Polish regulation of computer eavesdropping.
Article 267(3) of the PC requires the direct intent of the offender, while no such
premise is contained in Article 6 of Directive 2013/40. One should possibly consider
leaving that provision as it is (or mostly as it is), and at the same time adding a
provision (in conformity with Article 6 of Directive 2013/40) determining the act in
relation to which the offence defined in the current Article 267 (3) of the PC would
constitute the aggravated offence.51
Amendments to Article 269b (1) of the PC are also warranted. It appears
necessary to limit the penal responsibility to direct intent, and to specify that it
concerns the hardware and software “most of all” or “primarily” (as was used in the
English-language version of Directive 2013/40) serving the purpose of committing
crimes. Moreover, the list of crimes for which they could be utilised should be
extended at least by the remaining acts under discussion. It would be also advisable
to ease the sanctions.
offender only agrees that his/her conduct meets the statutory criteria of the crime, since the situation
usually look as if he/she did not want to create, acquire, sell or share certain hardware or software
but, with some probability only, assumed that they might turn out to be adapted to committing one
of the crimes set out in the Article, agreeing that it would be just so. The author plainly suggests that
the “uncertainty of diagnosis”, e.g. as regards the adjustment of hardware or software, allows one to
assume that, in such a case, we are actually dealing with indirect intent only, Giezek (2014),
pp. 1007–1008.
49See Adamski (2005), p. 61; Gienas (2005), pp. 81–82; Górniok (2006), pp. 369–370; Kalitowski
(2012), p. 1214; Kozłowska-Kalisz (2020), Commentary to Article 269b.
50
“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, when committed intentionally,
the access without right, to the whole or to any part of an information system, is punishable as a
criminal offence where committed by infringing a security measure, at least for cases which are not
minor.” See also: Radoniewicz (2016), p. 459.
51See more Radoniewicz (2017b), pp. 303–317.
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2 Cyberterrorism: “Cybercrimes of a Terrorist Nature”
Framework Decision 2002/47552 was transposed into Polish legislation by way of
the Act of the 16th of April 2004 Amending the Penal Code and Certain Other
Acts.53 As mentioned earlier, its provisions are similar to those set out in the
Directive 2017/541/EU,54 and the definition of a “terrorist” offence (in PC—offence
of a terrorist nature) has a similar shape.55 The Polish legislator, however, did not
decide on its literal transposition, instead creating a more synthetic one (Article
115 (20) of the PC), whereby emphasis was placed on the criterion of the offender’s
purpose. Similar to Article 1 (1) of Framework Decision 2002/475 and Article
3 (2) of Directive 2017/541, the following were listed alternatively as the offender’s
purposes:
(1) severely intimidating many people,
(2) forcing a state authority of the Republic of Poland or other state, or a body of an
international organisation, to undertake or relinquish certain actions,
(3) causing serious disruptions in the political system or economy of the Republic of
Poland, another state or an international organisation.
The second element of the definition in Article 115 (20) of the PC was formulated
differently from the original definition in Framework Decision 2002/475 (and is, in
consequence, different from that in Directive 2017/541). The list of crimes which,
when committed for any of the purposes listed in the definition, are viewed as
corresponding to terrorist acts was replaced with a formal criterion, a requirement
that the offence was punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least five
years.. Therefore, this provision does not result in delictum sui generis but it makes
any offence (a crime and a more serious act punishable by deprivation of liberty for a
maximum term of imprisonment of at least five years), committed for any of the
purposes listed in the definition, be considered an offence of a terrorist nature.
Pursuant to the provisions set out in Framework Decision 2002/475 (and Directive
2017/541), an offence of a terrorist nature also includes threat to commit such a
crime (Article 115(20) in fine).56
In the light of the above definition, cybercrimes of a terrorist nature may be the
following prohibited acts: Article 165 (1)(4) of the PC (causing danger to the life or
health of many people, or resulting in large-scale damage to property), Article 268
52Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. OJ EC
2002 L 164/3.
53Act of 16 April 2004 Amending the Penal Code and Certain Other Acts Polish Journal of Laws of
2004, No. 93, item 889.
54Directive 2017/541/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 March 2017 on
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ EU 2017 L 88/6.
55Radoniewicz (2019c), pp. 193–205.
56Giezek (2012), p. 738. Cf. Radoniewicz (2015), pp. 192–196.
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(3) of the PC (preventing one from accessing information, which results in gross
material damage), Article 268a(2) of the PC (an attack on computer data or the
processing of such data which results in gross material damage), Article 269 of the
PC (an attack on computer data of special significance), Article 269a of the PC
(disturbing the operation of an information system, an ICT system or an ICT
network) and—paradoxically (see earlier remarks)—Article 269b(1) of the PC
(offences connected with “hacker tools”).
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Cybercrime in Selected European Countries
Filip Radoniewicz
Abstract This study does not claim to exhaust all the abundant comparative legal
issues. Therefore, it has been limited to discussing the penal provisions of eight
European countries, without going into detailed considerations on issues related to
e.g. form of offences committed or the liability of legal persons. The overarching
intention was to present as diverse regulations as possible.
All countries whose regulations were discussed have signed and ratified the
Convention on Cybercrime and are members (except United Kingdom) of the
European Union, which resulted in their obligation to implement Framework Deci-
sion 2005/222 on attacks against information systems, and the need to adapt their
regulations to the provisions of Directive 2013/40, which has replaced this decision.
1 Introduction
Firstly, it should be emphasised that the present study does not claim to exhaust the
whole of the complex comparative-law issue, particularly as only one of over twenty
Chapters has been devoted to it. Therefore, it has been narrowed down to discussing
the substantive penal-law regulations of several European countries, without enter-
ing into detailed deliberations on the issues related to, for example, the stages of a
crime, and forms of accessory liability for a crime, or the liability of legal persons,
while the overriding intention was to present as diverse regulations as possible.1
All the states, whose regulations have been discussed here, signed and ratified the
Convention on Cybercrime, and they are, or were (the United Kingdom), Member
States of the European Union, which is why their regulations are based on Council
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Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of the 24th of February 2005 concerning
attacks against information systems and Directive 2013/40/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of the 12th of August 2013 on attacks against
information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA
(OJ EU L 218, 14.08.2013, p. 8.). Consequently, similar solutions have been
adopted in these countries.
As regards an offence involving illegal access, most legislators make the
offender’s penal liability conditional on the elimination of safeguards designed to
protect against unauthorised access to the data or system. Such a requirement was
introduced in Czech, Estonian, French and German regulations.
Regarding the remaining offences, which are the subject of this study (assaults on
the integrity of computer data and computer systems and networks, computer
eavesdropping and the production, possession and distribution of hacking tools),
the regulations in question demonstrate certain similarities, differing mainly in
the level of detail and types of aggravated crimes and, with regard to offences
against the integrity of data and computer systems, in the introduction of the
requirement for the offender to cause a consequence (Spain), the significant impor-
tance of the data to the victim (Germany), and action with the intent to cause harm
(Spain).
Unique solutions are found in the laws developed on the basis of English Law
(Computer Misuse Act of 1990). Several countries followed suit, including Malta,
whose regulations are discussed in this chapter, and some non-European countries,
such as Singapore.2
The texts of the penal laws under discussion, in addition to respective Govern-
ment websites, are available, for example, via the Council of Europe’s
Legislationline service3 and on the website of the World Intellectual Property
Organisation.4
2 The Czech Republic
The Czech Penal Code5 is the most recent of the discussed laws. It was adopted on
the 8th of January 2009,6 and entered into force after a vacatio legis period of almost
one year, on the 1st of January 2010. The Czech legislator included computer-related
2The Act No. 19/1993 of 30 August 1993—Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act, as amended
by the Act of 31 July 2007 (Chapter 50A), http://statutes.agc.gov.sg, accessed on 15.12.2020.
3www.legislationline.org, accessed on 15.12.2020.
4http://www.wipo.int/wipolex, accessed on 15.12.2020.
5The Penal Code of the Czech Republic of 8 January 2009 (Zákon trestní zákoník; Trestni zákoník),
Zakon č. 40/2009 Sb., http://aplikace.mvcr.cz/sbirka-zakonu, accessed on 15.12.2020.
6This happened after the Czech Republic signed the Convention on Cybercrime, which took place
on 9 February 2005, but before its ratification, which took place on 22 August 2013 (for the Czech
Republic, the Convention entered into force on 1 December 2013).
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crimes, being the subject of this study, in two chapters of the Code. The vast majority
of them, namely the offences of unauthorised access, unauthorised alteration of data,
disruption of networks and the development and distribution of “hacking tools”,
have been classified as offences against property (Division V of the Code). Com-
puter eavesdropping has been rightly considered to be an attack on the right to
privacy, and therefore it is laid down in Chapter 2 “Offences against personal
interests and the secrecy of private life and correspondence” of Division II of the
Code, entitled “Offences against freedom, personal interests and privacy of private
life and correspondence.” The discussion regarding the Czech regulation should
begin with this issue.
Computer eavesdropping is categorised in Section 182(1) (b), and Subsection
(c) of that Section defines the basic type of such an offence. According to these
provisions, imprisonment of up to two years or a prohibition of an activity (zákaz
činnosti) may be imposed on an offender who committed an intentional breach of the
confidentiality of communication (data, text, images, sounds), which may be attrib-
uted to a particular participant in the data exchange process or user to whom the data
are transferred via electronic communication networks or via private transmission of
computer data to, from or within a computer system, including by analysing
electromagnetic emissions generated by the computer system in connection with
the data transfer. The same sanction shall be imposed on anyone who, with the
intention of causing damage to a third party or of gaining an illegal advantage for
himself or a third party, discloses information (constituting a secret) not intended for
him or her, which he or she obtained from a letter, telegram, telephone conversation
or transmission via electronic communication network, or who uses such informa-
tion (Section 182(2)). The Czech Penal Code is quite strict and prescriptive.7 There
are numerous types of aggravated crimes, and computer eavesdropping may serve as
a good example here. When identifying its aggravated type under Section 182(3), the
legislator indicated as aggravating circumstances the commission of the acts referred
to in Section 182(1) or 182 (2) within an organised group, acting with a malicious
intent or with the aim of causing significant damage,8 or with the intention of
obtaining a substantial benefit for the offender or for a third party. Such an offence
is punishable by imprisonment for a period of six months to three years or a
prohibition of an activity. Whereas, if the perpetrator of the act described in
Section 182(1) or 182(2) is a public officer, or causes large-scale damage or, while
committing the act, intends to obtain a considerable benefit for himself\herself or for
a third party, he/she shall be liable under Section 182(4), which provides for a term
of imprisonment of between one and five years or a fine. Pursuant to Section 182(5),
a similar sanction (i.e. imprisonment of between one and five years, a fine and,
moreover, a prohibition of an activity) is imposed on a person, who being an
7More on the Czech Penal Code in W. Radecki, Nowy czeski kodeks karny, Prok. i Pr. 2009,
No. 7-8, p. 185 et seq.
8A significant damage—as defined in Article 138(1) of the Czech Penal Code—is a damage of at
least CZK 500,000, and a large-scale damage is damage of at least CZK 5,000,000.
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employee of a postal or telecommunications service provider, computer system
operator or anyone engaged in rendering communication services:
(1) commits an act referred to in Section 182(1) or 182 (2), or
(2) intentionally facilitates the commission of the said acts by a third party, or
(3) alters or loses a document sent by post or courier service or a message sent
privately as computer data, by telegraph, telephone or other similar means.
The above offence has an aggravated type, representing a (particularly) serious
crime.9 In accordance with Section 182 (6), the perpetrator, whose conduct meets the
criteria of an offence under Section 182 (5), and causes large-scale damage or who
acts with the intention of obtaining substantial benefits for himself/herself or a third
party, shall be subject to the penalty of imprisonment for a period of three to ten
years.
The group of computer crimes listed in Division V of the Code includes the
unauthorised access to the computer system or its part (Section 230). Infringement of
security measures constitutes a condition for the perpetrator to be indicted for such
offence. The offence is subject to imprisonment for a period of up to two years, a
prohibition of an activity or the forfeiture of movable property.
The second offence mentioned in this Section is the act of obtaining access by the
perpetrator to a computer system or information medium (there is no requirement
that such access be unauthorised) and:
(1) the unlawful use of data stored in that computer system or on that information
medium, or
(2) the unlawful erasure or other destruction or damage, alteration, deletion of data
or rendering the data stored on that computer system or on that information
medium unusable, or
(3) falsification or alteration of data stored in a computer system or information
medium in order to make it appear to be accurate, or make the system or medium
treat it as if it were accurate, whether or not such data are directly legible and
understandable, or
(4) unlawful input of data into a computer system or onto an information medium or
otherwise affects computer software or hardware or other technical device for
data processing.
The perpetrator of this offence shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to
three years, a prohibition of activity or the forfeiture of property.
The offences discussed above, as well as computer eavesdropping, have a wide
range of aggravated types. They are defined, first and foremost, in Section 230(3),
under which it is stipulated that the penalty of imprisonment for a period of six
9Pursuant to Section 14(2) of the Czech Penal Code, misdemeanours include all unintentional acts
and those intentional acts for which the penal law provides for a prison sentence with an upper limit
of up to five years. Serious crimes include all those offences that are not misdemeanours. On the
other hand, particularly serious crimes are all those which are punishable by imprisonment, the
upper limit of which is at least ten years (Section 14(3)).
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months to four years shall be imposed on a person who commits the act referred to in
Section 230(1) or 230(2) with the intention of causing damage to a third party, or
other harm, or of obtaining a substantial benefit for himself/herself or a third party, or
with the intention of limiting the operation of a computer system or other technical
device used for data processing. Secondly, pursuant to Section 230(4), the offence
referred to in Section 230(1) or 230(2) shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment
of one year to five years or by a fine, if the offender:
(1) acted as a member of an organised group,
(2) caused significant damage,
(3) caused by his conduct a serious disruption in the activities of a State adminis-
tration body, local government body, court or other public authority,
(4) obtained a significant benefit for himself or for a third party,
(5) caused a serious disruption of the activities of a legal person or natural person
acting as an entrepreneur.
On the other hand, pursuant to Section 230(5), the offender who, as a result of the
committed offence, has caused large-scale damage or thus obtained for himself/
herself or a third party significant benefits, shall be subject to a penalty of impris-
onment for a period of three to eight years. As already indicated above, due to the
level of the sanction, this offence is classified as a serious crime.
Section 231 of the Czech Penal Code criminalises acts related to the development
of, and trade in, hacking tools. Under this provision, the penalty of imprisonment for
a period of up to two years, prohibition of activity or forfeiture of property shall be
imposed on anyone who, with the intention of violating the secrecy of correspon-
dence, an offence under Section 182(1)(b) and 182(1)(c) or of obtaining access to a
computer system or information medium, an offence under Section 230(1) and 230
(2), produces, markets, imports, exports, transports, offers, arranges, disposes of, or
otherwise makes available to himself/herself or a third party, distributes or stores:
(1) any device or component, tool or other means, including a computer program
designed or adapted to gain unauthorised access to an electronic communication
network, computer system or parts thereof, or
(2) a computer password, access code or other similar means by which it is possible
to access a computer system or parts thereof.
The Czech legislator provided for two types of aggravated offences. The first,
referred to in Section 231(2), is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, a
prohibition of activity or the forfeiture of property, and the aggravating features
include the offender’s commitment of the act within an organised group or the
obtaining of a significant benefit by the offender for himself/herself or for a third
party. The second type, provided for in Section 231(3), is punishable by imprison-
ment for a term of between six months and five years, and the aggravating feature
includes the offender’s obtaining for himself/herself or for a third party a benefit of
considerable value.
According to Section 232 of the Czech Penal Code, the offence of damage to a
computer system and information medium and interference with a computer device
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due to negligence (unintentionally) is an offence, which is not covered by any other
legislation. It is applicable to a person who violates, with gross negligence, his or her
obligations arising from his or her employment, profession, position or function,
whether by law or by contract, and:
(1) destroys, damages, alters or otherwise renders unusable data stored in a com-
puter system or on an information medium, or
(2) interferes with software or hardware on a computer or other technical data
processing device,
resulting in a significant damage to the property of a third party.
This offence is subject to a maximum of six months’ imprisonment, prohibition of
activity and/or forfeiture of property. Section 232(2) provides for its aggravated type
depending on the value of the damage caused, in the case of causing large-scale
damage, the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment of up to two years (and a
prohibition of activity or forfeiture of property).
3 Estonia
Estonian Penal Code (Karistusseadustik)10 was adopted on the 6th of June 2001 and
became valid into force on the 1st of September 2002. The Republic of Estonia is
one of the earliest countries to ratify the Convention on Cybercrime, it did so on the
12th of May 2003 (the Convention on Cybercrime entered into force on the 1st of
July 2004). The offences covered by this study are listed in Chapter 13 “Offences
against property”, Division 1 “Offences against ownership”, Subdivision 2 “Damage
to property” (Sections 206 and 207 of the Estonian Penal Code) and in Division
2 (“Offences against all types of property”), Subdivision 3 “Unlawful use” (Sections
2161, 217).
Furthermore, Section 206 defines the offence of impacting computer data by
illegally altering, deleting, or damaging computer data in a computer system, or
rendering such data inaccessible. This act is punishable by a fine or imprisonment of
up to three years. Nevertheless, where the offence in question is:
(1) directed against the data processed in a significant number of computer systems
or programs or devices specified in Section 2161 (hacking tools) were used to
commit thereof;
(2) an act committed within a group;
10The Penal Code of the Republic of Estonia (RT I 2001, 61, 364). The text is available on the
website of the official journal, Riigi Teataja (https://www.riigiteataja.ee). Since 1 June 2010, Riigi
Teataja has been published exclusively on the Internet. English translations of some legislation,
including the Penal Code, are available on this website (and updated relatively frequently).
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(3) targeted against data processed in a computer system of strategic significance for
the State;
(4) it has caused significant damage;
the perpetrator shall be subject to a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment
(Section 206(2)).
Illegal interference with a computer system or disruption of its operation,
consisting of downloading data from it, sending data to it, deleting, damaging or
altering the data processed therein or rendering such data inaccessible, constitutes an
offence under Section 207(1). It is subject to a financial penalty or imprisonment of
up to three years. The aggravated type is provided for in Section 207(2). The
aggravating features are similar to those of the act under Section 206(2):
(1) the offence was directed against a significant number of computer systems or
was committed using the programs or devices or as defined in Section 2161;
(2) the offence was committed within a group;
(3) the impact of the act includes an influence on, or interference with, a computer
system of strategic or public service significance;
(4) the offence caused substantial damage.
However, the sanction is identical to that provided for in the case of the offence
under Section 206(2), it is a financial penalty or a penalty of imprisonment of up to
five years.
Division 2, which refers to offences against all types of property, includes the
provision laid down in Section 217 (Subsdivision 3 “Unlawful use”) under which
unlawful access to a computer system by eliminating or circumventing security
measures is punishable as a criminal offence. The sanction for this offence is a
fine or imprisonment of up to three years. However, if the perpetrator has caused
significant damage, gained access to a computer system processing information
constituting State secrets (or other qualified types thereof) or the computer system,
to which he gained access is of strategic significance, he or she shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for a period of up to five years.
Furthermore, Section 2161 criminalises conducts, which are preparatory activities
to the commission of computer crimes, consisting of supplying, preparing,
possessing, distributing or disclosing in any other way, in order to be used to commit
an offence indicated in this provision (i.e. defined in Section 206, 207, 21311 or 217),
or with the intention of facilitating its perpetration by a third party, a device or a
computer program created or adapted specifically for committing the offences
referred to in this provision or the means of gaining access to a computer system.
The perpetrator of such an act shall be subject to a financial penalty or to
11This provision defines the offence of computer fraud, consisting in causing financial loss as a
result of gaining unauthorised access to a computer program or data or altering, deleting, destroying
or blocking access to a computer program or data or otherwise interfering unlawfully with the
processing of data in order to obtain a financial benefits.
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imprisonment of up to two years. The forfeiture of property directly derived from the
committed crime, as defined in Section 83, may be ordered against the offender.
On the other hand, among the offences against fundamental freedoms (Part 2 in
Chapter 10 “Offences against civil and political rights”); Section 156(1) stipulates
the offence of violating the secrecy of correspondence “by letter or via other means
of communication”. The perpetrators of this act are only subject to a fine. It appears
that the term “other means of communication” can be understood as electronic
means of communication. As regards the aggravated type (Section 156 (2)), this
offence is punishable by a fine or a penalty of up to one year’s imprisonment and the
aggravating feature is the perpetrator’s exercising his or her powers.12
4 France
The current French Penal Code of 199213 (Code Pénal) replaced the Napoleonic
Code Pénal (so-called Ancien Code Pénal) of 1810. Computer-related crimes were
already included in its original version, and are defined in Chapter III (“Offences
against automated data processing systems”), Title II (“Other offences against
property”) of Book III (“Crimes and misdemeanours against property”), in the
provisions of Articles 323-1 to 323-8, which derive their current wording from the
amendments to the Code Pénal made under Acts 2004-575 of the 21st of June 2004,
2009-526 of the 12th of May 2009, 2012-410 of the 27th of March 2012, 2013-1168
of the 18th of December 2013, 2014-1353 of the 13th of November 2014 and 2015-
912 of the 24th of July 2015.
Article 323-1 defines the offence of fraudulent obtaining ( frauduleusement)14 of
an access to all or part of an automated data-processing system or to maintain access
to such a system. The latter characteristic refers to the perpetrator’s behaviour
consisting in obtaining authorised access (i.e. on the basis of his or her powers)
and then gaining access to parts of the system to which he or she is not authorised to
enter. The offence under Article 323-1 is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and
a fine of 60,000 EUR. When the behaviour of the offender causes destruction or
12Furthermore, in this chapter, the following acts have been criminalised: unlawful disclosure of
personal data under Article 157, under Article 1571—disclosure of sensitive personal data, and
under Article 1572—identity theft understood as using the identity of a third party in order to gain
access to data or cause harm to another person or conceal the offence.
13The Penal Code of the French Republic was adopted in sections. The first four books (as Acts No:
92-683; 92-684; 92-685 and 92-686) were published in Official Journal No. 169 of 23.07.1992.
Book V was adopted under Act No. 92-1336 and published in Official Journal No. 296 of
23 December 1992 [cf. Rogacka-Rzewnicka (2004), pp. 456–457]. The text of the Code is available
in the official Legifrance database: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed on 15.11.2020).
14For the occurrence of this offence, it is not required that the offender breaks the security measures,
provided that the fraudulent (deceptive) nature of his or her act is proven, which may be evidenced
by circumventing the security features by e.g. using spyware or a Trojan horse and thus entering
into possession of a password or access code to the system. Cf. Féral-Schuhl (2010), pp. 915–916.
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alteration of the data stored in this system or any disruption (deterioration) in the
functioning of the system, the offender shall be liable to a penalty of three years’
imprisonment and a fine of up to 100,000 EUR (Article 323-1(2)).
Article 323-1(3) provides for an aggravated type of both of the above mentioned
offences. The aggravating features include the type of system and the nature of the
data processed therein. In the event of the State system where personal data are
processed, the offenders are liable to a five-year imprisonment sentence and a fine of
150,000 EUR.
Another offence against automated data processing systems is to hinder or
interfere with the operation of such a system, as specified in Article 323-2. The
perpetrator is punishable by imprisonment for a period of five years and a fine of
150,000 EUR. As in the case of the offence involving fraudulent access, considering
the type of the system attacked and the nature of the data processed in it (the State
system processing personal data), the legislator provided for an aggravated type of
such an offence, punishable by imprisonment for a period of seven years and a fine
of 300,000 EUR.
Article 323-3 criminalises the act of maliciously entering data into an automated
data-processing system or of fraudulently downloading, retaining, copying, trans-
mitting, deleting or altering data within that system. The perpetrator of such an act is
punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 EUR. Likewise, as in
the aforementioned offences, the constituent feature of the aggravated type of the
offence is the nature of the object affected by the commission of the offence, in the
case of a State system that automatically processes personal data. This act is
punishable by imprisonment for a period of seven years and a fine of 300,000
EUR (Art. 323-3(2)).
By means of an amendment under Act No. 2004-575, following the adoption of
the Convention on Cybercrime,15 the provision in Art. 323-3-1 relating to “hacking
tools” was added. On this basis, a given conduct is punishable if it is performed
without a legal basis (i.e. unauthorised), which may in particular include conducting
research or ensuring information security, involving the import, possession, sale,
transmission or making available (including via the Internet) of any device, tool,
computer program (or data of any kind) designed or specially adapted to commit one
or more of the offences referred to in Articles 323-1 to 323-3. As regards the penalty
envisaged, an unusual solution was applied. The perpetrators are subject to a
punishment for the offence for which a “hacking tool” can be used. If it can be
applied in several offences, such a perpetrator is subject to the most severe penalty.
Therefore, he or she is treated virtually as an accomplice in committing an offence
(somewhat equivalent to aiding in the commission of a crime in the Polish legal
code), with the significant difference, however, that his or her liability is not of an
accessory nature, i.e. it does not matter whether the “hacking tool” was used to
commit the offence, or in the case of committing such an offence, whether the
perpetrator’s guilt was proven.
15Representatives of France participated in the work on the Convention on Cybercrime. It was
signed by them on 23 November 2001, ratified on 10 January 2006 and entered into force for France
on 1 May 2006.
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Attempting to commit any of the above mentioned offences is punishable by law.
The offender shall be liable, as it is the case in Polish law, within the limits provided
for the offence actually committed (Article 323-7).
Article 323-4 criminalises membership in a criminal group or arrangement
formed in order to prepare one or more of the offences referred to in Articles
323-1 to 323-3-1. Participation in such a group is punishable on the grounds of its
undertaking at least one act demonstrating such an objective for its establishment,
subject to the penalty provided for the act, which the members of the group or
association intended to commit. In the event that the preparatory measures the group
has taken could lead to acts bearing the features of several offences, and it is
therefore necessary to choose the specific legal basis for the penalty, the provision
stipulating that the most severe penalty shall apply. Under the Act 2014-1353 of the
13th of November 2014, Article 323-4-1 was added, specifying an aggravated type
of offences as defined in Articles 323-1 to 323-3-1. The aggravating feature includes
the fact that an offence has been committed against a public data processing system
within an organised group, which is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a
fine of 300,000 EUR.
In Code Pénal, there are other offences against data or data processing systems.
First and foremost, emphasis should be placed on Chapter VI (“Offences against
personal rights”), Title II (“Offences against persons”), Book II (“Serious crimes and
offences against persons”). In Section IV (“Violation of secrecy”), in par. 2 (“Vio-
lation of secrecy of correspondence”), in Article 226-15(2), the offence of computer
eavesdropping is defined as an intentionally malicious act of interception, diversion,
use or disclosure of correspondence sent, transmitted or received via an electronic
communications network or the installation of devices intended for that purpose. The
punishments for this offence include one year of imprisonment and a fine of 45,000
EUR. But when it is committed by the spouse or cohabiting partner of the victim or
the partner linked to the victim by a civil solidarity pact, this act is punishable by two
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 60,000 EUR. . Section V (“Violations of personal
rights resulting from the processing of computer files”) consolidates the provisions
criminalising unlawful processing of personal data (in particular, acts performed in
breach of Act No. 78-17 of the 6th of January 1978 concerning information
technology, computer files and freedoms).
5 Germany
In the Penal Code of 1871 in force in Germany (Strafgesetzbuch—StGB)16 the
offences in question have been defined in Chapter XV, which contains offences
against private secrecy (computer espionage, Section 202a, interception of data,
16German Penal Code of 15 May 1871 (Strafgesetzbuch—StGB) as published on 13 November
1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322). Its contents (also in English, but not fully updated) can be accessed on the
Internet via Gesetze im Internet (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de).
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Section 202b, offences related to hacking tools, Section 202 c) and in
Chapter XXVII among offences involving damage to property (data alteration,
Section 303a, and computer sabotage, Section 303 b).
The offence of computer espionage as defined in Section 202a (Ausspähen von
Daten) entails unauthorised access by the perpetrator, for himself/herself or for a
third party, to data not intended for them, provided that his or her actions are
accompanied by the infringement of the specific security measures protecting against
unauthorised access. In Subsection 2 of the aforementioned Section, it is clarified
that only data, which are stored or transmitted electronically or magnetically or in
any other imperceivable (nicht unmittelbar wahrnehmbar—not perceivable by the
senses) manner shall be considered as data. Computer espionage is punishable by
imprisonment for a period of up to three years or a fine.
The next offence listed in Chapter XV, interception of data (Abfamgen von
Daten) as defined in Section 202b of the StGB, shall be committed by anyone
who intercepts data, for himself/herself or a third party (within the meaning of
Section 202a (2) of the StGB), which is not intended for them during their
non-public transmission or electromagnetic emissions generated by a data
processing system during such transmission, without authorisation. The perpetrator
of such an offence shall be subject to imprisonment of up to two years or a fine,
unless a more severe penalty is provided for in specific legislation.
In accordance with Section 202c of the StGB, the development and distribution of
hacking tools is punishable as a criminal offence. Under this provision, it is
prohibited to undertake preparatory activities leading to the commission of the
offences referred to in Section 202a and Section 202b, consisting of the development
or procurement (for oneself or for a third party), selling or transferring to a third
party, disseminating, or making available in any other way, passwords or other
security codes enabling access to data within the meaning of Section 202a (2), or
computer programs designed to commit a criminal offence. This offence is punish-
able by imprisonment of up to one year or a fine. Pursuant to Section 202b (2), the
provisions of Section 149(2) and (3) apply accordingly to this offence.17 In other
words, the perpetrator is not punished if the following two conditions are met jointly.
First, the offender will resign from committing the planned offence and, at the same
time, will prevent the threat of a third party’s continuing preparations for, or
perpetrating, the offence, or prevents the completion of the offence. Secondly, at
the same time (also on a voluntary basis) the offender shall destroy or render
unusable the instruments intended to commit the offence (if they still exist and are
suitable for such use), or notify the State authorities of their existence or deliver such
tools to the responsible authorities. On the other hand, in a situation when the danger
of preparing for, or committing, an offence has been prevented without the inter-
vention of the perpetrator, or its commission has been made impossible, and thus the
perpetrator is unable to fulfil the first condition for avoiding punishment specified in
Section 202c, such condition is nonetheless deemed satisfied if the perpetrator
17Section 149 of the StGB criminalises preparatory actions for the crime of money counterfeiting.
Cybercrime in Selected European Countries 429
demonstrates with his or her conduct that he or she voluntarily and zealously sought
to achieve this.
As mentioned, subsequent offences against data and computer systems have been
classified by the German legislator as property destruction offences
(Chapter XXVII). In Section 303a, the offence of data modification as unlawful
deletion, blocking, alteration or rendering useless has been identified. The perpetra-
tor of this offence is subject to a penalty of imprisonment of up to two years or a fine.
In accordance with Subsection 2, attempting to commit this act is punishable and, in
accordance with Subsection 3, Section 202c shall apply accordingly to preparation
for committing such offence.
The offence of computer sabotage referred to in section 303b is an act committed
by a person who significantly (materially) interferes with the processing of data,
which are essential to a third party through:
(1) committing the act referred to in Section 303a (1), or
(2) entering or transmitting data with the intention of causing harm to a third
party, or
(3) destroying, damaging, rendering useless, supressing or modifying an electronic
data-processing system or data carrier.
The perpetrator is subject to imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.
Attempting is punishable (Section 303b(3)). However, on the basis of Subsection.
5, Section 202c may apply accordingly in the case of preparation for committing
such offence.
Section 303b (2) and (4) provides for aggravated types of computer sabotage. In
the first case, the aggravating feature is the weight of the data processed in it. If the
undisturbed functioning of the system is of significant importance to someone else’s
economic activities, another person’s company or a State office, the perpetrator shall
be subject to a penalty of imprisonment of up to five years or a fine. In the second
case (which is in fact of the aggravated type of act under Subsection. 2), the
aggravating feature involves particularly serious circumstances of the offence
under Subsection 2. Their occurrence results in the possibility of sentences ranging
from six months’ to ten years’ imprisonment. The legislator decided that such
particularly serious incidents usually occur in a situation where the perpetrator:
(1) causes substantial financial loss, or
(2) has made proceeds from criminal activities a stable source of income or is a
member of a criminal organisation, which has been formed to commit the
offence of computer sabotage on a continuous basis, or
(3) through crime, he or she disrupts the provision of vital goods or services to the
population, or impairs the security of the State.
To conclude the discussion on Strafgesetzbuch, it is worth mentioning
Section 269. It may be applied (in some cases in conjunction with Section 303a)
to aggravate the liability for IP-spoofing. In its basic type (Section 269 (1)), it is an
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offence punishable by imprisonment of up to five years or a fine,18 imposed on a
person who, for the purpose of fraudulent legal transactions, collects or modifies
evidentiary data by falsifying or altering a document, which could be made in the
course of the transaction or which uses such data.19
6 The United Kingdom
The main objective of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA)20 was primarily to
combat the offence of gaining unauthorised access to computer data and programs.
Very soon it became obvious that it needed to be amended, it was emphasised, above
all, the powerlessness of the law enforcement authorities in their fight against
the perpetrators of DoS attacks, which could not be brought to justice on the basis
of the CMA. Given these opinions and the fact that the United Kingdom signed the
Convention on Cybercrime21 and the necessity to implement the provisions of
Framework Decision 2005/222, which has been made by means of adopting the
Police and Justice Act 2006,22 a number of substantial changes were introduced. For
instance, the provision of Section 3 criminalising the disruption of computer oper-
ations was thoroughly modified (inter alia, enabling the prosecution of perpetrators
of DoS attacks on its basis), and the provision of Section 3A, criminalising the
development and distribution of hacking tools, was introduced. Furthermore, sanc-
tions have been reinforced.23 Under the most recent amendment (Serious Crime Act
201524) the offence of causing, or threatening to cause, considerable damage has
been added.
Currently, the Computer Misuse Act contains provisions criminalising four
categories of infringement:
(1) acts related to obtaining unauthorised access (unauthorised access to a computer
program or data in electronic form—Section 1; unauthorised access with intent
to commit further offences—Section 2);
18For aggravated types of the offence, the penalty can be even up to ten years’ imprisonment (see
section 269(3) of StGB).
19Cf. Hoeren (2012), pp. 492–493.
20An Act to make provision for securing computer material against unauthorised access or
modification; and for connected purposes (c. 18); the discussed legal acts are available on the
official website http://www.legislation.gov.uk, accessed on 15.05.2020. CMA applies throughout
the UK.
21The United Kingdom signed the Convention on Cybercrime on 23 November 2001, but ratified it
until 25 May 2011, followed by its entry into force on 1 September 2011.
22Police and Justice Act 2006 (c. 48).
23Smith (2007), pp. 1019–1020; Murray (2010), pp. 338–340, 346–348; Walden (2007),
pp. 174–175.
24Serious Crime Act 2015 (c. 9).
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(2) unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing,
operation of computer, network etc.—Section 3;
(3) unauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious damage—section 3ZA;
(4) making, supplying or obtaining “hacking tools”—Section 3A.
The offence of unauthorised access, as defined in Section 1 (1), consists of
causing a computer to perform any activity with the intent to secure access to any
program or to data stored in any computer. This offence may be committed only
intentionally. Section 1(1) (c) indicates that the offender must be aware, at the time
of the action, that he is not entitled to access the data or the program. Simultaneously,
it is stipulated that the intent of the perpetrator does not need to be to secure
unauthorised access to a specific program or data (or even to a specific type of
program or data), or to data or software held in any particular computer [Section 1
(2)]. In other words, it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator of the act in
question intended to obtain specific information or acted for specific reasons in order
to bring charges against him or her. The intent of the offence is not a decisive factor
in determining whether an offence has been committed or not, it could be, for
example, to break the safeguards to test one’s skills or simply to make a “joke”.
Moreover, it is also not necessary to prove that the perpetrator has actually gained
access in order to attribute criminal liability to a given act. It is sufficient for him or
her to initiate the appropriate measures resulting in operations that may enable him
or her to do so.
The amount of the penalty that may be imposed depends on the type of pro-
ceedings under which this is to take place. In the case of summary proceedings (this
is a procedure without a jury, currently conducted by a single professional judge),
the offence is punishable by imprisonment of not more than twelve months or a fine,
or both. In general, these are the highest penalties that may be imposed under this
procedure. However, if the judge considers it necessary to impose a more severe
sanction, the case may be referred to the Crown Court, which may impose a sentence
of up to two years’ imprisonment or a fine (without limiting its amount), or both at
the same time.
Section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act criminalises the practice of obtaining
unauthorised access with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of further
offences. It is committed by the offender whose conduct has the attributes of an
offence referred to in Section 1, which constitutes a kind of activity preceding the
commission of another offence, as referred to in that Section, or activity facilitating
the commission of such an offence (whether by himself or herself or a third party).
It is irrelevant to the existence of the offence in question whether a “further
offence” was committed at the time of unauthorised access or whether it happened
later. The perpetrator of this offence is also liable if this further offence has not been
committed, or even if it was impossible.25 The perpetrator is liable to a more severe
penalty than the one provided for unauthorised access only. It is punishable by
25Cf. Clough (2013), p. 51.
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imprisonment of up to five years or a fine (or both). However, where summary
procedure is applied, the situation is analogous to that of the case of an unlawful act
referred to in Section 1.
The second group of offences provided for in the Computer Misuse Act includes
conduct consisting of the perpetrator’s intentional or reckless unauthorised act in
relation to a computer, which is intended or likely to disrupt the operation of a
computer, network, etc. This category includes two types of offences, which differ in
the mens rea component. The first one is committed with intentional fault, the
perpetrator commits an unauthorised act with the intention of causing the conse-
quences indicated in Section 3 (2), i.e., to impair the operation of any computer, to
prevent or hinder access to any program or data held on any computer, to impair the
operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data. The second type of
crime in question may be committed out of recklessness. Under Section 3 (3), the
perpetrator, when undertaking unauthorised acts as referred to in Section 3 (1) is
reckless as to whether the consequences indicated in Section 3 (2) occur
(i.e. program or data impairment etc.). For both categories of the criminal act in
question, the offender’s conduct must be accompanied by the awareness that the act
is unauthorised. It is not mandatory to prove that such conduct has led to any
impairment in the operation of a computer [(or to any other consequence laid
down in Section 3 (2)].26 Furthermore, as in the case of the offence of unauthorised
access, it is irrelevant from the perspective of the offence in question whether the
offender’s action was directed against a particular computer, program or specific
data, or a computer, program or data of any specific type (cf. comments to Section 1).
Consequently, the impairment, prevention or hindering of access is also punishable
if it is transitory in nature. Under proceedings held before the Crown Court, a prison
sentence of up to ten years or a fine may be imposed. Under the summary pro-
ceedings—as in the case of the offences discussed earlier—it is possible to impose
the highest penalties provided for by this type of procedure.
Section 3ZA defines the offence of unauthorised causing, or creating risk of,
serious damage. This is an unauthorised act in relation to a computer (as defined in
Section 3). The condition for liability is that the perpetrator, at the time of commit-
ting the act, is aware that he or she is not authorised to perform the actions that he or
she is attempting. This offence may be committed both intentionally and with
recklessness. The concept of serious damage of a material kind is understood
broadly. According to Section 3ZA (2), it is damage to human welfare or to the
environment, in any place it occurs (or may occur), or damage to the economy or
national security of any country. Whereas, pursuant to Section 3 ZA (3), damage to
human welfare is understood as:
(1) loss to human life,
(2) human illness or injury,
(3) disruption of money, food, water, energy or fuel supplies,
26Cf. Smith (2007), pp. 1020–1023.
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(4) disruption of the communication system (understood as the transmission of
information),
(5) disruption of facilities for transport,
(6) disruption of the services related to health.
Section 3ZA (4) stipulates that it is immaterial whether the perpetrator’s behav-
iour was the sole or principal cause of the damage, as well as whether it was a direct
or indirect consequence of his or her act.
Due to the seriousness of the crime, the proceedings for the aforementioned
offence are exclusively held before the Crown Court, which may impose a sentence
of up to fourteen years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. However, where the act of the
perpetrator has resulted in the death of a human being or damage to health or
substantial harm to national security (or has brought about a threat thereof), the
perpetrator shall be liable to imprisonment for life or to a fine, or to both.
Provisions criminalizing the conduct of producing, supplying or obtaining
“hacking tools” are contained in Section 3A of the CMA. Three prohibited acts
are defined. The first one includes making, adapting, supplying and offering to
supply any “article” (this term should be understood as any programs and data
held in electronic form)27 with the intention that it should be used to commit (or to
assist in the commission of) any of the offences referred to in Sections 1, 3 or 3ZA. It
is immaterial to the liability of the offender whether the tool created (provided) was
used to commit the offence, or even whether it was suitable for that purpose. The
offender’s intention to enable a third party to commit a crime is crucial. The act may
therefore be committed only intentionally, in contrast to the second offence, which is
described in Section 3A, which may also be committed out of recklessness. It
consists in supplying or offering to supply any “article” believing that it is likely
to be used to commit (or assist in the commission of) any of the offences specified in
Sections 1, 3 or 3ZA of the CMA. The third offence identified in Section 3A is the
obtaining of any “article” with the intention of using it to commit (or assist in the
commission of) any of the offences under Sections 1, 3 or 3ZA or of its being
supplied to a third party with the intention of using it to commit (or assist in the
commission of) any of the offences under Sections 1, 3 or 3ZA.
In summary proceedings, as in the case of other offences, the maximum penalties
provided for under such procedure may be imposed, while in the case of conviction
on indictment before the Crown Court, the offender may be sentenced to imprison-
ment of up to two years, to a fine, or both.
27In order to hold the perpetrator liable under this provision, it is sufficient that the object of his or
her action is a single “article”.
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7 Spain
The applicable Penal Code of the Kingdom of Spain28 (Código Penal) was adopted
on the 23rd of November 1995, replacing the Code of 1870, which had been subject
to multiple amendments.
Spain signed the Convention on CyberCrime on the 23rd of November 2001 and
ratified it on the 3rd of June 2010. The offences in question are defined in Articles
197, 197 bis, 197 ter, 197 quater and 198 (Title X “Offences against privacy, the
right to personal image and the inviolability of housing”, Chapter I “Discovery and
disclosure of secrets”) and Articles 264, 264 bis, 264 ter (Title XIII “Offences
against property and social and economic order”, Chapter VIII “Damage”) of
Código Penal. The Spanish regulation in its present form is the result of a compre-
hensive amendment introduced under the Act of the 31st of March 201529 (which
became valid on the 1st of July 2015), harmonising the Code regulations with
EU laws.
According to Article 197(1), an imprisonment sentence of one to four years and a
fine, or a sentence of twelve to twenty four months is imposed upon the perpetrator
who, in order to discover (uncover) the secrets or to breach privacy of another
person, without his or her consent, acquires any letters, e-mails or any other personal
documents or belongings, intercepts telecommunications of that nature or uses
technical means to eavesdrop on the transmission, recording or reproduction of
sound or image or other manifestations of interpersonal communication. Pursuant
to Paragraph 2, the same penalty may be imposed on an offender who, without being
authorised to do so, intercepts, uses or alters proprietary30 data of a personal or
family nature stored as files on a computer, on information or electronic media, or in
any similar data filing system, whether public or private, to the detriment of a third
party (i.e. both the person directly harmed by the actions of the perpetrator, the data
holder, i.e. usually the data subject, and any other third party who is affected by the
act for any reason). The same penalty shall be imposed on anyone who, without
being authorised to do so, accesses such data by any means, and alters or uses such
data to the detriment of the owner or third party.
Furthermore, a sentence of between two and five years’ imprisonment is provided
for a person who disseminates, discloses or transfers to third parties data or facts
coming to his or her knowledge as a result of committing the acts referred to in
Article 197(1) and (2) or images obtained in this way (Subparagraph 1 of Article 197
(3)). A person who is aware of the illegal origin of the data or images (i.e. the fact
28Organic Law No. 10/1995 of 23 November 1995 (BOE No. 281 of 24 November 1995). The text
is available on the Iberlex website (http://www.boe.es, accessed on 15.12.2020).
29Organic Law No. 1/2015 of 30 March 2015 (BOE No. 77 of 31 March 2015).
30According to the views of legal commentators and the views expressed in the case law of the
Spanish Supreme Court, this concept is broader than sensitive data. It contains all the private data
that is usually not disclosed to a wide circle of people, meaning persons other than closest relatives
and friends. Cf. Letai, p. 246.
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that they were obtained by means of one of the offences referred to in Article 197(1)-
(2)), if he or she did not participate in obtaining the data or images, but performs the
aforementioned activities, shall be liable to a fine and a sentence of between twelve
and twenty four months or to imprisonment of between one and three years (Article
197(3), Subpara. 2).
Further Código Penal provisions in Art. 197 provide for a number of types of
aggravated crimes under Article 197(1-2). Pursuant to Paragraph 4, the perpetrator
of these offences shall be subject to more severe sanctions (imprisonment of three to
five years) if he or she was the person responsible for the files, storage medium,
electronic archive or register in which the data were processed or which were under
his or her custody, or if the data, which were the subject of the offence were personal
data and the perpetrator was not authorised to use them. Whereas, where private data
classified as proprietary data (as referred to in Para. 2) are disseminated, transmitted
or disclosed to a third party, the offender shall be subject to a penalty within the
upper half of the range provided by law (Article 197(4), Subpara. 2). The nature of
data being the object of offence constitutes a factor aggravating criminal liability
pursuant to Article 197(5), in which it is stipulated that where the object of the
offences referred to in the previous provisions includes data concerning religion,
religious denomination, health, ethnic origin, race, sexual orientation (i.e. sensitive
data), or where the victim is a minor or a person with disability in need of special
care, the penalty imposed should fall within the upper half of the range provided
by law.
In accordance with Article 197(6), if the offence referred to in the preceding
paragraphs is committed for the purpose of making a profit, the offender shall be
sentenced to a penalty, which falls within the upper half of the penalty range
provided by law. However, if the offence affected data referred to in Para. 6 (sensitive
data), the offender is liable to even more severe sentences, ranging from to seven
years’ imprisonment.
The first Subparagraph of Para. 7 of the discussed Article provides for a type of
criminal act, which does not constitute a typical computer crime, but which may be
committed using information technology. According to this provision, a person who,
without the consent of the person concerned, distributes, discloses or transmits to
third parties photographs or audio-visual recordings, which he or she has obtained
with his or her consent in his or her place of residence or in other circumstances,
which demonstrate their private nature and the intention not to disclose them to
others shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of between three months and one
year, or a fine and a sentence of between six and twelve months (“domicilio o en
cualquier otro lugar fuera del alcance de la mirada de terceros”) if disclosure is likely
to infringe the privacy of that person.
The perpetrator can face a more severe penalty (imposed at the upper half of the
penalty range) if he or she is or has been the spouse of the victim or has been in a
similar relationship with him or her (but not necessarily cohabitation), or if the
victim was a minor or a person with disability in need of special care, or if the
offence was committed for the purpose of financial gain (Article 197(7) Subpara. 2).
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The subsequent articles (197 bis, 197 ter, 197 quater), added under the amend-
ment of the 31st of March 2015, are intended to implement the provisions of
Directive 2013/40. Article 197 bis (1) provides for a penalty of six months to two
years’ imprisonment for obtaining or facilitating unauthorised access to the whole or
any part of an information system by any means or method and after infringing
security measures, or for remaining in the information system despite the opposition
of the person, who has the right to prohibit it, (thus exceeding the limits of the
powers conferred on the user). The second Subparagraph of that provision
criminalises the unauthorised interception, by technical means, of non-public trans-
missions of computer data from, or within, an information system, including elec-
tromagnetic emissions. The said act is punishable by imprisonment for a period of
three months to two years or a fine and a sentence of between three and twelve
months.
The issue of the interrelation between the provisions of Art. 197 bis (1) and (2),
and those of Art. 197 are particularly interesting. Unfortunately, the framework of
this study does not allow this issue to be analysed.
The criminalisation of acts relating to hacking tools is provided for in Art. 197 ter.
It prohibits, on pain of imprisonment for a term of between six months and two years
or a fine of between three and eighteen months, unauthorised production, procure-
ment for use, import or making available in any way to third parties, with the
intention of facilitating the commission of any of the offences referred to in Article
197 (1) and (2) or Article 197 bis: a computer program designed or adapted primarily
to commit such offences, or a computer password, access code or similar data
enabling access to all or part of an information system.
Art. 197 quater provides for the aggravation of criminal liability where the acts
referred to in this Chapter of the Code have been committed within the framework of
a criminal organisation or group, a higher level of punishment than is provided in the
Code may be imposed.
Article 198 defines the aggravated type for all offences referred to in Article 197.
The aggravating feature is related to the mens rea component of the offence. This
provision refers to persons who, acting as public officers and taking advantage of
their function, commit an offence, which fulfils the characteristics of any of the
prohibited acts specified in Article 197. Such offender shall be subject to a penalty
appropriate to the offence in its upper half range. In addition, he or she is liable to an
“absolute prohibition” (la inhabilitación absoluta) ordered for a period from six to
twelve years.
The offences against the integrity of computer data and systems have been
identified in Article 264 of the Código Penal, which has been thoroughly modified
by the aforementioned amendment, and in the subsequent articles added as a result of
the amendment. Under Article 264(1), a penalty of six months to three years’
imprisonment shall be imposed on a person who, by any means whatsoever, without
right, erases, damages, deteriorates, alters, deletes or renders inaccessible data,
computer programs or electronic documents belonging to third parties, provided
that the consequences of the act are serious. The aggravated type of this offence is
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provided for in the next Paragraph. According to its contents, the perpetrator is
subject to increased liability if the action:
(1) has been committed within an organised criminal group, or
(2) has caused serious disruption, or has been directed against a significant number
of information systems, or
(3) has jeopardised the provision of essential public services or the essential needs of
the population, or
(4) has affected a critical infrastructure information system or created a serious
threat to the security of a Member State, the EU or an EU Member State, or
(5) has been committed using the measures specified in Article 264 ter (i.e. “hacking
tools”).
The penalty provided for includes imprisonment for a term of between two and
five years and a fine, which may be imposed of up to ten times the equivalent of the
damage caused. However, if the offence has had particularly serious consequences,
an imprisonment sentence higher by one level may be imposed (Article 264(3)).
Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 264 (4), penalties for the acts referred to in that
Article are imposed applying the upper half range if, in committing them, the
offender concerned has used the identity of a third party in order to gain access to
an information system or to win the trust of a third party.
The next Article (Article 264 bis) criminalises attacks involving the unauthorised,
substantial disruption or interruption of the operation of an information system
belonging to a third party through the performance of acts described in the preceding
provisions, the input or transmission of data, destruction, damage, deactivation,
removal or replacement of an information system or mass storage. This offence is
punishable by imprisonment for a term of six months to three years. Nonetheless, if it
has had a significant impact on the activities of the enterprise or on the functioning of
the public administration, the penalty shall be applied within upper half range, and
may be increased by one level.
Article 264 bis (2) stipulates that where the act referred to in Para. 1 has been
committed in the circumstances described in Article 264(2), the perpetrators are
liable to a term of imprisonment of between three and eight years, and to a fine of
between three and ten times the value of the damage caused. Similarly to the
offences under Article 264, penalties for the acts, referred to in the said Article,
are imposed in their upper half range if, in committing them, the offender has used
the identity of a third party in order to gain access to an information system or to win
the trust of a third party (Article 264 bis (3)).
Article 264 ter criminalises acts relating to hacking tools used to commit the
offences referred to in the aforementioned provisions. It has the same wording as
Article 197 ter, as discussed above, so it is not necessary to cite it again.
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The Entities and Institutions in Charge
of Combating Cybercrime in Poland
Jerzy Kosiński
Abstract This chapter presents the relationship between cybersecurity and national
and internal security and identifies the effects of cybercrime and the need to combat
it. The author, pointing to selected main state institutions and authorities, describes
their activities in ensuring cybersecurity and combating cybercrime.
1 Introduction
Cybersecurity is most often understood as the security of globally connected infor-
mation systems (e.g. the Internet infrastructure), telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and industrial control systems. Cybersecurity breaches can
serve the purpose of numerous criminal acts which cause substantial financial and
non-financial losses for organisations, businesses, and individuals. It is hardly
questionable that this problem is also significant in the context of internal security,
and, hence, national security.
In 2003, Dan Verton wrote that the uninterrupted functioning of cyberspace1 in
highly developed countries was fundamental, not only for the proper functioning of
the economy, but also for national security.2 This statement, concerning both
external and internal security, has become even more pertinent with the development
of information and communication technologies.
J. Kosiński (*)
Akademia Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni/Polish Naval Academy in Gdynia, Gdynia, Poland
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1The emergence of cyberspace is connected with the establishing of the political concept of “the
information superhighway” during Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign in 1992, defined as all types
of information containing text, sounds, and images, which could be transferred over large distances,
in a quick and uninhibited manner. However, it is to Vice President Al Gore to whom greater credit
in this field should be attributed, as he continued to promote the development of the information
superhighway later during Clinton’s presidency. It is worth noting that the technical and functional
concepts of the information superhighway derive from the Infostrada concept proposed in the early
1970s by Prof. Andrzej Targowski.
2Verton (2004), p. 76.
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The rapid technological advancement observed in recent years, and in particular
the development of telecommunication technologies and the progressing
computerisation in virtually every sphere of human life, have made information
the most precious resource. Information is the key to success in politics and business,
and in the planning and conducting of military operations. It is no less significant to
note that the uninterrupted flow of, and access to, information is indispensable for the
proper functioning of the economy, administration, and specialised forces of every
country.3
No elements in national power are free from, or independent of, information. The
Army, the Police, the financial system, the economy, transportation, energy,
healthcare, and the media—all these rely on the functioning of communication and
information systems. Information contained and processed in such systems should
be protected, as is done with every material good. Information has become the object
of conflicts, the tools for which include any means adjusted to its collection,
disruption, and protection. Information warfare is aimed at obtaining and using the
kind of information resources which contain classified, confidential, and inaccessible
information. While it is frequently conducted with a view to gaining access to
personal data, it sometimes involves competing businesses and corporations. Infor-
mation warfare also takes place at the national and regional levels.4
The information warfare concept can be approached by analysing its major
elements, i.e. information resources and antagonists, as well as offensive and
defensive operations.5 One of the domains of information warfare includes crimes6
which are usually perpetrated, together with Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and
competitive intelligence, for the purpose of offensive operations, while combating
cybercrime is among the major duties of governments as regards defensive
operations.
What is specific to the threats emerging from the use of ICTs is the absence of
physical contact with the perpetrator. The fact that there is no clearly defined
adversary makes the threats seem blurred, and less real, which triggers an imminent
need to develop and maintain an appropriate security system. The lack of universal
social understanding in this field is also a threat in itself, as it hinders reasonable
efforts leading to the shaping of cybersecurity space in a multidimensional, concur-
rent and substantively consistent manner.7
It is worth noting that constructing an absolutely secure communication and
information system is practically impossible from the technical point of view.
Threats to communication and information systems can involve both technological
and human factors. On the one hand, threats posed by technology, such as hard drive
3The White Book on the National Security of the Republic of Poland, National Security Bureau
(BBN), Warsaw 2013, p. 63.
4Cf. Ciborowski (2001), p. 9.
5More information in Denning (2002), pp. 23–48.
6Denning (2002), p. 59.
7Ciborowski (2001), pp. 178–179.
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failure, are usually foreseeable, and can be properly mitigated (e.g. by doubling the
critical system elements), or a desirable level of security can be ensured through risk
analysis (e.g. by incremental backups). Threats induced by humans, on the other
hand, are much harder to foresee. An attacker might be an outsider in breach of
security, or an insider, i.e. a person from within the organisation whose conduct
gives rise to a threat. Although the media are much more inclined to publicise
information on outsider attacks, various research and analyses have indicated that
insider attacks (i.e. perpetrated by current or former employees, contractors, or other
business partners) are in fact more dangerous and cause more severe losses.8
The Council of the European Union, in its conclusions of 2013 on setting the EU
priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and 2017,9
recognised as one of its priorities combating cybercrime committed by organised
criminal groups and generating large criminal profits, such as online and payment
card fraud, cybercrimes which cause serious harm to their victims, such as online
child sexual exploitation, and cyber attacks which affect critical infrastructure and
information systems in the EU. In 2017, the Council decided to continue the series of
EU policy on serious and organised international crime in 2018–2021.10 Also, it
should be borne in mind that the previously adopted Cybersecurity Strategy of the
European Union11 emphasised the need to increase the operational capability for
combating cybercrime and increasing IT infrastructure’s resilience. Based on the
same document, a comprehensive approach to the cybersecurity problem should
combine three pillars—network and information security, law enforcement, and
defence—which are also governed by various legal frameworks.
The scale of cybercrime also appears alarming, with 378 million victims per year,
which corresponds to 12 people falling victim to cybercriminals every second. In
2017, cybercriminals stole $172 billion from 978 million victims in 20 countries.
Although the average direct loss dropped to USD 142/victim, cybercrime conse-
quences took on average nearly 24 h (which equals 3 full working days) to be
removed. In the United States alone, 143 million consumers have fallen victim to
cybercrime, which accounts for over 50% of the adult U.S. population present
online.12
8Increase in Insider Threat Cases Highlight Significant Risks to Business Networks and Proprietary
Information, http://www.ic3.gov/media/2014/140923.aspx, Survey: More Attacks Coming From
Outsiders, Insider Attacks More Costly, http://www.securityweek.com/survey-more-attacks-
coming-outsiders-insider-attacks-more-costly and Lynch (2006). Accessed on 1 December 2020.
9Council conclusions on setting the EU’s priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime
between 2014 and 2017. Doc 137401/13.
10https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/eu-fight-against-organised-crime-2018-2021/.
Accessed on 1 December 2020.
11Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee,
and the Committee of the Regions, of 7 February 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European
Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, doc. JOIN (2013)1.
12https://us.norton.com/cyber-security-insights-2017. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
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In testifying before the U.S. Congress on 20 March 2009, Edward Amoroso, CSO
of AT&T, estimated that the annual profits made by cybercriminals exceeded $1
trillion (1012), i.e. more than the revenue generated by the entire IT industry, and
corresponding to approximately 7% of the U.S. GDP.13 This value, however, might
have been overestimated, as it was quoted in connection with applying for
financial aid.
Based on the survey conducted by the British Department for Business, Innova-
tion & Skills, in collaboration with PwC, the level of costs incurred by British
entrepreneurs due to cybersecurity breaches has reached billions of pounds per year,
and these costs have tripled since 2012.14 The same survey revealed that 87% of
small enterprises and 93% of large organisations recorded at least one security
breach in 2012. The most severe breaches of cybersecurity cost small enterprises
an average of £50,000, and large enterprises (with more than 250 employees)
approximately £650,000. To get the bigger picture, these costs should be added to
the expenditures on cybersecurity, accounting for approximately 10% of the total IT
costs in enterprises. In 2013, for the above reasons, the British Government launched
a special CISP15 platform, comprising officers of the GCHQ,16 the NCA,17 MI5, UK
CERT, and representatives of business circles (at first from critical infrastructure
sectors—defence, energy, finance, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications), to
defend companies against the growing threat of cyber attacks from China, Russia,
and Iran.
Although most cyber attacks were outsider violations performed by criminals,
hackers, or competitors, internal threats were also reported. 36% of the most severe
security breach cases were caused by unintentional human behaviour, and another
10% resulted from systems’ being deliberately abused by employees.
Khoo Boon Hui, President of Interpol, at the 41st European Regional Confer-
ence,18 quoted an academic study by the London Metropolitan University, which
found “80 per cent of crime committed online is now connected with organised
gangs operating across borders.” He also remarked that “the cost of cybercrime is
larger than the combined cost of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin trafficking. In
Europe, the cost of cybercrime has apparently reached 750 billion Euros a year,
13National Research Council. Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing
Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press, 2010, p. 8, http://www.nap.edu/download.php?record_id¼12997. Accessed on
1 December 2020.
14http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb3fcc90-ab4a-11e2-ac71-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RO-
fLvggZ. Accessed on 1 December 2020.




17The National Crime Agency.
18http://www.interpol.int/content/download/14086/99246/version/1/file/41ER-Khoo-Open-ing-
Speech.pdf. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
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[. . .] with US banks purportedly losing $900 million to bank robbers but $12 billion
to cyber criminals [in 2011].” Perhaps, this was not a landmark finding, considering
that Valerie McNevin, an advisor to the U.S. Treasury International Technical
Assistance Office, estimated earlier (in 2005) that the global revenue from e-crime
had exceeded USD 105 billion in 2004. The proceeds from illegal drug trafficking in
the corresponding period had been lower,19 though better documented. In 2012, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recorded a decrease in “physical crime”,
including bank robbery, which was in contrast to cybercrime, which had been
growing at an alarming rate.20
General Keith Alexander, Director of the U.S. National Security Agency super-
vising the U.S. Cyber Command, warned in July 2012 that illicit cyberspace
activities essentially amounted to “the greatest transfer of wealth in history21”. The
UNODC report of 2010 revealed that the annual revenue of criminals from identity
theft (being the most profitable cybercrime) amounted to $ 1 billion, and from child
pornography to $ 250 million.22 In the 2012 survey by McAfee, it was estimated that
the global cost of cybersecurity amounted to $ 1 trillion.23 Obviously, any such
findings, especially when they concern phenomena which are hard to measure, such
as the cost of cybercrime, should be approached with caution.24 However, even if its
level were 50% lower, it would still be a huge sum. In the 2014 report, McAfee
analysts stated that the Internet generated $2–3 trillion in revenue in the global
economy per year (with a steady upward trend), but that value was, in fact, reduced
by 15–20% due to cybercrime.25
More and more frequently, cybercrime can be treated as a sort of type of “service”
rendered by criminals. In simple terms, there are four categories of “services”
rendered by the Internet’s criminal underworld:
19http://news.techworld.com/security/4881/cybercrime-more-profitable-than-drugs. This finding
has been questioned several times, e.g. http://www.informationweek.com/experts-debate-whether-
cybercrime-profits-surpass-drug-trafficking/d/d-id/1038656?. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
20http://www.wmbfnews.com/story/20972727/robberies-decrease-as-cyber-crime-increases-fbi-
says. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
21http://www.ibtimes.com/americas-top-cyberwarrior-says-cyberattacks-cost-250-billion-year-
722559. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
22The TOCTA 2010 Report, UNODC, pp. 205, 211, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/10.Cybercrime.pdf. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
23http://truth-out.org/news/item/10700-does-cybercrime-really-cost-1-trillion. This value, however,
is often questioned. Further details on the calculation method can be found in a report entitled The
Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage, McAfee 2013, http://www.mcafee.com/sg/
resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
24The cybercrime cost estimation method can be found in D. Florencio, C. Herley, Sex, Lies, and
Cyber-crime Surveys, MSR-TR-2011-75, June 2011, http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/149886/
sexliesandcybercrimesu-rveys.pdf. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
25Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime Economic impact of cybercrime II,
McAfee 2014. http://csis.org/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.
pdf. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
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(1) Research-as-a-Service—some criminal groups specialise in facilitating the sales
of vulnerabilities on the black market, before modifications to mitigate such
vulnerabilities are published by their producers (zero-day vulnerabilities). There
are also people who act as intermediaries in the sales of this specific kind of
intellectual property. Contrary to the other three categories, research as a Service
does not necessarily come from illegal sources.
(2) Crimeware-as-a-Service—this category features the “service” of creating and
developing malicious software which is aimed at exploiting programming errors,
and then using them for specific criminal acts, as well as developing auxiliary
software to foster an attack (downloaders, keyloggers, bots, etc.), tools to
disguise malicious software with some security mechanisms (keypads,
obfuscators, polymorphic malware, etc.), and spam tools. In addition, it can
also include creating hardware to be used for data acquisition (e.g. magnetic card
skimmers) or security breaking devices (e.g. antennae, eavesdropping devices);
(3) Cybercrime Infrastructure-as-a-Service—this involves the situation in which
other cybercriminals can use a set of tools, once developed, against their victims.
An example is renting a computer network for perpetrating an attack, as well as
providing access to an online platform for the purpose of independently config-
uring cybercrime tools, or maintaining a platform facilitating the acquisition or
exchange of tools enabling criminal activity.
(4) Hacking-as-a-Service—this involves the complete outsourcing of an attack. In
this case, the person ordering the service does not need to have any technical
expertise. However, this service can cost more than purchasing tools and
conducting an attack independently. This category also covers such services as
providing information to be used for identity theft, and acquiring credit card data
and website login details.26
Another problem arises from the fact that politicians, law enforcement authorities,
and the judiciary underestimate the scale of computer-crime threats, and its associ-
ations with business. The social costs of cybercrime are frequently neglected, as the
focus is only on the financial impact. In addition, the real extent of cybercrime is hard
to determine, which largely stems from the fact that such crimes are often revealed
accidentally, mainly due to errors made by the perpetrators themselves. Police
statistics usually include only those crimes which have been identified. While the
Police authorities tend to proudly publicise the numbers of detected crimes, they are
reluctant to mention that approximately 70% of these are crimes whose perpetrators
were already known at the time of the crime’s detection27 (e.g. they had been
identified by the victim or the victim’s services).
26Cf. a report entitled Cybercrime Exposed. Cybercrime-as-a-Service, McAfee 2013, p. 3, http://
www.mcafee.com/uk/resources/white-papers/wp-cybercrime-exposed.pdf. Accessed on
1 December 2020.
27This is the author’s own study of computer fraud in Poland (Adamski and Kosiński 2007,
pp. 131–149), but the results in other countries are similar.
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The Republic of Poland has a centralised cyberspace-protection system. The
responsibilities regarding cybersecurity are shared, inter alia, by the Ministry of
Digital Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and Administration, the Ministry of National
Defence, the Ministry of Justice, the Government Centre for Security, the Office of
Electronic Communications, the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection, the
Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Internal
Security Agency, the Police, the Intelligence Service, the Military Counterintelli-
gence Service, and the National Bank of Poland, as well as CERT POLSKA,
forming part of the Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK).
This study, rather than providing a detailed description of the responsibilities
assigned to all these entities, focuses on combating cybercrime, and on briefly
outlining the responsibilities of those entities with whom law enforcement a engage
in close cooperation.
2 The Ministry Competent for Computerisation
Let us begin by outlining and presenting the responsibilities of the ministry compe-
tent for computerisation, as it is a single central public institution, responsible for
both cybersecurity policy and cybersecurity itself. The ministry competent for
computerisation is in charge of the political and strategic coordination of cyberspace
to guarantee Poland’s security. Duties in this field include establishing the minimum
ICT-security requirements in public administration, and defining the minimum
requirements for public records and electronic information exchange, as well as
the minimum requirements for communication and information systems (based on
the Act of 2005 on the Computerisation of the Operations of the Entities Performing
Public Tasks, and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 2012 on National
Interoperability Frameworks). In addition, the ministry of competent for
computerisation has also been entrusted with supervising the Office of Electronic
Communication, to which telecommunications operators report major incidents
regarding telecommunication networks (in compliance with the Act of 2004—
Telecommunications Law). The Ministry also supervises the activities pursued by
the Research and Academic Computer Network, as a research institute, and as a data-
transmission network operator, and the National Cybersecurity Centre (NC Cyber
NASK), established in July 2016 as a major centre in charge of the cybersecurity of
the Republic of Poland. NC Cyber NASK has been separated, in organisational
terms, from the Research and Academic Computer Network’s structure. Some of its
duties have been delegated to other sections of that research institute. Dyżurnet.pl is
one of the NC Cyber NASK divisions, which acts as a point of contact responding to
reports received from Internet users about potentially illegal material (mainly related
to the sexual abuse of children, and child pornography, but also to acts of aggression
for racist, ethnic, religious, and other motives). Another major duty of NC Cyber
NASK is to conduct the ongoing monitoring of network threats such as botnets, and
of the working methods of their owners.
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3 The Internal Security Agency
The Internal Security Agency (ISA) is another public administration authority
dealing with cybersecurity as well as cybercrime. The ISA’s activities relating to
cyber threats focus on coordinating responses to incidents threatening the security of
communication and information systems and networks used by state authorities (the
duty of CERT.GOV.PL), as well as on developing the capabilities of public admin-
istration for protecting ICT resources, and on supervising the early warning system
of threats to public administration networks (ARAKIS-GOV). Another of the ISA’s
activities is to combat cyberterrorism (illegal attacks or threats of attacks on com-
puters, networks, or information systems, resulting from the activities of terrorist
groups or foreign intelligence services).
The ISA is mainly in charge of recognising, preventing, and combating threats to
the country’s internal security and its constitutional order, and in particular to the
sovereignty and international standing, independence, and integrity of its territory,
and defence. The ISA may collect any personal data (including classified informa-
tion), and also so-called sensitive data, where justified by the character of the
implemented tasks. The ISA has the right to use both such data and information
obtained through investigative operations undertaken by authorised bodies, services,
and public institutions, and to process such data and information, in compliance with
the Act on Personal Data Protection, without the knowledge and consent of the data
subjects. If any information or materials obtained through the activities of the bodies,
services, or institutions authorised to perform investigative operations indicate that
the case constituting the subject matter of such activities falls within the scope of the
ISA’s duties, these bodies, services, or institutions shall obligatorily transfer the
obtained information and materials to the Agency. If, however, any information and
materials obtained through the ISA’s activities indicate that the case constituting
their subject matter falls within the scope of duties of other authorities, services, or
institutions, the ISA’s Head shall transfer the obtained information and materials to
the authorised body, service or institution.
On 1 February 2008, the Governmental Computer Security Incident Response
Team (CERT.GOV.PL) was established within the ISA’s structure, to ensure and
develop the capabilities of public administration units regarding protection from
cyber threats, and in particular from attacks on infrastructures comprising informa-
tion systems and networks, the destruction or disruption of which can severely
threaten the lives and health of the country’s population, national heritage, or
environment, or can lead to substantial financial losses, or obstruct the functioning
of public sector entities. In compliance with the CERT.GOV.PL policy, it essentially
acts as a computer security incident response team in the domain of government
administration. The principal duty of CERT.GOV.PL is to carry out operations
related to the security of the information systems of state bodies. This involves
ensuring and developing the capabilities of public administration authorities to
protect themselves from cyber threats, and in particular from attacks on ICT infra-
structure. CERT.GOV.PL mainly deals with cyber incidents in the public sector, and
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its duties include coordinating the response to incidents, and handling and analysing
incidents, as well as coordinating the response to security breaches. In the case of
incidents with a wide spectrum of impacts, CERT.GOV.PL coordinates the mea-
sures taken in connection with a given incident and responds to it, and also
exchanges information with the entities directly affected by the cyber attack. It
also uses the experience gathered from previous incidents, prepares warnings
containing technical information and recommendations for further measures, and
supplies them to government administration units. This process is aimed at
preventing similar attacks on other institutions, or at reducing the likelihood of
their occurrence.
4 The Police
Preparatory proceedings in cybercrime cases are conducted by the Police, and are
governed by the Act on the Police.
In October 2014, the Department for Fighting Cybercrime was established within
the Criminal Office of the National Police Headquarters. Its activities were supported
by the Departments for Fighting Cybercrime operating within individual Provincial
Police Headquarters. Similar departments were also established in the Capital Police
Headquarters in Warsaw, and in the Central Bureau of Investigation. In December
2016, the Department for Fighting Cybercrime operating within the National Police
Headquarters was transformed into the Office for Fighting Cybercrime.
The OFC is primarily in charge of implementing activities related to creating the
conditions for the effective detection of crimes perpetrated with the use of advanced
communication and information technologies. Its duties include, in particular,
supervising, coordinating, and supporting activities undertaken by the Departments
for Fighting Cybercrime operating within individual Provincial Police Headquarters,
and performing investigative operations. These duties are implemented in coopera-
tion with government administration authorities, the courts, public prosecutor’s
offices, public institutions dealing with cybersecurity, and private entities operating
in that field. The following units operate within the Office: the Operations Depart-
ment, the Investigative Department (including the 24/7 Service Division), the
Investigation and Analysis Department, the Support and Research Department,
and the General Affairs Department.28
Notably, the fact that the Office’s activities were limited to investigative opera-
tions was a drawback of the described structure. While undoubtedly these activities
are extremely important in the fight against cybercrime, this rather narrow formula-
tion of the Office’s responsibilities has some serious implications.
28ht tp: / /bip.kgp.pol icja .gov.pl /kgp/struktura-organizacyjn/22759,STRUKTURA-
ORGANIZACYJNA-KOMENDY-GLOWNEJ-POLICJI.html. Accessed on 1 December 2020.
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Ultimately, the Office’s activities frequently result in drawing up a notification of
a crime, which, together with the gathered intelligence, is lodged with the police unit
or public prosecutor’s office with appropriate territorial jurisdiction, with a view to
instituting the relevant preparatory proceedings. At the Police, it is often assigned to
an officer who has a limited knowledge of cybercrime. This significantly affects the
course of the preparatory proceedings at the initial stage, which is when there should
be the collection and securing of evidentiary material, which is then handed over to
the public prosecutor, and, eventually, to the court. The fact that no Police officers
from the criminal investigation division were from the outset expressly delegated to
conducting preparatory proceedings related to cybercrime had a negative impact on
the quality of the handling of cases in this field. Fortunately, this approach was
modified in 2018, and, since then, both the Office and the Departments for Fighting
Cybercrime have conducted (inquiry and investigation) proceedings.
It is worth mentioning that in June 2017 the State Public Prosecutor’s Office,
jointly with the Research and Academic Computer Network, conducted training
aimed at identifying the potential systemic, organisational, and legislative barriers
which were negatively influencing the pace of proceedings in the event of incidents
(cybercrime), thus making it difficult to hold the perpetrators of such acts account-
able. The training was attended by representatives of the State Public Prosecutor’s
Office, the Provincial Public Prosecutor’s Office in Warsaw, the Office for Fighting
Cybercrime operating within the National Police Headquarters, NC Cyber NASK,
and the Research and Academic Computer Network.
As brought to light by the training, the major identified problem which inhibited
incident handling, and thus affected the further course of the preparatory proceed-
ings, was the need to precisely determine the appropriate unit or organisational
section of the Police to be in charge of conducting procedural activities related to
the identified incident. A major finding was also that the officers of the Regional,
District and Municipal Police Headquarters, i.e. those units to which cases are
handed over once proceedings begin, did not have specialised knowledge of
cybercrime, and, in particular, knowledge of the methods and techniques for secur-
ing evidence in this field. Those officers also usually lacked the specialised IT tools
which would let them effectively, and in particular quickly, conduct activities at the
preliminary stage of the preparatory proceedings. Notably, the above-mentioned
police units were also overloaded with other criminal cases which they were
handling at any given time. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the Police
collaborate directly with EUROPOL and INTERPOL, and in cybercrime cases such
cooperation is an absolute necessity.
5 The Public Prosecutor’s Office
It seems that the Prosecutor’s Office is the most important element in combating
cybercrime, as the preparatory proceedings in cybercrime cases are either conducted
or supervised by Public Prosecutors. However, the common organisational units of
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the Prosecution Service generally lack a uniform structure dedicated to fighting
against this type of crime.
The former General Public Prosecutor’s Office, which had operated until June
2016, and was then changed into the State Public Prosecutor’s Office, by way of the
Act of 28 January 2016 on the Law on Public Prosecutor’s Offices,29 had no
organisational structure whatsoever dedicated to fighting cybercrime. Within the
framework of the General Public Prosecutor’s Office, three prosecutors were
appointed to deal with this issue, and in particular with handling international issues
related to this type of crime.
It was only in the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 7 April 2016—the
internal rules of the common organisational units of the Prosecution Service,30 that
the function of the Prosecution Service to combat cybercrime was expressly men-
tioned. In §21(1)(a) of the Regulation, concerning the role of the Economic Crime
Department, the following statement was included: “Supervising and coordinating
preparatory proceedings in cases involving serious crimes perpetrated via the Inter-
net, advanced technologies, and computer systems (cybercrime), conducted by
regional, provincial and district Public Prosecutor’s offices.31” This provision should
be interpreted as a sign of a change in the Prosecution Service authorities’ approach
to the issues of cybercrime.
In the same paragraph, and more specifically in Point 4, the need to engage in
international cooperation in the field of combating cybercrime, and to prosecute its
perpetrators, were recognised, along with the requirement to cooperate with the
Polish representation in EUROJUST, as regards the Prosecution Service’s activities,
and with other international and supranational organisations acting under interna-
tional agreements, ratified by the Republic of Poland, on combating cybercrime.32
Moreover, in § 20(1)(b) of the Regulation, the responsibilities of the Organised
Crime and Corruption Department were formulated, i.e. “supervising and coordi-
nating preparatory proceedings in cases involving crimes perpetrated via the Inter-
net, advanced technologies, and computer systems, with a national or international
reach (organised cybercrime)33”.
In the same paragraph, and more specifically in Point 6, the necessity to engage in
international cooperation in the field of combating organised cybercrime and to
prosecute its perpetrators was also recognised, along with the requirement to coop-
erate with the Polish representation in EUROJUST, as regards the Prosecution
Service’s activities, and with other international and supranational organisations
29Act of 28 January 2016 of the Law on Public Prosecutor’s Offices Consolidated text, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 740, as amended.
30Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 7 April 2016—the internal rules of the common
organisational units of the Prosecution Service Consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of
2017, item 1206.
31The Regulation: The internal rules of the common organisational units of the Prosecution Service.
32The Regulation: The internal rules of the common organisational units of the Prosecution Service.
33The Regulation: The internal rules of the common organisational units of the Prosecution Service.
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acting under international agreements, ratified by the Republic of Poland, on com-
bating organised cybercrime.
In consequence of formulating the above-mentioned brief of the Economic Crime
Department and the Organised Crime and Corruption Department, Chapter 3 of the
Internal rules—“The organisational structure and tasks implemented by regional,
provincial and district Public Prosecutor’s offices”—envisaged the possibility of
establishing new organisational units. In § 27 on regional Public Prosecutor’s
offices, and in § 29 on provincial Public Prosecutor’s offices, the possibility of
establishing organisational units to deal with conducting and supervising cases
involving crimes perpetrated via the Internet, advanced technologies, and computer
systems (cybercrime) was anticipated. As regards regional Public Prosecutor’s
offices, a condition was made that these should be multi-person cases involving
serious crimes.34
Last but not least, the justice system, or the judiciary, should be discussed. Within
the courts, there is no organisational structure dedicated to considering cybercrime
cases. Nor are there any reliable data on the number of judges with cybercrime
expertise, as the Ministry of Justice does not maintain any statistics regarding this
matter.
Although the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution has for several
years organised courses in this field, addressed to judges and judicial assistants, there
are no data which would allow us to determine the number of such professionals’
being trained in cybercrime issues. Data on the courts in which the judges train in,
and, with expertise on cybercrime issues, currently preside, are also non-existent.
These circumstances, in combination with the fact that cases are randomly delegated
to various judges’ sections, lead to the conclusion that both the indictments from,
and findings of, incidental preparatory proceedings, as well as the requests for
temporary detention as regards cybercrime cases, are assigned to individual judges
in a random manner.
While the situation in the judiciary is as such, the Ministry of Justice, as an entity
supervising the courts in administrative terms, has already become aware of how
serious the problem of cybercrime is. Notably, the Ministry of Justice features
central information systems of great significance, not only for the judiciary, such
as the National Criminal Register, but also for economic transactions, such as the
National Court Register, the Electronic Land and Mortgage Register, and the
National Registered Pledge Information Retrieval System. The Ministry of Justice
also acts as the administrator of the information systems used in the courts’ work.
Previously, the responsibilities related to cybercrime prevention and cybersecu-
rity had been implemented by the Computerisation and Court Registers Department,
but in June 2017 they were delegated to the newly established Digital Security and
Protection Office. Along with the underlying duties related to ensuring the protection
of classified information, running the Secret Office, and guaranteeing security, the
Office also undertakes activities aimed at supervising the functioning of the
34The Regulation: The internal rules of the common organisational units of the Prosecution Service.
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cybersecurity protection system at the Ministry of Justice, and its subsidiary units,
which includes detecting and preventing threats to cybersecurity, as well as moni-
toring and analysing the information security status in the Ministry of Justice
cyberspace.35
6 The Ministry of Defence
The Computer Incident Response System (CIRS) of the Ministry of Defence imple-
ments tasks in the field of coordinating the processes of preventing, detecting, and
responding to computer incidents in the communication and information systems
and networks of that Ministry.
The CIRS features a three-level structure which is compliant with NATO’s
recommendations (the CIRS Coordination Centre, the CIRS Support Centre,
which implements tasks consistent with the scope of the responsibilities assigned
to CERTs, and the administrators of the communication and information systems of
the organisational units and some sections of the Ministry).
The principal activities of the CIRS include coordinating responses to computer
incidents, handling and analysing events and incidents, and implementing measures
aimed at increasing awareness regarding communication and information security.
As part of its activities, the CIRS collaborates with the organisational units and
sections of the Ministry of Defence, and with organisations from outside the
Ministry, both domestic and international.
In May 2019, following the merger of the National Cryptologic Centre and the
Information Technology Inspectorate, the establishment of the Cyberspace Defence
Troops was announced. On 1 July 2019, the National Cybersecurity Centre was set
up through the consolidation of scattered units of the Ministry of Defence, in charge
of cybersecurity, cryptography and ICT. The Cyberspace Defence Troops concept
assumes establishing, by 2022, the Polish Command of the Cyberspace Defence
Troops, and their achieving of operational readiness by 2024.
7 Summary
The above review of the bodies and institutions in charge of combating cybercrime
in Poland demonstrates that certain measures to secure cyberspace and to combat
cybercrime are indeed being implemented. Unfortunately, most of these are not
planned and systemic measures, and they rarely display the requisite coordination.
35https://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/ministerstwo/struktura-organizacyjna/biuro-ochrony-i-bezpieczenstwa-
cyfrowego/. Accessed on 1 of December 2020.
The Entities and Institutions in Charge of Combating Cybercrime in Poland 453
They are often limited-range and stop-gap measures forced by necessary modifica-
tions arising from Poland’s international obligations.
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Operational Activities in the Field
of Cybersecurity
Justyna Kurek
Abstract The increase in cybercrime and the importance of cyberspace for the
preparatory stage of crimes led to the redefinition of operational and exploratory
activities. It has become desirable to move away from the concept of targeted
surveillance and towards prevention systems used on a massive scale. This trend is
manifested in using technological achievements like hacking software for legal
purposes. The goal of this article is to define the concept of state-run on-line remote
search of information systems, including the use of breakthrough security software
like spyware, in the context of procedural- and pre-trial guarantees, the presumption
of innocence and protection of privacy. The article attempts to verify the following
research hypothesis: that the creation of new appropriate guarantees (institutional,
substantive and procedural) for the digital environment is required since the existing
safeguards appropriate to the actions in the real world cannot be applied by analogy
in the digital environment without influencing the effectiveness of the measures. The
legal framework for operational activities in the digital world must take into account
the requirement of subsidiarity and necessity of maintaining a balance between
effective criminal law and respect for privacy.
1 Foreword
The twenty-first century is described as the information age.1 The transformation
from machinery-based production to an information-based economy, in which the
intellectual factor2 plays a crucial part, has resulted in the development of the
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information society. The efficiency of the new economy is driven by knowledge.
These processes are accompanied by the continued reduction in the costs related to
the aggregation of knowledge and the services related to the latest technology.3,4 On
entering the information age, some cultural changes have been closely related to the
evolution and development of communications. A transformation has been evident
from the traditional mass media like TV and radio, predominant in the twentieth
century,5 to horizontal communication networks based on the Internet and wireless
communication.6 Computer networks, open-source software (including Internet
protocols), the rapid development of digital connections, and data transmission
with telecommunications networks resulted, at the beginning of the 1990s, in the
expansion of the Internet and its use for private purposes. At the same time, a
revolution started involving communications and the dynamic development of
wireless communication.7 The Internet and Internet-based technologies also con-
tributed to a revolution in the understanding of traditional legal terms and
institutions. T. Hoeren defined these changes as law deconstruction,
depersonalisation, distortion, and de-territorialisation.8
All these technological developments, and the related social changes, resulted in
the establishment of the information society,9 based on permanent access to infor-
mation, which is essential for both businesses and private lives.10 The establishing of
the new social structure was connected with, and resulted from, the massive success
of the Internet, and its growing influence, in particular its non-commercial resources.
It facilitated the conceptualisation of real phenomena in the digital world.11
2 The Information Society and the Challenges Related
to Security
Digitisation processes resulted not only in changes to the economy and private lives,
but also to the functioning of criminal groups and types of crime. The increase in
cyber threats has had an impact on public expectations regarding the security
measures provided by the state and the authorities. Concerns caused by external
threats (inter alia, terrorism, the spread of organised crime, and cybercrime) have
resulted in rising expectations towards the state regarding security, which also
3Picot and Neuburger (2004), p. 6.
4Wang (2010), p. 6 et seq.
5Broad analyses of mass media—cf. Kocot (2004), p. 13 et seq.; Polański (2007); Polański (2006),
p. 241 et seq.; Kuliński (2010); Janowski (2008); Konieczny (2005).
6Castells (2010), p. 9.
7Castells (2010), p. 16.
8Hoeren (2008), p. 2615.
9Mickel and Bergmann (2005).
10Picot and Neuburger (2004), p. 1; Yukins (2004), p. 667 et seq.
11Mik (1999), p. 63.
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include, in addition to traditional military actions and non-military activities, pro-
tection against crime and violence.12 With reference to changes taking place in the
information society, redefining the objects regarding the protection of public security
in the context of individuals’ rights appears crucial. As rightly noted by
K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz and M. Nowikowska, “constitutional rights provide
grounds for any restrictions, as well as for activities performed by public adminis-
tration authorities, and for the use of certain tools by public authorities13”. Expec-
tations towards the state as a guarantor of security have also led to social acceptance
of the infringement of individuals’ fundamental rights if such actions serve the
purpose of achieving the objective, which is protecting the security of the public.14
The growth in cybercrime, and the increased significance of cyberspace’s pro-
viding a preparatory stage for criminal activities, has enforced the redefinition of the
operational activities and practices performed by the police and the special services,
including in the field of broader prevention.15 Consequently, departures from
targeted surveillance were accepted, and replaced with prevention measures used
on a massive scale.16 This trend is being demonstrated with the use of the latest
technological developments by the police and the special services, including spy-
ware. Seizing and securing data carriers or computing equipment is not sufficient for
the purpose of the efficient collection and securing of evidence in cyberspace.
Law-enforcement authorities taking action in an overt manner would thwart the
effects of these operational activities. Moreover, the transferred content is usually
encrypted, and the supply of services in the cloud results in the transfer of informa-
tional resources outside the physical devices of suspected or accused persons.
Efficient operational activities require covert performance, obtaining access, or
extracting data remotely, as well as security breaches and hacking to obtain access
to encrypted data. To cope with a variety of tasks related to combating crime, the
state must employ hackers, and engage in some justifiable activities in terms of legal
defence, avoiding the illegality of acts meeting the criteria for hacking. Possible
inevitable side-effects of such operational activities, in particular preventive mea-
sures taken on a massive scale, often involve interference with the private lives of
third parties not engaged in criminal activities. Securing evidence and operational
activities can also result in the disclosure of legally protected data and information—
providing the foundation for a fair trial—inter alia, interfering with the professional
secrecy of defence counsels.
Actually, it is difficult to imagine activities in cyberspace, in particular those
involving crime combating and prevention, without close cooperation with the
12Zalewski (2013), p. 6.
13Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz and Nowikowska (2020).
14Kurek (2016), p. 163.
15Adamski (2015), p. 2.
16Working Document 1 on the US and EU Surveillance programmes and their impact on EU
citizens fundamental rights. European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs, Rapporteur: Claude Moraes, 11.12.2013 (DT/2012434Pl.doc), p. 2.
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private sector, and the use of its infrastructure. It was perfectly expressed by a
German philosopher E.-W. Böckenförde, who commented that “a pillar of a dem-
ocratic and secular state includes values which the state by itself is not able to
guarantee. This is a risky undertaking which the state performs in the name of
freedom”.17 Therefore, the system which efficiently provides cybersecurity must
include not only state bodies responsible for crime prevention and combating
through cybersecurity, but also the network of private businesses supplying services
related to the monitoring and identification of potentially dangerous incidents.18
Numerous regulations impose certain obligations regarding the reporting of inci-
dents, inter alia, the Polish law on the national cybersecurity system. Cooperation
with the private sector will ensure the supply of information regarding vulnerabilities
and incidents. The digital environment provided and controlled by telecommunica-
tions operators and Internet-service providers collects transmission data and digital
footprints, which are indispensable for the performance of operational activities.
3 Technological Aspects of Covert Operations
The transparent and widely available methods for the collection and acquisition of
information from the private sector are not enough. Accordingly, to face challenges
related to cybersecurity, the state and its local authorities must also develop certain
covert tools which facilitate the gathering of data without the active engagement of
the private sector. However, the operational scope of such tools must not be random,
and their use should only be justified in view of existential threats. The development
of related software can present a significant challenge. It is certain that it cannot be
standard software widely available on the market. Moreover, it is necessary to
answer some questions regarding the scope of the cooperation established between
the law-enforcement authorities and the private sector during the development of
such tools. Can the state use ready-made commercial solutions? Or is the develop-
ment of customised solutions designed for public entities absolutely necessary?
Notably, even in the case of solutions dedicated for law enforcement authorities,
their use poses a risk of unauthorised access to the software and difficulties regarding
the protection of source codes. Probably, the development of such tools by a
specialised department of law-enforcement authorities would provide a safe, but
also costly, solution.19 When analysing these issues, can the key question be
answered regarding codes for this software, i.e. can they be handled by the private
sector? Can such source codes be made available to the private sector by public
17Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren
kann. Das ist das große Wagnis, das er, um der Freiheit willen, eingegangen ist W: Buchholtz
(2016), s. 910 after Böckenförde (1976), p. 60.
18Cf. Kurek (2019), p. 152.
19Kurek (2016), p. 161.
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entities for the purpose of setup and upgrade or further development in the context of
security?
4 Redefining State Activities—New Tools for Crime
Prevention—Spyware in the Service of Security
Due to encryption and cryptographic protection, actions taken by law-enforcement
authorities are not limited to acquiring data from telecommunications operators and
Internet service providers. Data can be acquired unilaterally, with bypass mecha-
nisms and security breaches using malware, e.g. spyware, trojans, sniffers and
keyloggers, i.e. applications which record keystrokes.20 Such software is installed
remotely, without the user’s consent, to provide information on his or her computer
system.21 This raises the question not of the deployment of such investigation
methods, but of the required logistics and IT-related protection for such operations.
During covert operations, the relevant body should act with due diligence to
minimise immissions and safeguard the use of information in forms essential for
operational activities. Any information obtained from the system not directly
connected with the object of the investigation should be immediately deleted.
Moreover, the performance of such activities exposes some gaps and vulnerabilities
in the system. The infected system can be more vulnerable to external attacks due to
the operation of spyware. In this case, certain solutions adopted by Germany should
be considered which oblige the body performing operational activities to provide
additional protection for the resources under surveillance. On the completion of
operational activities, any security gaps and vulnerabilities should be remedied.22
The performance of covert operations raises additional questions regarding the
right to information in the case of operations performed by the investigating author-
ities which do not result in the detection of crimes. Should the user of resources be
advised accordingly about this surveillance, and his or her security system’s being
hacked, when there are no charges brought? Considering the analysis regarding
potential threats to information resources, the key is the precise documentation of
spyware software operation by the body performing the operational activities. For
example, the German BKAG law introduced an obligation to log activities. The
report must include information regarding the types of technical measures and the
times of use thereof; data enabling the identification of the system and any
implemented changes; and data enabling the identification of the acquired
information.
Another crucial issue is securing the right to privacy. For example, German
regulations, in line with recommendations by the BVerfG
20Kurek (2016), p. 161.
21Cf. Kurek (2013), p. 66 et seq., and references included therein.
22A detailed analysis of German solutions in Kurek (2020), s. 225–240.
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(Bundesverfassungsgericht—the highest German Court), established the principle of
a two-level privacy-protection test.23 First, the employment of any remote-intrusion
solution is forbidden when it would only ensure access to information on private
lives. Second, the authority responsible for the performance of operational activities
should provide conclusive verification that the acquired data do not only relate to
private lives, and if they do, any such data should be deleted immediately.24 These
solutions are in line with recommendations laid down in European Community
strategy and European case law. For example, the European Data Protection Super-
visors, on the grounds of case law in the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights, defined four essential guarantees which should be
implemented within national legal systems to minimise interference with private
lives to the degree required, and in the scope accepted, in a democratic society, in
cases of employed intrusive means of supervision—i.e. (1) processing must be based
on transparent, clear, and precise rules; (2) necessity and proportionality must be
substantiated with regard to legitimate purposes; (3) an independent supervisory
mechanism should be provided; and (4) effective remedies should be available.25
5 Conflicts of Interest Regarding Data Protected by Law
As highlighted by the BVerfG, “State security is essential for public order and peace,
and the concomitant respect for human dignity and self-esteem must be guaranteed
to ensure public security, as provided by the Constitution’s provisions, and are
treated equally with other constitutional rights26”. The protection of public order
and national security also contribute to the protection of the rights and freedoms of
other people.27 Security should therefore be perceived as a provision contributing to
freedom.28 The deployment of spyware in the course of performing operational
activities can include not only the surveillance of current and potential criminals,
but also of innocent persons.29 Due to the high intrusiveness of such tools and
interference with fundamental rights, including the protection of privacy, and the
confidentiality of information and trade secrets, legal and public acceptance for such
23Kutscha (2012), p. 392.
24Roggan (2009), p. 262.
25Working Document 1/2016 of 13.04.2016 (16/EN/WP/237) on the justification of interferences
with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection through surveillance measures when
transferring personal data—EuropeanEssentialGuarantees.
26Point 100 of BVerfG ruling in cases No. BVR 966/09 and 1 BvR 1140/09.
27Point 53—ECJ ruling of 15 February 2016 in case No. C-601/15.
28Buchholtz (2016), p. 909.
29Also in Adamski (2015), p. 2.
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activities requires the establishing of institutional, substantive, and procedural
rules.30
An axiological basis for legal regulations concerning covert operations performed
by investigating authorities using spyware is provided, inter alia, by case law in
German courts. The ruling of BVerfG of 20 April 2016 regarding cases No. 1 BvR
966/09 and 1 BvR 1140/0931 indicated that the special services’ rights whose scope
interferes with private lives shall be limited to security matters and the enhancement
of essential legitimate interests, i.e. it should be exercised exclusively in cases of
serious crimes, and for the protection of life, health, freedom, and national security.
The criterion fulfilling this unique condition is the safeguarding of values funda-
mental to the common interest.32 So, the BVerfG sustained the previous case-law
line, for example, in the ruling of 27 February 2008 regarding case No. 1 BvR
370/07, when, examining the right to use online surveillance, it cited the relevance
and proportionality rules, and stated that the deployment of surveillance measures
highly interfering with private lives might follow only if the method in question was
one which could prevent a hazard posed to legally protected rights. Therefore, online
surveillance must relate to unique means whose use shall be justified in cases of
utmost importance. The German Supreme Court also alluded to the proportionality
rule. The BGH’s ruling of 31 January 2007 regarding case No. StB 18/0633 indicated
clearly that these means could be employed only if a serious crime is suspected, and
thus their use should be subjected to very restricted formal procedures.
The ruling of 20 April 2016 regarding cases No. 1 BvR 966/09 and 1 BvR 1140/
09 BVerfG also highlighted the protection of the private lives of persons who, by
accident, were within the range of operational measures. The Court cited the issue of
third parties not being targeted by the special services, but who are accompanying a
suspect (a targeted person). Such persons may be closest persons, family members,
friends in close relationships with the suspect, or criminal, whose correspondence,
due to its nature (e.g. defence counsels, lawyers) shall be under protection.
6 Summary
In the light of the changes in society, redefining the law enforcement authorities’
activities involving the prevention and combating of serious crime seems to be
inevitable. Ensuring adequate protection is now impossible without engaging the
30Cf. Kurek (2018).
31BVerfG ruling of 20 April 2016 in case No. 1 BvR 966/09 i 1 BvR 1140/09, <https://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/04/rs20160420_1bvr096609.
html>, accessed 1.10.2020 r.
32Rössel (2016), p. 149.
33BGH ruling of 31 January 2007 in case No. StB 18/06,<http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/
rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht¼bgh&Art¼pm&Datum¼2007&Sort¼3&nr¼38779&
linked¼bes&Blank¼1&file¼dokument.pdf, accessed on 1.10.2020.
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private sector or interfering with business and human rights. The functioning of the
state under such conditions, and the activities conducted by its authorities to combat
crime, require the employment of technology related to surveillance and technolog-
ical advancements, also including the use of operational measures enabling surveil-
lance on a large-scale. The efficient prevention and combating of crime in the digital
environment includes the use of spyware tools. This should be based on the
assumption that protection cannot be ensured at an adequate level without monitor-
ing private computer resources, and includes the surveillance of current and potential
criminals, as well as innocent people.34 Due to the high intrusiveness of such tools
and interference with the fundamental rights, including the protection of privacy, the
confidentiality of information and trade secrets, the legal and public acceptance of
such activities requires the establishing of institutional, substantive, and procedural
rules.35
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Operational Activities and the Right
to Privacy
Katarzyna Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
Abstract The confidentiality of the services and the lack of external control may
lead to excessive autonomy or subjectification of the very purpose of operational
activity and failure to exercise due restraint in encroaching on civil rights and
liberties. Sometimes, such a situation may result from excessive ideological or
political considerations in the operations of the executive authorities. In other
words, the secrecy of operational control may lead to abuse. An additional aspect
is the development of electronic communication facilities and the related
cybercrime. The development of cyberspace requires control activities to be under-
taken also in this area. The experience of modern democratic states indicates that the
executive power responsible for public security and order, including its subordinate
entities conducting operational and reconnaissance activities, has at its disposal
resources which, in the name of defending public order, may lead to the destruction
of democratic institutions and reduction of civil rights, including privacy rights.
The confidentiality of the services and the lack of external control may lead to
excessive autonomy or subjectification of the very purpose of operational activity
and failure to exercise due restraint in encroaching on civil rights and freedoms.
Sometimes, such a situation may result from excessive ideological or political
considerations in the operations of the executive authorities. In other words, the
secrecy of operational control may lead to abuse. An additional aspect is the
development of electronic communication facilities and the related cybercrime.
The development of cyberspace requires control activities to be undertaken also in
this area. Public security, considered as a fundamental in principle justifying the
limitation of civil rights by the legislator, requires respecting the proportionality of
acceptable encroachment in the name of safeguarding the safety and smooth func-
tioning of the control system, while maintaining this proportionality in practice.
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Otherwise, the safety protection measures in the form of legally acceptable opera-
tional activities might in themselves present a risk to rights and liberties. Such will be
the situation if, first, the introduced limitations prove arbitrary and disproportionate
to the potential threats and, second, if they are removed (legally or effectively) from
the control of democratic institutions. The conflict over the limits on applying
operational and technical activities is familiar in any democratic country respecting
the rule of law or, in practice, in international bodies in which, under Article 8 of the
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,1 uni-
versal standards have been developed. These standards are to benefit the assessment
of proportions between public authorities’ interference and individual rights in this
domain. The experience of modern democratic countries shows that executive
authorities responsible for public order and safety, including their subsidiary bodies
responsible for operational and exploratory activities, deploy measures whose
utilisation—in the name of public safety protection—can lead to the deterioration
of democratic institutions and a reduction in civil liberties, including the right to
privacy.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal, in its judgment of 19 February 2002,2
expressed its opinion on the nature of the right to privacy. The Tribunal claimed
that a vital component of the right to privacy is the so-called informational autonomy
of the individual, which implies the autonomous right to disclose one’s personal
information, as well as the right to exercising control over such information which is
held by other entities. The right to privacy is guaranteed by Article 47 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the informational autonomy of the
individual is guaranteed primarily by Article 51. Under Article 51(1), no one may
be compelled, except when based on an Act, to disclose information concerning
himself or herself. Article 51(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
establishes that everyone is entitled to have such information which is incorrect,
incomplete, and collected in a way which is contrary to the law, to be corrected or
removed. Furthermore, it is required for the principles and procedures of collecting
and accessing information to be specified by an Act (Article 51(4) of the Constitution
of the Republic of Poland). In the Court’s view, lege non distinguente, this last
provision shall also be applied to the collecting and sharing of information by private
entities. This line was also followed by P. Winczorek, “The right to privacy declared
in the provision is protected, not only in relations between individuals and the public
authorities, but also with other individuals and public and private institutions
(vertical and horizontal application of law)”.3
However, in view of the growing number of terrorist attacks, particularly with the
use of new technologies, the boundaries of interference with the right of privacy are
1The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed
in Rome on 4 November 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Convention.
2The judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 19 February 2002, file No. 3/01, Polish
Journal of Laws of 2002, No. 19, item 197.
3Winczorek (2010), p. 114.
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greatly widening. In the Court’s view, as expressed in the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights of 12 January 2016, No. 37138/14 (The right to privacy,
home, and correspondence), exercising covert control by bodies with executive
power is a natural consequence of the forms terrorism takes. The government’s
use of the latest technologies with the purpose of staying ahead of such attacks,
including the mass monitoring of communications which could contain clues
concerning pending incidents, might constitute the only reasonable solution. The
techniques used in such monitoring operations have seen significant progress in
recent years. These techniques have reached a degree of sophistication hardly
imaginable to the average citizen, especially taking into consideration the techno-
logical facilitation and prevalence of automated and system-based data collection.
Due to this progress, the Court had to examine the question of whether the devel-
opment of control methods resulting in the immensity of collected data is paralleled
by a simultaneous development in the legal provisions protecting the observance of
citizens’ rights as envisaged in the Convention. These data often contain further
information on the conditions in which essential components intercepted by public
authorities have emerged, involving components such as the time and place, as well
as the equipment used to produce computer files, digital photographs, electronic and
text messages, and the like. Indeed, the aim of the government’s efforts, whose target
is to limit terrorism and thereby to restore citizens’ confidence in the government’s
ability to maintain public safety, would be undermined if a terrorist threat was
paradoxically replaced by a visible threat triggered by the unhindered authority of
executive power to intervene in the sphere of the private lives of citizens using
uncontrollable, and at the same time far-reaching, control techniques and preroga-
tives. Potential interference with electronic correspondence, including mobile phone
and Internet services, as well as covert mass control, attract the Convention-based
protection of private life to an even larger extent. Such interference might be justified
only under Article 8(2) of the Convention, if it is in accordance with the law, pursues
one or more legally justified goals as indicated in Article 8(2), and is crucial in a
democratic society to achieve any of these goals. The provision, as it allows an
exception to the right provided by the Convention, must be interpreted narrowly.
Powers to covertly control citizens, which are a feature of a Police State, are tolerated
exclusively under the Convention only to the extent that they are strictly necessary
for the protection of democratic institutions. The Court has concluded that the aim of
the said interference is the protection of public safety, and/or the safeguarding of
order and crime prevention, in line with Article 8(2) of the Convention.
In accordance with the view of the European Court of Human Rights regarding
the privacy of the individual protected under Article 8 of the Convention, it is
potentially permissible for the authority (legislative, executive, judicial) to interfere
in this privacy as long as it meets certain criteria. Any such encroachment must,
nonetheless, pass the three-tier evaluation test. This means that it is not permissible
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to implement restrictions (on privacy) with legal provisions of ranks other than an
Act.4
In the cases against France (cases Kruslin v France, 11801/85 and Huvig v
France, 11105/84 of 24 April 1990), it was pointed out that the Convention required
from the national legislature that an applicable act define the category of persons for
which such operational control could be used on the basis of a court order; the type
of crime such an order could be issued against; the maximum control period; the
reporting procedure concerning the content of recorded conversations (the case was
about telephone tapping); measures providing the transfer of intact recordings and
enabling their full control by the judge and the defence; and defining the cases in
which the recordings may or must be destroyed, especially when the investigation
was discontinued or the convicted person was acquitted by the judge. French
legislation was declared as not meeting the criteria, similarly to the national legis-
lation in the case of Malone v the United Kingdom (8691/79) in the judgment of
2 August 1984 (the cases concerned the collection of information and telephone
tapping). It was recognised that the local acts were too vague and non-specific,
which led to a situation in which, although the activities were statutory, they were
also not in line with the Convention. It is not sufficient to refer to the factor of
purposefulness. It appears vital to prove the necessity, strictly, of the specific
(concerning the range and manner) limitation established by an ordinary Act.
Therefore, collecting information in the course of operational control must be dealt
with in legislation and, additionally, in the Police practice, as a subsidiary procedure
in the intervention aim (as a safeguard to the public interest), mentioned in Article
8 of the Convention, including national security, public safety, the economic welfare
of the country, crime prevention and the protection of order; the safeguarding of
health and morality; and the freedom of other individuals. A similar provision was
introduced into the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 31(3) of the
Constitution specifies that the restrictions on the exercise of fundamental constitu-
tional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by law, and only when necessary in
a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, or for the
protection of the natural environment, health, or public morals, or the freedom or
rights of other persons. These limitations, however, cannot violate the essence of
freedoms and rights.
In each case, it is necessary to demonstrate a plausible need for taking such
limitation measures, and solely in the name of protecting the very rules of democratic
order. A situation in which, by “incidentally” collecting operationally useful data,
operational control gathers private data, which go beyond the aim of the control,
means that the authority is operating beyond the scope of permissible intervention in
the private domain.
4Even made as a provision, it is still too general, blanket and vague in character, taking into
consideration the fact that it is an eligibility law which serves as a source of the application of
objectives to measures—in such a case, the premise of a sufficient statutory basis is not met.
468 K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
The European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged, however, that the
covert control of individuals is “necessary in today’s reality in a democratic society
for national security and in order to safeguard order and prevent crime”, whereby it
recognised that the fact of “the failure to inform about observation” does not violate
the Convention (see the reasoning of the judgment of 6 September 1978 in the case
of Klass and others v Germany (5029/71)), as well as D. Gajdus, B. Gronowska,
Stosowanie podsłuchu telefonicznego w ocenie Europejskiej Komisji i
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka (Refleksje na tle rozwiązań polskich),
“Palestra” No. 11/1994, pp. 115 and 116). Although the judgment in the case of
Klass and others v Germany was in favour of the German legislature, the law was
amended after the judgment had been passed in Strasbourg. As a result of the
amendment, there was an increase in the protection standards by imposing an
obligation to inform ex-post the person against whom such operational activities
were being conducted, under Article G-10, that such a control was being carried out
against him or her (Article 5(5)).5
In its judgment of 4 May 2000 (Rotaru v Romania, 28341/95) the European Court
of Human Rights established that systems of covert invigilation must contain
legislative (procedural) guarantees applicable to the control of actions by the appro-
priate departments. According to that Court, the investigative procedures must
correspond to the values of a democratic society as closely as possible, and must
in particular correspond to the rule of law. According to the ruling, the interference
of an executive authority with the rights of individuals should be subject to effective
control. The control should be carried out by external bodies in respect of the
appropriate authorities carrying out operational actions. It is highly desirable
that—in normal circumstances—it be done by judicial bodies. A judicial review
guarantees independence, impartiality, and the application of the correct procedures.
The Court considers that non-judicial control, exercised by other external bodies
against the controlled person, with a properly representative composition, does not
prejudice the standards of the Convention. An alternative to subjecting operational
and exploratory activities to judicial control might be subjecting activities to the
control of a special body whose location and composition ensure independence from
the executive authority. Only then will the objectivity of the results of the control be
guaranteed. It should be noted that, in the justification of the judgment by the
European Court of Human Rights in the aforementioned case of Klass and others
v Germany, it was deemed appropriate to exclude judicial control in cases in which
telephone tapping was used. The ruling was delivered against a different regulation
in which the function of control over tapping was entrusted to an official “with
5It should be pointed out that, for instance, the German anti-terrorist legislation of 1968 (Act of
13 August 1968 limiting the secrecy of correspondence and telephone conversations, commonly
referred to as Act G-10) successfully passed the test of correctness and conformity with “the
objective necessary in a democratic society” (the case was about wiretapping in connection with
a suspicion of terrorism, which were to remain a secret for the interested parties), as well as the
proportionality of the used limitation and the provision of adequate appeal and control measures
(albeit these were not judicial measures, but control by a specially created representative body).
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qualifications for a judicial office” with the concurrent guarantee of stable parlia-
mentary control, exercised by a three-member commission, as well as a five-member
Board of the Union Parliament. In the judgment of 27 April 2004, in the case of
Doerga v the Netherlands (50210/99), the European Court of Human Rights stressed
that any intervention in subjective rights guaranteed by the Convention must be in
accordance with the rule of law. This, in turn, requires the foremost compliance of
operational activity with the requirements of the national law. According to the
Court’s case law, intervention in private life and correspondence include not only the
individual means of covert control aimed at particular entities but also the strategic
monitoring of connections and obtaining the personal data of communicating enti-
ties. The question was considered in the case of Weber and Saravia v Germany, in
which German provisions regulating the strategic monitoring of telecommunication
connections, whose aim was to record the telephone conversations of an unspecified
number of callers, and then identify, using key-word information included in the
conversations, which could potentially identify the offenders or their criminal plans,
were challenged (the case of Weber and Saravia, Application No. 54934/00).
Collecting and storing data connected with an entity by the state services,
irrespective of the means by which they were collected (the citied case of Rotaru v
Romania, Application No. 28341/95), also constitute an encroachment into the
private sphere of an entity. In order to assume that there was an intervention in the
law guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, it is enough to determine whether
there was a collection of data on entities, regardless of how it would be used in the
future. Nevertheless, the possibility of covertly obtaining information about persons
by public authorities was not ruled out. The Court pointed to their indispensability as
a tool enabling effective security guarantees, as well as the protection of a demo-
cratic state’s institutions against sophisticated forms of threats, notably espionage
and terrorism.
The standards of collecting and processing data by competent authorities are
defined by judgments in the cases of Zakharov v Russia, Application No. 47413/06,
and Szabó and Vissy v Hungary, Application No. 37138/14. The applicant, Roman
Zakharov, used the services of several mobile network operators, and on
23 December 2003 filed a lawsuit against three phone operators, claiming that
they had committed an infringement of his rights to the privacy of telephone
communication. He further claimed that, according to Regulation No. 70 of the
Ministry of Communication, the mobile network operators had installed a device
which enabled the Federal Security Service to intercept phone calls without the prior
authorisation of a judicial authority. Regulation No. 70, which has never been
published, excessively limited his right to privacy. Roman Zakharov requested the
Court to issue a warrant under Regulation No. 70, ordering the installed device to be
removed, and to make telephone communication available only to authorised per-
sons. The provisions of Russian law regulating the interception of communication
transmission do not take into consideration any adequate and effective guarantees
against the risk of such malpractice, which is integral to every system of invigilation,
and which is particularly high in a system in which secret services and the Police
have direct access, via technical means, to all telephone communication. In
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particular, the circumstances in which public authorities are authorised to use secret
surveillance measures are not expressed in sufficiently precise terms. The provisions
regulating the discontinuation of using secret surveillance measures do not provide
sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interferences. National laws allow the auto-
matic interception of suspect data; in addition, it is not clearly specified in which
cases the intercepted material should be stored or destroyed at the end of the test.
The procedures for authorisation cannot guarantee that secret surveillance mea-
sures will be used only in situations in which they are “necessary in a democratic
society”. Nowadays, control over intercepted communication does not fulfil the
requirements of independence, nor that which pertains to the entrusted authority
and power which would be sufficient for effective and constant control. The effec-
tiveness of appeal mechanisms is weakened because the person whose communica-
tion is being intercepted is not informed of the fact, and, furthermore, because of the
lack of effective access to the documentation pertaining to the interception. Provid-
ing executive authorities with unlimited decision-making powers in the matters of
national security would be contrary to the rule of law. The law must mark with
sufficient clarity the limits of every decision-making freedom conferred on any
competent authority, as well as the means by which it is exercised, keeping in
mind the legal aim of the measures, so as to provide the entities with adequate
protection against arbitrary interference. What is required is prior judicial authori-
sation, providing an essential safeguard against arbitrariness.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the Hungarian
Act on the Police infringed the right to privacy. Following the amendments intro-
duced in 2011, the Act now enables special anti-terrorist units to carry out covert
house searches, to tap phones, to open packages and letters, and to perform the
uncontrolled viewing and recording of electronic mail. The Court consistently holds
that the rules on the special powers of the secret services should provide for strong
control of their actions, and for informing citizens of the fact that they are under
surveillance. In the case of Szabo and Vissy v Hungary, the Court ruled that the
contested regulations could apply to any person staying on the territory of the
country and to any property located there, and people have no way of verifying
whether they are being surveilled or not. The introduction of special powers for the
services to fight terrorism is, according to the Court, justified; however, Hungary
should, at the same time, guarantee sufficient protection of its citizens’ rights. The
legal provisions should indicate that tapping and intercepting communication is
allowed only in the case of persons for whom there is a reason to suppose that
they are participating in terrorist activities. The undertaken measures should be
subject to external, preferably judicial, control, also that conducted ex-post. The
Court has also been critical towards the fact that the Hungarian regulations do not
take into consideration the deletion of stored personal data which have proven
useless, or any clear indication of whether it is possible to extend several times the
use of privacy-infringing control measures. This should be achieved by external
control, and by providing the people with an effective tool enabling them to assert
their rights. The first step, though insufficient, is stating whether a person is being
subjected to a special inspection.
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It should be stressed that nations are equipped with what has been referred by the
Court as the margin of appreciation; in other words, a degree of freedom to balance
the rights of individuals against national security (vide 5 Leander v Sweden, 9248/
81, § 59, 26 March 1987). As early as in the 1970’s, the Court observed that
legislation allowing the covert monitoring of the mail and telecommunication in a
democratic country was necessary in exceptional circumstances, in the interests of
national security, and/or in order to prevent hostile actions or crime. More recently,
the Court has found that the invigilation of terrorist suspects using GPS does not
infringe their right to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (Lass and
others v Germany, 5029/71, 6 September 1978, Series A, No. 28, § 48, as well as
Uzun v Germany, 35623/05, § 80, the European Court of Human Rights, 2010
(fragments)). The Court ruled that sufficient safeguards had been used in providing
protection against the arbitrary use of such methods. On the other hand, the powers
conferred on the Police by special anti-terrorist legislation, to detain and search any
person on no sufficiently defined basis for suspicion of violation, are deemed as
infringing the applicant’s rights to the respect of his or her private life.6
So far, there has been no single Act in Poland which would thoroughly regulate
the question of the detection, prevention, and elimination of terrorist threats, or the
issue of removing the effects of such attacks. Basic regulations to this effect have
been included in the following Acts:
(1) The Act of 6 June 1997—Penal Code, which, inter alia, contains a definition of a
terrorist crime (Article 115 § 20), and penalises the founding and leadership of,
and involvement in, an organised group or association whose aim is to commit a
terrorist crime (Article 258 § 2 and 4), the financing of a terrorist crime (Article
165a), as well as distributing or publicly presenting content which can facilitate
the perpetration of a terrorist crime (Article 255a);
(2) The Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management, which determines the author-
ities responsible for cases of crisis management, as well as their tasks, and the
principles of action in the field, as well as defines, inter alia, the concept of a
terrorist incident;
(3) The Act of 1 March 2018 on Preventing Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism,7 which determines the principles and manner of preventing the
financing of terrorism.
The basic aim of the new regulations is to raise the effectiveness of the Polish
anti-terrorist system, thus increasing the safety of all Polish citizens through facili-
tating effective actions in cases of suspected terrorist crimes, including setting up
preliminary procedures. The issue of responding to terrorist threats has also been
recognised in regulations concerning emergencies. In addition, the issues related to
6Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom, 4158/05, § 87, the European Court of Human Rights,
2010 (fragments).
7Act of 1 March 2018 on Preventing Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, consol-
idated text, consolidated text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 971.
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the tasks and authorisations of services and institutions with regard to terrorist threats
are contained in competence acts regulating their action (e.g. the Act of 6 April 1990
on the Police, the Act of 12 October 1990 on Border Guards,8 and the Act of 24 May
2002 on the Internal Security Agency and on the Intelligence Service9), as well as
other legal acts covering selected aspects pertaining to a particular type of threat
(such as the Act of 4 September 2008 on the Protection of Maritime Traffic and Sea
Ports, and the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Protection of the State Border). In order
to strengthen the state’s preparations to the emergency of terrorist threats, it is crucial
to integrate activities implemented by particular members of the multi-party anti-
terrorist system in Poland. Of key importance in the effective functioning of an anti-
terrorist system in Poland is providing the optimal coordination of actions and
mechanisms of cooperation on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For
this purpose, the Act of 10 June 2016 on Anti-Terrorism was adopted. According to
the definition contained in this Act, these are activities of public administration
authorities whose aim is to prevent terrorist actions, to prepare for taking control of
them through planned actions, to react in the event of such actions, and to remove
their effects, including by restoring the resources targeted at reacting to them (Article
2(1)). Article 25 of the Act provides for a special mode of preliminary proceedings in
case there is a suspicion of an attempt at committing a crime or making preparations
for a terrorist crime, with the aim of detecting or detaining, or compulsory appear-
ance of, any person suspected, and also in order to find items which could constitute
evidence in the case, or which could be confiscated in the criminal proceedings. This
mode refers, inter alia, to the possibility that the prosecutor issues a provision to
search any premises identified in the provision, or to detain a suspect, should there be
justified reasons to assume that the suspect or the listed items might be present in the
area. In order to find objects which can be considered evidence in a case, or be
subject to seizure in criminal proceedings, the Article also provides for the possibil-
ity to search persons present on the premises, their clothing and objects they have on
them. The above-mentioned actions may be carried out at any time of day or night.
The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment on Sher and others v the
United Kingdom (No. 5201/11), ruled that, in the case of proceedings relating to
terrorist crimes, there is justification for allowing such a search or detention to be
performed based on conditions considered more broadly than in other cases. In
particular, as pointed out by the Court, there is no violation of the European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if the search is performed
on the conditions indicated above, and in a situation in which there is a right of
appeal against the above-mentioned activities. Under Article 23 of the Act on Anti-
Terrorist Activities, and amendments to other Acts, with regard to the scope not
regulated herein, Article 236 of the Act of 6 June 1997 of the Code of Criminal
8Act of 12 October 1990 on Border Guards, consolidated text, Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item
305, as amended.
9Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal Security Agency and on the Intelligence Service, consolidated
text Polish Journal of Laws of 2020, item 27, as amended.
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Proceedings10 shall apply, in accordance with which any persons whose rights have
been violated are entitled to lodge a complaint. Furthermore, it has been pointed out
in Article 26 of the Anti-Terrorist Act, relating to the situation in which there is a
suspicion of committing a terrorist crime, that if it is in the best interests of
preparatory proceedings, an order for the bringing of charges may be drawn up on
the basis of information obtained as a result of operational and exploratory activities,
including the activities referred to in Article 9 of the Act, i.e. laid down by the Head
of the Internal Security Agency against a non-citizen of Poland, in whose case there
exists a justified suspicion of terrorist activities, for a period not exceeding 3 months,
and covert operational and exploratory activities. In order to detect, prevent or fight
crime, the Head of the Internal Security Agency may order against a non-Polish
citizen in whose case there exists a justified suspicion of terrorist activities, for a
period not exceeding 3 months, covert activities including:
(1) obtaining and recording the content of conversations using technical means,
including telecommunication networks
(2) obtaining and recording the images and sounds of persons from rooms, public
transport, or places other than public places
(3) obtaining and recording correspondence content, including correspondence via
means of electronic communication
(4) obtaining and recording data recorded on digital-data media, communications
terminal equipment, information, and information and communication systems
(5) obtaining access to and control of the content of consignments.
Moreover, in this case, the Court, at the request of the Prosecutor, may order a
provisional detention for a period not exceeding 14 days. An autonomous indication
for the implementation of a provisional detention is the likelihood of committing, or
preparations to commit, a terrorist crime. Under Article 6 of the Act, the Head of the
Internal Security Agency, complying with the requirements concerning classified-
information protection, keeps an updated list containing information on persons
undertaking activities intended for the purpose of terrorist organisations or organi-
sations connected with terrorist activities, or members of such organisations; wanted
persons conducting terrorist activities or persons suspected of committing terrorist
crimes, against whom in Poland there is an order of arrest or search, or against whom
there is an arrest warrant, as well as those wanted on the basis of a European arrest
warrant; persons against whom there is a justified suspicion that they might carry out
actions whose aim is to commit a terrorist crime, including persons posing a threat to
the safety of Polish civil aviation; or persons taking part in terrorist training, or
travelling with the aim of committing a terrorist crime. Additionally, under Article
10 of the Act, within the framework of the entitlement to collect palmprint image
data, to copy facial images, and to collect DNA material, the officers of the Internal
Security Agency, the Police and the Border Guard are entitled to collect palmprint
10Act of 6 June 1997 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, consolidated text, Polish Journal of
Laws of 2020, item 30, as amended hereinafter referred to as the CCP.
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images, to capture facial images and to collect biological material in a non-intrusive
way in order to determine the DNA profile of a non-Polish citizen, in cases where:
(1) there is a justified doubt concerning the person’s identity, or (2) there is a justified
suspicion that the person has illegally crossed the border of Poland, or doubt about
the declared purpose of that person’s stay on Polish territory, or (3) there is a
suspicion concerning the intention of that person’s unlawful presence on Polish
territory, or (4) there is a justified suspicion that the person might be in some way
involved in terrorist activity, or (5) the person might have taken part in terrorist
training. Under Article 26 of the Anti-Terrorist Act, should there arise a suspicion of
a terrorist crime, for the sake of preparatory proceedings, the decision to present
charges may be drawn up on the basis of information obtained in the course of
operational and exploratory activities. It is worth adding that, in accordance with
Article 60 of the Act which establishes a registration obligation in the case of
pre-paid services, the subscribers to pre-paid services who signed a contract prior
to the date of the entry of the regulation into force, have been duly summoned to
supply the pre-paid services provider with the data specified in the Act of 16 July
2004—Telecommunications Law (Article 60b—the obligation to supply personal
data by the subscriber). In accordance with the Act, subscribers (excluding those
who use publicly available phone services provided using public phones, or by
dialling the network access number to the service provider’s network, or pre-paid
services subscribers whose aim is to broadcast or distribute TV programmes through
ground, cable or satellite), should supply the provider with the following data:
(1) for subscribers who are natural persons:
(a) name and surname
(b) personal identification number (PESEL), if assigned, the series and number
of a document confirming the person’s identity, and, in the case of a
foreigner not being a citizen of a Member State or the Swiss Confedera-
tion—the passport number or residence permit;
(2) for subscribers who are not natural persons:
(a) name
(b) the business registry number (REGON) or the tax identification number
(NIP), or the National Court Register (KRS) number, or the Business
Register Number, or a number affixed in any other register.
The service provider begins to provide telecommunication services:
(1) not earlier than the conformity of the data provided by the subscriber is con-
firmed against the data included in the document stating the subscriber’s identity
as a natural person, included in a specific register, or after the subscriber pro-
vides his or her personal data, and these are confirmed electronically using
electronic identification means serving to authenticate, in the IT system of the
national bank, the data verified using a qualified certificate of an electronic
signature, or electronic identification means serving authentication purposes in
the IT system of the telecommunication service provider, if the subscriber’s
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personal data have already been verified in connection with a different contract,
and electronic identification means serving authentication purposes in the IT
system which meets the requirements specified in the regulations issued on the
basis of Article 20a(3) of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the Computerisation of
the Operations of Entities Performing Public Tasks.
Confirmation may also be made by the service provider through a third party
operating on behalf of that service provider. A pre-paid service provider of a public
telecommunication network shall immediately cease to provide such services to
subscribers who fail to deliver such data, or whose data have not been confirmed.
Similar solutions regarding interference in the right to privacy have been introduced
in Article 180a of the Telecommunications Law, which regulates the issue of data
retention. Both the public telecommunication network operator and the publicly
available telecommunications service provider are obliged, at their own cost, to:
retain and store data relating to the network termination point, telecommunica-
tions terminal equipment, the end user: initiating the connection, and to whom the
connection is addressed; as well as determining:
(a) the date and time of the connection, and its duration
(b) the type of the connection
(c) the location of the telecommunications terminal equipment generated in the
telecommunications network, or processed by them within the Polish territory,
for the period of 12 months counting from the day of the connection or the failed
connection, and to destroy the data after the end of this period, with the
exception of information which has been saved in accordance with separate
provisions, and to share data concerning the entity initiating the connection, as
well as the one to whom the connection is addressed with the competent
authorities, the Court, and the Prosecutor, on the terms and conditions, and in
the mode, as specified in separate provisions. These authorities include the
Police. Under Article 20c of the Act on the Police [Obtaining and processing
telecommunication, postal and Internet data], in order to detect or prevent crime,
including fiscal crimes, or in order to save human life or health, or to support
search-and-rescue actions, the Police may obtain data which do not constitute a
telecommunications transmission, a transported postal item, or an electronic
service (“telecommunications, postal or Internet data”), and may process the
same without the persons concerned being informed and/or having given their
consent to it.
The Chief Police Commander, the Head of the Central Bureau of Investigation,
the Head of the Police Internal Affairs Office, and the Regional Police Commander
maintain registers of telecommunications, postal or Internet data requests. These
requests contain information identifying the Police unit and the Police officer
obtaining such data, their type, the purpose for which they are being obtained, and
the time at which they are being obtained. These registers are electronic, without
prejudice to the rules of protecting classified information. The data are also collected
from, and shared with, law-enforcement authorities of the European Union, and
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other countries, European Union agencies engaged in crime prevention and combat,
and the International Crime Police Organisation—Interpol, on their due request, if
this is aimed at detecting crime and prosecuting perpetrators, protecting human lives
and health, or searching for missing persons. Under Article 20a, control over
telecommunication, postal or Internet data collection by the Police is exercised by
the Regional Court appropriate for the Police unit to which the data are made
available. The Police authority, with the provision on the protection of classified
information, submits to the Regional Court, on a half-yearly basis, a report covering
(1) the number of cases in which telecommunications, postal or Internet data were
obtained in a given reporting period, as well as the type of requested data;
(2) the legal classification of the actions with regard to which there were requests for
obtaining telecommunications, postal or Internet data, or information concerning
such acquisition of data in order to save human life or health, or in order to
support search and rescue operations.
As part of the control, the Regional Court might need to view the materials which
justify sharing such telecommunications, postal or Internet data with the Police. The
Regional Court then informs the Police authorities of the outcome of the control
within 30 days of its completion. As a consequence, the ex-post system of opera-
tional and exploratory control allows the establishing of whether such an interven-
tion in private life was purposeful, proportionate, and necessary.
Social changes which are the result of civilisational developments stimulate the
democratic processes and constitute a space in which various business, economic,
organisational, and socially desirable aims can be achieved, but they also tend to be
the reason for regressive actions. This applies to virtually every sphere of human
activity, and it applies to human rights and basic freedoms in particular. The risk of
such dangers for an individual grows in proportion to the process of weakening the
country as a structure and an institution. As a consequence, an individual citizen
loses his or her sense of security. This feeling is related to the new situations in which
an individual, a citizen, exists. Globalisation, the crisis of the institution of the state
as a regulator, doubts connected with the territory, information exchange, the
intermingling of cultures, the identity crisis, the world economic crisis, and terrorism
with its new sources, all create a new space in which rights and basic freedoms
require special public attention, and the redefinition of aims for choosing the proper
protection measures. An additional aspect of these changes is the question of
safeguarding public safety which, also for the above-mentioned reasons, requires
redefinition. The protection of public safety is one of the most crucial aims of the
state’s actions and, consequently, those of public authorities and the entire public
administration. Thus, it is worth stressing that public security is composed of various
elements, such as personal and individual safety.
While wielding its attributes of power, the state uses various legal instruments
and institutions whose aim is to protect the public interest, morals, and national
security. A situation in which the state is weakened, like no other, poses a direct risk
to public security and, as a consequence, to individual safety. For this reason, it has
become vital to determine the status of the individual against the state, within the
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framework of public authority directed at the protection of the individual by ensuring
public safety. Undoubtedly, operational and exploratory control is such a measure. If
one analyses the status of such a control guarantee, it becomes vital to supplement its
scope with an assessment of the citizens’ responsibilities and limitations connected
with public safety, including such spheres of individual functioning as are related to
a citizen’s privacy and identity—though always in accordance with the principle of
Christian Wolff, the continuator of Pufendorf’s thinking that homo persona moralis
est quaternus spectatur tanquam subiectum certarum obligationum atque iurium
certarum.11
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Summary
Katarzyna Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz
An area that has been partially regulated by law, and one that has special prominence in
law systems, is cybersecurity. Cybersecurity needs to be considered as an interdisci-
plinary concept that draws on multiple fields, including various domains of law. But in
order to distinguish it from the legal and administrative system as a whole (in relation
to the latter especially in organisational and objective terms), and to categorise it and
identify regulatory areas, it is necessary to define the scope of activity that this sphere
involves (in subjective, objective, functional and organisational terms). Only then will
it be possible to systematise the issue of the legal protection of cyberspace.
When addressing issues related to cybersecurity, in addition to the analysis of
systemic solutions, it is important to consider the following questions: What is
cyberspace, generally speaking, and how are we responsible for any actions within
it? and What legal regulations have so far been adopted within national and inter-
national law? How are these enforced and is it correct for these to be based on
the regulations concerning reality? What is cybercrime? What are the powers of the
organisations responsible for fighting cyber crime?, and, by extension, What are the
rights and responsibilities of actors operating in cyberspace, and also Are network
users responsible for their online actions? Are they responsible jointly and severally
with service providers? And also, How should we balance individual interests,
including the right to privacy, and the public interest, which involves actions related
to defining responsibility for online actions. The backdrop for these problems are
such issues as current strategic and regulatory policies for cyberspace, and the related
security challenges and legal regulations to ensure a secure cyberspace.
Ensuring cybersecurity in the EU requires a new policy for prosecuting and
penalising individuals and organisations found guilty of breaching communication
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and information systems. The introduction of new, more effective, solutions, includ-
ing a review of Directive 2013/40/EU of 12 August 2013 on attacks against
information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA,
and also the provisions of the EU’s new Cybersecurity Strategy, should be accom-
panied by a serious discussion on how to strengthen law enforcement authorities at
the EU and national levels.
Relevant data shows the need to take action. In 2018, the CERT Polska team
received 19,439 security reports and recorded 3739 security incidents, which corre-
sponds to an increase in incident number by 17.5% compared to 2017. In 2019
CERT Polska (CSIRT NASK) recorded 6484 such incidents. This means a massive
increase in incidents—by 73% compared to 2018. In the first half of 2020 CSIRT
NASK received as many as 16,689 reports, of which 5205 were considered inci-
dents, so the number of incidents in 2020 could be twice as that in 2019. The data
presented in CSIRT ABW reports are also alarming. In 2018 CSIRT ABW received
31,865 reports, of which 6236 were considered incidents, and in 2019 there were
226,914 reports, of which 12,405 were considered incidents.
The proposal for the new directive, known as NIS 2, is the product of a review of
the currently applicable NIS Directive and is to be part of a broader package
including also separate regulations for financial institutions (Regulation on Digital
Operational Resilience for the financial Sector, or DORA) and the Resilience of
Critical Entities Directive.
It seems that the legislation currently in force is producing certain divergences
between individual Member States in relation to the regulated matter. And one of the
by-products of this is the lack of restriction instruments to enforce this law against
the regulated entities, which significantly undermines cybersecurity. The decision to
adopt the new directive seems to be the right thing to do. The new directive will be a
minimum harmonisation one, which allows Member States to take further steps to
introduce solutions for a higher level of cybersecurity (see Article 3). The proposal
provides for the establishment of a Cooperation Group (Article 12) and CSIRTs
network (Article 13), and the European Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network
(EU – CyCLONe) to support the management of large-scale cyberincidents and
crises (Article 14). This is crucial due to the extra-territorial nature of these. In the
context of 5G network construction, but not only, it is important to introduce
provisions on coordinated supply chain risk assessments (Article 19 and
Section 47 of the Preamble) and certification schemes (Article 21). Important
elements of the directive are also standardisation (Article 22) and information-
sharing (Article 26). Without a doubt these areas will affect market activities.
While the Commission will decide which categories of key entities (and this status
can be held by public entities and private entities which perform public tasks or their
own tasks) will be required to obtain certification, the new obligations under NIS
2 will require the involvement of various entities in areas that have not been covered
by such regulations. However, certification should apply to device manufacturers
rather than entities providing services based on such devices. Political considerations
concerning the provenance of the entities selling such devices on the market should
not affect the operations of electronic communication services providers. If the
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certification obligation is imposed on manufacturers, service providers and network
operators will not have to recall the equipment, which can be costly, and manufac-
turers will need to ensure appropriate manufacturing conditions. With the
digitisation and computerisation of the economy, cybersecurity is becoming crucial
for more and more fields. And this generates new responsibilities for a new group of
entities—important entities. Not everyone will be happy about this, but these
regulations are not about market-oriented reforms. The public interest does not
always go hand in hand with individual or economic interests.
Whatever their size, businesses providing electronic communication services will
need to comply with NIS2 regulations. The directive also provides for heavy fines
for entities that fail to appropriately meet their obligations. Maximum fines are to be
up to EUR 10,000,000 or 2% of the business’ total annual global revenue, whichever
is higher. These fines can be particularly painful for smaller businesses which are
only entering the cybersecurity system. Perhaps some graduation of fines would be
useful here. In order to answer the question about whether this new directive meets
market requirements, it is necessary to remember what was the primary goal behind
these provisions. And this goal was extensive cooperation between different sectors
to ensure cybersecurity. Cybersecurity-oriented actions of Member States and their
public authorities, taken within the common and uniform telecommunications mar-
ket, need to be supported by all its actors. This is also required from telecommuni-
cations businesses and all other entities whose operations could or do affect
cybersecurity. Without such cooperation and coordination there can be no safe and
secure cyberspace.
What is problematic about these solutions for the telecommunications market is
that the amended Directive can possibly create collisions with the provisions of other
regulations, such as Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communica-
tions Code, which also addresses the security of electronic communications net-
works and services, and, in practice, those requirements have been in place for many
years. However, it is also important to note that requirements imposed by telecom
regulations are one thing, and requirements related to the establishment of a uniform
cybersecurity system with the national administration system are another. But it is
worth emphasising that new cybersecurity objectives can cause an increase in
business costs among the relevant entities, which can be a valid reason to increase
the prices for end users.
Irrespective of the above-mentioned concerns, the new directive can contribute to
increased resilience to cyberattacks, provided that it is successfully implemented by
Member States. Nevertheless, the key factors to ensure security in cyberspace are
risk awareness and education. Man is at the centre of cybersecurity.
Personnel training and acquiring the necessary cybersecurity skills are long-term
processes, and this needs to be taken into consideration when designing and
implementing any cybersecurity mechanisms and requirements. Member States
need to become actively involved, also by allocating sufficient funds for this purpose
in their budgets, in building professional education about, and training in,
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cybersecurity, while closely cooperating with businesses to ensure that the system
provides a sufficient number of job candidates with in-demand skills.
Despite all disappointments, failures and tragic mistakes, people will build a
better world. If they were not to act with that thought, we would lose all faith in
humanity and its potential, in which case it would be better not to live at all my
friends.
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